L.B. v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2025) · DecisionDepot
L.B. v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Dec 31, 2025 No. E087144Unpublished
Filed 12/31/25 L.B. v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
L.B.,
Petitioner, E087144
v. (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2500352)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Malvina
Ovanezova, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Petition denied.
Thomas C. Steelman for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Catherine E. Rupp, Deputy
County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
1
The juvenile court found true allegations pertaining to defendant and appellant
L.B. (father); removed L.B. (minor, born September 2013) from parents’ custody;1
bypassed reunification services to father pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12) (parent convicted of a violent felony),2 and set the
section 366.26 hearing. By petition for extraordinary writ, father contends insufficient
evidence supports the jurisdictional finding against him, and that the court erred in
bypassing his reunification services.3 We deny the petition.
1 L.B. is the father of minor. The proceedings below also involved minor D.S., who has a different father. The latter minor, her father, and mother are not parties to this proceeding.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
3 In their response, real party in interest Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) asserts that father also contends that insufficient evidence supports the court’s decision not to place minor with father; however, we discern no such issue raised in father’s petition. At the very least, there is no such argument under a separate heading. The petition must include a summary of the grounds of the petition, the relief requested, and be accompanied by a memorandum. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a)(1)(D), (E) & (a)(3).) “The memorandum must state each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point and support each point by argument and citation of authority.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(b)(2).) “The purpose of requiring . . . coherent arguments in appellate briefs is ‘to lighten the labors of the appellate [courts] by requiring the litigants to present their cause systematically and so arranged that those upon whom the duty devolves of ascertaining the rule of law to apply may be advised, as they read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.’ [Citation.]” (Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830, fn. 4.) A petitioner forfeits an issue when he makes only a blanket, conclusory statement, with no citation to authority or discussion of the authority as it applies to the facts of the case. (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.) Therefore, to the extent father did raise this issue, it is forfeited. (Ibid.)
2
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 9, 2025, department personnel received an immediate response referral
with allegations of physical abuse, emotional abuse, and severe neglect. Reports
indicated that on August 8, 2025, mother hit minor with a wooden object multiple times,
leaving a welt above her eyebrow.
Mother lost her marijuana pen and thought minor took it. Minor locked herself on
the balcony to avoid being further hit. Mother told minor, “‘If you do not jump off and
kill yourself, I am going to hit you when you come inside.’” Minor believed mother.
Minor jumped off the third-story balcony onto the neighbor’s second-floor balcony.
Minor’s sibling, D.S., was in the home during the incidents.
An officer arrested mother for inhumane corporal punishment or injury of a child
resulting in traumatic condition. (Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a).) Mother would not
provide any information regarding how to contact minor’s and D.S.’s fathers.
The social worker interviewed mother in jail. “[M]other disclosed that she was
done with [minor] and did not want anything to do with her. The mother expressed that
she would like [minor] to be a part of the system, and the Department could keep her.
The mother shared she had no desire to continue to care for [minor] because she felt that
she would ultimately just end up back in jail. Regarding the allegations, the mother
initially stated that she had gotten into an altercation with [minor]. At some point, she
believed [minor] had run out of the house to a neighbor’s, which is something she usually
does when they disagree.”
3
In response to the social worker’s question whether mother told minor to jump off
the balcony, “mother advised that she and [minor] were fighting and disclosed that she
did get physical with [minor], but would not expand on how physical. She shared that
[minor] ran onto the balcony and she told [minor], ‘If you jump off the balcony, you’re
going to kill yourself! You need to come inside, you’re drawing negative attention to my
house!’”
Mother indicated she wanted to reunite with D.S. but not with minor. Mother
declined services for minor. “[M]other reiterated that the Department should take
[minor], as ‘she would be better off being in the system, where she could get the help she
needs.’”
Minor “had a small bump on the left side of her forehead with a minor abrasion in
the middle of the bump in various stages of healing. [Minor] indicated and pointed to a
small scratch on her arm that she claimed had been caused during an altercation with her
mother. She shared that the bump and abrasion on her head was caused by the mother as
well.”
Minor said mother hit her with a “‘thigh master’” because she was taking too long
to clean her room. “[M]other struck [minor] repeatedly on various parts of her body,
causing the bump and the abrasion on her head.” Minor “ran out onto the back balcony,
and the mother continued to scream and threaten her, hitting her a few more times before
she made it outside onto the balcony. She explained that the mother told her to ‘jump off
the balcony and kill herself, or to come inside the house and take a beating,’ and was
4
threatening to hit her with a wooden object.”
