Stallo v. Mount San Jacinto Community College Distrct CA4/2 (2025) · DecisionDepot
Stallo v. Mount San Jacinto Community College Distrct CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Dec 5, 2025 No. E081215Unpublished
Filed 12/5/25 Stallo v. Mount San Jacinto Community College Distrct CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
EMILEE STALLO,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E081215
v. (Super.Ct.No. MCC1901667)
MOUNT SAN JACINTO COMMUNITY OPINION COLLEGE DISTRICT et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Angel M. Bermudez,
Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Robert P. Ottilie and Robert P. Ottilie for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hylton & Associates, Courtney L. Hylton and Ruben Escobedo III for Defendants
and Respondents, Mount San Jacinto Community College District and Fantaya
Willingham.
Aarvig & Associates, Maria K. Aarvig and Diane K. Huntley for Defendant and
Respondent, Fontay Mozga.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, plaintiff and appellant Emilee Stallo enrolled as a student at one of Mount
San Jacinto Community College District’s (MSJCC) campuses. Plaintiff began receiving
direct payments from the federal government in the mail, and she eventually discovered
that someone had submitted a FAFSA1 application with falsified personal information to
obtain federal grant money on her behalf. Plaintiff denied any involvement in submitting
the falsified FAFSA and returned the money, but she insisted that MSJCC investigate the
matter and provide her with a definitive confirmation that her name and reputation had
been “cleared.”
When MSJCC failed to complete this investigation to plaintiff’s satisfaction,
plaintiff filed a civil suit generally alleging that employees at MSJCC were engaged in a
scheme to misappropriate state and federal funds. In addition to MSJCC, plaintiff named
defendants and respondents Fontay Mozga and Fantaya Willingham as participants in the
scheme. Plaintiff obtained a jury verdict in her favor on a cause of action for fraud
against Mozga and a cause of action for negligence against all defendants, with the jury
awarding a total of $250,000 in compensatory damages.
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by sustaining
a demurrer to a cause of action seeking a writ of mandate to compel MSJCC to take
various steps to comply with provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA; 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)); (2) the trial court erred by sustaining a demurrer to
1 Free Application for Federal Student Aid.
2
her cause of action for violation of civil rights pursuant to Civil Code section 52.1; (3) the
jury “erred as a matter of law” when it failed to find MSJCC liable for fraud under a
theory of ratification; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her
requests for permanent injunctions as additional equitable relief. Additionally, plaintiff
seeks reversal of a postjudgment order denying her request for attorney’s fees pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5; and contends that we should “strike” language
from the trial court’s ruling on her request for injunctive relief for “flawed reasoning,”
irrespective of whether the reversal is warranted.
We conclude that plaintiff has not shown error warranting reversal of the judgment
or reversal of the postjudgment order denying her request for attorney’s fees.
Additionally, in the absence of reversible error, we decline to address plaintiff’s claims
that the trial court’s written rulings contain discrepancies that require correction.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Allegations of Operative Pleading
According to the operative complaint,2 when plaintiff was a high school student,
she was recruited to attend MSJCC and play on its basketball team. During the
recruitment period, she developed a good relationship with Mozga, who was MSJCC’s
basketball coach. Prior to the start of plaintiff’s first semester, Mozga reached out to
plaintiff to request access to plaintiff’s FAFSA information. Plaintiff had previously
2 Plaintiff filed her original complaint and petition for writ of mandate in December 2019. A first amended complaint was filed in August 2020, and a second amended complaint (SAC) was filed in January 2021. The second amended complaint is the operative pleading.
3
completed a FAFSA form as part of a high school class requirement but knew that she
did not actually qualify for student aid. However, plaintiff gave her FAFSA information
to Mozga believing it was part of the enrollment process at MSJCC.
During her first semester at MSJCC, plaintiff began receiving checks in the mail.
She deposited her first two checks after being assured by Mozga that the funds were
properly distributed by MSJCC. However, in November 2018, plaintiff’s mother
received correspondence from the United States Department of Education notifying
plaintiff’s family to reapply for a Pell Grant.3 Plaintiff’s mother accessed plaintiff’s
FAFSA account online and discovered that an application with false information had
been submitted on plaintiff’s behalf. The application bore plaintiff’s electronic signature
but not that of her parents.
When plaintiff discovered that the checks she was receiving were the result of a
falsified FAFSA application, she contacted Mozga as well as Willingham, who was a
representative working in MSJCC’s financial aid office. Both Mozga and Willingham
allegedly encouraged plaintiff to continue accepting and using the financial
disbursements. Mozga expressed her belief that this was a mistake on the part of
MSJCC’s financial aid office. Plaintiff requested that Mozga and Willingham arrange for
the return of any improperly disbursed funds and for confirmation in writing that plaintiff
3 “A Pell Grant is a subsidy the United States federal government provides through participating institutions for students with exceptional financial need who have not earned their first bachelor’s degree or who are enrolled in certain postbaccalaureate programs.” (People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 494, fn. 3.)
