California Court of Appeal Dec 9, 2025 No. E083533Published
See Concurring Opinion
Filed 12/9/25 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E083533
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF2202269)
S.H., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Charles G. Rogers, Judge.
(Retired Judge of the San Diego Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art.
VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed with directions.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Kristen Allison and Matthew Murray
Deputy District Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Carl W. Sonne, Assistant Attorney General,
Marichelle S. Tahimic and Kristen T. Dalessio, Deputy Attorneys General for Loretta
Melby, Executive Officer of the California Board of Registered Nurses as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Joshua M. Mulligan and Forest Wilkerson for Defendant and Respondent.
1 Penal Code section 236.15 allows the trial court to vacate a conviction on a 0F0F
nonviolent offense if the conviction was the direct result of being a victim of intimate 2 partner violence or sexual violence. Defendant and respondent S.H. petitioned under 1F1F
section 236.15 to vacate his conviction for possessing child pornography, arguing his
offense directly resulted from sexual violence he had suffered both as a child and as an
adult. After a January 2024 evidentiary hearing, over the People’s opposition, the trial
court granted defendant’s petition.
We reverse, finding defendant’s possession of child pornography was not a “direct
result” of his being a victim of sexual violence under section 236.15.
FACTS
In October 2022, the People charged defendant (born 1982) with one count of
possessing child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a)) and an enhancement for possessing
more than 600 images, of which 10 or more involved minors less than 12 years old
(§ 311.11, subd. (c)(1)). In February 2023, defendant accepted a plea agreement and
pleaded guilty as charged. In exchange, he was sentenced to two years formal probation
and 90 days in jail to be completed on a work release program; he also had to register as a
sex offender.
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 2 Section 236.15, subdivision (q), requires that the “record of a proceeding related to a petition pursuant to this section that is accessible by the public shall not disclose the petitioner’s full name.” We interpret that provision to include appeals of trial court rulings on section 236.15 petitions.
2
In September 2023, defendant petitioned for his conviction to be vacated under
section 236.15. Defendant’s declaration described his parents as active members in a
“cult”; his father was a minister and “extremely preoccupied with the church.”
Defendant recounted physical and emotional abuse at the hands of his parents and other
family members. He described “a myriad of memories of family members beating
children” and “lived in constant fear that [he] was next.” When he was seven years old,
he watched as his aunt pulled his cousin “across the floor by her hair and hit her with a
hairbrush until she was bloody in the face.” At another aunt’s house, he saw her “lock
her youngest children in a dark room in the basement and putting a wet towel in front of
the door to muffle their screams and cries for help.” He recalled both his parents being
brutal towards animals, including his father killing family cats and dogs, and “four or five
different times” when his mother forced defendant and his siblings to drown unwanted
litters of puppies. His mother was “extremely violent” with defendant, and “anything
was liable to set her off.”
Defendant also described being sexually abused on multiple occasions, by older
children and by adults, including his father, beginning when he was five years old and
repeated through his childhood. As a young adult, he “experienced multiple attempted
exorcisms . . . by church members to ‘[exorcise] the gay out of [him]’”
3
At 24, defendant “escape[d]” and began to build a new life, becoming a registered 3 nurse in 2011. Three more times, however, he was again the victim of sexual violence. 3F2F
When he was 25, he “was violently raped by a man [he] met at a gay bar and had a brief
relationship with. That ended the relationship.” He was drugged and raped on two other
occasions, by other perpetrators, when he was 27 and again in 2018. The 2018 rape had
lingering physical consequences, causing pain and requiring multiple medical procedures.
According to defendant, the sexual violence had severe psychological effects,
particularly after the 2018 rape: “I suffered from debilitating panic attacks and major
depression as well as periods of dissociation. It was at this time I turned more to
pornography than normal as a means of self-soothing and a safer release than with
someone else.” Memories of the animal abuse he had witnessed and forced to participate
in as a child, as well as the “worst” work environment he had “ever been in,” also
contributed to him being “in bad shape mentally.” Defendant sought treatment from a
“PTSD specialist therapist.” In therapy, he began to “uncover memories”—including of
childhood sexual abuse—that were “extremely painful and horrific to remember.” He
“began experiencing flashbacks and having vivid memories,” causing him “a great deal
of mental anguish.”
Shortly after the 2018 rape, a man (“David”) who defendant “was talking with and
who asked for nude pictures and videos” sent him “some child porn (accidentally he
3 Defendant’s profession matters here in part because Loretta Melby, the executive officer of the entity that governs licensing of registered nurses, the California Board of Registered Nursing, filed an amicus brief supporting the People’s appeal.
4
claims).” Defendant was intensely drawn to the child pornography: “I had always
enjoyed a certain type of pornography with men and their father figures, as I am only
attracted to men who are older than me and I liked to see myself as the son figure. But
the child pornography showing the same thing with a child was different, because I truly
associated with the role of the child, as I felt like I was reliving the trauma [of] my
childhood and youth.” Defendant said he “did not understand” why he was drawn to
child pornography at the time, but he has learned he “was fantasizing about the father
figure due to the abuse that [he] suffered.” He emphasized: “I have never been attracted
to the child in these images and would only picture myself as the child. . . . Pretending
that I was the boy, I felt in control of what had happened. I could rewrite that scene in
my mind, making me in control of the men and others who molested me and with the
rape.”
According to defendant, he “voluntarily deleted” all child pornography files from
his computer before his arrest, trying to “clean [himself] up and regain control of [his]
life and mind.” He testified that he did so “at least six months” before his arrest. He was
not aware, however, that child pornography remained on a “cloud drive,” which he had
“no idea how to access.” And he had been so “ashamed” about the child pornography
that he “could not even bring it up to a therapist.”
In September 2023—after his arrest, but before his plea—defendant voluntarily
sought treatment at a program certified through the California Sex Offender Management
Board. (See §§ 9001-9003.) It provided two weeks of “intense therapy and daily
5
classes” in a partial hospitalization setting, meaning six to eight hours of daily treatment.
