D.O. v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2025) · DecisionDepot
D.O. v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Oct 16, 2025 No. E086388Unpublished
Filed 10/15/25 D.O. v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
D.O. et al.,
Petitioners, E086388
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. J293829, J293830, J293831 & J293832) THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, OPINION
Respondent;
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petitions for extraordinary writs. Annemarie G.
Pace, Judge. Petitions denied.
Vincent W. Davis for Petitioner D.O.
Valerie Ross for Petitioner R.H.
No appearance for Respondent.
1
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Helena C. Rho, Deputy County Counsel, for
Real Party in Interest
D.O. (father, to distinguish from the child with the same initials) and R.H.
(mother) each filed a petition for an extraordinary writ after the juvenile court terminated
family reunification services and set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26
hearing.1 Father contests the placement of the minors, the jurisdictional findings against
him, that he was provided reasonable reunification services, and that the caregiver
received de facto parent status. Mother disputes the court’s finding that returning the
children to her would be detrimental to them. We deny the petitions.
BACKGROUND
A. Initial Proceedings
Mother and father share four male children who are the subjects of the dependency
proceedings underlying these writ petitions: D.O. (born 2015), G.O. (born 2017), S.O.
(born 2018) and T.O. (born 2019).
In June 2022 the children’s younger half sister was hospitalized for severe
malnutrition. All the children were living with mother at the time. In July, San
Bernardino County Children & Family Services (the department) removed the four boys
from mother’s care and placed them with father. That same month the department filed a
petition under section 300, subdivision (j), as to each of the four boys, alleging abuse of
their sibling. In its jurisdictional/dispositional report the department recommended the
1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
petition be sustained, the children remain with father, that father receive family
maintenance services, and that mother receive family reunification services. Father lived
with his now wife (stepmother) and the children’s older stepsiblings.
At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in October 2022, the juvenile court
followed the department’s recommendations.
In a status review report filed in March 2023, before the six-month review hearing,
the department recommended the children be jointly maintained between the parents, and
the dependency continued. However, there was some friction between father and mother,
as well as between father and the department. Father expressed frustration that mother
was allowed unsupervised visits, and that “he does all the work for the children; the
mother has no responsibilities.” He also drove by mother’s home while the children were
at her home for overnight visits, and the department received a number of anonymous
calls concerning both this behavior and father allegedly approaching neighbors to ask
them to “spy” on mother. Father was also late for dropoffs and often tried to argue with
mother, though mother remained silent.
The children expressed some concerns about their placement with father. They
disliked sharing a room with their stepsiblings, and reported that “some of their big
brothers are mean to them, [and] hit them.” They told their stepmother, but not father,
because he “has lots of jobs [and] is always at work or . . . is gone some where far with”
their stepmother.
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At the six-month status review hearing in April 2023 the court ordered the parents
share parenting time and ordered family maintenance services for both.
In August 2024, mother sought a restraining order against father. She alleged
father was harassing and stalking her. She alleged he drove around her neighborhood
during her visits, talked to her neighbors, tried to harass her during exchanges, and
followed her after exchanges. The inciting incident for seeking the restraining order was
finding an Apple AirTag in one of her son’s shoes, which she believed father placed there
to track the child. Mother also alleged exchanges were not peaceful despite happening at
a police station, and that father frequently brought stepmother, who would also harass
mother. Mother further alleged that much of this harassment occurs while the children
are present. The court denied the request for a temporary restraining order on the basis
that nobody’s physical safety was under immediate threat, but set the request for a
restraining order for hearing. At the hearing the court denied the request for a restraining
order, but ordered the parents and stepmother not to discuss the case with the children or
disparage each other, nor use any tracking devices.
In October 2023 the department filed a status review report in which it
recommended the matter be continued. The parents had participated in coparenting
couple’s therapy, but had difficulty behaving amicably. For instance, the department
reported sometimes children would be left without “proper clothing or shoes” after
leaving a parent’s house, because the parent was “being petty,” and that when one of the
children was sick, the parents would refuse to share the necessary medication. The
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children also reported that they did not like it when the parents said “yucky” things about
each other.