4
“was not responsible for the monies or the misrepresentations.” However, they took no
meaningful efforts to address this request.
Eventually, plaintiff’s family contacted the Director of Financial Aid at MSJCC.
The director arranged for plaintiff’s family to meet with the Dean of Student Services,
who accepted plaintiff’s repayment of disbursed funds. MSJCC provided a receipt to
plaintiff indicating a return of the funds but also informed plaintiff that it could not
provide any written confirmation that any money had been “returned” to the federal
government. Plaintiff’s family then contacted MSJCC’s superintendent to report the
fraudulent conduct and again request “confirmation that [plaintiff] be cleared and any
negative information on this issue be removed” from plaintiff’s educational records.
However, plaintiff’s family received no response.
In addition to sending formal correspondence to MSJCC’s superintendent, plaintiff
also contacted the United States Department of Education, the United States Attorney’s
Office, the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office, the San Jacinto Police
Department, and the California Community College Athletic Association to report the
alleged fraud. The complaints submitted to each of these entities were all sent on the
same day, and all requested a formal investigation that would definitively absolve
plaintiff of all responsibility for any fraudulent activity. However, plaintiff was unable to
obtain the resolution her family desired, so she retained counsel and filed suit.
Based upon these allegations, plaintiff purported to state six causes of action:
(1) a cause of action seeking a writ of mandate to compel MSJCC to comply with various
provisions of FERPA regarding procedures for accessing, challenging, and altering
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student records; (2) a cause of action for “TRO/Preliminary Injunction/Permanent
Injunction”; (3) a cause of action for “fraud by identity theft and concealment” against
Mozga and MSJCC; (4) a cause of action for violation of plaintiff’s civil rights pursuant
to Civil Code section 52.1 against Mozga and MSJCC; (5) a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants; and (6) a cause of
action for negligence against all defendants.
Defendants demurred to the first cause of action seeking a writ of mandate and
fourth cause of action for violation of civil rights pursuant to Civil Code section 52.1.
The trial court sustained the demurrer to both causes of action, without leave to amend.
B. Jury Trial of Legal Issues
The legal issues presented in the operative pleading were tried first before a jury.
Evidence was presented over the course of 11 days in which 10 witnesses testified. With
respect to the cause of action for fraud, the jury returned a special verdict finding Mozga
liable but also finding that Mozga was not acting within the course and scope of her
employment and that MSJCC did not ratify Mozga’s conduct. With respect to the cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the jury returned a special verdict
in favor of defendants. Finally, with respect to the cause of action for negligence, the
jury returned a special verdict finding all defendants liable. The jury awarded a total of
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$250,000 in damages but also apportioned 10% fault to plaintiff for contributing to her
injuries.4
C. Court Decision on Equitable Issues
After the jury returned a verdict, the parties stipulated to submit the equitable
issues to the court without further presentation of evidence. As set forth in the operative
pleading, plaintiff requested: (1) an injunction compelling defendants to “acknowledge
that plaintiff bears no responsibility for the false FAFSA form and did not participate in
its preparation”; (2) an injunction compelling defendants to “clear plaintiff’s college
record of any reference to the false FAFSA form that in any way implicates her as having
any responsibility for its preparation”; and (3) an injunction “direct[ing] defendants to
return the misappropriated money to the rightful owner(s) and provide proof to the Court,
the taxpayers and plaintiff of having done so.” In written briefing, plaintiff also
requested an injunction compelling MSJCC to afford her a hearing and opportunity to
contest any matters in her educational record as required by FERPA.
In a written statement of decision, the trial court summarized its view of the
evidence and concluded that “[p]laintiff was a willing participant in the FAFSA alteration
of which she claims to be a victim” and “agree[d] with the jury that . . . plaintiff bears
responsibility in the present fact pattern.” Specifically, the trial court observed that the
evidence showed only three individuals—Mozga, plaintiff, and plaintiff’s mother—had
4 Specifically, the jury found that plaintiff had suffered $350 in past economic loss; $950 in future economic loss; $60,000 in past non-economic loss; and $188,700 in future non-economic loss. The jury apportioned 10% fault to plaintiff, 25% fault to Mozga, 25% fault to Willingham, and 40% fault to MSJCC.
