California Court of Appeal Oct 9, 2025 No. E084298Unpublished
Filed 10/9/25 Toledo v. Lukes CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT TOLEDO,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084298
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVSW2404130)
JOHN CHRISTIAN LUKES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jeremiah Raxter,
restraining order against Lukes. Toledo coached Lukes’s son’s little league baseball team
in the Temecula Valley Little League (the little league). Earlier in the season, Toledo had
denied Lukes’s request to be an assistant coach.
In support of the request for the restraining order, Toledo described the harassment
from Lukes as starting in mid-March 2024. Toledo said that Lukes sent him hundreds of
“unhinged” and “erratic” text messages after midnight. Lukes also sent “erratic” email
messages to Toledo and certain officials of the little league. According to Toledo, Lukes
made false claims about Toledo’s character “and threatened that [Toledo] ha[d] no idea
what [Lukes] will do when it comes to protecting his kids.”
Toledo emailed Lukes two days before filing the request and asked him to cease
all communication, but Lukes did not comply and last harassed Toledo on the day that
Toledo filed the request. Toledo checked a box on Judicial Council Form CH-100
indicating that he should not be charged a filing fee for the request, because Lukes “has
used or threatened to use violence against [Toledo], has stalked [him], or has acted or
spoken in some other way that makes [Toledo] reasonably fear violence.”
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The trial court granted a temporary restraining order on April 25, 2024, prohibiting
Lukes from having any contact with Toledo. The court set a hearing on the restraining
order request in mid-May.
The following day, Toledo filed an amended request for a civil harassment
restraining order in which he also sought protection of his two minor sons, who attended
games with Toledo. In addition, Toledo attested that Lukes had emailed him that
morning that he would be attending the team’s baseball game the following night,
causing Toledo to feel unsafe. Toledo further described the text messages that Lukes had
previously sent, including that Lukes texted Toledo that he was “going to bring his
buddies to the field and ‘we need to talk,’” and also texted “‘Look me up I’m not nice
when I see injustice and it’s my family.’” In the amended request, Toledo again checked
the box on Judicial Council Form CH-100 indicating that he reasonably feared violence
by Lukes and thus should not be charged a filing fee.
Lukes filed a responsive declaration in which he extensively described why he
sent the text and email messages to Toledo and the little league officials. Lukes attached
copies of emails that he had sent and what he described as “the entire text message chain”
consisting of a total of 114 messages between Lukes and Toledo from January 29, 2024,
through April 24, 2024.
Starting at about 1:00 a.m. on April 15, 2024, within one hour Lukes sent Toledo
29 unanswered text messages, which Lukes later described as “harsh,” “unkind,”
“inappropriate,” “vile,” and “[u]nflattering.” Lukes took issue with Toledo’s failure to
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pick Lukes to be the team’s assistant coach and Toledo’s decision to pick another parent
who was a law enforcement officer. Lukes described details of his personal life in the
messages, including that he was involved in a “custody battle” with his ex-wife that
caused him to have limited contact with his son. Throughout the messages, Lukes
repeatedly insulted the assistant coach and Toledo’s coaching. Lukes repeatedly texted
variations of, “You have no idea who I am,” followed by, “I’m not messing around.” He
also texted, “Look me up I’m not nice when I see injustice and it’s my family,” followed
by another text saying, “If you bring my kids mom into this then all of my attorneys get
involved. And I mean not just family law. So you and I need to speak and bring the
cop.”
During the afternoon on April 15, 2024, Toledo sent Lukes an email response to
the text messages, copying the president and the vice president of the little league (the
little league officials). Toledo asked Lukes “to refrain from including [him] in any
personal-related issues, sensitive family related matters, harsh critiques of my methods,
or speaking negatively against my selected coaches—especially outside of hours
reasonable for communication.” Toledo said that it would be appropriate for Lukes to
contact him to discuss matters regarding team-related topics between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00
p.m.
Several minutes after Toledo sent that email, Lukes texted Toledo and apologized
for “being vile in [his] previous messages” and acknowledged that “it was not okay.”
Lukes later emailed Toledo and the little league officials, extensively described his
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frustrations with not being chosen as an assistant coach, and explained that in a previous
season he had assisted another coach with whom he remained friends. Lukes apologized
to Toledo and to the little league officials for his “inappropriate texted communications to
Coach Toledo” and promised that it would “not occur again.”