Terry Gatewood, the program’s clinical director, submitted a letter supporting
defendant’s petition to vacate his conviction. Gatewood’s “professional conclusion” was
that defendant’s “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder caused by the [2018] rape event,”
together with the memories of “repeated sexual abuse in early childhood” that were being
uncovered through therapy, were “directly responsible for his behavior of Trauma
Repetition exhibited by his viewing” child pornography and “identifying solely with the
young victim.” Gatewood also testified at the hearing on defendant’s petition. He
described defendant’s behavior of “trauma repetition” as a “very complex” result of his
upbringing and his later experiences, a “perfect storm” of components that came together
when he was raped as an adult in 2018.
Gatewood assessed defendant using a procedure that “measures an adult person’s
sexual attraction beyond his awareness utilizing the Visual Response Time (VRT) 4 method.” The assessment confirmed defendant’s self-report, finding he demonstrated 4F3F
5 “no sexual attraction to persons under the age of 13.” Given defendant’s previous 5F4F
therapy, his treatment in the sex offender treatment program, and his “continued
4 Gatewood characterized the procedure, known as an ABEL AASI-3 screening, as a “standard procedure” used to assess sex offenders. 5 Gatewood’s letter emphasized that sexual attraction to adolescents aged 14 to 17 “is NOT considered deviant sexual attraction due to genetic programing.” He testified that the screening test showed defendant had “some attraction” to children aged 14 to 17, but that is not considered deviant under the test’s guidelines, though acting on such attractions would be “deviant and illegal.”
6
outpatient treatment and 12 Step Meetings,” Gatewood’s opinion was that defendant’s
risk of recidivism was “very low.”
After defendant’s conviction, the state’s Board of Registered Nursing initiated 6 disciplinary proceedings to remove his nursing license. Those proceedings remained 6F5F
pending when the trial court entertained his section 236.15 petition. Defendant’s
employer since 2019, a cosmetic surgery practice, fired him because of disruptions to the
practice resulting from publicization of the charges. Nevertheless, the doctor who ran the
practice submitted a letter supporting defendant’s section 236.15 petition. He described
firing defendant as “a gut wrenching decision”: “I see the good in [him] and I wish I
would have been able to help him to heal previous traumas and to be able to reach his
fullest potential as a human being. I hope and pray that the universe will give him a
second chance at redemption.” Defendant had started his own “Botox company,” but
“live[d] under constant fear of being labeled a child molester and ruined or chased from a
community and losing [his] work.”
Defendant and Gatewood testified at the January 2024 evidentiary hearing. At the
end of the hearing, the court indicated its tentative ruling was to grant the petition and
took the matter under submission. The court later issued a minute order and statement of
decision granting the petition. Defendant’s counsel gave notice of the ruling to the Board
6 We grant the Board’s unopposed request that we take judicial notice of the accusation against defendant and several related documents.
7
of Registered Nursing, and the disciplinary proceedings against defendant were
dismissed.
DISCUSSION
A. Required Elements for Section 236.15 Relief
During the hearing on defendant’s section 236.15 petition, the trial court observed
that section 236.15 “appears . . . to have two routes to relief,” with lack of requisite intent
to commit the offense an element under subdivision (a), but not subdivision (g). Looking
to statutory context and legislative history, we conclude the statute is best interpreted to
have only a single set of elements. Fortunately, the parties and the trial court focused on
the elements as laid out in subdivision (g), which accurately describes the sole path for a 7 petitioner to obtain relief. 7F6F
The parties’ misinterpretation, however, was understandable. As we detail below,
viewed in isolation, section 236.15, subdivision (a)’s current language is ambiguous. In
our view, the clause in that subdivision “. . . that demonstrates that the person lacked the
requisite intent to commit the offense” is best understood not to describe an element that
the defendant must show, but rather a legal conclusion that follows from the defendant’s
showing “by clear and convincing evidence, that the arrest or conviction was the direct
7 The court stated its tentative view, later adopted as its final ruling, that “the defense has met their burden by clear and convincing evidence on all of the elements of the [subdivision (g)] theory,” observing “[i]t’s a little bit dicier with respect to [subdivision (a)] because of that intent issue.” The prosecutor also affirmed that “the People were proceeding under [subdivision (g)].”
8
result of being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence.” (§ 236.15, subd.
(a).)
Our role in construing a statute is to “discern the Legislature’s intent ‘so as to
effectuate the purpose of the law.’” (People v. Hupp (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 946, 950,
quoting DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387.) “We begin
by examining the statutory language,” but we “look to the entire substance” of statutes,
“constru[ing] the words in question in context, keeping in mind the statute[’s] nature and
obvious purposes.” (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975.) We may resort to
evidence of legislative intent beyond the language of the statute where, as here, that
language alone provides “no definitive answer.” (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th
145, 151.)
The Legislature enacted section 236.15 effective January 1, 2022, as part of
Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess) (Assembly Bill 124), Stats. 2021, ch. 695)
and amended it effective at the start of each of the next two years. As enacted, section
236.15 provided: “If a person was arrested for or convicted of any nonviolent offense
committed while the person was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence,
the person may petition the court for vacatur relief of their convictions and arrests under
this section. The petitioner shall establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
arrest or conviction was the direct result of being a victim of intimate partner violence or
sexual violence.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 1.) Subdivision (g) of the statute provided:
“After considering the totality of the evidence presented, the court may vacate the
9
conviction and expunge the arrests and issue an order if it finds all of the following: [¶]
(1) That the petitioner was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence at the
time the nonviolent offense was committed[;][¶] (2) The commission of the crime was a
direct result of being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence[;][¶] (3) The
victim is engaged in a good faith effort to distance themselves from the perpetrator of the
harm [;][¶] (4) It is in the best interest of the petitioner and in the interests of justice.”