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access to plaintiff’s FAFSA account, and there was no evidence to suggest Mozga had a
motive to fraudulently obtain money solely for the benefit of plaintiff. In contrast, the
trial court noted that plaintiff had a motive to participate in the fraud, observing that
plaintiff’s father appeared to be very controlling, plaintiff had no financial independence
as an adult, and the alterations to plaintiff’s FAFSA coincided with a time in which her
family experienced some financial instability.
The trial court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to any equitable relief.
Specifically, the trial court concluded that: (1) an injunction requiring MSJCC to
acknowledge plaintiff bore no responsibility or to alter educational records to that effect
would be contrary to the jury’s factual finding that plaintiff was partially at fault; (2) the
balance of equities did not support an injunction requiring the alteration of educational
records; (3) an injunction compelling the return of money to the federal government
would be moot based upon the trial court’s factual finding that the matter had already
been resolved; and (4) plaintiff was not entitled to any form of equitable relief because
she had already obtained a monetary award that adequately compensated her for her
injuries.
D. Judgment and Posttrial Motions
A judgment was entered January 25, 2023, incorporating the jury’s verdict and the
trial court’s statement of decision with respect to equitable relief.
On March 17, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion seeking an award of attorney’s fees
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In support of the motion, plaintiff
submitted (1) the declaration of her counsel setting forth the basis for his professional
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background and the manner in which he calculated the amount of the attorney fee
request; (2) declarations by plaintiff and her mother detailing why they believed litigation
was necessary in this case; and (3) the declarations of more than 10 attorneys with
professional or personal relationships with plaintiff’s counsel offering their opinions that
the amount requested by counsel in fees was reasonable for this type of case. Plaintiff
argued that her litigation conferred substantial benefit to the public because it exposed a
theft by a public employee, resulted in the termination of corrupt employees, and resulted
in the return of public monies that would benefit other students. The trial court denied
the motion concluding that, even if plaintiff was a successful party within the meaning of
section 1021.5, she had not shown any of the other elements that would entitle her to an
award of fees under the statute.
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and the postjudgment motion denying her
request for attorney’s fees.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the Demurrer
We turn first to plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer to the first cause of action seeking a writ of mandate to enforce various
provisions contained within FERPA and the fourth cause of action for violation of her
civil rights pursuant to Civil Code section 52.1. As we explain, we find no error in the
record before us.
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1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint
and/or petition for writ of mandate.” (Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County of Siskiyou
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 38-39 (Siskiyou Hospital, Inc.).) “ ‘A ruling on a general
demurrer is thus a method of deciding the merits of the cause of action on assumed facts
without a trial.’ ” (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279,
291-292 (Morris).)
“We apply two standards of review on appeal from a judgment of dismissal after a
demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.” (Morris, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 292.) “First, we review the operative complaint ‘de novo to determine whether the
complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory or to
determine whether the trial court erroneously sustained the demurrer as a matter of
law.’ ” (Ibid.) “Second, we determine ‘whether the trial court abused its discretion by
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.’ [Citation.] Abuse of discretion is
established when ‘ “there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect
with an amendment.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 292-293.)
In this appeal, plaintiff’s opening brief fails to separately discuss whether the trial
court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend. As such, we deem any such
argument waived (Golden Day Sch. v. Dep’t of Educ. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 681, 695,
fn. 9 [arguments not separately discussed under separate heading deemed waived]) and
proceed to consider only whether the allegations of the operative pleading were sufficient
to state a cause of action as a matter of law.
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2. Plaintiff Failed To State a Cause of Action for Writ of Mandate
“ ‘Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, providing for [traditional] writs of
mandate, is available to compel public agencies to perform acts required by law.
[Citation.] To obtain relief, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) no “plain, speedy, and
adequate” alternative remedy exists; [citation] (2) “ ‘a clear, present, . . . ministerial duty
on the part of the respondent’ ”; and (3) a correlative “ ‘clear, present, and beneficial right
in the petitioner to the performance of that duty.’ ” ’ ” (Siskiyou Hospital, Inc., supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 36-37.) Here, the trial court sustained the demurrer after
concluding that plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a clear ministerial
duty to act. We find no error in this conclusion.
Specifically, plaintiff sought a writ of mandate to enforce various provisions of
FERPA. On appeal, plaintiff cites only to these provisions as the source of a mandatory
duty. However, “Congress enacted FERPA under its spending power to condition the
receipt of federal funds on certain requirements relating to the access and disclosure of
student educational records.” (Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe (2002) 536 U.S. 273, 278
(Gonzaga Univ.); Rim of the World Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1398 [“FERPA conditions the availability of federal funds on
conformance with its provisions.”].) “ ‘The statute takes a carrot-and-stick approach: the
carrot is federal funding; the stick is the termination of such funding’ ” to educational
institutions that fail to comply with its provisions. (BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 742, 752.)