The following day, Toledo texted Lukes, thanked him for the response, and
remarked that everything “should be good” so long as all communication remained
focused “on team-related topics.” Lukes responded, “Sounds good to me.” Lukes then
sent Toledo over 20 unanswered text messages within several minutes of each other
providing Toledo coaching advice and discussing his son’s performance, culminating in
Lukes telling Toledo that he would not attend that night’s game because he had to work.
Toledo responded to the final message, “Bummer about getting stuck at work.”
One week later, on April 23, 2024, Lukes sent Toledo another series of 17 text
messages starting at approximately 10:15 p.m. Lukes accused Toledo and another coach
of (1) inflicting “violence” on Lukes by scowling, smirking, and grinning at him, (2)
publicly humiliating Lukes during a game, and (3) “tak[ing] it out on [Lukes’s] son.”
Lukes did not specify exactly what had happened. Among the messages sent, Lukes
texted, “We have issues,” followed by “You’re done,” and “You have no idea clearly
what I do legally to protect my kids. And it’s not kangaroo family court anymore.”
Lukes told Toledo to check his email, because Lukes had involved his lawyers.
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Attached to Lukes’s responsive declaration is a long email thread between Lukes
and some combination of Toledo, the little league officials, and Lukes’s attorneys, with
22 total messages sent between April 23, 2024, and April 25, 2024, starting at 10:20 p.m.
on April 23. Lukes sent 20 of the 22 messages.1 Lukes’s email messages included the
same accusations that he had texted to Toledo in the middle of the night on April 23 and
24, with some additional detail, including that Lukes believed that Toledo and another
coach had acted punitively toward Lukes’s son by yelling at him during a game and
telling Lukes’s son not to listen to Lukes. Lukes indicated that the issue should be
investigated by child protective services, and he demanded that the little league officials
remove Toledo and the other coach. Lukes repeatedly stated that he was “fully prepared
to escalate the issue beyond the League,” and he repeatedly indicated that he had copied
his attorneys on the emails. Lukes’s attorneys appear as copied recipients on one of the
messages.
A little after midnight on April 24, 2024, Toledo emailed Lukes that he was “very
confused” by the hours-long “stream of threatening and accusatory texts” and email
messages sent by Lukes, which Toledo noted included threatened legal action. Toledo
denied engaging in any of the behavior Lukes alleged. Toledo wrote: “I do not
appreciate being harassed at all hours of the night—in fact, you are currently still
1 The most recent email message in the series sent between April 23, 2024, and April 25, 2024, lists the little league officials as the email’s recipients, and the remaining messages appear to be replies, responses, or forwards to some combination of the little league and Toledo. Most of the subordinate messages do not include the recipients’ addresses, but many of the messages include salutations identifying the recipient.
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continually sending me harassing texts while I type this email at 11:54pm! Your texts are
a mix of bashing me, threatening me, and attempts to goad me into actions such that you
can have some form of legal basis to action against me. . . . I would respectfully request
that you cease communicating with me all together.” (Underscoring omitted.) Within 20
minutes, Lukes emailed Toledo and continued to accuse him of bullying and defaming
him and yelling at his son. In that message, Lukes remarked, “I’m sober lucid and I can
do this forever.”
The little league president emailed Lukes on April 25, 2024—the day that Toledo
filed the initial request for a restraining order—and informed Lukes that the little league
was investigating the alleged incident and asking Lukes to cease and desist all
communications with any managers, coaches, or board members of the little league.
Lukes responded by sending two email messages within the next 30 minutes. The
following day—the same day that the court issued the temporary restraining order
protecting Toledo—Lukes emailed the little league officials and Toledo that he would
withdraw his complaint if they could all mutually agree that Lukes’s son would not be
targeted and that there would be no further one-on-one communication between him and
the coaches.
The court held a hearing on the restraining order request on May 16, 2024. Both
Toledo and Lukes appeared at the hearing, represented themselves, and testified. At the
hearing, the court indicated that it had reviewed the documentation submitted by both
parties.