(Ibid.)
As enacted and now, section 236.15 defines “‘[n]onviolent offense’” as “any
offense not listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.” (§ 236.15, subd. (t)(1).)
Defendant’s conviction offense, section 311.11, subdivision (c)(1), is not listed in
subdivision (c) of section 667.5.
The relief provided by an order of vacatur under section 236.15 is broad. For
purposes of the section, “‘[v]acate’” is defined to mean “that the arrest and any
adjudications or convictions suffered by the petitioner are deemed not to have occurred
and that all records in the case are sealed and destroyed pursuant to this section.”
(§ 236.15, subd. (t)(2).) “Notwithstanding any other law,” a petitioner “may lawfully
deny or refuse to acknowledge an arrest, conviction, or adjudication that is set aside”
under section 236.15, and “the records of the arrest, conviction, or adjudication shall not
be distributed to any state licensing board.” (Id., subds. (o) & (p).)
Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature adopted Assembly Bill No. 2169 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2169), amending section 236.15 and the parallel statute
10
providing relief to victims of human trafficking, section 236.14. (Stats. 2022, ch. 776,
§ 2.) The amendment removed the requirements that the court find that the petitioner is
engaged in good faith efforts to distance themselves from the perpetrator of the harm and
that vacating the arrest, adjudication, or conviction was in the best interest of the
petitioner. As amended, section 236.15, subdivision (g) requires three findings to vacate
an arrest or conviction: “(1) That the petitioner was a victim of intimate partner violence
or sexual violence at the time of the alleged commission of the qualifying crime[;][¶] (2)
The arrest or conviction of the crime was a direct result of being a victim of intimate
partner violence or sexual violence[;][¶] (3) It is in the best interest of justice.”
The bill also made changes intended to clarify that the basis for section 236.15
relief is a legal defect. A committee report noted that an arrest or conviction vacated
under state law may have adverse federal immigration consequences unless the vacatur is
based on a legal defect in the arrest or conviction. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor
Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2169 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), as
amended March 17, 2022, p. 4.) Originally, section 236.15 “fail[ed] to explicitly specify
that the vacatur relief is based on a substantive defect that legally invalidates the
conviction.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 2169 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended March 17, 2022, p. 4.) As a
result, a conviction vacated under section 236.15 was “erased under state law,” but “non-
citizen victims continue[d] to face collateral immigration consequences.” (Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2169 (2021-
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2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended March 17, 2022, at pp. 4-5.) Thus, the bill “clarifie[d] that
vacatur relief under Sections 236.14 and 236.15 is based on a substantive defect in the
underlying arrest or conviction—that petitioner lacked the requisite mens rea (i.e., intent)
to commit the offense, which is a necessary element of all criminal offenses.” (Id. at p.
5.) The bill “also clarifie[d] that the vacatur is based on a finding that the conviction or
arrest is invalid due to a legal defect.” (Ibid.)
Some statutory changes enacted by Assembly Bill 2169 unambiguously reflect
that intent. As amended, section 236.15, subdivision (h), requires an order vacating an
arrest or conviction to “[s]et forth a finding that the petitioner was a victim of intimate
partner violence or sexual violence at the time of the alleged commission of the
qualifying crime and therefore lacked the requisite intent to commit the offense,” and a
court must “[s]et aside the arrest, finding of guilt, or the adjudication and dismiss the
accusation or information against the petitioner as invalid due to a legal defect at the time
of the arrest or conviction.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 776, § 2 (italics added); see § 236.15, subd.
(h)(1) & (2).)
Unfortunately, for want of a comma, Assembly Bill 2169’s changes to section
236.15, subdivision (a), resulted in ambiguity. The last portion of that subdivision was
amended to add the language that we will here place in italics: “The petitioner shall
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the arrest or conviction was the direct
result of being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence which
demonstrates that the person lacked the requisite intent to commit the offense. Upon this
12
showing, the court shall find that the person lacked the requisite intent to commit the
offense and shall therefore vacate the conviction as invalid due to legal defect at the time
of the arrest or conviction.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 776, § 2 (italics added). With a comma
before “which,” it would be apparent that the last clause of that sentence describes the
legal conclusion that follows from a petitioner carrying his or her burden of proof. (See
Garner’s Modern English Usage (4th ed. 2016) pp. 995, 1016 [restrictive and
nonrestrictive clauses].) That would accord with the legislative intent discussed above, as
well as the language of section 236.15, subdivisions (g) and (h). Without the comma and
taken in isolation, the same language is susceptible to being misinterpreted as a restrictive
clause, meaning that lack of the requisite intent to commit the offense is itself something
the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence.
The next amendment to section 236.15, subdivision (a), only further muddied the
waters. A code maintenance bill effective January 1, 2024, made “nonsubstantive”
amendments to numerous code sections, including section 236.15, subdivision (a). (Stats
2023, ch. 131, § 149.) In the current version of the statute, “which” is replaced with
“that”: “The petitioner shall establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the arrest
or conviction was the direct result of being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual
violence that demonstrates that the person lacked the requisite intent to commit the
offense.” (§ 236.15, subd. (a) (italics added).) This change, however, made
misinterpretation more likely, as “that” is more easily—but here incorrectly—read to
13
indicate a restrictive clause. Adding the comma instead would have better expressed the
intended meaning.
Nevertheless, even as currently formulated, in context, the Legislature’s intended
meaning is discernible. It would be odd for subdivision (a) of the statute to provide a
defendant with one path to relief, while another path requiring different evidence
appeared in subdivision (g), without express language to that effect. Our reading of
section 236.15, subdivision (a), best gives meaning and effect to all parts of the statute.
(See People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67 [“‘The meaning of a statute may not be
determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and
provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent
possible’”].) Our reading is also confirmed by the extrinsic evidence of legislative intent
we discuss. We therefore reject the People’s arguments on appeal based on the premise
that it is a defendant’s burden to produce evidence showing a lack of the requisite intent
to commit the offense, rather than lack of intent being a legal conclusion that follows
from the defendant’s showing that the conviction was the direct result of being a victim
of intimate partner or sexual violence.
