California Court of Appeal Nov 12, 2025 No. E079972AUnpublished
Filed 11/12/25 In re Andres R. CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re ANDRES R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E079972
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. RIJ2200411)
v. OPINION
A.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dorothy McLaughlin,
Judge. Affirmed.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
A.R. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order adjudging his
son, Andres R., a dependent of the court and removing the child from his custody. The
court also ordered reunification services for Father. On appeal, Father challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional finding and the removal
order. He also argues that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services
(DPSS) failed to comply with state law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
In the unpublished portion of a prior opinion, we held that substantial evidence
supported the jurisdictional finding and the removal order. In the published portion of
the prior opinion, we rejected Father’s ICWA argument, concluding that DPSS did not
err by failing to ask various extended family members about Andres’s potential Indian
ancestry.1 (In re Andres R. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 828.) Our Supreme Court granted
review and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of In re Ja.O.
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 271 (Ja.O.). While this matter was under review, Father and D.P.
(Mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights, and we
affirmed that order in an unpublished opinion. (In re Joseph P. (May 19, 2025, E084575)
[nonpub. opn.] (Joseph P.).)
The Supreme Court recently transferred this case back to us with directions to
vacate our prior opinion and reconsider the appeal in light of Ja.O. We gave the parties
1 Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,” we use it as well “to reflect the statutory language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1.) No disrespect is intended. 2
the opportunity to file supplemental briefs addressing matters arising after our previous
decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b)(2).) Father filed a letter stating that he
would not be submitting a supplemental brief in light of Joseph P. DPSS did not file a
supplemental brief or otherwise respond to our order permitting supplemental briefs.
Having complied with the Supreme Court’s directions, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Detention
Father’s one-year-old son, Andres R., came to DPSS’s attention in May 2022,
when Mother called law enforcement to report domestic violence. Mother reported that
Father put her in a headlock and choked her. She freed herself from the headlock and
tried to call law enforcement, but Father grabbed her phone and threw it. He then drove
off. Mother put Andres and his two half-siblings in her car, which contained only one car
seat, and chased Father’s car. She called law enforcement during that chase. Andres and
his half-siblings witnessed the altercation but were not injured.2 Mother refused an
emergency protective order.
The social worker went to the family’s hotel room the following day. The family
had been living at the hotel for two years. The front desk agent described Father as mean
and aggressive with staff. A hotel guest said that he heard screaming inside the family’s
room the night before and again that morning. The social worker heard voices and a
television inside the family’s room, but no one answered the door for over an hour, so the
2 Mother is not a party to this appeal, nor are the fathers of Andres’s half-siblings. 3
social worker called law enforcement to conduct a welfare check. Father opened the door
when the officers knocked on it, but he attempted to close it when he saw them.
Although Father resisted the officers, they eventually arrested him. Mother closed the
hotel room door and refused to open it when the officers were dealing with Father.
Father yelled to Mother that she should not open the door or come outside. One of the
officers got a room key from hotel staff and tried to open the door, but the key did not
work. The social worker later discovered that the parents had removed the batteries from
the key reader on the door.
Mother came out of the hotel room after the officers took Father away. She told
the social worker that Father was upset the day before because paternal grandfather had
been killed. Father “got in her face,” put her in a headlock, and choked her. She had red
marks on both sides of her neck. She allowed Father to return to the hotel room after the
incident because she loved him and he lived there. She described Father as a good man
and a good father, and she said that yesterday was the first time “he ha[d] ever done
anything like this.”
Andres’s half-sister, who was nearly six years old, told the social worker that
Father was mad and threw Mother across the bed. He also hit Mother with his fist, which
the child demonstrated by making a fist. Mother looked scared. The child could not
remember what anyone had said. She told the social worker that she had seen Father hit
Mother before. Andres’s half-brother, who was nearly four years old, seemed not to
4
understand the social worker’s questions and made no statements. Father refused to be
interviewed for the detention report.
The social worker also reported on the condition of the family’s hotel room and
included photographs with the detention report. Trash and other things were all over the
floor, and the room was very dark because the lights did not work. The social worker
tripped twice as she was trying to navigate the room and asked Mother to open the
curtains. The window had two large cracks in it, and the mirrored closet door was also
cracked. The parents had divided the room by hanging a tarp across it. There were piles
of boxes, bags, and other objects against every wall and a makeshift wall and a tall pile of
items behind the couch. A makeshift fan was hanging from the ceiling in the bathroom,
and the floor in there was also littered with trash, including acrylic paint bottles. The
counter in the kitchenette area was covered with items, including a blade within the
children’s reach. The social worker asked Mother to clean up the room as much as
possible so that the children did not trip or hurt themselves.