The court held a review hearing that same month, where it ordered continuing
family maintenance services and additional individual counseling. It also reiterated its
prior orders forbidding disparaging remarks about the other parents and told the parents
“I want to warn you both: This isn’t family law court. The difference is I can remove
these kids from both of you, and I will if I have to . . . . [¶] So you need to work
together.”
B. Subsequent and Supplemental Dependency Petitions
A social worker observed the children on January 7, 2024. The social worker
noted that S.O. had a swollen cheek and jaw, but that he was not bruised. S.O. did not
report anything about mother hitting him.
Two days later the department received a referral alleging mother physically
abused S.O. because he had a swollen cheek and jaw when father took over custody of
him. Mother said she was aware of the issue, had already taken S.O. to urgent care, and
that urgent care said it was a tooth abscess. However, S.O. told the reporting party that
he got in trouble for stealing candy, and that mother took him into the garage, punched
him in the face, and locked him in for an indeterminate period of time. The other
children reported they saw mother take S.O. into the garage but did not see her hit him.
Father alleged that mother provided him with a doctor’s note and told him to follow up
with a dentist, but when he did the dentist did not discover any signs of a tooth infection.
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He said he then took S.O. to the emergency room, where they reported he did not have
any fractures but did have “soft tissue damage” consistent with being hit in the face.
Father did not have any medical records of this visit at the time, but had pictures of S.O.’s
cheek and jaw. Father refused to turn the children back over to mother.
On January 12, the same social worker who observed the children on January 7
saw them again, and reported they “were cold and looked terrified,” whereas they are
normally “hyperactive and warm.” D.O. reported unprompted that mother “ ‘spanked my
brother and punched him in the face, and they were in the garage,’ ” which the social
worker found odd. The social worker believed the children were being coached and did
not believe mother hit S.O. The social worker also reported that father insists the
children call mother by her first name when at his house, that both father and stepmother
disparage mother, and that the children sometimes make disparaging remarks about
mother unprompted and without being able to explain what they mean. The social
worker said she felt the children needed to be removed because the parents could not
coparent, and the referrals would continue until they were removed.
The department spoke to the children on January 16. All of the children, save
S.O., said mother punishes them with timeouts and denied any physical discipline. S.O.
told them mother hit him in the face, and that his mother sometimes puts him in the
garage when he breaks rules. He denied any other instances of physical discipline, and
insisted that he told “ ‘dad’s doctor’ ” the truth about mother hitting him despite not
saying anything to the first doctor he saw. D.O. said that S.O. complained of cheek and
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tooth pain before the alleged incident, and that mother and maternal grandmother (MGM)
told him it was something wrong with S.O.’s tooth. All the children, save S.O., denied
seeing mother hit S.O. D.O., S.O., and G.O. confirmed they must call mother by her first
name at father’s house.
The department asked father to send photos of S.O.’s alleged injuries, and noted
that they appeared altered. According to the department, father also accidentally sent the
unaltered picture as well, and the metadata for the photos indicated the allegedly altered
photo was a screenshot while the allegedly unaltered one was taken by a camera, further
indicating manipulation. Father provided a dental note corroborating that there was no
tooth abscess. Finally, father sent a video to a social worker where he was asking S.O.
leading questions and S.O. was repeating what he said.
The next day, the department removed the children from both parents due to
concerns about physical abuse by mother and emotional abuse—including coaching—by
father. The children were placed with MGM. The department then filed a petition under
sections 342 and 387 alleging the children came under section 300, subdivisions (b), (c),
and (j). The new petition alleged the children were at substantial risk of abuse or neglect
and were “suffering serious emotional damage,” because they had been “exposed to an
unrelenting struggle between the parents.” The petition with respect to S.O. also included
an allegation under subdivision (a), that mother “utilize[d] inappropriate and excessive
discipline[] techniques including . . . punching the child in the face.” Finally, the
supplemental petition alleged family maintenance was no longer appropriate because
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mother used inappropriate physical discipline and both mother and father placed the
children “in the middle of a custody dispute causing emotional stress.”