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Toledo testified that he applied for the restraining order because Lukes had
harassed him with his “very erratic behavior.” Toledo testified extensively about the text
messages and the emails that Lukes had sent. Most of Toledo’s trial presentation
consisted of screenshots of the text messages displayed on an ELMO. While Toledo
displayed the messages, the court indicated for some that it was reading them in the
moment as they were displayed. The court otherwise indicated that it had previously read
some messages. The record on appeal does not contain a copy of the displayed
screenshots.
The court asked Toledo if Lukes’s son was still playing on a team that Toledo
coached, and Toledo said that he was. Lukes asked Toledo, “The season over?” Toledo
responded, “No.” The court repeated the question, and Toledo answered, “We’re in the
playoffs right now.” The court asked Toledo if Lukes could livestream games, and
Toledo explained that when he applied for the restraining order he wanted no contact
with Lukes, so he had removed Lukes from the GameChanger app as a person permitted
to livestream the games.
The court asked Lukes if he denied sending any of the text messages that Toledo
had displayed, and Lukes responded that he did not. After Lukes made that admission,
the court remarked: “Okay. That’s all I need to know.” Lukes argued that the only
messages that were possibly problematic were the ones that he sent in the middle of the
night on April 15, 2024, but he explained that they were limited to a one-hour period, and
he subsequently apologized for sending them. Lukes argued that those messages were
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irrelevant because Toledo accepted the apology, thus demonstrating to Lukes that the
issue was resolved. The court asked Lukes if he thought his behavior was inappropriate,
and Lukes responded, “My behavior was inappropriate with respect to the text messages
over one hour of period of time on the 4/15 and 4/24. No other behaviors were
inappropriate.” Lukes believed that “[e]verything else” he did was “fine,” describing his
subsequent text messages as “[n]ormal, cordial text messages until after he retaliated
against me for those text messages.”
Lukes argued that Toledo had failed to demonstrate by “clear and convincing
evidence that [Toledo] was subjected to emotional harm or duress in any way.” The
court construed the argument as a contention that Toledo had not “proven that he was
under duress or anything like that.” The court responded that Lukes did not need to
“prove duress” but rather needed to prove only that the text messages “seriously alarm,
annoy, or harass a person [and] serve[] no legitimate purpose.”
After hearing both parties’ testimony, the court granted Toledo’s request for a
restraining order. The court expressly rejected Lukes’s characterization and perception of
his text messages. The court reasoned that Lukes’s conduct toward Toledo was a
“knowing and willful course of conduct directly to a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, harasses the person, and serves no legitimate purpose.” The court ordered Lukes
to stay at least 100 yards away from Toledo, his two minor sons, and any little league
event involving Toledo or his team for one year, until May 16, 2025. The court ordered
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Toledo to add Lukes back to GameChanger so that Lukes could watch the games via
livestream.
Two weeks after the trial court issued the restraining order, Lukes filed a notice of
intent to move for a new trial. Lukes stated that the motion would be made on several
statutory grounds listed in section 657, including insufficiency of the evidence, newly
discovered evidence, and legal error. Lukes stated that the motion would be based on the
notice, the parties’ filings, the evidence presented at trial, and a yet-to-be-filed
memorandum of points and authorities.
In a minute order entered on June 17, 2024, the court stated that it had read and
considered the notice of intent to file the motion for new trial and made the following
order: “This is a hearing that has already concluded. The proper procedure appears for
the party to appeal the decision. I do not have any legal authority to grant a new trial.”
The following day, the court sent an electronic notice that it had rejected the e-filing of
the motion and proposed order for the following reason: “Per minute order on 6/17/2024,
the court does not have legal authority regarding a motion for new trial.” In a minute
order entered on July 8, the court stated that it had read and considered a memorandum of
points and authorities that Lukes submitted in support of a motion for new trial. The
court found the document to be the same motion that it previously denied, and the court
again ordered the motion for new trial denied. Several days later, Lukes filed the
memorandum of points and authorities. Handwriting above the file-stamp from the
superior court reads, “Filed on demand.” A declaration from Lukes is attached to the
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memorandum of points and authorities, with accompanying exhibits attached to the
declaration. The declaration is not signed.
DISCUSSION
I. The restraining order2
Lukes contends that the trial court erred by granting the civil harassment
restraining order because the court misapplied the standard under section 527.6. Lukes
also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that (1) the course of conduct would have
caused a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress or that it actually
caused Toledo to suffer any emotional distress, and (2) the harassment was likely to
recur. We find no prejudicial error.