Mother told the social worker that she did not have any Indian ancestry. The
worker was unable to ask Father about Indian ancestry because of his refusal to be
interviewed.
DPSS applied for a protective custody warrant for the removal of the children
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 340, and the court issued the warrant on the
same day. (Unlabeled statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)
DPSS also filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging in relevant part
5
that (1) the parents neglected Andres’s health and safety because the family’s residence
(the hotel room) was “found in deplorable conditions,” (2) Father abused controlled
substances, (3) the parents engaged in ongoing acts of domestic violence in Andres’s
presence, and (4) Father had a criminal history, including an arrest and/or conviction for
felony inflicting corporal injury on a spouse.
At the detention hearing in June 2022, Mother requested that the court issue an
emergency protective order restraining Father. Her counsel stated that she did not agree
to one earlier because she did not understand the request, but Mother was now “more
than happy to do whatever” DPSS requested. Father objected to the request for an
emergency protective order. He argued that the order was unnecessary because (1) he
was in custody, and (2) the altercation was an isolated incident. Father’s counsel
indicated that Father might have Cherokee ancestry, and Father filed Judicial Council
form ICWA-020 (Parental Notification of Indian Status) indicating that Andres might be
eligible for membership in the Cherokee tribe.
The court detained Andres from the parents and issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) protecting Mother from Father. Additionally, the court found that ICWA
may apply to Andres.
II. Jurisdiction and disposition
DPSS again interviewed Andres’s half-sister and Mother in preparation for the
jurisdiction and disposition hearings. The half-sister reported that she saw Father “roll[]”
Mother “all over the bed” and choke Mother. Mother asserted that Father had never “laid
6
a hand on” her before the choking incident and that he was upset because paternal
grandfather had been murdered. She again asserted that Father had always been good to
her and the children.
Father’s counsel did not permit DPSS to interview him about the domestic
violence allegations. However, Father answered questions about his social history and
background. Father claimed to have Cherokee ancestry. Paternal grandmother reported
that neither she nor paternal grandfather had Indian ancestry. Father said that he would
do whatever was necessary to have Andres returned to his care. When the social worker
asked about placement, Father responded: “‘I don’t like that they’re trying to keep the
kids together. I feel like my son was taken from me because of her [Mother] and her
kids.’” He wanted DPSS to place Andres with paternal grandmother or paternal aunt.
Paternal grandmother was willing to care for Andres and his half-siblings, so DPSS
submitted a resource family referral on her behalf. After Father was released from
custody, he had supervised visitation with Andres twice per week.
DPSS gave Father referrals for housing assistance, random drug testing, substance
abuse treatment programs, parenting education, and domestic violence services at a
mental health agency. Father drug tested negative and provided proof of enrollment in
parenting education, anger management, and counseling services. He also provided a
letter from a substance abuse treatment program stating that he did not meet the medical
requirements for treatment.
7
At the jurisdiction hearing in July 2022, the parents requested that the court set the
matter for contest, so the court continued the hearing. With respect to the TRO, Mother
asked the court to allow the TRO to expire. The court granted that requested, and the
TRO expired that day.
Father continued to visit Andres twice per week for two hours and was engaging
in domestic violence services. He had taken three random drug tests with negative results
and failed to appear for a fourth test. DPSS was waiting for Father’s substance abuse and
parenting education providers to confirm his attendance at those programs.
DPSS contacted the Cherokee Nation and asked whether the parents, paternal
grandparents, or Andres were enrolled members of the tribe or eligible to enroll. The
tribe responded that Andres was not an Indian child in relation to the Cherokee Nation.
DPSS amended the petition to allege the family’s residence was “unsafe,” rather
than in deplorable conditions. The agency also amended the allegation about Father’s
criminal record to state that he had an arrest and/or conviction for misdemeanor inflicting
corporal injury on a spouse, rather than an arrest and/or conviction for the felony offense.
The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing occurred in August 2022.