1. Jurisdiction/Disposition
The department filed a jurisdictional/dispositional report in February 2024 before
the hearing on these new petitions. The department reported that father was highly
critical of mother and believed all of the allegations against her were true, and he was
also critical of the department and court for permitting unsupervised visits. He said the
department was only involved in his life because of mother, and that he was going to
request a new social worker. The department prepared an addendum to this report in
March 2024, and reported that the children said father and stepmother do not like mother
and the feeling is mutual. They said when at father’s house he and stepmother “ask them
questions about [their] mom all day long,” that they do not like answering these
questions, and that they do not like that their parents do not get along. Finally, in April
the department filed an additional information where MGM reported three incidents
where she claimed father harassed her after visits. The first involved father allegedly
blocking her car in and recording her while he and stepmother yelled at her while the
second, which a social worker observed, involved father waiting outside for MGM,
making MGM fearful to leave and compelling the social worker to offer her an escort to
her car. Finally, MGM claimed father waited for her to leave with the children and
followed her out of the parking lot. Father denied any of these incidents happened or that
he was harassing MGM.
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The court held a jurisdiction/disposition hearing in April 2024. The parents
agreed to admit certain of the allegations in the petitions in exchange for dismissing
other. Specifically, mother admitted using inappropriate physical punishment on the
children, while both mother and father admitted they caused the children emotional
distress by putting them in the middle of their custody dispute. The court ordered
reunification services for both parents.
Father appealed, arguing substantial evidence did not support the removal order.
(In re T.O. (Mar. 28, 2025, E084173) [nonpub. opn.] (T.O.).) We affirmed, finding there
was “substantial evidence father engaged in behavior that either caused emotional harm
or risked emotional harm to the children.” (Ibid.) That, combined with his “lack of
insight” regarding “his part in creating and maintaining the parents’ animus toward each
other,” “provided an ample basis for the juvenile court’s order removing the children
from his care.” (Ibid.)
2. Six-Month Status Review
In October 2024 the department prepared a report before the six-month status
review hearing where it recommended continuing reunification services. The department
reported that recent efforts to contact father had been unsuccessful. Mother, on the other
hand, showed “a degree of compliance,” but tended to minimize her substance use issues.
The parents both tended to “focus on their individual challenges, rather than prioritizing
the well-being of their children.”
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During the reporting period the children showed signs of severe emotional
distress. D.O. “struggle[ed] with managing his emotions and ha[d] difficulty processing
feelings effectively.” G.O. “constantly worrie[d] about being perceived as good and
tend[ed] to prioritize pleasing others,” and also showed “difficulty in articulating his
feelings.” S.O. was physically aggressive towards caregivers and at school, lacked
appropriate boundaries, and struggled to focus. T.O. was throwing tantrums, hitting,
biting, and had difficulty being redirected. Though things improved in MGM’s care,
there was still underlying emotional turmoil. The children believed their behavior caused
the removal, and were concerned about the relationship between mother and father.
Visitation also continued to be fraught. Father brought stepmother to a visit and
insisted the children call her mom, even though all the children said they did not want her
present and all but S.O. said they did not want to call her mom. On another occasion the
father repeatedly asked the children about school in a way that distressed them, and
continued to do so even after D.O. told father he did not want to talk about it. Both father
and stepmother struggled to redirect the children, but father tended to perform better
when stepmother was present “as she interacts with the children and helps facilitate
engagement.” Father was observed making disparaging remarks and commenting about
mother and grandmother’s caregiving choices, which the department believed harmed the
children’s well-being. The children also showed significant distress both before and after
visits with either parent.
10
At the status review hearing the court ordered stepmother not to be present for
visits and clarified that father was supposed to participate in random drug testing. It also
ordered father to participate in additional individual counseling to address coparenting
and anger management issues. It otherwise continued reunification services.
3. 12-Month Status Review
In February 2025 the department filed a status review report that recommended the
court terminate father’s reunification services, but give mother an extended visit to see if
she could transition to family maintenance services. Father had continued to act in ways
detrimental to the children’s emotional well-being. For example, at visits he showed
videos of the children’s stepsiblings encouraging them to “come home soon” and
confusing and distressing the children. Father was encouraged to work with a parent
partner to address these concerns, but did not do so.
The children continued to show significant emotional distress, especially around
visits. They said they feared father speaking negatively about mother, and mother and
father continuing to not get along. D.O. was anxious, distressed, and frequently asked
when visits would end G.O. showed anxiety—manifesting in physical symptoms like
stomachaches—and exhibited negative behaviors like fighting with his siblings. S.O.
exhibited aggressive, deceitful, destructive, and even self-harming behaviors. T.O. had
frequent tantrums. All four children’s behavior was particularly concerning before and
after visits with father.
