Mattison contends that vacating the restitution fine portion of his judgment
requires a full resentencing.
The “full resentencing rule” is often stated in terms of appellate procedure. That
is, “when part of a sentence is stricken on review,” on remand “‘a full resentencing as to
all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of
the changed circumstances.’” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 (Buycks).)
The reason for the full resentencing rule is that “‘“an aggregate prison term is not a series
of separate independent terms, but one term made up of interdependent components. The
invalidity of one component infects the entire scheme.”’” (People v. Terwilligar (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 585, 601 (Terwilligar).)
The same rule applies to “statutes addressing recalled sentences.” (Buycks, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 893.) When a sentence is recalled after judgment, “the resentencing court
has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected
to the recall.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163 [entitlement
to resentencing means “vacatur of the original sentence, whereupon the trial court may
impose any appropriate sentence”].)
Still, not every correction to a sentence means a recall of the sentence. When a
trial court corrects an abstract of judgment to conform to the judgment, the sentence is
not recalled and no resentencing occurs. For instance, when an abstract of judgment does
not accurately reflect the fines imposed, the trial court simply corrects the abstract to
4
conform to the judgment. (Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 188; see also People v.
Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 426-427 [ordering erroneously applied prior prison term
struck without a resentencing]; People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 985-986
[correction of clerical error does not permit resentencing].)
Here, we conclude that section 1465.9(d) does not trigger the full resentencing rule
in declaring the restitution fine portion of the judgment vacated. It vacates that portion of
the judgment as if the trial court had orally pronounced as much. For any court
proceeding today, it simply requires correction of the abstract of judgment to conform it
to the judgment, to show that the portion of the judgment that eliminates the now-
unenforceable restitution fine is vacated.
Our conclusion is supported by the statute’s text. The statute indicates that the
Legislature did not intend for the sentence to be recalled or for a resentencing to occur
because it refers to neither of those things. Section 1465.9(d) simply declares the fine
unenforceable after 10 years and the portion of the judgment imposing it vacated.
(Compare, e.g., § 1172.1 [statute with recall and resentencing procedures].) Not only
does it not refer to recall or resentencing, but the statute conspicuously does not order the
entire sentence vacated, only the “portion” of the judgment that imposes the fine.
The substance of section 1465.9(d) reinforces our conclusion that the full
resentencing rule does not apply. The statute alters a fine but does not address a
defendant’s custody time. It thereby involves a portion of the sentence that is normally
not interdependent with the imprisonment components. The reason for the full
5
resentencing rule is that in an “‘“aggregate prison term”’” the components are often
interdependent. (Terwilligar, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, italics added.) Where a
fine, rather than a prison term, is eliminated, that reason dissipates.
Moreover, there was no judicial error in the judgment here, nor does the restitution
fine statute implicate any discretionary decision that suggests a court might wish to
revisit the sentence. The imposition of the restitution fine is mandatory (absent
“compelling and extraordinary reasons” (§ 1202.4, subd. (c))), and its elimination at 10
years also so. The portion of the judgment imposing Mattison’s fine was vacated by
statute on January 1, 2025. It cannot be collected upon. All that is left, at most, is to
correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that vacatur.
People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248 accords with our conclusion. There,
the Court of Appeal concluded that section 1465.9, subdivision (a), which vacated the
portion of the judgment imposing probation supervision fees, required vacating a portion
of the judgment, but the court did not recall the sentence nor order a resentencing.
(People v. Clark, supra, at pp. 259-260.) As in People v. Clark, no full resentencing is
warranted here.
B. A Motion Can Conform the Abstract of Judgment
Mattison contends that his habeas petition is the proper vehicle for him to seek to
“vacate his restitution fine” under section 1465.9(d). We disagree. The fine has been
vacated. We conclude that a defendant may file a motion seeking to have the trial court
modify the abstract of judgment to reflect that.
6
On January 1, 2025, when the statute became effective, Mattison’s restitution fine
was rendered uncollectible and unenforceable. At that time, the portion of his judgment
imposing that fine was vacated. The judgment is the sentence ordered orally by the court;
the abstract of judgment is not the judgment. (People v. Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p.
344, fn. 9; Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 185.) Once the new law was effective,
Mattison’s restitution fine was vacated as surely as if the trial court judge had ordered it.
While other changes in sentencing law might require a judicial determination before a
judgment is changed (see, e.g., § 1172.75, subd. (c)), this one does not.