Father’s counsel argued that the court should find the allegations of unsafe living
conditions to be untrue because Father was not living at the hotel and went there only to
help with Andres or to pick up the child. He also argued that there was no evidence to
support the substance abuse allegation. Counsel noted that Father had pled to
8
misdemeanor inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, but he did not offer any specific
arguments with respect to the domestic violence allegations.
The court struck the substance abuse allegation. But it found true the allegations
that (1) the family’s residence was unsafe, (2) the parents were engaged in ongoing
domestic violence, and (3) Father had a misdemeanor conviction for spousal abuse. (The
court also found true that Mother had an extensive criminal history and neglected the
medical and educational needs of Andres and his half-siblings.) The court took
jurisdiction over Andres on the basis of the sustained allegations.
As for disposition, DPSS had placed Andres with paternal grandmother a few days
before the hearing. Father stated that he approved of Andres’s placement with paternal
grandmother and that he was “submitting on family reunification services.”
The court made the required findings under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), by
clear and convincing evidence and adjudged Andres a dependent of the court. It removed
Andres from the parents’ physical custody and ordered reunification services for both of
them. The court found that DPSS had made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for
removal. The court also found that ICWA did not apply to Andres.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional finding
Father argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s
jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). We disagree.
9
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), authorizes a juvenile court to take jurisdiction
over a child if the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness” as a result of the “failure or inability of the
child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.” The statutory
definition requires DPSS to demonstrate three elements by a preponderance of the
evidence: “(1) neglectful conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and
(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or
illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848.)
Section 300 generally requires proof that the child is subject to the defined risk of
harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, but the court need not wait until the child is
seriously injured to take jurisdiction. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 165; In re
Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824.) “The court may consider past events in
deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.” (In re N.M., supra, at
p. 165.) A parent’s “‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions’ if there is
reason to believe that the conduct will continue.” (In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th
453, 461.) Domestic violence between a child’s parents may support a jurisdictional
finding “‘if there is evidence that the violence is ongoing or likely to continue and that it
directly harmed the child physically or placed the child at risk of physical harm.’” (In re
L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 239.)
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jurisdictional finding
requires us to determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports it. (In re
10
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the finding and review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s
determination. (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent
judgment but merely determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the finding.
(Ibid.)
As a preliminary matter, DPSS urges us to reject Father’s challenge because he
does not challenge the jurisdictional findings based on Mother’s conduct. When the
juvenile court takes jurisdiction on multiple grounds, we may affirm the court’s finding
of jurisdiction if any single ground is supported by substantial evidence. (In re I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) We “‘need not consider whether any or all of the other
alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.)
However, we will address the merits of a challenge to any jurisdictional finding that
forms the basis for dispositional orders also challenged on appeal. (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 278, 283 (D.P.).) That is the case here: Father challenges the dispositional
order removing Andres from his custody, which is based on the sustained allegations of
domestic violence and unsafe living conditions. We therefore reject DPSS’s argument.
We also reject DPSS’s argument that Father forfeited his substantial evidence
challenge by failing to specifically contest the allegations of domestic violence. At the
jurisdiction hearing, Father’s counsel opened by stating that Father’s “general denials
continue.” Counsel made specific arguments about the allegations of unsafe living
conditions and the substance abuse allegation. Counsel then stated that Father was
11
“submit[ting] on jurisdiction . . . with those arguments.” But none of that forfeited
Father’s substantial evidence challenge. “[W]hen a parent submits or acquiesces on a
particular record, ‘the court must nevertheless weigh evidence, make appropriate
evidentiary findings and apply relevant law to determine whether the case has been
proved.’” (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 464.) And “[e]ven if the parent
does not contest the state of the evidence, he or she preserves the right to challenge it as
insufficient.” (Ibid.) Father thus preserved his substantial evidence challenge.
As for the merits of the challenge, the record contains substantial evidence
supporting the court’s jurisdictional finding. According to Mother, Father choked her,
put her in a headlock, and threw her phone. The social worker observed red marks on
Mother’s neck the day after the altercation. Andres’s half-sister reported that Father
threw Mother across the bed and hit her with his fist. The half-sister had seen Father hit
Mother on other occasions. Although Father had engaged in some domestic violence
services by the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there was no information about his
progress in those services. And Father refused to discuss the domestic violence
allegations with DPSS. There was thus no evidence about what had caused Father to be
violent from his perspective, whether he had any meaningful insights about the violence,
or whether he had effectively resolved the issue. Instead, Father demonstrated a lack of
insight about the issue when DPSS asked about placement—he said that he felt Andres
was taken from him because of Mother and her children. Moreover, the parents appeared
to be together still. Mother allowed Father to return to the hotel room just after the
12
altercation. She eventually asked the court for a TRO but then asked the court to let the
TRO expire. At the time of the jurisdiction hearing, both parents were still using the
hotel room as their mailing address. On this record, the court could reasonably infer that
domestic violence between the parents was likely to continue in the absence of court
supervision.
