Rancho Cucamonga Central School District v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2025) · DecisionDepot
Rancho Cucamonga Central School District v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Nov 7, 2025 No. E084855Unpublished
Filed 11/7/25 Rancho Cucamonga Central School District v. Superior Court CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
RANCHO CUCAMONGA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, E084855 Petitioner, (Super.Ct.No. CIVSB2225076) v. OPINION SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,
Respondent;
KRISTOPHER FLOWERS et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Joseph T. Ortiz,
Judge. Granted.
Schumann Arevalo, Eric Arevalo, Jeffrey P. Cunningham, and David P. Reid;
Dolen Tucker Tierney & Abraham and Raymond F. Dolen, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
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Walkup, Melodia, Kelly & Schoenberger, Khaldoun A. Baghdadi, Valerie N.
Rose, and Kelly L. Ganci; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy and Holly N. Boyer, for Real
Party in Interest, Kristopher Flowers.
Real party in interest Kristopher Flowers alleges that the director of his school’s
childcare program sexually abused him when he was a minor. Flowers sued several
parties, including petitioner Rancho Cucamonga Central School District (the district).
The district moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication of the four causes of
action asserted against it. The trial court granted summary adjudication to the district as
to two causes of action but denied it as to the other two. The district sought writ relief as
to the partial denial.
Our order to show cause limited the issues to Flowers’s fourth cause of action,
which asserts a claim for negligent supervision. We find the district is entitled to
summary adjudication of that cause of action and therefore grant the petition.
FACTS
Flowers was a student at one of the district’s middle schools for sixth, seventh, and
eighth grade between 1999 and 2002. During this time, he attended a childcare program
before and after school. Defendant West End Young Men’s Christian Association (West
End YMCA) operated the program on Flower’s school campus. West End YMCA
employed defendant Christine Johnson as the program director. The national entity with
which West End YMCA is affiliated is defendant National Council of YMCAS of the
USA dba YMCA of the USA (YMCA USA).
2
Flowers alleges Johnson repeatedly sexually abused him during the 2001-2002
school year on the school campus and at her residence. His complaint, filed in November
2022, alleges seven causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (3) negligent hiring/retention; (4) negligent supervision/failure to
warn; (5) battery; (6) sexual battery; and (7) failure to perform mandatory duties. The
first, third, fourth, and seventh causes of action are asserted against the district. The first
cause of action alleges the district (as well as West End YMCA and YMCA USA)
negligently breached a duty to supervise students, while the fourth cause of action alleges
negligent breach of a duty to supervise Johnson.
The district moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication. The trial
court denied summary judgment, granted summary adjudication as to the third and
seventh causes of action, and denied summary adjudication as to the first and fourth
causes of action.
The district petitioned for writ relief from the partial denial of its motion.
DISCUSSION
We ordered the parties to show cause why we should not grant the district relief on
Flowers’s fourth cause of action. Thus, the trial court’s denial of summary adjudication
as to the first cause of action, based on allegedly negligent supervision of Flowers, is not
at issue here. Also, Flowers clarifies in his return that the “failure to warn” aspect of his
fourth cause of action is limited to West End YMCA and is not asserted against the
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district. Our only question here, then, is whether there are triable issues as to the
district’s alleged negligent supervision of Johnson.
“Summary adjudication works the same way as summary judgment, ‘except it acts
on specific causes of action or affirmative defenses, rather than on the entire complaint.’”
(Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 382, 398.) “‘A summary
adjudication is properly granted only if a motion therefor completely disposes of a cause
of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.’” (Id. at pp.
398-399; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (f)(1).)
“A party challenging denial of summary judgment [or summary adjudication] may
do so by writ petition.” (San Antonio Regional Hospital v. Superior Court (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 346, 350; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (m)(1).) “‘Where the trial
court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment [or summary adjudication] will result in
trial on nonactionable claims, a writ of mandate will issue.’” (CRST, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1255, 1259-1260.) We review the trial court’s decision de
novo, determining independently whether the undisputed material facts support summary
adjudication. (Id. at p. 1260; Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.)
Our Supreme Court articulated the standard applicable to Flowers’s fourth cause
of action in C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861
(C.A.). “[A] school district is liable for the negligence of supervisory employees who
‘knew or should have known of [a school employee’s] dangerous propensities, but
nevertheless hired, retained and failed to properly supervise’ the employee.” (Roe v.