Understanding this context is crucial because the United States Supreme Court has
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explained that spending power legislation of this type creates contractual rights between
the federal government and the state rather than individually enforceable rights. (Medina
v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic (2025) 145 S.Ct. 2219, 2224 [“courts described
federal grants as contracts, not commands” and “spending-power legislation is ‘much in
the nature of a contract’ ”]; see McDonald v. Stockton Met. Transit Dist. (1973)
36 Cal.App.3d 436, 441 [“The acceptance of a federal grant under terms and conditions
authorized by Congress creates a binding contract.”].) And it is well settled that
“ ‘mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for enforcing a contractual obligation against
a public entity.’ ” (300 DeHaro Street Investors v. Department of Housing & Community
Development (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1254-1255; Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 806.) This is
because the law imposes “ ‘ “no special duty to carry out the terms of contracts or to
refrain from breaches of contractual relations. [Public entities] are not singled out, as
distinguished from other corporate entities or other individuals, as especially enjoined to
Thus, the FERPA statutes do not, in themselves, show the existence of a
ministerial duty to perform any act.5 To the extent FERPA imposes obligations on
5 We observe that the California Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in a different procedural context in Coast Community College Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2022) 13 Cal.5th 800. In that case, several community college districts filed a claim with the Commission on State Mandates arguing that regulations that “specify various conditions the districts must satisfy to avoid the possibility of having their state aid withheld” created mandates to which they were entitled to be reimbursed. (Id. at p. 806.) In rejecting this argument, the California Supreme Court explained that “the [footnote continued on next page]
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MSJCC, such obligations are contractual in nature and do not constitute the type of clear,
ministerial duty that is properly the subject of a writ of mandate. Where the pleading
does not identify a clear, ministerial duty to act, the trial court does not err in sustaining a
demurrer to a cause of action for writ of mandate.
3. Plaintiff Failed To State a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Rights
“The Bane Act provides for liability for the interference or attempted interference
with a person’s state or federal constitutional rights ‘by threat, intimidation, or
coercion.’ ” (Wiley v. Kern High School Dist. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 765, 774 (Wiley).)
“To plead a cause of action under the Bane Act, the plaintiff must show ‘(1) intentional
interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right,
and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or
coercion.” (Wiley, at p. 774; Animal Protection & Rescue League, Inc. v. County of
Riverside (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 914, 920.) We conclude that the trial court did not err
in sustaining the demurrer to this cause of action for two, independent reasons.
First, the SAC fails to adequately allege an underlying state or federal
constitutional or legal right. Plaintiff alleged that defendants’ actions interfered with her
“ ‘property interest in her rights as a student,’ ” her liberty interest in maintaining a good
districts are not legally obligated to adopt the standards described in the regulations, but rather face the risk of potentially severe financial consequences if they chose not to do so. Because the regulations induce rather than obligate compliance, legal compulsion is inapplicable.” (Id. at p. 807.) And while the case addressed the doctrine of legal compulsion in the context of a claim before the Commission on State Mandates, our Supreme Court specifically explained that the concept of legal compulsion required finding “a mandatory, legally enforceable duty to obey” “similar to the showing necessary to obtain a traditional writ of mandate.” (Id. at p. 815.)
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name and reputation, and her rights under FERPA. However, “[n]o United States or
California Supreme Court opinion holds a student has a property or liberty interest in
continued enrollment in good standing in an academic program.” (Lachtman v. Regents
of University of California (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 187, 199.)6 Likewise, “[a]n ‘interest
in reputation alone is not a constitutionally protected liberty interest.’ [Citation.] Even
‘serious damage to reputation alone is insufficient to constitute deprivation of a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest . . . .’ ” (Los Angeles Police
Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 136, 149; Caloca v.
County of San Diego (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1218-1220 [reputational damage does
not amount to a constitutional violation].) Finally, the United States Supreme Court has
unambiguously held that FERPA does not create any personally enforceable rights.
(Gonzaga Univ., supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 289-290; Medina, supra, 145 S.Ct. at p. 2224
[Spending legislation does not create any individual rights absent “clear rights-creating
language.”].) Thus, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to identify a violation of an
underlying constitutional right, which is a necessary element of any claim under Civil
Code section 52.1.