The bottom line, then, is that a section 236.15 petitioner’s burden is to establish
that he or she “was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence at the time of
the alleged commission of the qualifying crime,” and his or her arrest and conviction
were “a direct result of being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence.”
(§ 236.15, subd. (g)(1)-(2).) If the court is persuaded of those two elements, and also
14
finds vacating the conviction would be “in the best interest of justice,” it “may vacate the
conviction and expunge the arrests and issue an order” granting the petition. (Id., subd.
(g)(3).) Because section 236.15, subdivision (a), expressly requires clear and convincing
evidence only as to the first two of those three elements, we infer the preponderance of
the evidence standard applies to any other factual findings underlying the trial court’s
determination of whether it would be in the best interest of justice to grant the petition.
B. Standard of Review
An order granting a petition to vacate an arrest or conviction under section 236.15
is an appealable order. (§ 1238, subds. (a)(2), (5), & (6).) Section 236.15, however, does
not expressly address the appellate standard of review, and no appellate authority has
considered it.
Under section 236.15 as originally drafted, there would be little basis to question
that the abuse of discretion standard of review applied. “‘Ordinarily, when a statute
provides a court “may” do something,’” as section 236.15, subdivision (g), does, “‘the
statute is permissive, not mandatory, and grants the court a discretionary authority.’” (Lo
v. Lee (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1071-1072.) And a court’s determination of what the
interests of justice require is inherently discretionary. (See, e.g., People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033 (Walker) [“‘furtherance of justice’” inquiry under § 1385, subd.
(c)(1), “requires a trial court’s ongoing exercise of ‘discretion’ (id., subd. (c)(2))”]);
accord, People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530 (Romero).)
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After Assembly Bill 2169, however, subdivision (a) of section 236.15 includes
some mandatory language: “Upon this showing, the court shall find that the person
lacked the requisite intent to commit the offense and shall therefore vacate the conviction
as invalid due to legal defect at the time of the arrest or conviction.” (Italics added.)
Emphasizing this newer statutory language and our Supreme Court’s recent interpretation
of a different statute in People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar), the People propose
instead independent review. We are not persuaded.
Vivar held that the independent review standard applies to rulings under section
1473.7, subdivisions (a)(1) and (e)(1). (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 524; § 1473.7,
subd. (a)(1), (e)(1).) A defendant may move under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), to
withdraw a plea because “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial
error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) In ruling on such a motion, the court
“shall grant the motion . . . if the moving party establishes, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the existence of any of the grounds for relief specified in subdivision (a).” (Id.,
subd. (e)(1).) Our Supreme Court’s “embrace of independent review in this context
[was] a product of multiple factors,” including “the history of section 1473.7, the interests
at stake in a section 1473.7 motion, the type of evidence on which a section 1473.7 ruling
is likely to be based, and the relative competence of trial courts and appellate courts to
assess that evidence.” (Vivar, at p. 527.)
16
Our context, however, differs. “Whether counsel’s advice regarding immigration
was inadequate and whether such inadequacy prejudiced the defense, while mixed
questions, are predominantly questions of law.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 524.) The
questions consider how lawyers act and the effect of those actions on judicial
proceedings. In contrast, how best to serve the interests of justice is an “‘amorphous’”
concept, limited by certain “‘general principles,’” but otherwise entrusted to the
“‘broad’” discretion of the trial court. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) Courts
have “uniformly rejected attempts to decouple Vivar from its rationale, and to export its 8 independent judgment standard of review into different contexts.” (People v. Franco 9F7F
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 194.) We will do the same.
Section 236.15’s legislative history discussed above also weighs against the
People’s interpretation of the mandatory language added by Assembly Bill 2169. The
Legislature did not signal an intent to modify trial court analysis or appellate review of
section 236.15 petitions. Rather, the Legislature’s expressed intent was to clarify the
legal basis for section 236.15 relief to ensure the rulings would be given their intended
effect by federal courts. From this perspective, section 236.15, subdivision (a)’s sentence
8 We doubt Vivar even applies to all of section 1473.7, subdivision (a); subdivision (a)(2) allows a motion to withdraw a plea when “[n]ewly discovered evidence of actual innocence exists that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence as a matter of law or in the interests of justice.” (Italics added.) Vivar does not specify that its holding also applies to motions asserting actual innocence under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(2). Rather, the court’s characterization of its own ruling was that it was adopting independent review “for all claims made under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1).” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 526, fn. 4.) Nothing in Vivar’s reasoning suggests that its holding extends to the “interests of justice” aspect of subdivision (a)(2).
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beginning “Upon this showing, the court shall find . . .” is best interpreted to specify
findings and orders to be made after the trial court has found all the elements described in
subdivision (g), including the discretionary determination of the best interest of justice.
Thus, we conclude the abuse of discretion standard of review applies here.
“The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls
for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed
de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and
capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712 (Haraguchi).)
Substantial evidence is “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.”
(People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is
whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its
review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable
inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-
1012.) It is “well settled,” even under the higher beyond a reasonable doubt standard,
that the testimony of a single witness may be substantial evidence, sufficient to support a
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conviction or other factual finding, “‘unless the testimony is physically impossible or
The People argue no substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant “was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence at the time of the
alleged commission of the qualifying crime.” (§ 236.15, subd. (g)(1).) Although they
framed it in terms of substantial evidence, the People are advancing a legal argument
about what it means to be a “victim . . . at the time of the alleged commission of the
qualifying crime” (ibid.) and what it means for an offense to be committed “while the
person was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence (id., subd. (a).) In the
People’s view, to qualify for relief, defendant “must have been victimized concurrent
with his commission of the crime.” Since defendant’s conviction is for possessing child
pornography in 2022, and there is no evidence he was a victim of sexual violence
committed after 2018, the People conclude he could not possibly fall within section
236.15, subdivision (g)(1).