A. Legal framework
“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all
intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage
of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 (Arceneaux); Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) An appellant bears the burden of demonstrating, “on the basis
of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
2 The one-year civil harassment restraining order expired while the appeal was pending. In light of the restraining order’s expiration, we asked Lukes to file a supplemental brief addressing why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot (see Nebel v. Sulak (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1368), which he did. In a signed supporting declaration, Lukes attests that his ex-wife is using the restraining order against him in family law proceedings. We exercise our discretion to consider the appeal. (San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 564 [“An appeal from an expired restraining order is not moot if it could have collateral consequences in future proceedings”].)
11
justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609
(Jameson).) It is the appellant's burden to provide an adequate record on appeal. (Ibid.)
The failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved
against the appellant. (Ibid.)
Section 527.6 provides that the trial court must issue a restraining order if the
court finds “by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists.” (Id.,
subds. (a)(1), (i).) The statute defines harassment as “a credible threat of violence, or a
knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of
conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
Surety); Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.) Because Lukes
has failed to argue that the error was prejudicial, he has failed to carry his burden of
establishing reversible error. (Century Surety, at p. 963.)
Lukes does argue, however, that there is insufficient evidence that the course of
conduct would have caused a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress
and that it actually caused Toledo to suffer substantial emotional distress. The argument
fails for two reasons.
First, the record on appeal is not adequate to review the challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. The record does not include the screenshots of text messages
that Toledo displayed at trial, and no one testified that the screenshots were the same as
those attached to Lukes’s responsive declaration. We cannot presume that the displayed
messages were the same ones that Lukes attached to his responsive declaration, because
“all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of” the correctness of the trial
court’s order. (Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1133.) By failing to include the
evidence that the court relied on at the hearing in the record on appeal, Lukes has failed
15
to carry his burden of providing an adequate record to facilitate review of his challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) We accordingly
must resolve the issues against him. (Ibid.)
Second, even the inadequate record before us contains sufficient evidence to
support findings by clear and convincing evidence that Lukes’s course of conduct would
have caused a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and that it
actually caused Toledo to suffer substantial emotional distress. Over the course of a 10-
day period, Lukes twice sent Toledo a long series of disparaging and uncivil text
messages during the middle of the night. Lukes apologized for the first series of
messages, and he admitted that both series were inappropriate, while additionally
characterizing the first set of messages as vile, harsh, and unkind. The second series of
late-night text messages was accompanied by a series of equally disparaging email
messages that were sent to Toledo and the little league officials. In those emails, Lukes
demanded an investigation, demanded removal of Toledo, and threatened to escalate the
matter. Lukes accused Toledo of acting violently toward him by scowling and smirking
at Lukes and also accused Toledo of engaging in child abuse for reprimanding Lukes’s
son during a baseball game. Lukes threatened to take legal action against Toledo and
even threatened to involve child protective services. Moreover, Lukes was undeterred by
Toledo’s direct request after the first series of late-night text messages that Lukes not
contact him after 9:00 p.m. and only communicate with him in a professional manner.
Despite agreeing to that request and even apologizing for the behavior, Lukes
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nevertheless repeated the same behavior within one week. Toledo emailed Lukes during
the flurry of text messages and emails sent by Lukes during the second incident and
asked Lukes to cease all communications, but Lukes continued to send unprofessional,
disparaging, and threatening emails and text messages. Lukes similarly failed to comply
with the little league president’s subsequent request that Lukes stop all communications
with everyone involved in the little league. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude
from all of that evidence that Lukes’s course of conduct would have caused a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress. (See Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 1400, 1405-1406, 1414 [finding that several disturbing letters and telephone
calls constituted a “socially unacceptable course of conduct” that “would have seriously
alarmed, annoyed, or harassed a reasonable person, and would have caused a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress”].)
The record also contains ample evidence that Toledo actually suffered substantial
emotional distress, even though Toledo never directly testified to that. “A trial court may
infer substantial emotional distress from the nature of the harassing conduct.” (E.G. v.
M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 688, 705.) Toledo attested that he feared violence by Lukes
and did not feel safe about the prospect of Toledo attending another baseball game.