6 The United States Supreme Court has “recognized that where state law has created a student’s entitlement to a public education, that entitlement constitutes a property interest that is constitutionally protected.” (Doe v. Occidental College (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1018, fn. 2; Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 573-574, 576.) However, California authorities have consistently held that the right to education under the state constitution (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584) does not encompass “a fundamental right to college and/or community college education” (Gurfinkel v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 1, 5; Levi v. O’Connell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 700, 705-710; Doe, at p. 1013 [alleged interference with college enrollment “do not ‘ “involve[e] a fundamental vested right” ’ ”]).
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Second, the SAC fails to allege any threat, intimidation or coercion by any of the
defendants.7 “The ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ requirements—the ‘egregiousness’
element—were intended to prevent the Bane Act from extending to ordinary tort claims.”
(Wiley, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 775.) Our review of the SAC reveals no allegation
that any defendant threatened, intimidated, or coerced plaintiff at any relevant time. And
while plaintiff’s arguments on appeal focus largely on the trial court’s use of the term
“violence” in conducting its analysis, plaintiff has not identified any factual allegations in
the operative pleading that could support the requisite element of a threat, intimidation or
coercion directed at plaintiff. Thus, we conclude that even if plaintiff had properly
alleged interference with a constitutional right, plaintiff failed to adequately allege the
requisite threats, intimidation or coercion necessary to support recovery under Civil Code
section 52.1, and the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to this claim.
B. Plaintiff Has Forfeited Her Challenge to the Jury’s Findings
Plaintiff also contends that the jury “erred as a matter of law” with respect to its
finding that MSJCC did not ratify Mozga’s conduct. We conclude that this argument has
7 Plaintiff correctly notes that what is sufficient to constitute the requisite threat, intimidation, or violence is unsettled. (See Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [“[W]here coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged,” the “statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the [constitutional violation].”] and Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 799-800 [“Nothing in the text of the statute requires that the offending ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ be ‘independent’ from the constitutional violation alleged.”].) However, it is unnecessary to address this dispute to resolve the claims in this appeal. Both lines of cases recognize that there must be some action amounting to a threat, intimidation, or coercion in order to pursue a claim under Civil Code section 52.1, and the SAC contains no such allegation in this case.
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been forfeited and, even in the absence of forfeiture, plaintiff has not shown error
warranting reversal.
Generally, a jury’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.
(Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 500-501.) Additionally,
“ ‘[t]he substantial evidence standard of review takes on a unique formulation where, as
here, “the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden
of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals.” ’ [Citation.] Under these
circumstances, ‘ “ ‘ “the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically,
the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and
unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Symons Emergency
Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 597 (Symons).)
However, on appeal, plaintiff argues that the jury’s finding should be reviewed de
novo, and presents no argument as to why the evidence was uncontradicted or
unimpeached and of such character as to compel a finding in her favor.
“ ‘“ ‘[A]rguments should be tailored according to the applicable standard of appellate
review,’ ” ’ and ‘ “[f]ailure to acknowledge the proper scope of review is a concession of
lack of merit.” ’ ” (Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 597 [forfeiture for failure to
tailor arguments to correct standard of review]; Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948 [same].) Thus, plaintiff’s failure to identify and tailor
her arguments to the correct standard of review forfeits the claim of error on appeal.
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Even in the absence of forfeiture, we would conclude that plaintiff has not met her
burden on appeal to show error warranting reversal. “ ‘ “The theory of ratification is
generally applied where an employer fails to investigate or respond to charges that an
employee committed an intentional tort. . . . Whether an employer has ratified an
employee’s conduct is generally a factual question.” ’ ” (Thomas v. Regents of University
of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 619.) Here, even assuming the evidence
identified in plaintiff’s opening brief was entirely uncontested at trial, there was no direct
evidence of ratification. Instead, the evidence relied on by plaintiff consists only of the
failure of MSJCC to take sufficient corrective action, giving rise to an inference of
ratification. And “where ratification is sought to be implied from conduct or deduced
from acts of alleged acquiescence,” it is “especially true” that “the question is one for the
jury.” (Rhee v. L.K. Small Co. (1927) 83 Cal.App. 339, 344.) “The jury is not compelled
to draw the inference . . . , even in the absence of contrary evidence and may refuse to do
so. . . . [W]hether the inference shall be drawn, in any given case, is a question of fact for
the jury.” (Blank v. Coffin (1942) 20 Cal.2d 457, 461.)
Thus, where plaintiff’s claim of ratification relies entirely on convincing the jury
to draw certain inferences in her favor based upon circumstantial evidence, it is not of
such character or weight as to compel a finding in plaintiff’s favor. The jury was entitled
to reject the credibility of plaintiff’s evidence and decline to draw the inferences urged by
plaintiff, even in the absence of contradictory evidence and plaintiff has not established
error warranting reversal, even in the absence of forfeiture.