In their briefing in trial court and their opening brief here, the People relied
exclusively on what they view as the plain meaning of being a victim at the time that the
defendant committed a crime. The ordinary meaning of “victim,” though, leads to a
different result. It includes any person who has suffered from a crime directed at them.
(See Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), victim [“A person harmed by a crime, tort,
or other wrong”]; People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 243 [“victims as ordinarily
19
understood” are “those against whom crimes had been committed”].) In various contexts,
the Penal Code employs definitions that reflect that ordinary meaning. (See, e.g., § 136,
subd. (3) [“‘Victim’ means any natural person with respect to whom there is reason to
believe that any crime as defined under the laws of this state or any other state or of the
United States is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated”]; § 679.01,
subd. (b) [victim is “a person against whom a crime has been committed”].) A person
who has suffered from a crime directed at them remains a “victim” in that ordinary sense
even after the crime is complete and the person is no longer being victimized, whether a
day later or years later.
Applying the ordinary meaning of “victim,” section 236.15, subdivision (g)(1)’s
language “was a victim . . . at the time of the alleged commission of the qualifying
crime,” or subdivision (a)’s language about offenses committed “while the person was a
victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence,” excludes any person who became
a victim of intimate partner or sexual violence only after committing an otherwise-
qualifying crime. Given that section 236.15 reflects a legislative judgment about a
defendant’s mental state when a crime was committed, it would not make sense to
provide relief based on events that occurred after the crime.
A difficulty with adopting this ordinary meaning of “victim,” however, is that it
also would mean that, after a person was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual
20
violence, the person would always be a “victim” under the statute. 9 That would be in 10F8F
tension with section 236.15, subdivision (l), which contemplates circumstances where a
petitioner is no longer a victim. Under subdivision (l), a section 236.15 petition “shall be
made and heard within a reasonable time after the person has ceased to be a victim of
intimate partner violence or sexual violence or within a reasonable time after the
petitioner has sought services for being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual
violence, whichever occurs later . . . .” (Italics added.)
Moreover, in other statutes added or modified by Assembly Bill 124, the
Legislature uses language that sweeps in both past and present victims. For example, for
determinate sentences, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), makes the low term the
presumptive term if a contributing factor in the commission of the offense was that “the
person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including but not
limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation or sexual violence,” or if “[p]rior to the instant
offense, or at the time of the commission of the offense, the person is or was a victim of
intimate partner violence or human trafficking.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A), (C); italics
added; see also former § 1170 subd. (d)(1); § 1016.7, subd. (a)(1), (3).) The Legislature’s
9 The People make an unpersuasive slippery slope argument that such an interpretation would equate to a lifetime get-out-of-jail free card. To obtain relief under section 236.15, a petitioner must demonstrate that each arrest or conviction was a “direct result” of being a victim, and that granting relief would be in the best interest of justice. Someone who continues to commit additional criminal offenses after receiving vacatur relief would not succeed in making these showings indefinitely, no matter their status as a “victim . . . at the time of the alleged commission of the qualifying crime” within the meaning of section 236.15. (§ 236.15, subd. (g))
21
decision not to use similar language in section 236.15 could demonstrate section 236.15
relief was intended to be available only for crimes committed concurrently with abuse.
But there are other problems with reading the statute to require that the crime be
concurrent with abuse. As to the other statutes involving intimate partner violence, there
often are straightforward ways to draw a line between when a person is a victim of
intimate partner violence and when a person was a victim of intimate partner violence;
for example, when the intimate partnership relationship ends, as demonstrated by the
perpetrator’s incarceration or by the victim escaping the relationship. 10 For sexual 1F9F
violence—at least for a single act of sexual violence—it would be odd to draw the line in
the same way. We simply do not say someone no longer is a rape victim, but only was a
rape victim in the past, the moment the rape itself is over. Hence the language of section
1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) states that it applies where “the person has experienced . . .
sexual violence,” which differs from the provision applicable to victims of human
trafficking or intimate partner violence framed in terms of “is” and “was.” And for
multiple acts of sexual violence, it would be discordant for the statute to cover offenses
between the acts but exclude those after the last one.
Legislative history provides no definitive answer to this interpretive quandary.
For example, Assembly Bill 124’s author cited available statistics about the percentage of
the female prison population with “a history of physical or sexual abuse before being
10 An implication of the distinction means that, for instance, a victim’s acts of prostitution could be covered while in the relationship but not immediately after escaping it. And the same would be true, presumably, for victims of human trafficking under the parallel provisions of section 236.14.
22
incarcerated,” and also acknowledges other groups who are both “disproportionately
survivors of violence and overrepresented in prison.” 11 (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. 12F10F
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), as
amended Sept. 3, 2021, pp. 5-6 (italics added).) These statistics obviously include some
who were being victimized concurrently with their offenses, but are not limited to them.
But that does not tell us how far the vacatur relief offered by section 236.15 was meant to
be extended, as distinguished from the other forms of relief provided by Assembly Bill 12 124.13F1F
Similarly, the People emphasize portions of section 236.15’s legislative history
saying that the vacatur relief provided in section 236.14 for victims of human trafficking
11 In the same vein, the author characterized Assembly Bill 124 as “an opportunity to correct unjust outcomes of the past, provide full context of the experiences that might impact a person’s actions, and use a more humanizing and trauma-informed response to criminal adjudication.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended Sept. 3, 2021, p. 6 (italics added).) The author observed: “When law enforcement views girls [and other victims of intimate partner or sexual violence] as perpetrators, and when their cases are not dismissed or diverted but sent deeper into the justice system, the cost is twofold: [their] abusers are shielded from accountability, and the trauma that is the underlying cause of the behavior is not addressed. The choice to punish instead of support sets in motion a cycle of abuse and imprisonment that has harmful consequences for victims of trauma.” (Ibid.) 12 In addition to the retrospective relief offered by section 236.15, Assembly Bill 124 also implemented reforms at the plea bargaining, trial, and sentencing stages of criminal proceedings. (Stats. 2021, ch. 695.) For example, Assembly Bill 124 added the language now found in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), imposing a presumption of a lower term where the defendant “experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,” including “sexual violence,” or where “[p]rior to the instant offense, or at the time of the commission of the offense, the person is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking,” and that was a “contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” (See Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5.)