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The department did not have updated information about father’s participation in
services, but mother made significant progress in hers. Father missed five drug tests but
tested negative on seven, while mother only missed one and tested negative on all of
them. Both participated in parenting classes and additional individual therapy. While
mother reported benefiting from these services, father did not report at all.
At a hearing held in March 2023 the court ordered both parents to participate in
conjoint therapy.
4. 18-Month Status Review
The department in April 2025 updated its recommendation to also terminate
reunification services for mother. Father did not participate in family therapy, and
mother’s therapist reported that though she presented well “she appears to be ‘checking
off boxes’ and has not demonstrated full honesty or accountability.” Meanwhile, the
children’s behavior was getting worse, with G.O. experiencing his first panic attack, and
all of the children becoming increasingly dysregulated and aggressive. The children’s
mental health services were also becoming decreasingly effective, and a member of their
mental health services team “emphasized that the children are unlikely to benefit from
continued services without addressing the underlying emotional distress linked to
ongoing contact with their parents.” The department thus recommended discontinuing
family therapy—which seemed to make the children’s issues worse—and “assessed [that]
continued contact with the parents [was] detrimental to the children’s emotional well-
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being.” The department opined that “[t]he severity and persistence of the behavioral
issues strongly indicate that reunification is not in their best interest.”
At the next hearing, the court suspended visits and set a contested review hearing.
After the court terminated visits with the parents the children’s behavior seemed to
improve. Father expressed his view that their behavioral issues did not begin until
placement with the MGM. Both parents continued to participate in services.
On June 3, 2025, MGM filed a request to be designated a de facto parent. The
court eventually granted this request.
The court held a contested review hearing on June 11, 2025. The children testified
via out-of-court answers to pre-prepared questions. Each of them said they loved mother
and wanted to live with her. All of the children except T.O. said they loved father and
wanted to live with him. However, T.O. said he did not want to live with father, and
T.O., G.O., and D.O. reported that they did not feel safe living with father—though G.O.
and D.O. specified this was only because of their stepsiblings, and that they felt safe with
just father. The children had universally positive things to say about MGM.
The social worker testified father completed his case plan, but that he did not
benefit from services, “show[ed] no accountability [for] his actions,” and deflected blame
on to the department and MGM She also testified that father disparaged MGM to the
children and spoke to the children about their stepsiblings, neither of which was
permitted. With regards to mother, the social worker said mother had not benefited from
services, as she struggled with alcohol, resisted treatment, and insisted she did not have a
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problem. Family therapy sessions with mother did not go well, and mother did not use
any of the parenting skills she was supposed to have learned during visits.
Father testified but was evasive in his answers. For instance, when asked whether
one of the issues of concern to the court was emotional harm to the children he responded
“that was stated” and when asked whether his conduct caused that emotional harm he
responded “the emotional harm that was stated in this case is based a lot on the
interaction between myself and the children’s mother.” He claimed that though he and
mother had issues he “was never mad at her, never upset with her,” and “always tried to
work with her.” When asked what he did wrong, father responded “I believe it was a
lack of communication and the wrong type of communication.” He also denied doing
anything wrong regarding the doctored pictures of S.O. he provided to the department.
Finally, when asked whether he believed the children were removed because of
something he did, father answered “[n]o. I mean, every action has a consequence.”
Mother testified that she did benefit from services, and that her therapist may have
concluded otherwise only because she was not good at expressing herself. She also
denied physically disciplining her children.
After hearing evidence and argument, the court stated its concern that mother’s
therapist reported she was just checking boxes as “that’s the time to really demonstrate
that you are able to communicate with your children.” It also felt that her alcohol use
issues were not resolved, and therefore she had not “fully benefitted from services.” For
father, the court stated that “it is not enough to say ‘I’m accountable.’ You have to
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describe how you are accountable.” The court also said father’s numerous
communication issues with the children demonstrated that he failed to recognize the
emotional impact he was having on them, and that he was being “extremely emotionally
damaging and manipulative.” The court found father, too, had not benefited from
services.
Accordingly, the court terminated reunifications services for both parents and set a
permanency planning hearing under section 366.26.
