California Court of Appeal Oct 9, 2025 No. E084229Unpublished
Filed 10/9/25 P. v. Woodham CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084229
v. (Super.Ct.No. CR23647)
GENE PAUL WOODHAM, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Joshlyn R. Pulliam,
Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Tami
Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Gene Paul Woodham appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. (Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the
Penal Code.) The court denied the petition after holding an evidentiary hearing.
Woodham argues that the People did not prove the causation element of murder, and they
1 Woodham’s opening brief states that he pled guilty to second degree murder, and the brief cites a minute order reflecting that he pled. But the minute order contains the following disclaimer at the top: “DATES OF PLEA AND SENTENCE ARE ESTIMATED [¶] CASE WAS FILED PRIOR TO SYSTEM BEING ACTIVATED. [footnote continued on next page]
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II. Woodham’s petition for resentencing
In March 2023, Woodham filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.
The People argued that he was prima facie ineligible for relief, because the record of
conviction showed that he was the actual killer. The court found that Woodham had
stated a prima facie case for relief and issued an order to show cause.
In anticipation of the evidentiary hearing, the People filed a brief arguing that
Woodham was ineligible for resentencing because he was the actual killer. They
submitted a number of exhibits, including certified transcripts of Woodham’s parole
hearings in 1991, 1996, 2002, and 2021.
At the parole hearing in 1991, Woodham testified that he met Kyler at a bar.
Woodham was drinking, and Kyler offered him a place to stay. The two of them
continued to drink at Kyler’s house. Kyler made sexual advances toward Woodham, who
pushed Kyler away. Woodham “kind of blacked out,” but he recalled “wrestling
around,” picking up an object, and swinging the object until Kyler dropped. He did not
recall how many times he hit Kyler. He was “very drunk” at the time.
THESE MINUTES ARE NOT TO BE USED AS A TRUE AND ACCURATE COPY OF THE MINUTES ENTERED.” The minute order does appear to be inaccurate, to the extent that it reflects a conviction by plea. We draw our summary of the bench trial proceedings from exhibits submitted by the People in opposition to Woodham’s petition for resentencing. The People obtained the exhibits from the court’s original file. They include minute orders reflecting the five-day bench trial in 1986. In addition, the abstract of judgment shows that Woodham was convicted after a bench trial, and defense counsel’s oral argument in support of the petition for resentencing acknowledged that Woodham was convicted after a trial. According to the People, the reporter’s transcript of the trial is no longer available because of the age of the case.
3
At the parole hearing in 1996, Woodham again testified that he met Kyler at a bar,
and Kyler invited him to Kyler’s home. Once there, Woodham severely beat Kyler with
a hammer after Kyler made sexual advances toward him. Woodham fled and did not call
for help. He was intoxicated during the incident and did not remember much of it.
Woodham acknowledged that he was responsible for putting Kyler in the hospital, but he
declined to take responsibility for Kyler’s death. As far as Kyler’s death, Woodham
stated: “I don’t know what kind of care he was given in the hospital, what . . . caused it
or did not cause it.”
At the parole hearing in 2002, Woodham again testified that he met Kyler at a bar,
went home with him, and attacked him in response to sexual advances. Woodham again
did not recall how many times he hit Kyler but was told that it was 20 to 30 times. Kyler
died over two years after Woodham beat him with the hammer. During that period,
Kyler was in an outpatient care facility once, but he was otherwise in the hospital. Kyler
died after contracting pneumonia.
At the parole hearing in 2021, Woodham described the events somewhat
differently. He said that he was hitchhiking when Kyler picked him up and invited him
to Kyler’s house. Woodham was drinking and accepted Kyler’s offer, thinking that he
would steal Kyler’s car. He meant to hit Kyler with the hammer one time and render
Kyler unconscious so that he could take the car. Kyler would not “go down,” so
Woodham continued to hit him.
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Woodham’s brief in support of his petition argued that the People had to prove
that his beating of Kyler caused Kyler’s death, and they had not offered any evidence of
causation.