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Hesperia Unified School District (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 25 (Roe), quoting C.A. at p.
875.) Thus, the school district may be liable for hiring, supervising, or retaining an
employee if the district’s supervisory personnel had actual or constructive knowledge of
the employee’s dangerous propensities. (Roe, at p. 26.) “Constructive knowledge is
knowledge that ‘may be shown by circumstantial evidence “which is nothing more than
one or more inferences which may be said to arise reasonably from a series of proven
facts.”’” (Ibid.)
Applying C.A. to the undisputed facts here, the lack of any evidence that any
district employees had either actual or constructive knowledge of Johnson’s dangerous 1 propensities is fatal to Flowers’s claim. The undisputed facts show no district employee,
let alone a supervisor, witnessed any of the alleged sexual assaults or inappropriate
behavior by Johnson, and Flowers did not report them to anyone during his time at the
middle school. There also is no evidence any district employee observed anything that
reasonably should have triggered suspicion of abuse to justify an inference of
constructive knowledge.
1 We need not decide whether Johnson’s status as a West End YMCA employee, rather than one of the district, is an independent reason why the district is entitled to summary adjudication on Flowers’s fourth cause of action. C.A. held that a school district may be liable for such things as negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of an employee. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 865, 879.) It did not consider whether the district has a duty to supervise someone like Johnson, who was not a district employee, but employed by a third party to operate a program for district students on district property. Either way, the lack of any evidence the district had actual or constructive knowledge of Johnson’s behavior would lead to the same result.
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The facts of Roe provide a useful contrast. In Roe, this court found the complaint
stated a claim against the defendant school district for negligent supervision of a school
janitor who had sexually abused students. (Roe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) The
plaintiffs had not alleged the defendant district had actual knowledge of the abuse. (Id. at
p. 28.) But they had alleged that “two principals, one of whom was also a school district
director, and an assistant principal witnessed plaintiffs sitting on [the janitor’s] lap and
[the janitor] escorting plaintiffs across campus to empty rooms,” in violation of school
policy about being alone with students in rooms with closed doors and having physical
contact with students. (Id. at p. 30.) We found these alleged facts sufficient to state a
claim for negligent supervision of the janitor by demonstrating constructive knowledge of
abuse by district supervisory personnel. (Id. at p. 31.) Here, in contrast, there is no
evidence any district employee saw Johnson do anything abusive or inappropriate, or
giving rise to suspicion of abuse or inappropriate behavior. Thus, the district is entitled
to summary adjudication on Flowers’s cause of action for negligent supervision of
Johnson.
Flowers’s arguments for a contrary conclusion muddle together the standard for a
claim the district negligently supervised students with the standard for a claim based on
negligently supervising an employee (or, in this case, a non-employee operating a
program for district students on a district campus). With respect to a claim that the
district negligently failed to supervise students, “plaintiffs must allege facts
demonstrating that school personnel failed to exercise ‘“‘ordinary prudence.’”’” (Roe,
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supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 29, quoting C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 869.) “‘“Either a
total lack of supervision [citation] or ineffective supervision [citation] may constitute a
lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student supervision.”’” (Roe, at
p. 29, quoting C.A., at p. 869.) That standard applies only to Flowers’s first cause of
action, based on allegedly negligent supervision of students, which we excluded from this
proceeding in our order to show cause. It is not the standard applicable to the cause of
action at issue.
Because there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether the district had
actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged abuse by Johnson, the district is entitled
to summary adjudication on Flower’s fourth cause of action.
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DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a writ of mandate issue directing
the superior court to (1) vacate its order on the district’s motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication, and (2) enter a new order granting the district summary
adjudication as to Flowers’s third, fourth, and seventh causes of action, and denying the
district’s motion in all other respects.
The district is awarded its costs per Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the school district is entitled to summary adjudication on the plaintiff's claim for negligent supervision because there was no evidence that district employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged perpetrator's dangerous propensities.
Issues
Whether the school district had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged perpetrator's dangerous propensities to support a claim for negligent supervision.
Disposition. granted
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“there is no evidence any district employee saw Johnson do anything abusive or inappropriate, or giving rise to suspicion of abuse or inappropriate behavior.”
“Because there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether the district had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged abuse by Johnson, the district is entitled to summary adjudication on Flower’s fourth cause of action.”