23
“was intended to provide relief for nonviolent offenses a human trafficking victim
commits ‘at the direction of the victim’s trafficker’ or for such offenses the trafficking
victim was ‘forced to commit during [her] exploitation,’” and that section 236.15 was
intended to “mirror[]” section 236.14. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem.
Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended April 15, 2021, p. 12 (italics added),
quoting Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analyses of Sen. Bill
No. 823 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 31, 2016; Sen Rules Com., Off. of Sen.
Floor Analyses, unfinished business of Sen. Bill No. 823 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Aug. 23, 2016.).) The italicized language, however, was never part of the
proposed statutory language of any version of Assembly Bill 124, let alone final version
that was enacted. Moreover, the first quote elides a modifier that is important for our
purposes: “Research demonstrates that victims are often charged and convicted of crimes
beyond prostitution and solicitation, like drug offenses, theft, using false identification
and more, usually committed at the direction of the victim’s trafficker.” (Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analyses of Sen. Bill No. 823 (2015-2016
Reg. Sess.) as amended May 31, 2016, p. 6 (italics added).) The same report, in the
section describing the bill itself, says it would allow “dismissal of any non-violent
offenses . . . committed as a result of or in clear connection with a human trafficking
scheme of which the person was a victim.” (Id. at p. 4 (italics added).)
In the end, we find no solid basis to define with precision the clauses “while the
person was a victim” in section 236.15, subdivision (a), or “was a victim . . . at the time
24
of the alleged commission of the qualifying crime” in section 236.15, subdivision (g)(1).
If needed to resolve this appeal, we would draw a line as best we can in hopes of properly
discerning the Legislature’s intent. In this case, though, we do not need to do that. We
therefore only observe the ambiguity, and we suggest that the Legislature resolve it for
other cases.
We turn, then, to a different aspect of section 236.15, the subdivision (g)(2)
requirement that the arrest or conviction be a “direct result” of being a victim of intimate
partner violence or sexual violence. The term is undefined in the statute.
In the People’s view, section 236.15 is intended to provide relief only to
“individuals who are in abusive relationships that are coerced and/or under duress to
commit crimes, or else face dire consequences from their abusers.” From that
perspective, because “zero evidence was presented that [defendant] committed the crime
at the behest of anyone . . . his commission of the crime was not the direct result of being
a victim of . . . sexual violence,” and he is not entitled to vacatur.
We disagree that “direct result” should be construed so narrowly for purposes of
section 236.15. As part of Assembly Bill 124, the Legislature also added a special
version of the coercion affirmative defense for offenses committed as a direct result of
being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence: “In addition to any other
affirmative defense, it is a defense to a charge of a crime that the person was coerced to
commit the offense as a direct result of being a victim of intimate partner violence or
sexual violence at the time of the offense and had a reasonable fear of harm.” (§ 236.24,
25
subd. (a) (italics added).) We infer that if the Legislature intended section 236.15 relief
to be similarly limited to where the petitioner was coerced to commit a crime, it would
have mirrored the language of section 236.24, rather than omitting the reasonable fear
element.
Moreover, we have found the parallel coercion defense for victims of human
trafficking, section 236.23, does not require a showing that the victim committed a crime
at the behest of someone: “[T]he accused’s reasonable fear of suffering harm as a result
of the trafficker’s scheme, plan, or pattern establishes the required showing of coercion to
commit the offense as a direct result of being a human trafficking victim. The provision
does not require the trafficker to have direct involvement in, or even knowledge of, the
minor’s crime for the defense to apply.” (In re D.C. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 915, 921.) In
In re D.C., a minor defended his possession of a concealed knife not as being at the
behest of a perpetrator of human trafficking, but as being motivated by a reasonable fear
of being kidnapped again by the perpetrator. (Ibid.) We remanded for factual findings
about whether there was sufficient evidence to support that story, concluding that if the
minor met his burden of proof, “then the trafficking defense must be applied.” (Ibid.)
Nevertheless, as used in section 236.15, “direct result” certainly requires a close
causative nexus between the arrest or conviction and the intimate partner violence and
sexual violence. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “direct” to mean (in the sense relevant
here) “free from extraneous influence; immediate.” (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024);
see also Another Planet Entertainment, LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1106,
26
1136 [“‘commonly understood’” definition of direct is “‘“proceeding from one point to
another in time or space without deviation or interruption,” “stemming immediately from
a source,” and “characterized by close logical, causal, or consequential relationship”’”].)
And the intimate partner violence or sexual violence must be something more than a
“contributing factor” of the sort that makes the low term the presumptive term for
determinate sentencing purposes under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) and (C).
Here, Gatewood’s professional opinion was that the sexual violence defendant
suffered—including the rapes he suffered as an adult and the childhood sexual abuse,
memories of which emerged during therapy—was “directly responsible” for his later
possession of child pornography. This does not establish, however, that defendant’s
conviction offense was a “direct result” of the sexual abuse under section 236.15. An
expert may provide testimony that speaks to the ultimate factual issue in a case but
cannot provide an opinion on a legal conclusion. (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1178.) Thus, we defer to the trial court’s decision to credit
Gatewood’s testimony establishing a causal relationship between the sexual violence
defendant suffered and his conviction offense; we review de novo its legal conclusion
that the conviction offense was a direct result of that sexual violence. (Haraguchi, supra,
43 Cal.4th at pp. 711-712.)
In our view, defendant’s possession of child pornography was not a “direct result”
of sexual violence under section 236.15. We have no doubt that sexual violence was a
contributing factor, perhaps even a but-for cause. But other contributing factors also
27
were in the mix, and they were significant and unusual, not merely attendant to the sexual
violence.