“Fearing that the mother was going to hit her with the wooden [object], and due to
the incident that had happened the day prior, she explained that she climbed over the
balcony and slid down holding onto the bars of the balcony so that she would not fall and
swung into the neighbor’s second-story balcony.” Minor “reported that the mother often
physically abuses her and that the mother frequently would make statements like ‘she is
better off without her’ and compare her to her other siblings in a negative way.”
Mother informed the social worker she had not seen or heard from father in years,
and that he had no contact with minor. D.S.’s paternal grandmother “described a time
when she heard the mother screaming at [minor] during a visit, hearing the mother tell
[minor], ‘I hate you! I hate you, I wish I never had you! If I could, I would pull over to
the side of the highway and throw you in a ditch!’”
Minor’s maternal grandmother informed the social worker she had once received a
phone call from mother during which she threatened harm to minor and said “‘she hates
[minor] and wishes [minor] were dead, and that when she dies, she will know then how
much she really hates her.’”
A parole agent “verified that . . . father had been recently arrested on April 18,
2025, for a parole violation and was released on May 25, 2025.” The social worker spoke
with father, who “reported the last time he had contact with [minor] was in March of
2022. He expressed that there was a protection order against him, and he lost contact
with [minor] due to the mother’s evasiveness.”
5
Mother had a prior history with the department between 2012 and 2025, which
included unfounded and inconclusive allegations of domestic violence, physical abuse,
general abuse, emotional abuse, and general neglect. Father had a prior history with the
department, which included substantiated allegations of domestic violence and unfounded
and inconclusive allegations of physical abuse, general abuse, emotional abuse, sexual
abuse, and general neglect.4
In May 2012, the department received a referral alleging mother was the victim of
domestic violence when father punched her in the face in front of one of her children. In
March 2014, a referral alleged that father stabbed mother in front of one of the children;
mother was hospitalized. In July 2014, father “was arrested and incarcerated for two
outstanding warrants for rape and domestic violence . . . .”
In October 2020, the department substantiated allegations when it was reported
that father hit his girlfriend in the face while minor was asleep in the room. Officers
arrested father. Minor reported that she witnessed father push his girlfriend on the bed
and place his hand around her neck. Minor also relayed that she showered with father on
one occasion but denied being touched inappropriately.
In October 2021, and February and March 2022, there were multiple referrals
alleging that father had sex with women in front of minor and would walk around naked
in front of her. It was further alleged that father would physically abuse minor, sold
drugs in front of her, and was a registered sex offender. Minor reported that father hit her.
4 We relate below only those referrals relevant to the jurisdictional findings against father. There were many other referrals.
6
In March 2022, minor “admit[ted] that the father would hit her from time to time on the
arm or shoulder, but denied that it ever left any marks or bruising.”
Mother had a criminal history that included driving under the influence and
domestic violence. Father’s criminal history consisted of a conviction of rape by force or
fear. Father was a registered sex offender. Father had been arrested on April 18, 2025,
for a parole violation for which he was released on May 25, 2025.
The department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging, as pertinent here,
that mother engaged in acts of domestic violence with her partners while in the presence
of minors (b-4), that father knew or reasonably should have known minor was being
physically abused by mother (b-5), and that father failed to provide for minor (b-6). The
court detained minor on August 13, 2025.
In the jurisdiction and disposition report filed August 29, 2025, the social worker
recommended that the court find the allegations in the petition true, that minors be
removed from parents, and that parents receive reunification services. The social worker
found additional criminal history for mother consisting of convictions for assault with
force likely to cause great bodily injury, malicious harassment, and vandalism. Father’s
criminal history reflected additional charges of domestic battery and several drug
charges.
The social worker interviewed father, who “became combative and stated the only
thing that I should be talking to him about was returning his child back into his care.”
“Father . . . continued to be combative and expressed that Riverside County illegally took
7
his child away from him and that he would go to the Supreme Court and sue the County
of Riverside if his child was not returned to his care on Friday, August 29, 2025.”
With respect to the b-5 allegation, father said it was false. “He reported when he
was released from jail in 2017, he tried to look for [minor], but the mother let her go out
of the state because [mother] had gone to jail. He denied knowing where the child was
for several years.” With respect to the b-6 allegation, father said, “‘Do [you] hear what
you just asked me. I just answered that question. I didn’t know where my daughter was.’
Father . . . stated he put out Amber Alerts in an attempt to locate his child.”