The court could also reasonably infer that the violence between the parents placed
Andres at substantial risk of serious physical harm. He and his half-siblings were present
during the altercation and could have easily been injured when Father threw Mother
across the bed and threw her cell phone. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183,
194 [children were at risk of physical harm from domestic violence “since, for example,
they could . . . be accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or leg, or by [the
victim] falling against them”].) Andres also could have been injured when Mother put
the children in the car and chased after Father. The court did not need to wait until
Andres was actually injured to take steps to protect him.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional finding based on
domestic violence between the parents. We need not consider whether the evidence of
unsafe living conditions also supported jurisdiction.3 (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
3 In any event, Father’s only argument with respect to the living conditions is that the parents were no longer living in the hotel room. Father does not cite to the record for that assertion, and our review of the record discloses no support for the claim. As noted, the parents were still using the hotel room as their mailing address. If they were living elsewhere or their living conditions had changed, the record does not reflect that. 13
pp. 283-284 [validity of one jurisdictional finding against a parent renders moot any
challenges to other jurisdictional findings against the same parent].)
II. Sufficient evidence to support the removal order
Father also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the order
removing Andres from his custody. The argument lacks merit.
To order a child removed from their parents’ physical custody, the juvenile court
must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there “would be a substantial danger
to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the child
in the parents’ home, and (2) “there are no reasonable means by which the [child’s]
physical health can be protected without” removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) We review
those findings for substantial evidence (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633), taking into
account the level of confidence that the “clear and convincing” standard demands
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995). The question before us “is whether
the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder
could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at pp. 995-996.) We
“view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses,
resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Id. at. p. 996.)
DPSS again urges us to conclude that Father forfeited his substantial evidence
challenge. The agency reasons that Father forfeited the issue by “submitting on family
14
reunification services.” DPSS relies on case law holding that a parent forfeited her
challenge to removal by submitting on the social worker’s recommendation to remove the
children. (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 587-591.) We are not persuaded.
Father did not say that he was submitting on the social worker’s recommendation (which
was removal), nor did he say that he was submitting on removal. His submission could
reasonably be construed as an agreement to participate in reunification services only if
the court removed Andres from his custody. We also note that in general substantial
evidence challenges are not forfeited by failure to raise them in the trial court. (In re R.V.
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 848; In re Javier G., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) In
the absence of an unequivocal statement that Father was submitting on removal or on
DPSS’s recommendation, we decline to find that Father forfeited his challenge to the
removal order.
On the merits, however, Father’s substantial evidence challenge fails. He argues
that there was insufficient evidence of a substantial danger to Andres because Father was
engaged in services and his attack on Mother was a one-time event. The argument
ignores all of the contrary evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the removal
order. Andres’s half-sister had seen Father hit Mother before the most recent incident.
Father attacked Mother in Andres’s presence. Andres was only one year old and likely
would have been unable to protect himself from any unintended consequences of such an
attack, like an object thrown in his direction. Further, Father’s mere participation in
services did not show that there was no danger to Andres. There was no evidence that
15
Father was benefitting from the domestic violence services, given the lack of information
about his progress and his failure to discuss the issue with DPSS. And the court could
reasonably infer that domestic violence remained a danger, because the parents were still
in a relationship and living together. They were using the same hotel address for
purposes of this case, and Mother asked the court to let the TRO expire. On the whole,
substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Father’s violence against Mother posed
a substantial danger to Andres’s physical or emotional well-being.
Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that there were no reasonable
means to protect Andres short of removal. Father proposes alternative means that he
claims would have sufficiently protected Andres. He suggests that the court could have
placed Andres in his custody on condition that he live with Andres at paternal
grandmother’s home, or the court could have allowed Mother to retain custody. Father
also suggests that the court could have issued a mutual stay-away order and ordered
unannounced home visits by DPSS.
