California Court of Appeal Dec 31, 2025 No. E086148Unpublished
Filed 12/31/25 P. v. Boyer CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E086148
v. (Super.Ct.No. PARS2500381)
WILLIAM BRIAN BOYER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Laurie Burns, Judge.
Affirmed.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A court found that defendant and appellant William Brian Boyer violated the terms
and conditions of his parole and sentenced him to 180 days in jail.
1
Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738,1 setting forth a statement of the facts,
a statement of the case, and identifying two potentially arguable issues: (1) whether the
court erred in denying defendant’s motion that the People had not established that his
parole violations occurred within Riverside County; and (2) whether the court adequately
considered and rejected intermediate or remedial sanctions for appropriate reasons and
sufficiently explained those reasons on the record.
We offered defendant the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which
he has not done. We affirm.
1 In People v. Freeman (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 126, the court held that Wende and Anders procedures do not apply to “an order revoking and reinstating [post release community supervision.]” (Id. at p. 133.) In People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), the California Supreme Court subsequently held that Wende and Anders procedures do not apply in appeals from the denial of a Penal Code section 1172.6 postjudgment petition. (Delgadillo, at pp. 224-226.) Regardless of whether Wende and Anders procedures apply to orders revoking a defendant’s parole, we exercise our discretion to independently review the record here for error. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 230 [“if the appellate court wishes, it may also exercise its discretion to conduct its own independent review of the record in the interest of justice”]; People v. Pittman (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1254, fn. 1 [exercising discretion to independently review postconviction order]; People v. Griffin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 329, 335-336 [“we find the interests of justice call for an independent review of the record as an additional layer of protection from the risk of a defendant remaining unlawfully incarcerated because of a failure to discover a meritorious issue in his or her appeal”].) Here, appellate counsel’s filing of a Wende brief may have misled defendant into believing that regardless of whether he filed a supplemental brief, this court would independently review the case.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 6, 2016, defendant was convicted of indecent exposure. (Pen. Code,
§ 314, subd. (1).)2 On February 2, 2017, defendant was again convicted of indecent
exposure. (§ 314, subd. (1)). As a result of his convictions, defendant was required to
register as a sex offender. (§ 290, subd. (c).) Defendant is considered a high-risk sex
offender.
On July 31, 2023, defendant was convicted of battery by gassing a peace officer.
(§ 243.9, subd. (a).) The court sentenced defendant to two years in prison.
On October 5, 2024, defendant was released to parole supervision; however, due
to mental health issues, defendant was remanded to the Department of State Hospitals
(DSH). On December 12, 2025, defendant was conditionally released from DSH and
picked up by parole agents at the Chino Institute for Men.
On February 12, 2025, defendant signed special conditions for parole, which
included a requirement that he “participate in continuous electronic monitoring.”
Another condition required that he “report to your parole agent on the first working day
following your release.”
On March 12, 2025, defendant was arrested for absconding parole supervision.
The court revoked his parole and sentenced him to 180 days in jail.3 Defendant was
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 One declaration reflects that the court sentenced defendant to 90 days in jail, while another reflects the court sentenced him to 180 days in jail.
3
released on March 24, 2025, after serving 12 days. Defendant was instructed to report to
parole on the first working day following his release. He failed to do so.
On March 26, 2025, a parole agent requested, and the court issued, a no bail
warrant for defendant’s arrest. Officers arrested defendant on the warrant on April 11,
2025.
On April 16, 2025, personnel from the Riverside parole unit filed a petition for
revocation of defendant’s parole. The parole agent reported that, “All remedial sanctions
. . . have been considered however, they are not appropriate at this time. . . .” Defendant
denied he violated his parole.
At the hearing on May 16, 2025, a parole agent testified that defendant was
assigned to his caseload. On February 12, 2025, the parole agent went over the
conditions of parole with defendant. One of defendant’s parole terms required that he
wear a GPS monitor. They affixed a GPS monitor to defendant.
Another term required that defendant report to his parole agent the first working
day following his release. Yet another required that he not violate any law. Defendant
was required by law to register as a sex offender. Defendant indicated he understood the
terms both verbally and by signing the terms and conditions.
Defendant failed to report to his parole agent as required when he was released in
March. When officers arrested defendant, he was not wearing his GPS device.
Defendant failed to register as a sex offender.
4
The parole agent considered intermediate sanctions; however, because defendant
failed to register as a sex offender, there was a mandatory referral for revocation of
parole.4 He had previously offered defendant an intermediate sanctions program;
however, defendant left the program.
Defendant’s counsel argued in part that the parole agent did not “appropriately
review[] or seriously consider[] intermediate sanctions, and preferred instead to sanction
[defendant] with the maximum penalty.” The People responded that the parole agent “did
testify that intermediate sanctions were not appropriate in this case due to the fact that
under Penal Code 3010.10, that does require mandatory revocation.”
Defense counsel added, “I don’t think it was ever established that this happened in
the county of Riverside.” The People responded, “there was testimony that the defendant
was booked in a facility that was about four to five miles from the parole agent’s location.
I would just ask the Court to take notice that that is within the county of Riverside.”
The court noted, “I don’t believe territorial jurisdiction applies to parole
revocations. It would have to be that way, for example, if there’s a term that the parolee
is to violate no other laws, he wouldn’t be able to go outside of the county and violate the
law and then escape the allegation of revocation.” “I do think, even if it were required,
4 “Unless the parole authority finds that in the interests of justice it is not appropriate in a particular case,” upon a violation of the requirement that a parolee have a GPS device affixed to his person, “the parole authority shall revoke the person’s parole and require that he or she be incarcerated in a county jail for 180 days.” (§ 3010.10, subds. (a) & (d).) Upon a violation of the requirement that a sex offender not remove a GPS device, “the parole authority shall revoke the person’s parole and require that he or she be incarcerated in a county jail for 180 days.” (§ 3010.10, subds. (b) & (e).)
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that would be satisfied. Because, for example, he’s required to report to the county, to the
agent’s office, and he failed to do that. So that omission did occur within the county.”
The court ruled that defendant violated the terms and conditions of his parole by
failing to report, by engaging in criminal conduct by failing to register as a sex offender,
by not having a GPS monitor, and by failing to register as a sex offender. The court
sentenced defendant to 180 days in jail.
II. DISCUSSION
Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have
independently reviewed the record for potential error and find no arguable issues.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
We concur:
FIELDS J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the revocation of the defendant's parole and the imposition of a 180-day jail sentence, finding no error in the trial court's determination that the defendant violated his parole conditions. The appellate court conducted an independent review of the record and found no arguable issues.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion regarding the establishment of territorial jurisdiction for parole violations.
Whether the trial court adequately considered and explained its rejection of intermediate or remedial sanctions for the defendant's parole violations.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court ruled that defendant violated the terms and conditions of his parole by failing to report, by engaging in criminal conduct by failing to register as a sex offender, by not having a GPS monitor, and by failing to register as a sex offender.”
“Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have independently reviewed the record for potential error and find no arguable issues.”