Mitchell v. Chula Vista Parole CA4/1

Filed 11/13/25 Mitchell v. Chula Vista Parole CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

KENYATTA QUINN MITCHELL, D084234

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020- 00008446-CU-PO-CTL) CHULA VISTA PAROLE et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carolyn M. Caietti, Judge. Affirmed. Kenyatta Quinn Mitchell, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, R. Lawrence Bragg, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Neah Huynh and S. Gray Gilmor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer filed by Defendants Chula Vista Parole, a unit of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and parole agent Paul Bennett to Kenyatta Quinn Mitchell’s complaint against them. Resolving Mitchell’s appeal of the

resulting judgment by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we affirm. I. A. We take the sparse facts from the operative second amended complaint. In May 2016, Mitchell’s girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend was a parolee under Chula Vista Parole’s supervision. The girlfriend had a restraining order against the parolee, but he kept violating it. The complaint is silent as to whether Mitchell was a protected party under this restraining order. The restraining order violations “were reported to [Chula Vista Parole], [but] nothing was ever done.” The parolee then assaulted Mitchell. Mitchell alleges he “suffered from severe emotional distress” and posttraumatic stress disorder as a result. For reasons unexplained—but, as far as we can tell from the complaint, seemingly connected to this assault—Mitchell was subject to criminal liability and incarcerated. B. Mitchell blamed Defendants for his assault and, representing himself, sued them. In the operative complaint, he asserts two causes of action under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, which prohibits “threat[s], intimidation, or coercion” designed to prevent a person’s exercise or enjoyment of their constitutional or statutory rights. (Civ. Code, § 52.1.) Under his first cause of action, Mitchell accuses Defendants of failing both to (1) enforce the restraining order against the parolee and (2) investigate violations of it. Mitchell contends Defendants (1) were negligent and reckless in “their decision not to fulfil[l] an obligatory duty”—