California Court of Appeal Jan 7, 2026 No. E083907Unpublished
Filed 1/7/26 P. v. McIntire CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083907
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF2201733)
ANGEL MARTINE McINTIRE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Francisco Navarro,
Judge. Affirmed.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Paige B. Hazard and Steve
Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
A jury convicted Angel Martine McIntire of the voluntary manslaughter of his
pregnant girlfriend. On appeal, he contends that there is insufficient evidence to support
the conviction and that the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of prior
acts of domestic violence and by sentencing him to the upper term. We affirm.
When a trial court rules on the admissibility of evidence of prior acts of domestic
violence, “the trial court’s determination should be guided by such factors as the ‘nature,
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relevance, and possible remoteness’ of the evidence, ‘the degree of certainty of its
commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from
their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on
the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and
the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting
some but not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though
inflammatory details surrounding the offense.’” (People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th
881, 900; People v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 630.)
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Ana’s testimony
about the prior domestic violence, McIntire assumes that all of Ana’s testimony was
admitted as prior bad acts evidence under Evidence Code sections 1109 and 352,
including the testimony that McIntire “told her if she dated anyone else, he would kill
them, and dump their bodies at the Indian reservation.” The record does not support that
characterization. The court stated that it was admitting Ana’s testimony about the violent
incident in April 2020 under Evidence Code sections 1109 and 352. McIntire’s
statements about killing anyone else Ana dated and how he would dispose of a dead body
were not made during the April 2020 incident. That testimony therefore was not
admitted pursuant to the court’s in limine ruling. Defense counsel did not object to the
admission of that testimony, so any objection has been forfeited. (Evid. Code, § 353.)
We accordingly only analyze whether the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence
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Code sections 1109 and 352 by admitting the evidence concerning the April 2020
domestic violence incident.
There is nothing arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd about the court’s ruling
that the evidence of the April 2020 incident was admissible to prove McIntire’s
propensity to act violently toward and threaten his romantic partners. The probative
value of the evidence was high. The evidence that McIntire acted violently toward Ana
and warned that she should fear him tended to show that McIntire had a propensity to act
violently toward his romantic partners. It corroborated the evidence that McIntire had
acted violently toward Perez and threatened her. His violence against Ana—pushing her
but not leaving any marks—was similar to his violence against Perez. Perez told her
sister and her ex-boyfriend’s mother that McIntire had pushed her, and she explained to
her sister that McIntire pushed her a lot and abused her in ways that tended not to leave
marks. In addition, the April 2020 incident involving Ana was very recent, having taken
place just a few months before the July 2020 domestic violence incident involving Perez
and less than one year before she disappeared.
Given the evidence’s high probative value, “we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion when it concluded that the danger of undue prejudice did not
substantially outweigh the probative value of the testimony.” (People v. Daveggio and
Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 826.) The details of the prior conduct were far less
inflammatory than the evidence of the charged offenses or other incidents of domestic
violence involving Perez. McIntire’s violence against Ana did not cause any physical
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injuries. The evidence of the uncharged conduct involving Ana therefore was not likely
to evoke any more emotional bias against McIntire than the evidence of the charged
offenses. And the risk that the jury might punish McIntire for the uncharged act of
violence against Ana was minimal.
McIntire argues that the evidence was “extremely prejudicial” and must have “had
an impact on the jury” because the jury asked to have Ana’s testimony read back. But the
jury’s request to have the testimony read back shows only that the jury was interested in
the testimony. It does not follow that the testimony biased or inflamed the jury. Rather,
the jury may have been interested in the testimony because of its probative value, i.e., its
tendency to prove McIntire’s guilt. That is not the type of prejudice that Evidence Code
“‘section 352 [was] designed to avoid.’” (Barrett, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 954.)
Moreover, the jury’s request for readback of Ana’s testimony may have been motivated
by interest in the testimony about McIntire’s threat to kill anyone Ana dated and his
claims about disposing of the body if he ever killed someone. Again, no objection to that
testimony has been preserved.
Finally, McIntire also contends that “[t]he admission of the incident involving Ana
only served to reinforce in the jurors[’] mind[s] that if [McIntire] acted in a certain
manner on a previous occasion, he must have done so on this occasion, thereby lessening
the prosecution’s burden of proof.” McIntire does not provide any legal analysis or cite
any authority to support the argument, so it is forfeited. (People v. Smith (2003) 30
Cal.4th 581, 616, fn. 8.) It also fails on the merits. “Evidence Code section 1109 does
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not lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof, because a properly instructed jury will be
told the defendant is presumed innocent and the prosecution must prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the jury to convict.” (People v. Johnson (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 410, 420.) McIntire’s jury was so instructed.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting evidence of the prior domestic violence against Ana.
III. The upper term
Voluntary manslaughter is punishable by a term of three, six, or 11 years. (§ 193,
subd. (a).) McIntire contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by sentencing him to
the upper term on the basis of “improper and unauthorized aggravating circumstances.”
(Capitalization omitted.) We disagree.
A. Relevant proceedings
During trial, defense counsel asked the court to take judicial notice that in January
2021 McIntire pled guilty to a violation of section 273.5 based on the July 2020 domestic
violence incident with Perez. The court denied the request.
The probation department recommended that the court sentence McIntire to the
upper term of 11 years if the court found any aggravating circumstances true. The
probation report stated that McIntire had the following prior convictions: (1) a 2017
misdemeanor violation of section 25850, subdivision (c)(7); (2) convictions in January
2020 for a felony violation of section 29815 and a misdemeanor violation of section
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21810; and (3) convictions in January 2021 for a felony violation of section 273.5,
subdivision (a), and a misdemeanor violation of section 273.6, subdivision (a).
