California Court of Appeal Dec 4, 2025 No. E083979Unpublished
Filed 12/4/25 Marquez v. Castaneda CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
BRANDON MARQUEZ,
Appellant, E083979
v. (Super.Ct.No. IND1701459)
EUGENIA CASTANEDA, OPINION
Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mickie Elaine Reed,
Marquez raises various arguments for reversing the trial court’s order granting
Castaneda’s request for a permanent DVRO. As we explain, his arguments fail to
demonstrate error.3
3 Shortly after Marquez filed his opening brief, the DVRO expired on February 7, 2025. Generally, we do not decide cases that have become moot, which occurs “ ‘when the decision of the reviewing court “can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.” ’ ” (Steiner v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1485.) An appeal from an expired order is not moot, however, if it “could have consequences for [a party] in . . . future court proceedings.” (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 209.) In Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 141 (Cardona), the court held that an appeal from an expired one-year DVRO was not moot because the rebuttable presumption in section 3044 was a “concrete legal consequence” for future custody proceedings. (Id. at pp. 148-149.) That presumption—which provides that “an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child”—is triggered by “ ‘ “a finding of domestic abuse sufficient to support a DVPA restraining order.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 148.) [footnote continued on next page]
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First, Marquez contends that the trial court violated his Second Amendment right
to bear arms by issuing a DVRO that prohibits him from possessing firearms for a period
of one year while the restraining order is in effect. He asserts that the firearm restriction
will result in “the loss of my employment opportunities within the security industry”
where “firearm rights are essential.” We construe Marquez’s challenge to be an “as-
applied” constitutional challenge because he asserts the need for an exception to the
restriction based on an individualized need to be able to secure work as an armed security
guard. (In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144 [An as-applied challenge seeks relief “
‘from a specific application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an individual or
class of individuals who are under [an] allegedly impermissible present restraint or
disability as a result of the manner or circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has
been applied.’ ”].) “Because an as-applied challenge asserts a ‘constitutional defect [that]
may be correctable only by examining factual findings in the record or remanding to the
trial court for further findings’ ([citation]), it is not appropriately raised for the first time
on appeal.” (Zachary H. v. Teri A. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1144 (Zachary H.),
citing In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887; see People v. Patton (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 934, 946 [“An as-applied constitutional challenge is forfeited unless
Moreover, the presumption is “mandatory, and it ‘remains in effect for five years regardless of whether an underlying domestic violence restraining order has expired.’ ” (Id. at p. 148.) Because the continued application of the section 3044 presumption to Marquez in future custody proceedings could impact his ability to gain custody of L., we agree with Cardona that the appeal is not moot because “we could provide him with effective relief by reversing the DVRO.” (Cardona, at p. 149.)
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previously raised.”].) Marquez forfeited his as-applied challenge by failing to raise it in
the trial court.
But even if Marquez had not forfeited his challenge in the trial court, he has failed
to demonstrate error on appeal by failing to support his challenge with analysis or citation
to authority. We treat an argument as waived “ ‘ “[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a
point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority.” ’ ” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939,
956.) “The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to
treat the contentions as waived.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) These rules apply equally to represented litigants and self-
represented litigants like Marquez. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574; Huang
v. Hanks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179, 183, fn. 1.)
Second, Marquez argues that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination because he was “unable to afford legal representation” at the
February 8 hearing. He contends that if he had been represented by counsel at the
hearing, he would have known to “plead the fifth and protect myself from self-
incrimination.” That argument fails because the Fifth Amendment does not apply in civil
proceedings like the one here. By its plain terms, the Fifth Amendment applies to “any
criminal case.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)
Marquez’s third argument fails for the same reason. He contends that the trial
court violated his Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel and to “present all
relevant evidence [and] secure witness testimony” to support his case. Like the Fifth
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Amendment, the Sixth Amendment applies to criminal proceedings. (U.S. Const., 6th
Amend.; see People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 214 [the Sixth Amendment does not
apply “in civil proceedings”]; In re Marriage of Tara and Robert D. (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 871, 887 [There is no due process right to counsel in dissolution
proceedings.].) Moreover, Marquez does not cite to any portions of the record to support
his claim of procedural unfairness, and he makes no effort to (1) explain how the trial
court prevented him from presenting all of his evidence, or (2) identify what evidence he
was prevented from presenting. “ ‘[A]n appellant must do more than assert error and
leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test his claim.
