California Court of Appeal Nov 20, 2025 No. E084583Unpublished
Filed 11/20/25 P. v. Jimenez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084583
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1600919)
CRISTIAN CASAS JIMENEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jennifer R. Gerard,
Judge. Affirmed.
Sabrina R. Damast, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Hilton and Steve
Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Cristian Casas Jimenez appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his motion to vacate his conviction under Penal Code1 section 1473.7. We
Defendant offered no other contemporaneous evidence, such as a declaration and/or
testimony by his plea counsel. (See Abdelsalam, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 664.) As
the court in Espinoza affirmed, “the burden rests with the defendant to establish
entitlement to relief” and “the inquiry under section 1473.7 requires consideration of the
‘totality of the circumstances.’” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 325.) Although
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defendant was not required to submit a declaration from his plea counsel, he did have the
burden of proof. (§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(1).) We note his current attorney did not provide a
declaration in support of the section 1473.7 motion showing that plea counsel was unable
or unwilling to provide a declaration.
2. Defendant Has Failed to Establish Prejudice
Even if the advisory on the plea form was inadequate or defendant did not
meaningfully understand the consequences of his plea, he has failed to establish that he
was prejudiced. “What someone seeking to withdraw a plea under section 1473.7 must
show is more than merely an error ‘damaging the moving party's ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences’ of the plea. [Citation.] The error must also be ‘prejudicial.’”
(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 528; § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1). “[P]rejudical error … means
demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if
[he] had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.” (Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.)
Defendant argues that he would not have taken the plea deal if he had known the
mandatory consequence of being deported since he had strong family ties here, he had
resided in the United States for 16 years, he graduated from high school in California, he
was employed here fulltime, and he had no meaningful connection to Mexico. Defendant
contends that if he had been properly informed of the consequences of his plea, he would
have been willing to go to trial or seek an immigration-safe plea. His declaration
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contains the only direct evidence presented as to whether he would have taken the plea
had he been aware of the immigration consequences. However, defendant’s claim “must
be corroborated by evidence beyond the defendant’s self-serving statements.”
(Abdelsalam, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 664; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530 [“when a
defendant seeks to withdraw a plea based on inadequate advisement of immigration
consequences, we have long required the defendant corroborate such assertions with
“‘objective evidence’”]; see also, Bravo, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074 [“‘a
defendant’s self-serving statement – after trial, conviction, and sentence – that with
competent advice he or she would have accepted [or rejected] a proffered plea bargain, is
insufficient in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to prejudice, and
must be corroborated independently by objective evidence’”].) We note that defendant’s
declaration demonstrates extensive familial ties in the United States in that most of his
family members reside here. However, his declaration provides no statement regarding
his involvement in the lives of his child or extended family or the extent of his interaction
with them.
Similarly, there are no facts or objective evidence to support defendant’s
contention that he had strong employment ties to the community. His declaration merely
stated that he worked fulltime at Forever 21 for an unspecified period of time. He did not
attach any paystubs or an employer declaration. We also note defendant did not state in
his declaration that he told his plea counsel his priority was to remain in the United States
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with his family and job, in order for his counsel to try to mitigate the consequences of the
plea.
Defendant did state in his declaration that he would not have pled guilty if he
knew he was going to be deported, and he would have insisted on going to trial or sought
an alternative plea agreement that did not have such severe immigration consequences.
However, contrary to his assertions that he would not have plead guilty if he knew he
would be deported, that is exactly what he did when confronted with the same situation in
2021 when he also suffered another domestic violence conviction and had been advised
his plea “will” result in deportation. Such evidence strongly suggests that immigration
consequences were not defendant’s primary concern in entering his plea. Additionally,
defendant suggested in his declaration that he would have gone to trial because he
thought he could win the case. This again points to factors other than immigration
consequences that defendant was concerned with in deciding whether to go to trial or
plead guilty.
Moreover, defendant failed to present evidence that at the time of the plea, he “had
reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.” (Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.) Similarly, there is no suggestion that defendant’s counsel
did not attempt to negotiate such a disposition. (People v. Perez (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
818, 830 (Perez) [there was no indication in the record that defense counsel did not
attempt to negotiate an immigration safe disposition].)
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Defendant asserts “the record indicates an alternative plea, with ‘less damaging
immigration consequences’ was available to [him].” He states he could have pled guilty
to domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), which is not a deportable offense. He further
notes that he received probation here and the prosecutor did not oppose a reduction to a
misdemeanor if he had no probation violations. Defendant then claims that “the
availability of a probationary and county jail sentence of comparable length, coupled with
the evidentiary problems posed by a non-cooperative witness, indicate a likelihood that
the prosecution would have accepted an alternate plea to domestic battery.” However,
defendant only speculates, with no corroborating evidence, that his plea counsel did not
attempt to secure an immigration-safe plea to domestic battery and that the prosecutor
would have agreed to such. In Perez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 818, as in this case, there
was “no indication in the record that the prosecution was willing to agree to an
immigration safe disposition.” (Id. at p. 830; see also, Ibid. [“[a]n appellant has the
burden of establishing, based on the record on appeal and based on facts, not speculation,
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel”].)
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Based on the evidence submitted in support of defendant’s motion and the totality
of the circumstances, we conclude defendant did not carry his burden of showing
prejudicial error. Accordingly, the court properly denied his motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J. RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
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Holding. The court held that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered prejudicial error under Penal Code section 1473.7, as his self-serving declaration lacked the necessary objective corroboration to establish that he would have rejected the plea had he been properly advised of the immigration consequences.
Issues
Whether the trial court's denial of a motion to vacate a conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7 'without prejudice' is an appealable order.
Whether the defendant established prejudicial error under Penal Code section 1473.7 by demonstrating a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea if he had understood the immigration consequences.