First, the root causes of the psychological harm that defendant claims led to his
offense are complex, complicating the ability to conclude that sexual violence was a
direct cause of crime. Defendant showed that he suffered extreme non-sexual childhood
abuse. This included a father who killed his childhood pets; a mother who forced him to
kill puppies, told him she wished he had never been born, and beat him severely; and
humiliating religious group “exorcisms” to remove the “gay” from him. These factors
could be sympathetic in reducing his culpability, but they are not the intimate partner
violence or sexual violence contemplated by the statute. As a child and as an adult,
defendant also was repeatedly sexually abused. But the sum of defendant’s horrid
childhood makes it difficult to show the sexual violence directly caused him to possess
child pornography. As Gatewood testified, defendant’s behavior of “trauma repetition”
was a “very complex” result of his upbringing and his later experiences, a “perfect storm”
of components that came together when he was raped as an adult in 2018.
Second, there were significant contributing causes after the adult sexual violence
that defendant suffered, which ended with the 2018 rape. David began to send defendant
adult porn with father-son themes, later introducing defendant to child porn. Defendant
asserted he was “influenced easily” and not in his “right mind” at the time, not just
because of sexual violence in the past, but also because of the other forms of violence he
suffered as a child, poorly controlled pain after surgeries, and traumatic events at work.
28
Defendant’s own decisions, motivated by “shame” and repeated over years, to indulge in
behavior that he “knew” was “wrong” rather than seek treatment, also contributed. This
led him to not just possess child pornography once soon after the 2018 rape, but to
continually possess it and view it for about three years until his arrest. Even with the
sexual violence defendant suffered as a child and as an adult as an underlying cause of his
child pornography possession, it is difficult to see it as a “direct” cause.
In our view, the length of time between 2018 when defendant last suffered sexual
abuse and 2022, when he was caught possessing child pornography, is a particularly
persuasive factor. The time between sexual violence and an arrest or conviction for an
offense may not always be determinative. On these facts, however, we find the causal
connection between the sexual violence defendant suffered and his possession of child
pornography is attenuated by the passage of time, together with other contributing
factors. (Cf. In re D.C., supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 918, 921 [minor possessed a
concealed knife the day after escaping from alleged human trafficker].) We would find
“direct” causation a tougher question had defendant possessed the pornography shortly
after the 2018 rape for a more limited time, rather then continuously over several years.
We conclude defendant’s conviction offense was not a direct result of sexual
violence under section 236.15, subdivision (g)(2). We therefore need not reach the
parties’ and amicus’s arguments about the best interests of justice. Defendant is not
entitled to relief under section 236.15, so the trial court’s order to the contrary must be
reversed.
29
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court’s order granting petitioner’s section 236.15 petition and
remand the matter with directions to enter a new order denying the petition.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION RAPHAEL J.
I concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
30
[People v. S.H., E083533]
MENETREZ, J., Concurring in the judgment.
In 2016, the Legislature created a procedure for victims of human trafficking to
obtain vacatur of arrests and convictions for any nonviolent offenses “committed while
[the defendant was] a victim of human trafficking,” provided that “the arrest or
conviction was the direct result of being a victim of human trafficking.” (Pen. Code,
§ 236.14, subd. (a); unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) In order to grant
relief, a court must find that the defendant “was a victim of human trafficking at the
time” the nonviolent crime was committed. (§ 236.14, subd. (g)(1).) The purpose of the
legislation was to free human trafficking survivors from the “criminal stigmatization”
resulting from “acts they were forced to commit during their exploitation.” (Sen. Com.
on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 823 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar.
31, 2016, p. 5.)
In 2021, the Legislature made the same kind of vacatur relief available to victims
of intimate partner violence or sexual violence. (§ 236.15.) The Legislature modeled the
new statute on the 2016 statute for human trafficking victims, using the same language.
In particular, the new statute applies to offenses “committed while the [defendant] was a
victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence” (§ 236.15, subd. (a)), and only a
defendant who “was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence at the time
of” the offense can obtain relief (§ 236.15, subd. (g)(1)).
In February 2023, when defendant S.H. was 40 years old, he pled guilty to one
felony count alleging that he possessed child pornography in 2022, and he admitted an
1
enhancement allegation that he possessed more than 600 child pornography images and
that 10 or more images involved a prepubescent minor or a minor under age 12.
(§ 311.11, subds. (a), (c)(1).) He received a 90-day jail sentence, to be served on work
release, plus two years of formal probation.
In September 2023, S.H. filed a petition and motion for vacatur relief under
section 236.15. He claimed that he was a victim of “extreme physical and sexual abuse”
as a child, was “violently raped” at age 25, and was also “the victim of date rape” at age
27 and again in 2018. He contended that those experiences as a victim of sexual
violence, the last of which occurred in 2018, caused him to commit the child pornography
offense in 2022.
The trial court granted the petition, and the People appealed.
I agree with the majority opinion that S.H.’s petition should have been denied, but
my reasoning differs from the majority opinion’s. S.H. committed the child pornography
offense in 2022, but there is no evidence that he was subjected to sexual violence after
2018. He is consequently ineligible for relief, because he was not “a victim of intimate
partner violence or sexual violence at the time of the” offense (§ 236.15, subd. (g)(1)) and
did not commit the offense “while [he] was a victim of intimate partner violence or
sexual violence” (§ 236.15, subd. (a)).
The majority opinion declines to adopt that reasoning, however, on the ground that
it presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20-25.)
I disagree and therefore concur in the judgment only.
