California Court of Appeal Nov 5, 2025 No. E081670AUnpublished
Filed 11/5/25 In re L.C. CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E081670
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J292768)
v. OPINION
A.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Conditionally reversed.
Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant A.C. (Mother) appeals from the June 21, 2023 orders
terminating parental rights to Mother’s child, L.C. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26,
395.)1 Mother claims that plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and
Family Services (CFS), failed to discharge its initial duty of inquiry, under section 224.2,
subdivision (b) (§ 224.2(b)), by asking several of L.C.’s maternal extended family
members (five of Mother’s six siblings) whether L.C. is or may be an “Indian child” for
purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et. seq.; ICWA). Mother
asks that we conditionally reverse the section 366.26 orders and remand the matter with
directions to the juvenile court to ensure that CFS discharges its initial duty of inquiry
(§ 224.2(b)), regarding L.C.’s material extended family members.
In our original opinion, we concluded that section 224.2, subdivision (b), did not
apply because the children were taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant. Our
Supreme Court granted review, remanded the cause to us for reconsideration in light of
its decision in In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271, and we invited the parties to submit
supplemental briefing on the matter. In supplemental briefing, CFS argues that, under the
specific facts of this case, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
an adequate inquiry had been conducted. We conclude that the record in this case does
not contain substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s implied finding that CFS
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
fulfilled its duty under section 224.2 and conditionally reverse the order terminating
Mother’s parental rights.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
L.C. was born in December 2021. On March 22, 2022, Mother went to a sheriff’s
substation in Hesperia with L.C. and reported there were suspicious vehicles parked in
front of her home, she was being “scammed out of $5,000,” and a person she met through
social media was sending fraudulent checks to her bank account. Mother became
“distraught to the point . . . she was shaking uncontrollably” and was told to “put the baby
down.” Mother reported receiving psychiatric services and suffering panic attacks.
Following her assessment by “TEST social workers,” Mother was released to go home
with L.C.
On April 6, 2022, a social worker went to Mother’s home to see whether Mother
had family members who could help Mother with a safety plan. At the “front house” on
the property, the worker spoke with the property owner who reported: Mother had lived
in the “back house” for several years but was not home; L.C.’s father did not “come
around,” but Mother’s ex-husband and the father of Mother’s older daughter, A., helped
Mother with L.C.; and Mother had recently been in car accident with L.C. in the car. The
owner also said that L.C.’s maternal grandmother had died several years earlier, and that
Mother had “an aunt from Oregon who sent her cards in the mail.” The owner denied
other knowledge of Mother’s friends or family.
Later on April 6, 2022, the worker spoke with Mother’s ex-husband, J.C., who
reported Mother cared for L.C.’s basic needs but agreed Mother’s paranoia had “been
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increasing” since L.C. was born. J.C. and Mother divorced in 2016; their daughter, A.
(age 15), lived with J.C. J.C. said there was a history of mental health issues in Mother’s
family; Mother suffered sexual abuse, physical abuse, and domestic violence as a child;
and Mother had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression, panic attacks, and
PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder).
Also on April 6, the worker spoke with Mother at a hospital where Mother had
taken L.C. When asked why she had taken L.C. to the hospital, Mother told “a very
lengthy story regarding people scamming her and taking pictures of [L.C.] for money.”
Mother also claimed that L.C.’s biological father, C.B., was hurting L.C. The hospital
would not discharge L.C. to Mother. CFS obtained a detention warrant and served the
warrant on Mother at the hospital on April 6. L.C. was initially placed with J.C.
On April 8, 2022, a dependency petition for L.C. was filed, alleging Mother
suffered from mental health problems that limited her ability to care for L.C. and the
whereabouts of L.C.’s alleged father, C.B., were unknown. (§ 300, subds (b)(1), (g).)
The petition stated CFS had been unable to complete an ICWA inquiry because Mother
was “unable to answer” and C.B.’s whereabouts were unknown.
At the detention hearing on April 11, 2022, Mother was present with her father
and one of her three sisters. In response to the court’s questions, Mother, her father, and
her sister each told the court that they did not have any Native American ancestry.
Mother also completed a “Parent: Family Find and ICWA Inquiry” form and a “Parental
Notice of Indian Status” form (ICWA-020), indicating on both forms that neither Mother
nor L.C. had Native American ancestry. On the family find form, Mother provided
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phone numbers for her father, her sister, and for Mother’s two other sisters. The court
appointed a guardian ad litem for Mother and ordered L.C. detained outside of parental
custody.
On April 14, 2022, L.C. was placed with a nonrelative extended family member
(NREFM). On April 28, CFS filed a jurisdiction and disposition report stating that
Mother and “all available relatives denied any Native American ancestry.” The report
also stated that Mother was born and raised in Utah; Mother’s mother was deceased;
Mother’s father still lived in Utah; and Mother had six siblings. Mother identified her
sisters as her support network. C.B. denied he was L.C.’s biological father and did not
wish to participate in the proceedings. The April 28 report did not indicate whether CFS
had asked Mother’s five other siblings about L.C.’s possible Native American ancestry
and status as an Indian child. On May 2, the court found that ICWA did not apply,
declared L.C. a dependent, and ordered L.C. removed from parental custody.