The only question for Mattison, or any defendant, is whether to ask a trial court to
correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the judgment. Large numbers of defendants
were affected by the enactment of section 1465.9(d). Nearly every convicted defendant
in the state is subject to a restitution fine, and any defendant with an unpaid balance after
10 years from imposition had that balance rendered uncollectable by section 1465.9(d),
even defendants no longer in custody. (See §§ 2085.6, subd. (a) [continuing obligation to
pay restitution fine on supervision], 2085.7, subd. (a) [continuing obligation to pay
restitution fine after release], 1214, subd. (b) [restitution fines collectable as civil
judgments].)
It may be enough for many defendants to leave the matter alone. For those that
have paid the fine, it may not matter whether the abstract of judgment reflects it as a
component of the sentence. Even among defendants who had a balance owed, it may be
enough for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to
7
ensure through its records that the restitution fine is recorded as no longer owed. The
People have submitted Mattison’s July 2025 CDCR “Offender Restitution Payment
History” that they claim shows Mattison with a zero restitution balance, though we are 2 unconvinced it shows that. More helpful to the general point, the People have submitted
a December 2024 CDCR policy document stating that its Trust Restitution Accounting
and Canteen System was being updated to ensure that collections on fines “automatically
cease” when required by section 1465.9(d). (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); People v.
Gram (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) It is reasonable to expect that CDCR’s
system functions to ensure that defendants ordinarily need take no action to ensure that 3 their restitution fine is treated as uncollectable at the proper time. Relatedly, we know
that defendants who pay off restitution orders generally need not go to court to obtain
proof of payment. The fact that an abstract of judgment shows a fine or restitution
amount initially ordered does not determine whether the amount was paid.
Nevertheless, we agree with the People that section 1465.9(d) implicitly allows a
defendant to file a postjudgment motion in trial court to correct the abstract of judgment
2 The People offer an exhibit that shows Mattison with a zero balance, but it shows an original balance of $1,700. This appears to reflect payment of the amount ordered for Mattison’s direct restitution to the victim, not his $8,000 restitution fine. To show that CDCR implements section 1465.9(d), we would want to see an indication that a restitution fine had been reduced to a zero balance on January 1, 2025, or on the 10th anniversary of its imposition. 3 We do not have information before us about whether the Franchise Tax Board’s process of collecting restitution fines from released defendants automatically reflects the effect of section 1465.9(d). (See Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19280-19282.)
8
to conform to the judgment. (People v. Clark, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 261.) If the
statute merely declared a defendant’s restitution fine uncollectable and unenforceable at
the 10-year point, we might conclude that was only a matter of recordkeeping. But the
statute creates an additional right by declaring that the “portion of a judgment” imposing
that fine is vacated. (§ 1465.9(d).) Courts generally have the power to correct the
abstract of judgment to conform to the judgment. (Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 188;
see also People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 69-70 [discussing, along with
correction of clerical errors, Code Civ. Proc. § 187 as a jurisdictional basis].) Because
the judgment has changed, such a motion appears appropriate so that the abstract of
judgment reflects that a portion of the judgment has been vacated.
Before us, though, is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that was filed after a
similar petition in trial court. A habeas petition is unavailable when a defendant has an
adequate legal remedy. (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452.) A motion to correct the
abstract of judgment is such a remedy. Mattison asks us to treat this habeas petition as a
freestanding motion. We have, though, no appeal from a trial court ruling from which to
take appellate jurisdiction; we have only a habeas petition filed in our original
jurisdiction. If we construed the habeas petition as a motion, we would lack jurisdiction
to decide the motion. Mattison is free to file such a motion in trial court.
III. DISPOSITION
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
9
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.
10
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. Section 1465.9(d) does not entitle a defendant to a full resentencing upon the vacatur of a restitution fine, and a postjudgment motion to correct the abstract of judgment is the appropriate remedy for a defendant seeking to reflect that change.
Issues
Does the vacatur of a restitution fine under Penal Code section 1465.9(d) trigger a full resentencing?
Is a petition for writ of habeas corpus the proper vehicle to seek correction of an abstract of judgment following the operation of section 1465.9(d)?
Disposition. denied
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“we conclude that section 1465.9(d) does not trigger the full resentencing rule in declaring the restitution fine portion of the judgment vacated.”
“we conclude that a defendant may file a motion seeking to have the trial court modify the abstract of judgment to reflect that.”
“A habeas petition is unavailable when a defendant has an adequate legal remedy. (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452.) A motion to correct the abstract of judgment is such a remedy.”