DISCUSSION
Father argues (1) that the trial court erred when it determined not to return the
children based on father’s alleged substance abuse, (2) that he was a nonoffending parent
and the children should have been placed with him, (3) the court erred by granting
MGM’s request to be designated a de facto parent, and (4) that he was not provided
reasonable reunification services. Mother argues only that the court’s findings that she
caused the children emotional distress were unsupported by substantial evidence. We
reject each of these arguments.
A. Father’s Petition
1. The Court Did Not Find Father Abused Substances
First, the court did not terminate reunification services due to father’s substance
abuse but due to his failure to benefit from services. The court stated it was concerned
that father showed little understanding of the harm he caused his children and no
accountability. The court did not raise substance abuse concerns with regard to father,
15
only mother. Indeed, the petitions never even alleged substance abuse by father. This
argument is therefore inapposite.
2. Father has Already Litigated and Lost his Placement Challenge
Father’s argument that the children should have been placed with him as the
nonoffending parent is similarly unavailing. We rejected this argument in his first
appeal, and we have no reason to reconsider our analysis whether because collateral
estoppel applies—as the department argues—or because our previous analysis remains
correct. (See In re T.O., supra, E084173.)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err Granting MGM De Facto Parent Status
We turn next to father’s challenge to the designation of MGM as a de facto parent.
The department argues parents lack standing to challenge another person’s designation as
a de facto parent, citing In re Crystal J. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 186, 190 and In re Daniel
D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823, 1835-1836. However, both cases involved parties
appealing an order denying de facto parent status to a third party. Parents may challenge
decisions to grant de facto parent status. (See, e.g., In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 594, 597, 601-602.) We therefore address father’s arguments on the merits.
De facto parent status “merely provides a way for the de facto parent to stay
involved in the dependency process and provide information to the court.” (In re Bryan
D. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 127, 146 (Bryan D.); see In re Brianna S. (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 303, 314 [“Designating a person as a de facto parent gives that person
‘procedural rights’ in the ongoing dependency proceedings, such as the right to be
16
present at hearings, to be heard and to retain counsel, but de facto parent status does not
grant the person any substantive rights to ‘reunification services, . . . custody, [or]
continued placement of the child.’ ”].) “A person requesting de facto parent status has
the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence he or she qualifies for that
status.” (In re Abigail L. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 169, 178.) “[F]actors relevant to the
decision . . . include whether (1) the child is ‘psychologically bonded’ to the adult; (2) the
adult has assumed the role of a parent on a day-to[-]day basis for a substantial period of
time; (3) the adult possesses information about the child unique from the other
participants in the process; (4) the adult has regularly attended juvenile court hearings;
and (5) a future proceeding may result in an order permanently foreclosing any future
contact with the adult.” (In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 66-67.)
We review a juvenile court’s decision on a request for de facto parent status for
abuse of discretion. (In re Michael R. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 150, 156.) But “[d]e facto
parent status is ordinarily liberally granted on the theory that a court only benefits from
having all relevant information on the best interests of the child.” (Bryan D., supra, 199
Cal.App.4th at p. 141.)
The court did not abuse its discretion in designating MGM as a de facto parent.
MGM has been the children’s caregiver since they were removed from father. She has
had day-to-day caregiving duties, and the children appear psychologically bonded to her.
They saw significant emotional benefits after visits with their parents were terminated
and while in MGM’s care. She has kept apprised of the proceedings and attended many
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of them. MGM easily meets the threshold for being designated a de facto parent, and the
court did not abuse its discretion by granting her that status.
4. Father Received Reasonable Reunification Services
Finally, father argues he was not given reasonable reunification services. When a
court orders reunification services, the department must ensure the provided services are
reasonable. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490,
1501.) Whether reunification services offered were reasonable is judged according to the
circumstances of the particular case. (Earl L., at p. 1501.) “The standard is not whether
the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether
the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2
Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) Any reunification plan “must be specifically tailored to fit the
circumstances of each family [citation], and must be designed to eliminate those
conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.” (In re Dino E. (1992)
6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.)
The court’s reasonable services finding “must be made by clear and convincing
evidence in the trial court.” (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238.)