The social worker noted that “in 2022 during an interview with the DA Abduction
Unit, [father] became defensive while being interviewed and stated, who would be able to
stop him if he left California with [minor]. Thus, there is concern for the father fleeing
with the child, as he has family ties in Chicago. Further, Father . . . has engaged in acts
of domestic violence, while in the presence of [minor], where the child contacted the
police herself, and the father was arrested . . . . Those allegations were substantiated,
along with inconclusive allegations for emotional abuse and . . . father not being able to
be located while [minor] was in his care.”
The social worker further observed that “father’s significant criminal history to
include being a registered sexual offender and domestic violence altercations, in the
presence of [minor], places her at risk of harm and/or danger. Father . . . declined the
need to engage in services to ensure the safety and well-being of [minor] if returned to his
care. Further, there is concern the father might be a flight risk with [minor] as he had
8
[minor] leave to another state before and the Department was unable to locate [minor].”
At the hearing on September 4, 2025, counsel for the department noted, “I did
inform all counsel earlier today, in further discussion with the Department, Department
will be considering a [section] 361.5 (b)(12) bypass for Father . . . and the mother, given
that they do have convictions that would meet the requirements for a (b)(12) bypass.”
In the addendum report of October 2, 2025, the social worker recommended that
reunification services to parents be denied pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12),
and that the court set the section 366.26 hearing. The social worker met with minor, who
said she did not want to attend the upcoming hearing because “she does not feel
comfortable around her father.” She said she did not want to live with father because “he
had ‘raped someone before’ and previously wore an ankle monitor. She also reported that
her father ‘surrounds himself with bad people sometimes.’ When asked if she would like
to visit with her father, [minor] stated ‘no.’ She also denied wanting to speak with him by
phone.” In another interview with minor, she again indicated she did not want contact
with father. Minor “adamantly expressed that she does not want any contact with Father
. . . either in person or by phone.”
Mother “reported one prior domestic altercation with Father . . . which resulted in
his incarceration.” “Father . . . declined to participate in services designed to ensure the
safety and well-being of [minor].”
On October 17, 2025, the department filed a first amended juvenile dependency
petition, as pertinent here, alleging mother engaged in acts of domestic violence with her
9
partners, including father, in the presence of minors (b-4); that father failed to provide for
minor (b-6); and that minor had been abused, which posed a risk to D.S. (j-1).5
At the hearing on October 17, 2025, the department argued father was on the “sex
offender registry, along with the rape conviction. Additionally, given that the father has
had little to no contact with the minor, and the minor has expressed throughout the
reports that she does not want to visit or communicate with the father; she does not feel
safe in his care and is aware of his rape conviction.” “[P]lacing the minor in the care and
custody of the father and providing services to the father through reunification services
while he’s a sex offender registrant, despite that having occurred years ago, continues to
place the minor at risk of potential sexual abuse.” Minor’s counsel agreed with the
department.
Father’s counsel argued that the department had failed to prove father’s rape
conviction, and, irrespective, that it was remote in time. He maintained that minor had
never suffered harm while in his care, and that father always provided for minor.
The court found the allegations in the amended petition true, sustained the petition,
removed minors from parents’ custody, ordered reunification services for parents
bypassed pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12), and set the section 366.26
hearing.
5 In his petition, father notes that, “One of the allegations (j-1) dealt with the risk of abuse or neglect of a sibling. That allegation will be discussed separately below.” Father does not later discuss that allegation. Nonetheless, it does not appear that that allegation would be relevant to the claims father raises in his petition.
10
II. DISCUSSION
Father contends insufficient evidence supports the b-4 allegation, and that it was
not in minor’s best interest for the court to bypass his reunification services. We
disagree.
A. Justiciability
“‘[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both. More
accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [him] within one
of the statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.]’” (In re X.S. (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.) “As long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it
is immaterial that another might be inappropriate.” (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 968, 979 (Ashley B.); accord, In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 896.)
“‘For this reason, an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for
any remaining jurisdictional findings . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 297, 308 (Briana V.); accord, In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 237
(L.O.).)
As here, where father does not challenge the other jurisdictional findings as to
mother, or even the b-6 allegation as to him, “‘any decision we might render on the
allegation[] involving Father will not result in a reversal of the court’s order asserting
jurisdiction. The juvenile court will still be entitled to assert jurisdiction over the minor
on the basis of the unchallenged allegations. Further, the court will still be permitted to
exercise personal jurisdiction over Father and adjudicate his parental rights, if any, since
11
that jurisdiction is derivative of the court’s jurisdiction over the minor and is unrelated to
Father’s role in creating the conditions justifying the court’s assertion of dependency
jurisdiction.’” (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.)6
“In fact, there need not be a jurisdictional finding as to the particular parent upon
whom the court imposes a dispositional order.” (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at
p. 311; accord, In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 719-720 (S.F.); In re I.A. (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 (I.A.) [“A jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a
particular parent is not necessary for the court to enter orders binding on that parent, once
dependency jurisdiction has been established”].)