At the evidentiary hearing in July 2024, the trial court admitted into evidence
Woodham’s parole hearing testimony. The court concluded that the testimony
established that Woodham did not have any accomplices, and he alone killed Kyler. The
court also found that Woodham’s testimony showed that the killing “was a murder.” The
court therefore denied Woodham’s petition.
DISCUSSION
Woodham contends that the court erred by denying his petition, because the
People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his beating of Kyler caused Kyler’s
Senate Bill No. 1437 created section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95) as a
mechanism for retroactive application of the changes in the law. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 & fn. 2 (Strong).) A defendant convicted under a now-invalid
theory of murder liability may petition the court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced if they could not presently be convicted of murder because of the changes to
sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that they are entitled to relief, then the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction
and resentence the petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c), (d)(1).) At the evidentiary hearing,
the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder
under the law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); Strong, at
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p. 709.) The trial court acts as an independent factfinder, and we review the court’s
factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055,
1065-1066.)
Although section 1172.6 authorizes an evidentiary hearing, the “parties are not
placed in the same position as if no trial had occurred.” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 778, 788.) The Legislature did not intend “to permit wholesale
relitigation of findings supporting murder convictions in the context of section 1172.6
resentencing.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715.) The evidentiary hearing is not “a
whole new trial on all the elements of murder. Instead, the parties will focus on evidence
made relevant by the amendments to the substantive definition of murder.” (People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) In addition, factual findings made at the
defendant’s original trial are “generally preclusive in section 1172.6 proceedings” if they
involve elements of murder that are unchanged. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 453; id.
at p. 454 [“it is difficult to foresee a situation in which a relevant jury finding, embodied
in a final criminal judgment, would not meet the traditional elements of issue
preclusion”].) The petitioner “cannot use a section 1172.6 resentencing hearing to
relitigate facts already determined, whether by plea, admission, or verdict.” (People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 458.)
The court in this case correctly rejected Woodham’s argument that the People had
to relitigate causation. “Murder includes both actus reus and mens rea elements. To
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satisfy the actus reus element of murder, an act of either the defendant or an accomplice
must be the proximate cause of death.” (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660,
italics omitted.) Proximate cause has long been an element of murder, including in 1986
when Woodham was convicted. (See People v. Harrison (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 330,
345 [“the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable in criminal proceedings in
determining responsibility for a person’s acts”], disapproved on another ground by
People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783.) Proximate cause “does not implicate
concerns regarding imputed mens rea and vicarious liability identified in . . . Senate Bill
No. 1437.” (People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1147.)
By convicting Woodham of Kyler’s murder after the bench trial, the trial court
necessarily found that Woodham’s acts or those of an accomplice were the proximate
cause of Kyler’s death. Woodham could not relitigate that factual finding, which was
unaffected by Senate Bill No. 1437. “Indiscriminate relitigation of findings supporting
murder convictions [is] not permitted.” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 459.) Woodham does not challenge the court’s finding at the section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing that “he, and he alone, committed this murder.” Nor does he
challenge any other aspect of the court’s express or implied findings. He therefore fails
to show that the court erred by denying his section 1172.6 petition.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying Woodham’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a petitioner for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 cannot relitigate the element of proximate causation, as that element was established by the original conviction and remains unaffected by the legislative changes in Senate Bill No. 1437.
Issues
Whether a petitioner for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 may relitigate the element of proximate causation of death.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the petition for resentencing after finding the petitioner was the actual killer.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The petitioner “cannot use a section 1172.6 resentencing hearing to relitigate facts already determined, whether by plea, admission, or verdict.””
“By convicting Woodham of Kyler’s murder after the bench trial, the trial court necessarily found that Woodham’s acts or those of an accomplice were the proximate cause of Kyler’s death.”
“Indiscriminate relitigation of findings supporting murder convictions [is] not permitted.”