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C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff also claims the trial court erred in denying her requests for injunctive
relief. “ ‘The grant or denial of a permanent injunction rests within the trial court’s sound
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion.’ [Citations.] The burden is on the party challenging the ruling to demonstrate
such abuse.” (Grail Semiconductor, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc.
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 786, 801 (Grail).) However, “[t]he abuse of discretion standard
is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial
court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial
evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to
the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) As we explain, we find no abuse of discretion in the
record before us.
The nature of the injunctive relief sought by plaintiff has shifted throughout the
course of litigation. In the operative pleading, plaintiff sought injunctions to (1) compel
defendants to “acknowledge that plaintiff bears no responsibility for the false FAFSA
form and did not participate in its preparation”; (2) compel defendants to “clear plaintiff’s
college record of any reference to the false FAFSA form that in any way implicates her as
having any responsibility for its preparation”; and (3) “direct defendants to return the
misappropriated money to the rightful owner(s) and provide proof to the Court, the
taxpayers and [plaintiff] of having done so.” In her brief following the trial of legal
issues, plaintiff purported to withdraw her first request but also sought to recast her
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second request as a request for an administrative hearing to challenge representations in
her educational record under FERPA.
1. Requests for Injunctive Relief Pleaded in Complaint
With respect to the first two requests, the trial court expressly relied on the jury’s
findings of fact to deny injunctive relief. Specifically, the jury returned a special verdict
finding that plaintiff was negligent, her negligence contributed to her alleged injuries, and
apportioned 10% fault to plaintiff. Plaintiff has not challenged these findings on appeal.
The trial court correctly observed that it was bound by the jury’s factual findings.
(Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 159 [“ ‘[W]here the legal issues are tried
first, the judge cannot ignore the jury’s verdict and grant equitable relief inconsistent with
the jury’s findings.’ ”].) Because an order compelling defendants to “acknowledge
plaintiff bears no responsibility” or “clear plaintiff’s college record of any reference . . .
that . . . implicates her of having any responsibility” would have been inconsistent with
the jury’s factual findings, the decision to deny these requests for injunctive relief cannot
be considered arbitrary or capricious such that it would constitute an abuse of discretion.
With respect to the third request, the trial court made a factual finding that the
money had already been returned. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court specifically
cited to witness testimony presented at the time of trial that “the FAFSA monies were
reversed and zeroed out with the Federal government.” On appeal, plaintiff does not
dispute that this testimony was presented but argues that the strength of other evidence
and the lack of documentation warranted a contrary finding. However, when reviewing
an order granting or denying injunctive relief for abuse of discretion, “[w]e accept the
19
trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence” (Caru Society for
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Anthony (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 751, 759) and,
“[u]nder the substantial evidence standard, the testimony of even one witness may
support a finding based thereon” (Newman v. Casey (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 359, 375).
Because the trial court’s factual finding that the money had already been returned is
supported by substantial evidence, we cannot conclude that the decision to deny an
injunction ordering return of the money constituted an abuse of discretion. (Scripps
Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 332 [“[A] change in circumstances at the
time of the hearing, rendering injunctive relief moot or unnecessary, justifies denial of the
request.”].)8
2. Request for an Injunction Compelling Compliance with FERPA
With respect to plaintiff’s belated claim for an injunction requiring MSJCC to
comply with various provisions of FERPA, we also conclude that denial of this request
was not an abuse of discretion and could not have been prejudicial.
8 Even assuming error, we question whether plaintiff could establish prejudice warranting reversal. And while the parties have not briefed the issue, we struggle to see how plaintiff could have standing to even seek an injunction to enforce the obligations of MSJCC with respect to monies owed to the federal government—a nonparty to this action. (United Farmers Agents Assn., Inc. v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 478, 488 [“ ‘ “A plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” ’ ”]; People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 486, 499 [“ ‘As a general rule, a third party does not have standing to bring a claim asserting a violation of someone else’s rights.’ ”].) It is not clear that plaintiff could ever obtain this specific injunctive relief, even if the matter were remanded for further proceedings.
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First, we disagree with plaintiff’s contention that reversal is warranted because the
trial court failed to specifically address her FERPA request in its statement of decision.
While the trial court specifically addressed certain arguments in its statement of decision,
it also concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to any form of equitable relief because she
had an adequate legal remedy. This was sufficient, as it adequately stated reasons upon
which the judgment rests. (Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106,
1124-1125 [“A statement of decision need not address all the legal and factual issues
raised by the parties. Instead, it need do no more than state the grounds upon which the
judgment rests . . . .”].) Thus, the trial court’s purported failure to specifically address
plaintiff’s FERPA arguments does not show an abuse of discretion.