“However, we generally will exercise our discretion and reach the merits of a
challenge to any jurisdictional finding when the finding (1) serves as the basis for
dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial
to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings
[citations]; or (3) ‘could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond
jurisdiction.’” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763, disapproved of on
another issue in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560; accord, In re Rashad D. (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 156, 164; contra, I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495 [dismissing appeal
and finding that “[i]n any future dependency proceeding, a finding of jurisdiction must be
based on current conditions”]; L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 237.) “Although a
6 Father did not raise justiciability in his petition, i.e., he did not address whether we had or should exercise any discretion to entertain his argument regarding the jurisdictional finding, considering that he does not challenge the other jurisdictional findings against mother, or the b-6 allegation against him.
12
jurisdictional finding that a parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally
stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal. The
stigma must be paired with some effect on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of
being redressed by a favorable court decision.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 277.)
Here, father does not challenge the other jurisdictional findings against mother or
the b-6 allegation against him. Thus, even if we found that insufficient evidence
supported the court’s order sustaining the b-4 allegation, the juvenile court would still
have jurisdiction over minor and father.
Moreover, the court would still have had jurisdiction to enter the dispositional
order bypassing father’s reunification services. Furthermore, as discussed post, it is not
reasonably probable that even absent a jurisdictional finding against father, the juvenile
court would have granted him reunification services. Father fails to identify any other
potential basis for us to exercise our discretion to address his claim, such as any
prejudicial effect or any consequences beyond jurisdiction. Therefore, we decline to
exercise our discretion to review whether sufficient evidence supported the court’s
finding sustaining the b-4 allegation.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Even assuming we exercised our discretion to review the court’s finding
sustaining the allegation against father, we would hold that sufficient evidence supported
it.
“‘“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
13
jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, supports them. ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ [Citation.] ‘We
do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if
there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’”’ [Citations.]” (L.O.,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 238.)
Here substantial evidence supports the b-4 allegation that parents had engaged in
domestic violence. Father was charged with domestic battery in 2007. In May 2012, the
department received a referral alleging mother was the victim of domestic violence when
father punched her in the face in front of one of her children. In March 2014, a referral
alleged that father stabbed mother in front of one of the children; mother was
hospitalized. In June 2014, father was arrested for an outstanding warrant for domestic
violence. In October 2020, the department substantiated allegations when it was reported
that father hit his girlfriend in the face while minor was asleep in the room. Officers
arrested father. Thus, sufficient evidence supported the court’s order sustaining the b-4
allegation, and its inherent finding that father had engaged in a pattern of domestic
violence in the presence of minor, which posed a current, substantial risk to minor.
14
C. Bypass of Father’s Reunification Services
Father argues the order bypassing his reunification services was not in minor’s
best interest.7 We disagree.
Here, “‘Even if we found no adequate evidentiary support for the juvenile court’s
findings with respect to [father’s] conduct, we would not reverse the court’s jurisdictional
and dispositional orders nor vacate the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over his
parental rights.’” (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 308; see Ashley B., supra, 202
Cal.App.4th at p. 979 [“We will not reverse for error unless it appears reasonably
probable that, absent the error, the appellant would have obtained a more favorable
result”].)
“[T]he juvenile court is not required to distinguish between a custodial and
noncustodial parent when ordering or bypassing reunification services for a child in out-
of-home placement.” (In re Adrianna P. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 44, 57; see In re
Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1508 [noting the juvenile court should have
bypassed nonoffending, noncustodial parent’s reunification services].) “In fact, there
need not be a jurisdictional finding as to the particular parent upon whom the court
imposes a dispositional order.” (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311; accord,
S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 719-720; I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 [“A
jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a particular parent is not necessary for the
7 Father does not challenge the fact that he had been convicted of a violent felony.
15
court to enter orders binding on that parent, once dependency jurisdiction has been
established”].)
“Generally, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to a
child and the child’s parents when a child is removed from parental custody under the
dependency laws. [Citation.] The purpose of providing reunification services is to
‘eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent
and child. This furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible.’