But the record supports a reasonable inference that alternative means would not
have sufficiently protected Andres. First, section 361 requires the court to consider two
options as reasonable means to protect the child: (1) removing an offending parent from
the home, and (2) allowing a nonoffending parent to retain physical custody, so long as
that parent presents a plan showing that they can protect the child from future harm.
(§ 361, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(B).) Neither parent was nonoffending in this case, and even if
16
they were, neither parent presented a plan about how they would protect Andres from
future harm.
Second, placing Andres in Father’s custody would have required Father to
cooperate fully with DPSS, and Father overlooks the evidence that he and Mother were
not fully cooperative with DPSS. When the social worker first visited the family home,
the parents refused to open the door for over an hour. They took the batteries out of the
key reader on the door so that the social worker and officers could not enter with the key
provided by hotel staff. Father eventually opened the door and resisted the officers’
attempts to get him out of the room. Once they did so, Father yelled for Mother to
remain in the room. She only came out after the officers took Father away. Father
refused to be interviewed at all for the detention report, and he refused to answer
questions about the primary issue in this case—domestic violence—for the jurisdiction
and disposition report.
Third, without any information from Father about the domestic violence or from
his service provider about Father’s progress, the court could not know whether the same
issue would arise even if Father were living apart from Mother. Under all of these
circumstances, the court reasonably concluded that there were no reasonable means to
protect Andres short of removal.
Father also argues that the record does not contain sufficient evidence that DPSS
made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. (§ 361, subd. (e)
[“The court shall make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to
17
prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from their home . . .”].) In
particular, he claims that DPSS failed to adequately investigate or propose alternatives to
removal like those he proposes on appeal.
Section 361 requires reasonable efforts, not perfect efforts, and substantial
evidence shows that DPSS’s efforts were reasonable here. (In re H.E. (2008) 169
Cal.App.4th 710, 725 [“reasonable efforts, like reasonable services, need only be
reasonable under the circumstances, not perfect”].) After the detention hearing, DPSS
provided Father with referrals for housing assistance, substance abuse treatment, drug
testing, parenting education, and domestic violence services. The agency also facilitated
visitation between Father and Andres. But given Father’s refusal to address the domestic
violence with DPSS, the suggestion that the agency should have done more to investigate
placement in his home is not reasonable. The court therefore did not err by finding that
DPSS made reasonable efforts.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s
removal order.
III. Claimed ICWA error
Father argues that DPSS failed to comply with the duty of initial inquiry under
state law by failing to ask extended family members whether Andres might be an Indian
child within the meaning of ICWA. (Former § 224.2, subd. (b); Stats. 2018, ch. 833,
§ 5.) Our prior opinion concluded that the duty to inquire of extended family members
did not apply, because Andres was not taken into temporary custody under section 306—
18
he was taken into custody pursuant to a protective custody warrant under section 340.
Ja.O. held that the “extended-family inquiry duty” applies even if a child was taken into
custody pursuant to a protective custody warrant.4 (Ja.O., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 278.)
But we need not remand for DPSS to conduct an inquiry of extended family
members. As we explained in Joseph P., DPSS made extensive ICWA inquiries while
this appeal was pending, including inquiries of extended family members. We rejected
Father’s claim of ICWA error in Joseph P., and we concluded that the juvenile court did
not abuse its discretion by finding that the ICWA investigation was adequate and proper.
At this point, there is no further ICWA investigation to conduct. Because we cannot
grant Father any effective relief, the issue is moot. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J. We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J. FIELDS J.
4 Ja.O. interpreted the scope of the initial inquiry duty under former section 224.2, subdivision (b), which was in effect at the time of the disposition hearing in this case. (Ja.O., supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 283-291.) Effective September 27, 2024, the Legislature amended section 224.2 to clarify that the extended-family inquiry duty applies regardless of whether the child is taken into temporary custody under section 306 or protective custody under section 340. (Ja.O., at pp. 277, 280, 291.) 19
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and removal order, concluding that substantial evidence supported the determination that domestic violence between the parents posed a substantial danger to the child and that no reasonable means existed to protect the child short of removal.
Issues
Whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
Whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's order removing the child from the father's custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1).
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court could also reasonably infer that the violence between the parents placed Andres at substantial risk of serious physical harm.”
“On the whole, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Father’s violence against Mother posed a substantial danger to Andres’s physical or emotional well-being.”
“the court reasonably concluded that there were no reasonable means to protect Andres short of removal.”