California Court of Appeal Nov 17, 2025 No. E085675Unpublished
Filed 11/17/25 In re I.V. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re I.V., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085675
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2400480)
v. OPINION
J.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dorothy McLaughlin,
Judge. Reversed.
Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
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Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie Jarvi, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this dependency matter, J.C. (mother) argues no substantial evidence supports
the court’s findings that there is a substantial risk of physical harm to her children or that
they were left without provision for support by their incarcerated father. We agree and
reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order and the dispositional orders that derived
indicated that the children were healthy, well adjusted, well cared for, bonded with each
other, and developing appropriately.” (Ibid.)
The facts underlying this case are significantly less serious than those in In re J.N.
Unlike in In re J.N., we do not know what injured A.C.C., do not know whether mother
caused the injury, cannot rule out that the injury was completely accidental, and know for
certain that mother’s own children have not been harmed. As in In re J.N., mother’s
children are “healthy, well adjusted, well cared for, bonded with each other, and
developing appropriately.” (In re J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026.)
Accordingly, we conclude there was no substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s true finding on allegation b-1 that mother’s conduct represented a substantial risk
of harm to I.V. and L.V.
We also conclude the court’s true finding on allegation b-2 was not supported by
substantial evidence. B-2 alleges father failed to provide for his children, specifically
that he “is not a member of the children’s household and he fails to provide the children
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment and protection.” The law is
clear, however, that “incarceration, without more, cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction,”
under section 300, subdivision (b). (In re Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358, 366.)
This is because subdivision (b), requires the children suffer or be at substantial risk of
suffering serious physical harm. A parent’s incarceration, without more, does not place
their children at serious risk of physical harm. (Ibid.) The uncontroverted evidence here
is that the children currently have adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, and
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protection. Father cannot provide for the children himself because he is incarcerated, but
by all accounts they have everything they need while in mother’s care. We therefore
conclude the court’s true finding on allegation b-2 is also not supported by substantial
evidence.
Because substantial evidence did not support either of the alleged bases for
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), the court’s finding that the children fell
under subdivision (b) must be reversed.
B. Allegation g-1
The department correctly concedes that substantial evidence does not support the
trial court’s true finding on allegation g-1. Section 300, subdivision (g), permits a court
to assert jurisdiction over a child when “the child’s parent has been incarcerated or
institutionalized and cannot arrange for the care of the child.” (§ 300, subd. (g).)
However “[t]here is no ‘Go to jail, lose your child’ rule in California.” (In re S.D. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077.) As long as a parent can “arrange for care of [their child]
during the period of [their] incarceration, the juvenile court ha[s] no basis to take
jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) Here, it is uncontested that father arranged for the care of his
children with mother. We therefore agree with the parties that substantial evidence did
not support the court’s true finding on allegation g-1, nor its assertion of jurisdiction
under subdivision (g).
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“Because we conclude that the jurisdictional findings must be reversed, the
dispositional order . . . also must be reversed.” (In re I.S. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 918,
933.)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. We remand to the
juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAPHAEL J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), as the record failed to demonstrate a substantial risk of harm to the children or a failure to provide for their care. Consequently, the jurisdictional and dispositional orders were reversed.
Issues
Whether substantial evidence supports the finding that the children were at substantial risk of physical harm due to the mother's care of a niece.
Whether the father's incarceration alone constitutes a basis for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) or (g).
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the record contains no evidence the children were at a substantial risk of physical harm due to mother injuring A.C.C.’s child.”
“incarceration, without more, cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction”
“As long as a parent can “arrange for care of [their child] during the period of [their] incarceration, the juvenile court ha[s] no basis to take jurisdiction.””