While Lukes was sending the second series of late-night text and email messages, Toledo
emailed Lukes and asked him to cease all communication, and Toledo expressed
confusion about the accusatory, threatening, and disparaging messages. After Toledo
made that request, Lukes quickly responded that he could continue doing “this forever.”
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Toledo immediately applied for a restraining order. A reasonable trier of fact could infer
from that evidence that the barrage of text and email messages caused Toledo to suffer
substantial emotional distress, that is, “highly unpleasant mental suffering or anguish
‘from socially unacceptable conduct’ [citation], which entails such intense, enduring and
nontrivial emotional distress that ‘no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be
expected to endure it.’” (Schild, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 762-763.)
Lukes’s only argument to the contrary is that Toledo’s acceptance of his apology
after the first series of late-night text messages and Toledo’s message telling Lukes that it
was a “bummer” that he could not attend a game the next day demonstrate that Toledo
did not suffer substantial emotional distress and that no reasonable person would have.
The argument is meritless. First, the argument ignores the series of disparaging,
threatening, and accusatory late-night emails and text messages that Lukes sent one week
later. Second, even assuming that Toledo’s acceptance of the apology demonstrated that
he was not experiencing substantial emotional distress at that moment, a reasonable trier
of fact could reasonably infer that Toledo’s feelings about the first series of messages
changed once Lukes repeated the same behavior despite the apology and the promise to
refrain, thus causing Toledo to reevaluate the sincerity of the apology and to ask Lukes
not to communicate with him at all.
C. Likelihood of recurrence
Lukes also argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence that the
harassing conduct was likely to recur. Again, we disagree
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The relationship between Lukes and Toledo was based entirely on Toledo’s
position as coach of Lukes’s son’s little league baseball team. Ongoing events involving
the baseball team were the basis for Lukes’s communications with Toledo. Toledo
testified that he still coached that team and that the season was not over. A reasonable
factfinder could therefore infer that Toledo and Lukes were likely to have future
interactions and that Lukes would have reason to continue communicating with Toledo.
(Harris, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 501.) Moreover, Lukes expressing willingness to
continue sending Toledo harassing messages when he wrote Toledo that he could “do this
forever” in response to Toledo’s request to cease all communications. Taken together, all
of that evidence is sufficient to support a finding that harassment was likely to occur in
the future absent an injunction.
Lukes’s contrary arguments are unavailing. Lukes contends that the evidence is
insufficient because “the baseball season was over the night before this trial.” The
assertion is contrary to the evidence and therefore fails. Lukes also contends that there
was no likelihood of recurrence given Lukes’s previous apology. The trial court could
reasonably decline to draw that inference, because Lukes sent Toledo another series of
harassing text and email messages after apologizing.
D. Protected activity
Finally, Lukes argues: “As of the date of the trial Lukes had sent no other text
messages or emails to Toledo except when reporting to the [the little league] Board his
claim of child abuse where Toledo is on the board. [Citation.] This protected activity
19
cannot form the basis of civil harassment.” The argument is forfeited. “To demonstrate
error, [the] appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to
authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Lukes does neither. He does not explain which of the
messages that he sent constitute protected activity, and he does not support the argument
with any citation to messages in the record. Instead, the only citation to the record that he
provides is to a printout listing Toledo as a board member of the little league. (Duarte v.
Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 [“‘It is the duty of a party to
support the arguments in its briefs by appropriate reference to the record’”].) In addition,
Lukes does not provide any legal analysis explaining why any of the messages constitute
protected activity. The conclusory assertion that the unspecified messages constitute
constitutionally protected activity is accordingly forfeited. (S.C., at p. 464.)
E. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Lukes has not shown any prejudicial
error in the granting of the one-year civil harassment restraining order.
II. The new trial motion
Lukes contends that the evidentiary hearing on Toledo’s request for a restraining
order constitutes a trial, so the trial court erred by failing to consider his motion for a new
trial. Lukes fails to demonstrate that the claimed error prejudiced him.