We review a finding that reasonable services were provided or offered for substantial
evidence. (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.) “In general,
when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a
finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether the
record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of
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fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of
proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.) In other words, “the
question before a court reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence is not whether the appellate court itself regards the evidence as clear
and convincing; it is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have regarded the evidence
as satisfying this standard of proof.” (Id. at 1009.)
Father does not argue how the department failed to provide reasonable
reunification services, nor why the court’s finding it did was not supported by substantial
evidence. Instead, he asserts generally that, “[a]s shown above, the Juvenile Court erred
when it found that reasonable services were offered,” to him and that “[d]espite the
minimal referrals” he completed his case plan. (See In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95,
114-115 [declining to consider a point which appellant failed to support with reasoned
argument.].) Moreover, we find nothing in the record suggesting the department failed to
provide reasonable services. (See Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30
Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546 [“We are not required to search the record to ascertain whether
it contains support for [a party’s] contentions.].) The primary barrier to reunification was
father and mother’s inability to co-parent, including father’s emotional abuse of his
children to fuel his ongoing feud with mother. Thus, the department provided parenting
classes and individual and joint counseling. This is exactly what the department should
have done, and father fails to identify anything more he wishes it would have done.
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Accordingly, we conclude sufficient evidence supported the court’s finding that the
department provided reasonable reunification services.
We therefore deny father’s writ petition.
B. Mother’s Petition
Mother argues the court’s finding she contributed to the emotional harm to her
children was not supported by substantial evidence. We understand her to contest the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying the court’s finding that returning the children to
her would be detrimental. The argument lacks merit.
At the 18-month permanency review hearing “the court shall order the return of
the child to the physical custody of [his or her] parent or legal guardian unless the court
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to [his or her]
parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).)
“The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive
progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return
would be detrimental.” (Ibid.) However, “ ‘simply complying with the reunification plan
by attending the required therapy sessions and visiting the children is to be considered by
the court; but it is not determinative. The court must also consider the parents’ progress
and their capacity to meet the objectives of the plan; otherwise the reasons for removing
the children out-of-home will not have been ameliorated.’ ” (Georgeanne G. v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 867 (Georgeanne G.).)
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“When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile court’s finding or
order is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports it.” (In re Albert T. (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 207, 216.) “Under that standard we inquire whether the evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s determination. We resolve all
conflicts in support of the determination, indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold the
findings and may not substitute our deductions for those of the juvenile court.
[Citations.] However, ‘[s]ubstantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence.
[Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance and
must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’ ” (Georgeanna G., supra, 53
Cal.App.5th at p. 865.) We review the juvenile court judge’s finding there is no
substantial probability of return and decision to terminate reunification services for
substantial evidence. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688.)
The same is true for the finding of detriment. (Georgeanne G., at p. 864.)
Here, substantial evidence showed that returning the children to mother’s care
would be detrimental. After the department recommended returning the children to
mother, their emotional health deteriorated. The children’s therapists opined that this was
caused by their continuing contact with both parents and their parents’ ongoing conflict,
and it would not be resolved without ceasing contact with the parents. Indeed, the
children’s emotional well-being improved after visitation ended. Mother’s participation
in family therapy with the children only made things worse. Her therapist believed she
21
lacked insight into her role in the children’s emotional turmoil, suggesting she failed to
appreciate how she contributed to the conflict. Finally, the social worker testified that at
visits mother “does not redirect the children or use any of the parenting skills that she’s
learned,” and mother’s therapist felt she was merely going through the motions.
There was ample evidence for the court to conclude that mother has not benefited
from services, and that returning the children to her care would be to their detriment.
Accordingly, we will deny mother’s writ petition.
DISPOSITION
Mother and father’s petitions for extraordinary writs are both denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAPHAEL J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
FIELDS J.
22
AI Brief
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Holding. The court denied the parents' petitions for extraordinary writs, affirming the juvenile court's decision to terminate reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing because the parents failed to benefit from services and continued to cause the children emotional distress.
Issues
Did the juvenile court err in terminating reunification services for the parents?
Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in granting the maternal grandmother de facto parent status?
Was the father provided reasonable reunification services?
Disposition. denied
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court stated it was concerned that father showed little understanding of the harm he caused his children and no accountability.”
“The court found father, too, had not benefited from services.”
“The court did not abuse its discretion in designating MGM as a de facto parent.”