Second, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff had an
adequate legal remedy was arbitrary or capricious. “In ordinary tort actions, injunctive
relief is generally available only if legal remedies (e.g., monetary compensation) are
inadequate.” (AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 838-839; Intel Corp.
v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352 [“ ‘[T]he extraordinary remedy of injunction’
cannot be invoked without showing the likelihood of irreparable harm.”].) As
acknowledged by plaintiff on appeal, a FERPA hearing is intended to permit a student to
challenge representations in her educational records. Presumably, the ultimate purpose of
this hearing is to obtain removal of disputed material that could cause plaintiff future
reputational harm. However, plaintiff had already sought and the jury had already
awarded monetary damages for future non-economic harm. Because plaintiff had already
obtained a monetary award intended to compensate her for the very harm which a
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FERPA hearing might also redress, the trial court could reasonably conclude that
monetary damages were an adequate remedy. (Grail, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 801
[where monetary damages are available, the plaintiff must show that “the facts in [the]
record . . . compel a conclusion as a matter of law that damages will be an inadequate
remedy” in order to establish that denial of an injunction constituted an abuse of
discretion].)
Third, even if we assumed the trial court abused its discretion in some manner, any
such error could not have been prejudicial with respect to the request for an injunction to
enforce FERPA. (TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766, 786 [“The
constitutional constraint, which applies in civil as well as criminal cases, ‘generally
“prohibits a reviewing court from setting aside a judgment due to trial court error unless
it finds the error prejudicial.” ’ ”]; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) “ ‘Injunctive relief is a
remedy, not a cause of action. [Citation.] A cause of action must exist before a court
may grant a request for injunctive relief.’ ” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 719, 734; Applied Medical Distribution Corp. v. Jarrells (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 556, 573 [“ ‘ “A permanent injunction is merely a remedy for a proven cause
of action. It may not be issued if the underlying cause of action is not established.” ’ ”].)
As relevant here, the United States Supreme Court has unambiguously held that there is
no private cause of action to enforce FERPA, observing that the statutory provisions
“entirely lack the sort of ‘rights-creating’ language critical to showing the requisite
congressional intent”; “speak only to the Secretary of Education” with respect to
enforcement; “speak only in terms of institutional policy and practice”; and provides for a
22
specific mechanism of enforcement by the Secretary of Education. (Gonzaga Univ. v.
Doe (2002) 536 U.S. 273, 287-288.) Based upon this reading of the statutory text, the
Supreme Court concluded that “it is implausible to presume that the same Congress . . .
intended private suits to be brought before thousands of federal- and state-court judges . .
. .” (Id. at p. 290.)
Federal Circuit courts have reached similar conclusions in a variety of contexts.
the Secretary of Education—and only the Secretary—to take ‘appropriate actions’ to
enforce its provisions.”]; Cenzon-DeCArlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp. (2010) 626 F.3d 695,
699 [Because FERPA does not create a private right of action, plaintiff is not entitled to
seek injunctive relief for its enforcement.].)
Absent an underlying cause of action to enforce FERPA in the first instance, there
is no right to seek injunctive relief as a remedy. Thus, regardless of the trial court’s
reasons for denying this specific request for injunctive relief, plaintiff could not have
been prejudiced such that reversal is warranted.
3. Request To “Strike” Language from the Trial Court’s Statement of Decision
Finally, we decline plaintiff’s request for this court to “strike” language from the
trial court’s written ruling or statement of decision because the language includes “flawed
conclusions” by the trial court. “ ‘It is a settled appellate principle that reviewing courts
uphold judgments or orders if correct for any reason, regardless of the correctness of its
grounds as “ ‘ “[i]t is judicial action and not judicial reasoning which is the subject of
review . . . .” ’ ” ’ ” (Bruno v. Hopkins (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 801, 816; Howard v.
23
Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443.) And “[w]e generally do not
address issues whose resolution is unnecessary to the disposition of an appeal.”
(Antounian v. Louis Vuitton Malletier (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 438, 455.) Further, we do
not rewrite the trial court’s ruling. The determination of the case in the first instance is
for the trial court. Upon appeal, we review that ruling, as it was given, for prejudicial
error.
Because we have already considered each of plaintiff’s claims of error on the
merits and concluded that plaintiff has not shown a basis for reversal of the judgment, we
decline to entertain plaintiff’s request that we comb the record to correct various alleged
errors in the trial court’s written rulings, “even if this Court rules against reversing the
rulings.”
D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff has also appealed from the trial court’s postjudgment order denying her
request for attorney’s fees. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.
