Thornberry v. County of Stanislaus CA5
Filed 11/7/25 Thornberry v. County of Stanislaus CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
KENNETH L. THORNBERRY, as Trustee, etc., F087970 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CV-22-001046) v.
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Stacy P. Speiller, Judge. Dan Farrar, for Defendant and Appellant. Berliner Cohen, Michael B. Ijams, Makayla A. Whitney, and Robert Aversa- Goodman for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo-
In this case, the County of Stanislaus (County) appeals after a bench trial where the trial court determined that County applied an incorrect methodology when assessing steel structures erected as part of new solar systems. Respondent Kenneth L. Thornberry (Thornberry), acting as trustee of the Kenneth L. Thornberry and Pamela B. Thornberry Revocable Trust, had purchased prefabricated steel structures to support solar panels added to two properties held by the trust. Such structures can be considered new construction that trigger reassessment of the properties and related tax liabilities. However, an exception exists for new construction that is part of an active solar system. Thornberry alleged the structures were part of active solar systems, but County disagreed and reassessed the properties with the structures. This dispute suggests several potentially relevant questions, including the meaning of the phrase “active solar system,” the scope of the exception for parts of such a system, and the line where an otherwise taxable structure can be excepted from taxation because it is necessary to the solar system. This opinion, however, does not reach these issues. As presented, County only raises a more foundational question: Does a trial court review such assessment determinations de novo or for substantial evidence? Here, the trial court reviewed the assessment de novo and found County’s methodology was arbitrary, exceeded its discretion, or was in violation of standards prescribed by law. County makes no argument that the trial court’s de novo resolution was incorrect. Rather, it argues the trial court was not permitted to review the underlying methodology and therefore could only consider whether substantial evidence supported County’s determination. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Thornberry raised a legal challenge to the assessment methodology that warranted de novo review. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. In doing so, we take no position on the correctness of the trial court’s analysis or on its conclusion that Thornberry’s property was excepted from reassessment as a matter of law under the facts presented. We consider such issues
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