On January 18, 2023, the court terminated Mother’s reunification services. On
June 21, the court terminated parental rights to L.C. and selected adoption as L.C.’s
permanent plan. (§ 366.26.) At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the NREFM was
willing to adopt L.C. Mother timely appealed from the section 366.26 orders.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Background and Standard of Review
“Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address concerns regarding the separation of
Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in
non-Indian homes. [Citation.] ICWA established minimum standards for state courts to
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follow before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster
care or adoptive homes.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048.)
Section 224.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code “creates three distinct duties
regarding ICWA in dependency proceedings. First, from the [Department's] initial
contact with a minor and his family, the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all
involved persons whether the child may be an Indian child. [Citation.] Second, if that
initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the
[Department] ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child,
and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ [Citation.] Third, if that further
inquiry results in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice
requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052;
§ 224.2)
Following the inquiry stages, the juvenile court may make a finding that ICWA
does not apply because the department’s inquiry and due diligence was “ ‘proper and
adequate’ but no ‘reason to know’ whether the child is an Indian child was discovered.”
(In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050.) “The finding implies that notice to a tribe
was not required because social workers and the court did not know or have a reason to
know the [dependent] children were Indian children and that social workers had fulfilled
their duty of inquiry.” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885, overruled in part
by In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152.) “ ‘ “On a well-developed record, the
[juvenile] court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry
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was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.” ’ ” (In re Dezi
C., at p. 1141.)
B. Application
As an initial matter, we disagree with Mother’s argument that an adequate inquiry
necessarily required CFS to ask every identified family member regarding the children’s
potential status as Indian children. As our Supreme Court has explained: “[i]f, upon
review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA
does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record
documentation as required by California law [citation], there is no error and conditional
reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has
an interest in the child.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) Thus, we disagree
with Mother’s argument to the extent she contends that the mere failure to interview a
handful of extended family members is sufficient to show a lack of substantial evidence
in support of the juvenile court’s implied finding that social workers fulfilled their duty of
inquiry.
Nevertheless, upon review of the record in this case, we conclude that the juvenile
court’s implied finding that CFS fulfilled its inquiry duty under section 224.2 is not
supported by substantial evidence and, as a result, any finding by the juvenile court that
an adequate ICWA inquiry had been conducted constitutes an abuse of discretion. While
we agree with CFS that an ICWA investigation need not be exhaustive, the juvenile
court’s finding that social workers fulfilled their duty of inquiry under section 224.2
generally turns on (1) whether social workers conducted an inquiry of extended family
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members whom they were already investigating as part of their usual course of work (In
re S.S. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 694, 704-705; In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 720);
and (2) whether the record was sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that the
inquiry “ ‘has reliably answered the question at the heart of the ICWA inquiry: Whether
a child involved in a proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.” ’ ” (In re H.B., at p.
720.) In our view, the ICWA inquiry efforts documented by CFS in this case were not
sufficient to meet the first prong of this test.
As CFS concedes, Mother provided contact information for two maternal aunts at
the time the children were detained.{CT 35} By statute, CFS was obligated to contact at
least these individuals to inform them of their right to request participation in the care and
placement of the child. (§ 309, subd. (e)(1); California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(b)(3);
In re K.B. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 689, 697.) Thus, these two maternal aunts were
extended family members whom CFS was already obligated to investigate as part of their
usual course of work. The failure to contact these family members renders CFS’s ICWA
inquiry efforts in this case inadequate. As a result, any implied finding by the juvenile
court that the inquiry was adequate under section 224.2 is not supported by substantial
evidence and constitutes an abuse of discretion. And when an ICWA inquiry is
inadequate, “conditional reversal is warranted in order to develop the record and cure the
inadequacy.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1145.)
We emphasize that, upon remand, our opinion should not be construed as limiting
any subsequent inquiry to any specifically identified family members. Instead, the duty
is to make reasonable efforts to conduct an inquiry that reliably answers the question of
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whether the children are Indian children. Thus, depending on the responses received in
the course of any subsequent investigation, it may become unnecessary to inquire of
additional identified family members currently identified in the record. Conversely, it
may become necessary to inquire of a family member who has yet to be disclosed.
Ultimately, the juvenile court has discretion to find that CFS has fulfilled its duty of
inquiry so long as the record supports the conclusion that CFS contacted family members
whom it is already obligated to contact as part of its normal duties and took reasonable
steps sufficient to reliably answer the question of whether the children are Indian children
within the meaning of ICWA.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is conditionally reversed and
remanded to the juvenile court for compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements
of sections 224.2 and 224.3 and the documentation provisions of Rules of Court, rule
5.481(a)(5). If the juvenile court thereafter finds a proper and adequate further inquiry
and due diligence has been conducted and it concludes ICWA does not apply, then the
juvenile court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If, instead, the juvenile
court concludes ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and
California implementing provisions. (See 25 U.S.C., §1912, subd. (a); §§224.2, subd.
(i)(1); 224.3 and 224.4.)
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the agency failed to fulfill its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 because it did not contact available maternal aunts, rendering the juvenile court's implied finding of an adequate ICWA inquiry unsupported by substantial evidence.
Issues
Whether the agency satisfied its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 regarding the child's potential Indian status.
Whether the juvenile court's implied finding of an adequate ICWA inquiry was supported by substantial evidence.
Disposition. conditionally reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The failure to contact these family members renders CFS’s ICWA inquiry efforts in this case inadequate.”
“conditional reversal is warranted in order to develop the record and cure the inadequacy.”