In re Riley

Filed 12/12/25 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re LATASHA RILEY on Habeas A174426 Corpus.

(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 012202510)

In exchange for a no contest plea, Latasha Riley was sentenced to four years of probation and a 60-day county jail term. She was referred to a work release program in lieu of serving jail time. She was unable to complete the work release program due to her recently discovered pregnancy, and the trial court ordered her to serve the remainder of her jail term in custody. Riley filed a petition for habeas corpus in this court, and we issued an order to show cause. We hold that persons enrolled in work release programs in lieu of jail time have a conditional liberty interest that cannot be revoked without affording due process. (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481–482; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458.) Under the facts of this case, we conclude the trial court violated Riley’s due process rights by ordering her back into custody based on a critical finding — that it was not feasible for her to participate in the program — unsupported by substantial evidence. BACKGROUND In February 2024, Riley entered a no contest plea to two counts of willful infliction of corporal injury and one count of dissuading a witness; she

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also admitted causing great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 136.1, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (e); undesignated statutory references are to this code.) In exchange, she received four years of probation and a 60-day county jail term. The agreement allowed her to apply for electronic home detention in lieu of serving jail time. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. In March, the sheriff asked the court to refer her to its work release program instead of electronic home detention. The court did so. In June 2024 — after having served six days in the work release program — Riley missed work because of morning sickness related to her pregnancy. She did not know she was pregnant when she enrolled in the program. After she provided proof to the sheriff, the sheriff told her they would send her file back to the trial court, and that the court “will find something else for you to do that is lighter or possibly give you a ‘stay’ that will send you back to the program at a later date.” The sheriff advised probation about Riley’s pregnancy, that she was referred back to court, and that she was advised “not to return to the worksite” because there was “no light duty available” and “to follow up with her Attorney and/or the court for the next steps.” In September 2025 — after probation requested that she add herself to the trial court’s calendar — Riley voluntarily appeared in court with her eight-month-old baby. She asked the court to re-refer her to the work release program. The prosecutor instead urged that she be ordered to serve the remainder of her jail term in custody. Although the court found that she did not willfully violate the terms of the program, it nonetheless ordered her to serve the remainder of her term in custody. It reasoned that she was sentenced to 60 days, “given the chance to do that by alternative means,” and since “[t]hose alternative means were no longer feasible . . . that 60-day jail