California Court of Appeal Dec 18, 2025 No. E083766Unpublished
Filed 12/18/25 P. v. Wheeler CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083766
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1402367)
WADE KLINTON WHEELER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Anthony R. Villalobos,
Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Sahar
Karimi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Wade Klinton Wheeler appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him
guilty of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence, and related offenses. On appeal,
Wheeler contends that the trial court improperly coerced the deadlocked jurors by
instructing them to continue deliberations. We disagree and affirm.
The trial court must exercise its discretion under Penal Code section 1140
“without coercing the jury.” (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 88.) “Whether a trial court
has improperly coerced a jury is a separate, albeit related inquiry from whether the court
abused its discretion under section 1140” of the Penal Code. (People v. Thomas (2023)
14 Cal.5th 327, 403.) Coercion occurs if “‘the trial court, by insisting on further
deliberations, expresse[s] an opinion that a verdict should be reached.’” (People v.
Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 783 (Peoples).) “‘“Although the court must take care to
exercise its power without coercing the jury into abdicating its independent judgment in
favor of considerations of compromise and expediency [citation], the court may direct
further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion that such direction would be
perceived ‘“as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their understanding of the case
rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed
and considered.”’”’” (Ibid.; Brooks, at p. 88.) “Any claim that the jury was pressured
into reaching a verdict depends on the particular circumstances of the case.” (People v.
Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265 (Pride).)
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Wheeler’s counsel opposed the request to order the jury to deliberate further,
because “they’re a very thoughtful jury,” they had been deliberating for “almost five days
or four days” already, and “they’ve made up their minds.” Counsel did not say anything
about coercion or articulate any objection to CALCRIM No. 3551. Wheeler’s counsel
also did not object when the trial court remarked that it was asking the jury to deliberate
further because the trial was so long. Wheeler therefore has failed to preserve those
issues for appeal. (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1037-1038; People
v. Neufer (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 244, 253-254.)
Wheeler contends that his counsel’s remarks about the jury’s thoughtfulness and
that it appeared that the jury already decided the matter fairly apprised the trial court of
the challenges that he now raises on appeal. We disagree. Nothing about those remarks
suggested to the trial court that Wheeler’s counsel believed that instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 3551 would be coercive. And counsel’s remarks were made outside the
presence of the jury before the court even made the purportedly coercive remarks to the
jury. That is not sufficient to preserve the argument being raised on appeal. (People v.
Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590.)
The argument fails on the merits in any event. There was no coercion. Wheeler
emphasizes that the jurors deliberated for five days, asked numerous questions of the
court, reached verdicts on two counts, and then informed the court that they were
hopelessly deadlocked on count 1 and count 5. Wheeler argues that in that context “[a]ny
reasonable jury would understand from the trial court’s supplemental comments
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regarding the lengthy trial and instruction to resume deliberations despite the jurors’ clear
communication of their belief that no further deliberations would help that they were
forced to continue deliberations until unanimity was reached.”
We disagree. Wheeler has not identified anything about the language in
CALCRIM No. 3551 itself that “‘displac[es] the jury’s independent judgment “in favor
of considerations of compromise and expediency”’” (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 88) or
otherwise expressed an opinion by the court that a verdict needed to be reached (Peoples,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 783). And the instruction is legally sound and not coercive.
(People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1120-1121 (Moore) [concluding that the
similar CALJIC instruction was not coercive].)
Moreover, the language of the instruction and the judge’s remarks about the
further deliberation confirm that the jury was not coerced. The trial court never told the
jury that it “must reach a verdict” or placed any other constraints on deliberations.
(Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 265-266.) Nor did the court “direct the jurors that ‘the
case must at some time be decided.’” (Moore, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121.) Rather,
the court instructed the jurors that they should “not change your position just because it
differs from that of the other jurors or just because you or others want to reach a verdict.”
(See CALCRIM No. 3551.) The court also instructed the jurors that it was their duty as
jurors to deliberate with the goal of arriving at a verdict “if you can do so without
surrendering your individual judgment.” (See CALCRIM No. 3551.) And the court
repeatedly told the jurors that if they remained deadlocked after further deliberations,
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they should “just let [the court] know.” The instructions and the court’s remarks thus left
open the possibility that the jury could remain deadlocked and was not required to reach a
verdict. (People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 884 (Butler).) “Nothing in the court’s
comments tended to dissuade any juror from maintaining his or her position.” (Ibid.)
“Nothing in the trial court’s charge was designed to coerce the jury into returning a
verdict.” (Moore, at p. 1121.)
Wheeler also contends that the trial court “impermissibly referenc[ed] the expense
and inconvenience of retrial,” arguing that such “repeated comments to the jury
referencing the length of the trial” were “coercive when considered in this context”
because they implied that “the jury must reach a verdict,” given “the expense and
inconvenience of retrial.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) The argument is based
on a false premise. The trial court did not make repeated comments about the length of
the trial but instead made a single comment after giving the jury CALCRIM No. 3551,
explaining the jury was being sent back to deliberate “one further time” “given the length
of time we spent on this trial.” The court did not say anything about whether a deadlock
would result in retrial, let alone suggest that a retrial would be expensive or inconvenient.
The court merely remarked on a fact of which the jury was already well aware: The trial
was long. “The court made no reference to the subject of costs, the prospect of a retrial,
or the desirability of a verdict.” (Butler, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 884.) The “court’s
complete remarks [along with the giving of CALCRIM No. 3551] do not suggest that the
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court crossed the line from encouragement to coercion.” (Peoples, supra, 64 Cal.4th at
p. 783.)
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not coerce the jury to reach
a verdict when it ordered the jury to continue deliberating on count 1 and count 5.
Because we conclude that Wheeler’s argument that the trial court coerced the jury fails
on the merits, we also reject Wheeler’s argument that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by not objecting on that basis in the trial court. (People v. Young
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1171.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or coerce the jury by instructing them to continue deliberations with CALCRIM No. 3551 after they reported a deadlock, as the court did not pressure the jurors to abandon their individual judgment.
Issues
Whether the trial court coerced a deadlocked jury by instructing them to continue deliberations and referencing the length of the trial.
Whether the defendant forfeited his claim of jury coercion by failing to object at trial.
Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the court's instructions to the jury.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The decision whether to declare a hung jury or to order further deliberations rests in the trial court’s sound discretion.”
“Nothing in the trial court’s charge was designed to coerce the jury into returning a verdict.”