California Court of Appeal Oct 30, 2025 No. E083299AUnpublished
Filed 10/30/25 P. v. Valenzuela CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083299
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1201315)
RICHARD ANDREW VALENZUELA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Daniel J. Kessler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Rogers and Christopher P.
Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Richard Andrew Valenzuela appeals from the trial court’s
postjudgment order finding him ineligible for recall of his sentence and resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 The appeal returns to us on transfer from the
California Supreme Court to reconsider the cause in light of People v. Rhodius (2025)
17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius). Rhodius resolved a split of authority among the Courts of
Appeal regarding resentencing eligibility when a defendant’s sentence for a prior prison
enhancement (see former § 667.5, subd. (b)) was imposed but then stayed. Rhodius held
that defendants whose enhanced prison prior term or terms were stayed at sentencing are
eligible for full resentencing under section 1172.75. Pursuant to Rhodius, we therefore
reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant a resentencing hearing, and remand for
the trial court to hold that hearing.
BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2015, defendant pleaded guilty to one of count of burglary (§ 459).
Defendant also admitted to having suffered three prior convictions within the meaning of
section 667, subdivisions (a), (c) and (e)(1), and 1170.12, subdivision (e)(1). He admitted
to having served one prior prison term within the meaning of former section 667.5,
subdivision (b). At defendant’s sentencing hearing on April 3, 2015, the trial court found
no grounds to strike the prior convictions. Defendant was sentenced to 15 years plus 25
to life. The trial court imposed a one-year enhancement term for defendant’s prison prior,
but stayed execution of that portion of his sentence.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
Defendant appealed and a panel of this court remanded the matter in order for the
trial court to allow defendant to request to withdraw his guilty plea. We ordered the trial
court to strike two of the section 667, subdivisions (a) priors, and two of the priors under
section 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1). This court rejected that the trial court must
impose or strike the prison prior; the trial court properly stayed the sentence on the prison
prior. On May 26, 2016, defendant’s oral motion to withdraw his plea was denied. A
new abstract of judgment was filed on June 9, 2016, reflecting a 25-years-to-life sentence
for the burglary; five years for one section 667, subdivision (a), prior; and the stayed
prison prior.
Defendant was identified by the Secretary of the CDCR as being in custody
serving a judgment that included an enhancement described in section 1172.75,
subdivision (a). On December 21, 2023, the trial court denied that defendant was entitled
to relief under section 1172.75. Defendant appealed the denial of relief on the single
ground that he was entitled to a full resentencing based on the imposed but then stayed
prison prior. On appeal, a divided panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s ruling
based on a split in the Courts of Appeal at the time on resentencing when a prior prison
prior was imposed but stayed. (People v. Valenzuela (February 13, 2025, E083299)
[nonpub. opn.].) The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded to this
court to vacate our decision and reconsider the issue following its decision in Rhodius.
The parties waived any supplemental briefings. We vacate our decision and consider the
matter in light of Rhodius.
3
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that
was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5,
except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense
. . . is legally invalid.” Section 1172.75, subdivision (b), requires the Secretary of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and county jail administrators to
“identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)” and to provide certain information
about those individuals “to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.” Upon
receiving that information, the trial court “shall recall the sentence and resentence the
defendant” if the court “determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement
described in subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) If the court determines that the
individual’s judgment includes such an enhancement, the defendant’s resentencing “shall
result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of
the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
Rhodius held that “section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the
underlying judgment includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before
January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead
stayed.” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054.)
Here, defendant’s judgment included one stayed prior prison term enhancement
that was imposed before 2020. None were for sexually violent offenses. Under Rhodius,
4
the stay the original sentencing court entered on those enhancements does not preclude
defendant from resentencing under section 1172.75. We therefore reverse and remand the
matter for the trial court to hold that hearing.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying defendant’s petition for recall and resentencing is
reversed. The matter is remanded for the court to recall defendant’s sentence, hold a
resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (d), and resentence
defendant consistent with the statute
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.
5
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a defendant is eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 even if their prior prison term enhancement was imposed but subsequently stayed.
Issues
Whether a defendant is eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 when a prior prison term enhancement was imposed but stayed.
Disposition. Reversed and remanded.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Rhodius held that defendants whose enhanced prison prior term or terms were stayed at sentencing are eligible for full resentencing under section 1172.75.”
“Rhodius held that “section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed.””