California Court of Appeal Dec 9, 2025 No. E083931Unpublished
Filed 12/9/25 P. v. Vargas CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083931
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV22004451)
ANGEL PADILLA VARGAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Tyler L.
Krentz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
After hearing evidence that he attacked his girlfriend with a knife, a jury convicted
defendant and appellant Angel Padilla Vargas of premeditated attempted murder and
making criminal threats, among other offenses. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 245,
that his characterization of the evidence is the “more likely interpretation” is insufficient
to warrant reversal. The jury’s interpretation of the evidence does not have to be the
more likely one for it to be upheld on substantial evidence review; it simply has to be
supported by reasonable and credible evidence.
But more importantly, the record contains more than sufficient evidence from
which the jury could conclude that Vargas’s attempted murder of Doe was the result of
reflection rather than impulse. The prosecution presented evidence that, during an
argument about his jealous suspicions, Vargas went outside to retrieve a knife, then
subjected Doe to a prolonged knife attack that involved his chasing her through the house
and telling her that he was going to kill her. (See, e.g. People v. Manriquez (2005)
37 Cal.4th 547, 577 [substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation where the
defendant approached the victim several minutes after they had engaged in a verbal
altercation, pulled a gun from his waistband, and shot the victim in the chest].) Crucially,
Vargas voiced his plan to kill Doe, not only during, but also before and after his attack.
From that evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that his actions were
premeditated and deliberate.
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In arguing for reversal, Vargas’s argument asks us to view the record in the light
most favorable to him. For example, he contends that his multiple threats to kill Doe
reflected his “emotional instability . . . rather than any calculated plan.” He also argues
that his attack was “chaotic and disorganized,” and the fact that he “did not deliver a fatal
blow, despite being armed with a weapon capable of causing death, strongly suggest[s]
that the attack was impulsive . . . and not designed to kill.” He also argues that he was
too intoxicated to form a plan to kill Doe.
However, the inferences are different when conflicts in the evidence are resolved
in favor of the verdict, as the standard of review requires. For instance, the jury could
reasonably infer a deliberate design to kill from the fact that Vargas stabbed a particularly
vulnerable body part, Doe’s head, during his attack. (See, e.g. People v. Anderson (1968)
70 Cal.2d 15, 27 [“[P]lunging a lethal weapon into the chest evidences a deliberate
intention to kill”].) And, although the distance from the bedroom to the patio may have
been short, the jury could nevertheless conclude that the distance afforded Vargas a
sufficient opportunity to form a deliberate plan to kill Doe because “[t]houghts may
follow each other with great rapidity, and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly.” (Nelson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 213.) The jury could also reasonably infer
from Vargas’s threat to harm Doe’s older daughter if she did not move away from Doe,
and from his resumption of his attack after Doe fled to M.H.’s side of the trailer, that he
was enacting a preconceived design from which he would not be deterred. (Potts, supra,
6 Cal.5th at p. 1029 [“A theory that a person killed in a fit of rage is undermined by proof
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that, after ample opportunity for reflection, the person decided that continuing a violent
attack was appropriate.”].)
Additionally, Vargas’s conduct before and after the killing is inconsistent with a
rash, impulsive killing. The jury could reasonably infer from both of his statements to his
neighbor that he was carrying out a plan he had formed at least as early as the previous
day and that his motive was jealousy. (People v. Disa (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 654,
667 [The jury may consider the “defendant’s conduct after the killing in relation to the
manner of killing.”]; People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 59, 66 [Evidence that the
defendant had become “increasingly jealous and possessive of” the victim in the months
before he killed her was evidence of motive and supported a finding of premeditation and
deliberation.].) It does not matter that J.M. did not, at the time, take Vargas’s threat from
the day before the attack seriously. What matters is how the jury interpreted the threat.
Given the evidence of Vargas’s actions after the threat, the jury could reasonably
conclude that the threat was in fact serious and that he intended to kill Doe.
Finally, we reject Vargas’s contention that the evidence that he was intoxicated
“undermined the prosecution’s argument that [he] acted with premeditation and
deliberation.” The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of
voluntary intoxication in deciding whether Vargas formed an intent to kill or acted with
deliberation and premeditation. The jury resolved the factual question of Vargas’s
intoxication against him, and their finding is supported by substantial evidence. (See
People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 [The question of whether a defendant
was intoxicated and the effect of the intoxication on their mental state is one of fact for
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the jury to resolve.].) Although Doe testified that Vargas arrived home from work with
“beers in his hand,” she did not know how much he drank and did not describe him as
drunk. From that evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that he was not
intoxicated, let alone so intoxicated as to prevent him from forming a plan to kill.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the record contains substantial evidence
to support the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation.
