California Court of Appeal Nov 12, 2025 No. E085063Unpublished
Filed 11/12/25 P. v. Wiley CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085063
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV01095)
GEORGE EMANUEL WILEY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A.
Camber, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark Alan Hart, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant George Emanuel Wiley appeals from a
postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1172.6. His appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and defendant filed a supplemental brief. We
have reviewed the contentions defendant raised in his supplemental brief and
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a),
count 1); burglary (§ 459, count 2); two counts of attempted robbery (§§ 664/211,
664, counts 3 & 4); false imprisonment by violence (§ 236, count 5); driving a
vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 6); and
being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a); count 7). As to count
1, the jury found true that defendant was armed and personally used a firearm in
the commission of the murder. (§§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a).) As to
counts 2 and 3, the jury found true that he personally inflicted great bodily injury
(GBI) upon the victim. (§ 12022.7.) The jury found not true the felony-murder
special circumstance allegations that the murder had occurred during the
commission of a burglary and attempted robbery.
1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
On March 18, 1994, the court sentenced defendant to state prison for 25
years to life plus a determinate term of 14 years and four months. In an
unpublished opinion filed on July 27, 1995, this court affirmed the judgment in
part and reversed the judgment in part with modifications. (People v. Foster, et
al.., (July 27, 1995, E014156) [nonpub. opn.].) On June 11, 1996, the trial court
modified the judgment as ordered by this court.
On March 20, 2023, defendant petitioned for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. The prosecution filed a brief opposing resentencing, asserting that
defendant was not eligible for relief since he was the actual killer. The prosecutor
stated that, while defendant was charged under the felony murder theory, and there
were multiple participants in the underlying felonies, the record of conviction
showed that he was the actual killer. Defendant and his two co-defendants, M.F.
and E.H., were all charged with murder. Defendant and M.F. were also charged
with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), as they both possessed and
used a gun. However, the prosecutor pointed out that only defendant was charged
with personally inflicting GBI (§ 12022.7) on the victim, which the jury found
true. The prosecution attached a copy of the prior appellate opinion and pointed
out the relevant facts from that opinion were M.F.’s statement to the police that
defendant shot the victim, and the recorded conversation between him and
defendant while they were in their holding cells, when defendant said he shot the
victim in self-defense.
3
Defendant filed a reply brief and also relied on the facts from the prior
appellate opinion. He argued that the jury rendered a general verdict finding him
guilty of first degree murder. However, because it was a general verdict, it was
“unclear whether he was found guilty on felony-murder, an aiding and abetting or
willful or deliberate theory.” Defendant also argued that the court could not
engage in judicial factfinding at the prima facie stage. Thus, he asked the court to
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.
On September 27, 2023, the court found there had been a prima facie
showing based on the totality of circumstances, including that the case involved
three defendants and two firearms. The court issued an order to show cause.
Both parties submitted supplemental briefing. The prosecutor’s brief
included an extensive factual background, with citations to the reporter’s transcript
from the trial. The prosecutor argued that the People’s theory of the case, the
charges, the jury instructions, and the verdicts all supported the fact that defendant
was the actual shooter, and the jury agreed. The prosecutor pointed out that, at
trial, it was argued that the GBI caused by defendant was the victim’s death, and
the jury found the GBI allegation true. Defendant’s brief argued that the jury’s not
true finding on the special circumstance allegations that the murder had occurred
during the commission of a burglary and attempted robbery required the court to
grant resentencing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2).
4
The court took judicial notice of the prior appellate opinion, and the
prosecution submitted into evidence all the transcripts from the trial. The court
reviewed the transcripts and held a hearing on November 20, 2024. Defense
counsel argued that the jury found the killing was not done during the commission
of a felony; thus, defendant should be resentenced under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(2). The prosecutor responded that defendant was the actual killer,
so section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2) did not apply. The court disagreed with
defense counsel’s argument and stated that the jury simply did not find the special
circumstance allegation true, and that the jury appeared to be confused. The court
then asked whether defendant was found guilty under a theory of felony murder,
and both counsel confirmed that he was found guilty under that theory. After
further discussion, the court denied the resentencing petition, stating: “The Court
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner attempted to commit a robbery
and/or a burglary in violation — the robbery is in violation of Penal Code section
211; burglary, 459 . . . and while attempting to commit those crimes, the petitioner
personally committed an act that directly caused the death of another person.” The
court then stated it was finding “beyond a reasonable doubt” that defendant was
guilty of first degree felony murder as defined by current law and thereby denied
the petition.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his petition for
resentencing.
5
DISCUSSION
Defendant was provided notice under Delgadillo and advised that counsel
filed a brief stating no arguable issues could be found, and that because this is an
appeal from a postconviction proceeding, this court is not required to conduct an
independent review of the record but may do so in its discretion. (Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) The notice advised him that he could file a
supplemental brief within 30 days. Defendant filed a supplemental brief. Where a
defendant has filed a supplemental brief, a court of appeal need only evaluate the
specific arguments presented in the brief. (Ibid.) “The filing of a supplemental
brief or letter does not compel an independent review of the entire record to
identify unraised issues.” (Ibid.)
Defendant’s four-page handwritten brief raises non-meritorious claims. He
cites to the prior appellate decision, in which we concluded that the trial court did
not prejudicially err in refusing to give his requested instructions on lesser
included offenses to murder. Defendant proceeds to claim that a failure to instruct
on lesser included offenses of murder “was state law error, not federal
constitutional error, and was not structural under Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18.” He asserts that he “requested lesser included offenses to murder
with malice aforethought that the jury may decide his culpability, beyond a
reasonable doubt. A due process [sic] that defendant has been denied when the
trial court refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses.” Defendant
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then argues that “[t]he jury’s ‘not true’ finding(s) on the special circumstances(s)
is thus most consistant [sic] — with the inference that — even without the asserted
error — the jury would have most certainly found defendant ‘not guilty’ of felony
murder.” He concludes that the jury’s not true finding was “entitled to significant
weight in — evaluating what the jury would have decided if the trial court had
properly instructed on lesser included offenses” and that the court’s order denying
his resentencing petition should therefore be reversed.
Notably, this court already decided in the prior appeal that the trial court
did not prejudicially err in refusing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses
of murder. Thus, defendant’s claim regarding “what the jury would have decided
if the trial court had properly instructed on lesser included offenses” is immaterial.
Further, it is not relevant to his petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437). This amended both the felony-
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (People v. Reyes (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 292, 295.) Here, the prosecution argued the record of conviction
showed that defendant was the actual killer. The court reviewed the record,
including the trial transcripts, and concluded that defendant intended to commit
7
robbery and burglary, and “while attempting to commit those crimes, [he]
personally committed an act that directly caused the death of another person.” In
other words, in denying the resentencing petition, the trial court found, and
defendant does not dispute, that the evidence adduced at trial showed he was the
actual killer. “[R]esentencing relief under section 1172.6 is not available to an
‘actual killer.’” (People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973.) Thus, the
court properly denied defendant’s petition.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J. RAPHAEL J.
8
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, finding that the defendant was the actual killer and therefore ineligible for relief.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.
Whether the defendant's claims regarding jury instructions on lesser included offenses are relevant to a section 1172.6 petition.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“[R]esentencing relief under section 1172.6 is not available to an ‘actual killer.’”