[Citation.] It is also the legislative intent, ‘that the dependency process proceed with
deliberate speed and without undue delay.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, the statutory scheme
recognizes that there are cases in which the delay attributable to the provision of
reunification services would be more detrimental to the minor than discounting the
competing goal of family preservation. [Citation.] Specifically, section 361.5,
subdivision (b), exempts from reunification services “‘those parents who are unlikely to
benefit’” [citation] from such services or for whom reunification efforts are likely to be
“fruitless” [citation].’ [Citation.]” (In re I.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 19, 23.)
“Section 361.5[, subdivision] (b)(12) allows the court to bypass reunification
services where the parent or guardian has been convicted of a ‘violent felony’ within the
meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). [Citations.]” (In re Allison J.
due to his two convictions for second degree robbery]; accord In re Christopher L. (2020)
16
56 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1189 [father whose reunification services were bypassed due to his
conviction for robbery].)
“Once it has been determined one of the situations enumerated in section 361.5,
subdivision (b), applies, ‘“‘the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a
legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental
resources. [Citation.]’” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Thus, if the juvenile court finds a
provision of section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies, the court ‘shall not order
reunification for [the] parent . . . unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
that reunification is in the best interest of the child.’ [Citation.] ‘The burden is on the
parent to . . . show that reunification would serve the best interests of the child.’
[Citation.]” (In re I.A., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 24.)
“We review an order denying reunification services under subdivision (b) of
section 361.5 for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, we do not
make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, we ‘review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings to determine if
there is substantial evidence in the record to support those findings.’ [Citation.] In doing
so, we are mindful of the higher standard of proof required in the court below when
reunification bypass is ordered.” (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
1113, 1121-1122.)
Father failed his burden of showing that reunification services were in minor’s
best interest. Here, father had a conviction for rape by force or fear, and he was a
17
registered sex offender. Father had been arrested as recently as April 18, 2025, for a
parole violation. Although, deemed unfounded or inconclusive, there had been prior
referrals of sexual abuse, including allegations that father showered with minor, had sex
with a girlfriend in front of minor, and walked around naked in minor’s presence. Thus,
as argued by the department, defendant posed a risk of sexual abuse against minor.
Father was charged with domestic battery in 2007. In May 2012, the department
received a referral alleging mother was the victim of domestic violence, when father
punched her in the face in front of one of her children. In March 2014, a referral alleged
that father stabbed mother in front of one of the children; mother was hospitalized. In
June 2014, father was arrested on an outstanding warrant for domestic violence. In
October 2020, the department substantiated allegations when it was reported that father
hit his girlfriend in the face while minor was asleep in the room. Officers arrested father.
Minor reported that she witnessed father push a girlfriend on the bed and place his
hand around her neck. Minor reported that father hit her. In March 2022, minor
“admit[ted] that the father would hit her from time to time on the arm or shoulder, but
denied that it ever left any marks or bruising.” Thus, father posed a risk of physical
abuse directed at minor, or, at minimum, that she would be present during domestic
violence incidents by father against others.
In 2022, father threatened to leave California with minor. Thus, father posed a
risk of absconding with minor if given custody or visitation with minor.
18
Mother had informed the social worker she had not seen or heard from father in
years, and that he had no contact with minor. Father “reported the last time he had
contact with [minor] was in March of 2022.” Thus, father had not had any contact with
minor for over three years.
Furthermore, minor, who was 12 years old on the date of the hearing, said she did
not feel comfortable around father. She said she did not want to live with him because
“he had ‘raped someone before’ and previously wore an ankle monitor. [Minor] also
reported that her father ‘surrounds himself with bad people sometimes.’ When asked if
she would like to visit with her father, [minor] stated ‘no.’ She also denied wanting to
speak with him by phone.” In another interview with minor, she again indicated she did
not want contact with father. Minor “adamantly expressed that she does not want any
contact with Father . . . either in person or by phone.”
Finally, “Father . . . declined to participate in services designed to ensure the
safety and well-being of [minor].” Thus, father failed to prove that reunification services
were in minor’s best interest, and it is not reasonably probable the juvenile court would
have found reunification services were in minor’s best interest even if it found the b-4
allegation untrue.
19
III. DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER J.
MENETREZ J.
20
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court denied the father's petition for extraordinary writ, affirming the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and the order bypassing reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12).
Issues
Whether sufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional findings against the father.
Whether the juvenile court erred in bypassing the father's reunification services.
Disposition. denied
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“As long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate.”
“The burden is on the parent to . . . show that reunification would serve the best interests of the child.”