A. Unanimity Instruction
Vargas argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to give a
unanimity instruction for the criminal threats charge because the record contains evidence
that he made multiple threats to kill Doe. We disagree.
“A criminal defendant is entitled to a verdict in which all 12 jurors concur as a
matter of due process under the state and federal Constitutions. [Citation.] In any case in
which the evidence would permit jurors to find the defendant guilty of a crime based on
two or more discrete acts, either the prosecutor must elect among the alternatives or the
court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (People v. Arevalo–
Iraheta (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1588–1589.) “The omission of a unanimity
instruction is reversible error if, without it, some jurors may have believed the defendant
guilty based on one act, while others may have believed him guilty based on another.”
(Id. at p. 1589.)
There are multiple exceptions to the unanimity instruction requirement. As
relevant here, the “continuous-course-of-conduct exception” applies if the separate acts
that could amount to the charged offense “ ‘are so closely connected in time as to form
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part of one transaction.’ ” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679.) “There also
is no need for a unanimity instruction if the defendant offers the same defense or defenses
to the various acts constituting the charged crime.” (Ibid.) The rationale behind the
same-defense exception is that “a guilty verdict indicates that the jury rejected the
defendant’s defense in toto.” (People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 572.)
Vargas argues that a unanimity instruction was required because Doe testified
about at least four different threats from Vargas, any one of which could have been the
basis of the jury’s guilty verdict. Specifically, he argues that Doe testified about the
following threats: (1) his threat to kill her when they were arguing inside their bedroom,
before he retrieved the knife; (2) his threat to kill her after he returned from the patio,
while he was wielding the knife; (3) his threat to harm her older daughter if her daughter
did not get out of the way; and (4) his threat to kill her after he found her inside M.H.’s
bedroom. We are not persuaded.
To begin with, the record demonstrates that the prosecution elected to treat the
threats he made to kill Doe while he was swinging the knife at her as the basis for the
criminal threats charge. This is made clear by the charge itself, which identified Doe as
the victim, and by the prosecutor’s closing argument, in which he identified the offending
conduct as the “multiple” threats Vargas made to kill Doe while “[h]e had the knife in his
hand, and he was swinging at her in close proximity.” Because of that election, there was
no risk that some, but not all, of the jurors would have convicted Vargas of the offense
based on the threat he made to the older daughter or the threat he made to Doe before he
grabbed the knife. (See People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1455 [unanimity
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instruction was not required where the prosecutor identified in argument to the jury “what
conduct by defendant amounted to the crime charged”].)
Moreover, a unanimity instruction was not required due to the fact that the elected
conduct covered multiple threats. This is because the threats Vargas made to kill Doe
while wielding the knife fall under both exceptions described above. The continuous-
course-of-conduct exception applied because the threats formed part of a single
transaction—Vargas’s knife attack on Doe. (People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
p. 679.) The same-defense exception applied because Vargas’s defense to all of the
charges except vandalism was that Doe was not a credible witness and was not telling the
truth. In closing argument, defense counsel conceded Vargas’s guilt on the vandalism
charge but told the jury that his client never attacked or threatened to kill Doe. Counsel
argued that the more reasonable interpretation of the evidence was that Vargas and Doe
had argued, Doe had taken her daughters with her and left, and that Vargas had ransacked
the mobile home after they had gone. By finding Vargas guilty of all the charged
offenses, the jury demonstrated that it rejected his defense in full. (People v. Hernandez,
supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 572.)
For all of these reasons, we reject Vargas’s challenge to the criminal threats
conviction.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions for premeditated attempted murder and criminal threats, finding sufficient evidence of premeditation and concluding that no unanimity instruction was required for the criminal threats charge.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support the attempted murder conviction.
Whether the trial court erred by failing to provide a unanimity instruction regarding the criminal threats charge.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The record contains more than sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Vargas’s attempted murder of Doe was the result of reflection rather than impulse.”
“The prosecution elected to treat the threats he made to kill Doe while he was swinging the knife at her as the basis for the criminal threats charge.”