Specifically, plaintiff sought an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5. “ ‘The Legislature adopted section 1021.5 as a codification of
the private attorney general doctrine of attorney fees . . . . Under this section, the court
may award attorney fees to a “successful party” in any action that “has resulted in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large
class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as
to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be
24
paid out of the recovery, if any . . . .” ’ ” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004)
34 Cal.4th 553, 565; City of San Clemente v. Department of Transportation (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 1131, 1148.) “Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a request for attorney fees
under section 1021.5 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Children & Families Com. of
Fresno County v. Brown (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 45, 57; City of San Clemente, at
p. 1149.)
Here, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees after concluding
that plaintiff had not shown that (1) the case resulted in an important right affecting the
public interest; (2) a significant benefit was conferred upon the general public or a large
class of persons; (3) private enforcement was necessary; (4) the financial burden of
private enforcement rendered an award necessary; or (5) the interests of justice warranted
an award of fees. Plaintiff challenges each of these findings on appeal. However, we
need not discuss each finding in detail because we conclude the trial court correctly found
that the litigation did not result in a significant benefit conferred upon the general public
or a large class of persons.
In ruling on a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5, a trial court “ ‘ “ ‘must realistically assess the litigation and determine
from a practical perspective whether the statutory criteria have been met.’ ” ’ ”
(Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 970, 980.) In this case, the plaintiff failed to prevail on any of her
requests for mandamus or injunctive relief. Instead, she prevailed only on her causes of
action based upon traditional tort theories of fraud and negligence and obtained only
25
monetary compensation for her individual damages as a result. Generally, this is not the
type of outcome that confers any benefit to the public. (Leiserson v. City of San Diego
(1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 725, 738 [“[W]here only a litigant’s personal economic interests
are advanced by a lawsuit, fees may not be awarded since the litigation does not
significantly benefit a large class of persons.”]; Royball v. Governing Bd. Of Salinas City
Elementary School Dist. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150-1151 [“[W]here the
litigation primarily advanced petitioners’ personal economic interests, we cannot find a
reasonable basis for the conclusion that a significant benefit was conferred on the public
or a large class of persons.”].)
Plaintiff argues that her litigation exposed a theft by a public employee, proved a
coverup at the highest level of the college, exposed numerous crimes, generated publicity
and resulted in the return of stolen public funds. However, “ ‘[b]ecause the public always
has a significant interest in seeing that laws are enforced, it always derives some benefit
when illegal private or public conduct is rectified. Nevertheless,’ ” the “ ‘statute
specifically provides for an award only when the lawsuit has conferred “a significant
benefit” on “the general public or a large class of persons.” ’ ” (Baxter v. Salutary
Sportsclubs, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 941, 945.) And we are unpersuaded that any of
the facts identified by plaintiff are sufficient to show a significant benefit to the public in
the context of this case.
As the trial court noted, there was never any evidence that Mozga engaged in any
similar fraud in relation to any other student at MSJCC. Plaintiff has not challenged this
finding on appeal. Indeed, prior to trial plaintiff conceded there was no evidence that
26
anyone else was subject to a similar scheme and represented that no such evidence would
be presented at trial. Thus, even accepting plaintiff’s characterization that her litigation
revealed a theft, public coverup, disclosed crimes, generated publicity, and resulted in
some restitution, it remains uncontested that all of these facts arose from a single set of
transactions unique to plaintiff.
Because the litigation resulted in vindication of only the personal financial
interests of plaintiff and because any corrective action that purportedly resulted from the
litigation addressed a situation that was not widespread, but unique to plaintiff, it was not
unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that plaintiff failed to meet her burden to
show that her litigation conferred a significant benefit to the general public or a large
class of persons. And because a party seeking fees under Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5 is required to establish all of the essential elements necessary for an award of fees
(Bui v. Nguyen (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1377), the failure to establish one essential
element renders it unnecessary to “consider whether [the moving party] satisfied the other
criteria upon which the court denied the motion.” (Children & Families Com. of Fresno
County v. Brown, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.)
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment and postjudgment order denying plaintiff’s request for attorney’s
fees are affirmed. Respondents to recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
28
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the judgment and postjudgment order, holding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for a writ of mandate or a civil rights violation under the Bane Act, and failed to demonstrate reversible error regarding the jury's findings or the denial of equitable relief and attorney's fees.
Issues
Did the trial court err in sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's cause of action for a writ of mandate under FERPA?
Did the trial court err in sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's cause of action for violation of civil rights under Civil Code section 52.1?
Did the jury err as a matter of law in finding that the college district did not ratify the employee's fraudulent conduct?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's requests for permanent injunctions and attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The FERPA statutes do not, in themselves, show the existence of a ministerial duty to perform any act.”