The information alleged that McIntire was ineligible for probation under section
1203.075 subdivision (a)(1), because McIntire personally inflicted great bodily injury
during the commission of the charged offenses within the meaning of section 12022.7.1
McIntire waived a jury determination on the issue. At sentencing, the court found that
McIntire was ineligible for probation under that provision because he had inflicted great
bodily injury on Perez. The court also expressly found that even if the probation
limitation in section 1203.075 did not apply, probation was still inappropriate.
The court imposed the upper term of 11 years in light of the aggravating factor of
McIntire’s prior convictions. The court had reviewed and considered the probation
report, and the court described each of McIntire’s convictions. The court noted that it
was permitted “to consider any certified prior convictions” and that McIntire had
“admitted these prior convictions” in that he “testified—admitted [the prior convictions]
when he testified.” With respect to the convictions, the court also commented: “These
are all local cases. The Court has reviewed its own records, find that you had these prior
convictions, and again, they were serious in nature.”
1 Section 1203.075, subdivision (a), provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, nor shall a finding bringing the defendant within this section be stricken pursuant to Section 1385 for, any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury, as defined in Section 12022.7, on the person of another in the commission or attempted commission of” certain enumerated offenses not including manslaughter.
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After the court imposed the sentence, defense counsel remarked: “Just a final
matter, Number 1, I think the Court stated that Mr. McIntire testified, and I just wanted to
make sure that we corrected that. He did not testify. I understand that the Court can still
use his priors in an aggravated sentence, but I want to make sure that correction was
reflected.” The court acknowledged that defense counsel was correct that McIntire did
not testify, and the court clarified that it meant that “there were no issues during the trial
regarding the priors” in that there had been numerous discussions about the prior
convictions being admitted, including at the request of defense counsel. The court
explained: “It was always understood that those convictions were, in fact, in place, and
that’s what I meant, that he was not disputing and had admitted that those prior
convictions had occurred.” Defense counsel did not object to those statements.
B. Analysis
Section 1170 imposes limits on a trial judge’s discretion in choosing between the
low, middle, and upper terms of a sentencing triad. (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th
730, 748; § 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(2).) Notwithstanding those limitations, “the court may
consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified
record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(3); Lynch, at p. 748.)
McIntire first contends that when the trial court imposed the upper term, the court
improperly relied on the aggravating circumstances of the great bodily injury finding and
the probation limitation. The record does not support the contention. The trial court did
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not rely on either of those findings as aggravating factors that supported imposition of the
upper term. The court repeatedly stated that the only aggravating factor that it considered
in determining whether to impose the upper term was McIntire’s prior convictions. The
court relied on the great bodily injury finding only in determining that McIntire was
ineligible for probation under section 1203.075. Because the record demonstrates that the
trial court did not rely on either the great bodily injury finding or the probation limitation
as aggravating factors to support imposition of the upper term, we reject McIntire’s
argument.2
McIntire next argues that the trial court improperly relied on the prior convictions
without certified records of conviction. The People contend that McIntire forfeited the
argument, and we agree. “A party in a criminal action forfeits appeal of the superior
court’s discretionary sentencing choices if the party had a meaningful opportunity to
object in the superior court yet did not, unless the sentence is legally unauthorized.”
(People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1222 (Sarmiento-Zuniga).)
That “‘rule applies when the trial court “clearly apprise[s]” the parties “of the sentence
2 In his reply brief, McIntire argues that even if the trial court relied on the great bodily injury finding only in denying McIntire probation, the separate finding of great bodily injury was inappropriate and unauthorized because great bodily injury enhancements do not apply to murder and manslaughter. (See People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 935 [great bodily injury enhancements under § 12022.7, subd. (g), “simply do not apply to murder or manslaughter”].) The argument is forfeited because McIntire raises it for the first time in his reply brief and has not shown good cause for failing to raise it sooner. (People v. Newton (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005.) Moreover, McIntire cannot demonstrate prejudice from the claimed error, because the trial court expressly found that probation would be inappropriate even without the great bodily injury finding.
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the court intends to impose and the reasons that support any discretionary choices”
[citation], and gives the parties a chance to seek “clarification or change” [citation] by
objecting to errors in the sentence. The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek
such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the . . . court
describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court
thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing.’” (Ibid.)
That is what happened here. The trial court apprised McIntire that it was imposing
the upper term based on the aggravating factor of his prior convictions, each of which the
court specifically described. The court stated that it had reviewed the probation report
and the court’s own records to verify those convictions. At no point during the
sentencing hearing did McIntire object to the court’s reliance on the prior convictions
because the court did not have certified records of those convictions. Instead, when
McIntire’s attorney corrected the trial court’s statement that McIntire had testified about
the convictions, defense counsel affirmatively stated that the court could nevertheless
“still use his priors in an aggravated sentence.” As Sarmiento-Zuniga explained in
analyzing the same issue, had McIntire objected to the court’s reliance on the prior
convictions without certified records of conviction, the issue “‘could have been readily
resolved.’” (Sarmiento-Zuniga, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1222.) Given the lack of
objection, the argument on appeal is forfeited. (Ibid.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
FIELDS J.
29
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter, holding that sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the conclusion that the victim had died and that the defendant was responsible for her death, despite the absence of a body or biological evidence.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter conviction when the victim's body was never found.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence.
Whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to the upper term.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The victim’s body does not have to be found in order for the evidence to be sufficient to support a homicide conviction.”
“There is overwhelming evidence that Perez died. She abruptly disappeared and left behind her infant daughter, whom she loved dearly.”
“The jury could reasonably infer that McIntire killed Perez on the morning of December 5, 2020.”