Section 657 enumerates the seven grounds on which a trial court may vacate a
verdict “and any other decision may be modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a
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new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of the party
aggrieved.” Section 656 defines “new trial” as “a re-examination of an issue of fact in
the same court after a trial and decision by a jury, court, or referee.” The potential
grounds for a new trial include “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court,” “[a]ccident
or surprise,” “[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application,
which he [or she] could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at
the trial,” insufficient evidence to justify the court’s decision or that the decision is
against the law, and an error of law. (§ 657.) A party moving for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence must show that the evidence “could not with reasonable
diligence have been discovered and produced earlier.” (Missionary Guadalupanas of
Holy Spirit Inc. v. Rouillard (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 421, 438 (Missionary
Guadalupanas).)
“‘[T]he trial court is bound by the rule of California Constitution, article VI,
section 13, that prejudicial error is the basis for a new trial, and there is no discretion to
grant a new trial for harmless error.’” (Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161 (Sherman); People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1262-1263.)
In reviewing an order denying a motion for new trial, “we must fulfill our obligation of
reviewing the entire record, including the evidence, so as to make an independent
determination as to whether the error was prejudicial.” (City of Los Angeles v. Decker
(1977) 18 Cal.3d 860, 872.)
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Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court erred by not entertaining the
new trial motion, Lukes nevertheless fails to argue that the error was prejudicial, so he
has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating prejudice. (Century Surety, supra, 139
Cal.App.4th at p. 963.) In any event, we conclude that the claimed error was harmless.
Lukes moved for a new trial on the following grounds: (1) The trial court applied
the wrong legal standard by failing to consider whether Lukes’s conduct actually caused
Toledo substantial emotional distress or would cause a reasonable person substantial
emotional distress, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the required findings on
those issues, (3) there was insufficient evidence that the harassment was likely to recur,
and (4) newly discovered evidence demonstrated that the baseball team’s season ended
the night before the hearing, demonstrating that Toledo lied at the hearing and that the
harassment was not likely to recur. In the unsigned declaration that Lukes filed in
support of the new trial motion, Lukes stated that the little league adopted a single-game
elimination format for the playoffs and that the team’s first playoff game had occurred
the night before the hearing. Lukes learned after the hearing that the team lost the game.
According to Lukes, that loss meant that the season was over and that Toledo had lied
when he testified to the contrary. Lukes said that he had “no way of knowing the
outcome of the game” before the hearing, because his ex-wife would not allow him to
communicate with his son and because he was not able to livestream the game. To
support the assertion that his son’s team lost, Lukes attached screenshots from the
GameChanger app that Lukes obtained from a parent of a player on the opposing team.
22
The arguments concerning the legal standard and the sufficiency of the evidence
lack merit for the reasons we have already explained. Those arguments consequently fail
to show that it is reasonably probable that Lukes would have obtained a more favorable
result if the trial court had considered the merits of the new trial motion.
It also is not reasonably probable that the trial court would have granted the
motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence. First, the motion was not supported
by any evidence, because Lukes did not sign the supporting declaration. “A declaration
not signed under penalty of perjury under the laws of California has ‘no evidentiary
value’ and can be disregarded.” (Safieddine v. MBC FZ, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
1086, 1094, fn. 9.)
Second, Lukes failed to demonstrate that the evidence “could not with reasonable
diligence have been discovered and produced earlier.” (Missionary Guadalupanas,
supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.) Lukes obtained information about the playoff game’s
results after the hearing from a parent of the opposing team. Lukes also had previously
emailed Toledo and the little league officials that he remained friends with another coach
in the little league. Lukes’s unsigned declaration does not attempt to explain why he
could not have asked those individuals about the result of the game before the hearing. A
showing of reasonable diligence would require such an explanation. (Ibid.)
For all of these reasons, Lukes has not shown that it is reasonably probable that the
trial court would have granted his new trial motion if the court had considered the motion
on the merits.
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DISPOSITION
The May 16, 2024, order granting Toledo a one-year restraining order against
Lukes is affirmed. The trial court’s June 17, 2024, and July 8, 2024, orders denying the
motion for a new trial are affirmed. Toledo shall recover his costs of appeal, if any.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
FIELDS J.
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Holding. The court affirmed the issuance of a civil harassment restraining order, holding that the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudicial error regarding the trial court's findings and failed to provide an adequate record to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in its application of the legal standard for civil harassment under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of harassment.
Whether the trial court had legal authority to grant a motion for new trial in this proceeding.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Reversal is not warranted by “error alone.””
“Because Lukes has failed to argue that the error was prejudicial, he has failed to carry his burden of establishing reversible error.”