2
I. Statutory language
In interpreting a statute, our “‘fundamental task . . . is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’” (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4
Cal.5th 1100, 1105 (Ruiz).) “‘Because the statutory language is generally the most
reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their
usual and ordinary meaning.’” (Ibid.) “‘If the statutory language is unambiguous, then
its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable
construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved and the legislative history.’” (Id. at p. 1106.)
The majority opinion claims that under “the ordinary meaning” of the word
“victim,” once a person becomes a victim of a crime, the person remains a victim forever
thereafter. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20-21.) Thus, on that interpretation of “victim,” the
statutory requirements that the defendant committed the offense “while [the defendant]
was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence” (§ 236.15, subd. (a)) and
that the defendant was a victim of such violence “at the time” of the offense (§ 236.15,
subd. (g)(1)) are satisfied as long as the defendant became a victim of such violence
sometime before committing the offense.
That cannot be the meaning of “victim” in section 236.15, however, because the
statute provides that a petition for vacatur relief must “be made and heard within a
reasonable time after the person has ceased to be a victim of intimate partner violence or
sexual violence or within a reasonable time after the petitioner has sought services for
being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence, whichever occurs later.”
3
(§ 236.15, subd. (l).) Thus, the statute expressly contemplates that a person who becomes
a victim of sexual violence or intimate partner violence can later cease to be such a
victim. That would be impossible under “the ordinary meaning” of “victim” described in
the majority opinion. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20-21.) Consequently, the majority
opinion’s “ordinary meaning” of the word “victim” cannot be the meaning of that word
as it is used in section 236.15.
But that does not make section 236.15 difficult to interpret. There is an alternative
but equally ordinary meaning of the word “victim,” according to which a person commits
a crime while the person is a victim of sexual violence or intimate partner violence only if
the person commits the crime while being subjected to such violence.
There is at least one additional problem with interpreting the word “victim” in
section 236.15 to mean that once a person becomes a victim, the person never ceases to
be a victim. On that interpretation of “victim,” the statutory requirements that the
defendant committed the offense “while [the defendant] was a victim of intimate partner
violence or sexual violence” (§ 236.15, subd. (a)) and that the defendant was a victim of
such violence “at the time” of the offense (§ 236.15, subd. (g)(1)) mean only that the
defendant must become a victim of such violence sometime before committing the crime.
(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.) But if those statutory requirements mean nothing more
than that, then they are surplusage—the requirement that the crime be “a direct result of
being a victim” of such violence (§ 236.15, subd. (g)(2)) already guarantees that the
defendant must become a victim before committing the crime, because a cause must
4
precede its effect. Interpretations that render statutory language surplusage are to be
avoided. (Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 691.)
The alternative interpretation does not have that problem: The statute requires
both that the victimization and the crime be causally connected (“a direct result”) and that
they be contemporaneous (“while” and “at the time”). (§ 236.15, subds. (a), (g)(1),
(g)(2).)
That should be the end of the matter. The plain language of the statute compels
rejection of the majority opinion’s putative ordinary meaning of the word “victim,” and
neither the majority opinion nor any party has identified any other way of interpreting the
statutory language that would eliminate the requirement that the crime and the
victimization be contemporaneous. (Ruiz, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1106 [unambiguous
statutory language is controlling].) S.H. committed the child pornography offense years
after he was the victim of sexual violence or intimate partner violence, so he is ineligible
for relief under section 236.15.
II. Extrinsic interpretive aids
Even if the language of section 236.15 were ambiguous, the result would be the
same, because extrinsic sources all lead to the same conclusion.
First, comparison of section 236.15 with other provisions that were amended or
created by the same bill that created section 236.15 makes clear that the Legislature
intended section 236.15 to require that the crime and the defendant’s victimization (i.e.,
the defendant’s experience of being subjected to sexual violence or intimate partner
violence) be contemporaneous. Section 236.15 was created by Assembly Bill No. 124
5
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 124). Assembly Bill 124 also created section
1016.7, which provides that if “[p]rior to the instant offense, or during the commission of
the offense, the [defendant] is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or human
trafficking,” then prosecutors engaged in plea negotiations must consider that
circumstance in mitigation if it contributed to commission of the offense. (§ 1016.7,
subd. (a)(3).) Similarly, Assembly Bill 124 amended section 1170 to require that at
sentencing the low term is the presumptive term if the same circumstance—“[p]rior to the
instant offense, or at the time of the commission of the offense, the [defendant] is or was
a victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking”—contributed to commission
of the offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(C).) The same language—“[p]rior to the instant
offense, or at the time of the commission of the offense, the [defendant] is or was a
victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking”—was also added to a
resentencing provision of section 1170. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(8)(C).) But Assembly Bill
124 also created section 236.24, which makes it an affirmative defense (to any charge
except a violent felony) “that the [defendant] was coerced to commit the offense as a
direct result of being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence at the time
of the offense and had a reasonable fear of harm.” (§ 236.24, subd. (a), italics added.)
Viewed together, those provisions and section 236.15 show that when the
Legislature intended a provision to apply to crimes committed anytime after the
defendant became a victim, the Legislature used broad language to make the temporally
broad scope of the statute explicit: “[p]rior to the instant offense, or at the time of the
commission of the offense, the person is or was a victim.” (§ 1016.7, subd. (a)(3);
6
§ 1170, subds. (b)(6)(C), (d)(8)(C).) But when the Legislature intended to limit a
provision to crimes committed contemporaneously with the defendant’s victimization, it
omitted that language (prior to . . . or at the time . . . the person is or was) and instead
used temporally restrictive language like “while” (§ 236.15, subd. (a)) and “at the time”
(§ 236.24, subd. (a); § 236.15, subd. (g)(1)). The conclusion for section 236.15 is again
straightforward: Because section 236.15 is expressly limited to crimes committed
“while” the defendant was a victim, and the defendant must be a victim “at the time” of
the offense, relief is available only for crimes committed contemporaneously with the