The appellant must present an adequate argument including citations to supporting
authorities and to relevant portions of the record.’ ” (Ribakoff v. City of Long
Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 162 (Ribakoff).) By failing to develop his argument or
support it with citation to the record, Marquez has failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating error. In any event, our review of the hearing transcript reveals that the
trial court gave Marquez the opportunity to present evidence to oppose Castaneda’s
DVRO request and to support his DVRO request and repeatedly asked him if he had
anything more to add.
Fourth, Marquez argues that the trial court’s rulings on his and Castaneda’s
DVRO requests violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. To support that claim, he
asserts that he “faced discrimination based on [his] gender” and was “depriv[ed] of the
same protections afforded to others in similar circumstances.” Marquez’s conclusory
assertion is insufficient to satisfy his burden of developing and supporting his arguments
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on appeal. In any event, and putting aside the fact that the record contains no support for
Marquez’s claim of gender discrimination, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply in
this context. The Fourteenth Amendment applies in circumstances where a “ ‘ “ ‘ “state
has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an
unequal manner.” ’ ” ’ ” (Zachary H., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.) A trial court’s
ruling on a DVRO request is not such a classification, as it affects only the persons
identified in the request.
Fifth, Marquez asks this court to review the DVRO request he filed against
Castaneda because he believes it will “she[d] light on [Castaneda’s] history of harassment
and manipulation.” In addition, Marquez asserts that his rights were “potentially
infringed” and asks us to “review the proceedings” and consider whether there was any
“denial of [his] rights during the February 8th hearing.” As noted, it is Marquez’s
obligation as the appellant to demonstrate that the trial court erred, and he may not enlist
our help in carrying that burden. (See Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015)
234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to
supply arguments for the litigants.”].)
Sixth, in a section entitled, “Impact on Career and Public Image” Marquez states
that he is an actor “signed by a huge talent agency” and that he had “plans to participate”
in a gameshow and “other high-profile shows and events that require a clean public
image.” He complains that he was “very excited” to participate in the gameshow and
“stood to win $150,000” but, “due to the screening order resulting from the restraining
order, [he] was unable to proceed with this opportunity.” These statements do not
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amount to a legally cognizable claim on appeal. Marquez fails to identify any error on
the trial court’s part; he merely expresses his concern over the practical ramifications of
the restraining order.
Seventh, in a section entitled, “Attorney Misconduct,” Marquez provides a list of
various sections from the Penal Code, Code of Civil Procedure, Family Code, and
Business and Professions Code that he claims Castaneda’s counsel violated. We need not
consider these claims because Marquez has not supported them with citation to the record
or reasoned argument. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [Appellate courts
need not address a “general assertion, unsupported by specific argument.”].)
Finally, we note that, at various places in his brief, Marquez appears to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the DVRO. For example, under the heading
“Sixth Amendment Violation,” Marquez asserts that there was a “lack of evidence
supporting the allegations against [him]” because “there is no video evidence or witness
testimony implicating [him] in any wrongdoing,” and the police report regarding the
patio incident “clearly indicates that [Castaneda] was uncertain about the perpetrator’s
identity.” Marquez’s failure to assert a sufficiency of the evidence claim under a separate
heading is grounds for us to treat the claim as forfeited. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) [“State each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing
the point . . . .”]; Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179 [“Failure to provide
proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly
identified by a heading.”].) In any event, the claim fails on the merits because, by
testifying that he dropped the television and displayed the condoms on Castaneda’s patio
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and sent her demeaning texts, Marquez admitted that he engaged in the conduct that the
trial court found to qualify as abuse under the DVPA.
DISPOSTION
We affirm the trial court’s orders granting Castaneda’s DVRO request and
denying Marquez’s. Castaneda is entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against the appellant, finding that his admitted conduct of vandalism and harassing text messages constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a DVRO against the appellant.
Whether the appellant's constitutional challenges (Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments) have merit.
Whether the trial court erred in its evidentiary findings regarding domestic abuse.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Marquez admitted that he engaged in the conduct that the trial court found to qualify as abuse under the DVPA.”