California Court of Appeal Oct 8, 2025 No. E084003Unpublished
Filed 10/8/25 P. v. Hull CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084003
v. (Super.Ct.No. BPR2400482)
DOMINIQUE DUPREE HULL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sylwia Luttrell,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded with instructions.
James M. Kehoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and
Flavio Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
After a contested hearing, the trial court found Dominique Dupree Hull in
violation of his parole and remanded him to the custody of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). On appeal, Hull makes two arguments. First,
precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to
determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the
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ground of vagueness.” (Ibid.) Where a term or condition of probation is
unconstitutionally vague, a reviewing court has the power to modify it to render it
constitutional. (Id. at p. 892.)
Restrictions on a parolee’s ability to possess sexually explicit materials are
particularly susceptible to challenge for vagueness, given the inherent difficulty in
defining such material. (See, e.g., People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436
[“The phrase ‘sexually stimulating/oriented material deemed inappropriate by the
probation officer’ is an inherently imprecise and subjective standard.”] (Turner).)
However, courts have determined that such conditions are not vague if they contain an
express knowledge requirement. That is, a condition may pass constitutional muster if it
first requires that the parole officer expressly identify which materials are prohibited.
This is because “[t]he fact that the probation officer may deem material sexually explicit
or pornographic after defendant already possesses the material would produce a situation
where defendant could violate his probation without adequate notice.” (People v. Pirali
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1352 (Pirali).) To meet this requirement, courts have
generally modified such conditions to require that the probation or parole officer first
identify prohibited materials as prohibited before a parolee or probationer may be held
liable for possessing those materials. (See, e.g., Pirali at p. 1353; Turner, supra, 155
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1436-1438; People v. Connors (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 729, 738.)
However, even this modification will not save a condition which seeks to prohibit
“pornography.” This is because “the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague,” and “a
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modification requiring [the parolee] to know or to be informed in advance that materials
are ‘pornography’ fails to address the term’s inherent vagueness.” (In re D.H. (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 722, 728-729.) While it is possible for a condition which references
pornography to define that term sufficiently well that it will pass constitutional muster—
for instance by defining it as “materials having ‘ “a primary purpose of causing sexual
arousal” ’ ”—using the term without such a definition renders the condition necessarily
vague. (People v. Gruis (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 19, 26 (Gruis).)
Hull’s condition 31 suffers from both these fatal defects. It has no express
knowledge requirement; nothing required Hull to know ahead of time that the materials
are prohibited. It also uses the term “pornographic materials” without further defining
that term. Accordingly, we agree with the parties that this condition is unconstitutionally
vague and vacate the court’s order finding that Hull violated it.
The remaining question is what to do about the term. “Although we have the
power to modify probation conditions to render them constitutional,” we find the better
approach is to remand for the trial court “to either strike the no-pornography condition or
modify it consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.” (Gruis, supra, 94
Cal.App.5th at p. 26.) If the court chooses to modify the condition, it should include an
express knowledge requirement and either strike the reference to “pornographic
materials” or else define it “with the ‘primary purpose’ or similar phrasing . . . that would
distinguish the prohibited materials from those depicting sexual conduct but having
primarily literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (Ibid.) It may also wish to
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clarify whether the condition extends not only to material in defendant’s possession, but
also to his control of any prohibited materials. (See id. at p. 26, fn. 4.)
2. DAPO Adequately Considered Intermediate Sanctions
Hull contests whether the parole agent adequately considered intermediate
sanctions instead of revocation. We reject the argument.
A demurrer is the proper mechanism to challenge a parole agent’s claim that
intermediate sanctions were considered and found inappropriate. (See People v. Perlas
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 826, 832 (Perlas).) Hull did not file a demurrer, which can be
grounds for forfeiture. (People v. Hronchak (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 884, 892 fn. 5
[defendant did not file a demurrer, and “[t]hat omission would usually result in a
forfeiture of this issue on appeal”].) Hull, however, moved to dismiss after close of the
prosecution’s case because DAPO failed to adequately consider intermediate sanctions
before petitioning to revoke his parole. The People suggest that Hull’s challenge be
“deemed to be a demurrer.” We agree with that approach, and therefore turn to the
argument’s merits.
“ ‘ “ ‘[A] demurrer raises an issue of law as to the sufficiency of the accusatory
pleading, and it tests only those defects appearing on the face of that pleading.’
[Citation.]” [Citations.] On appeal, we review the order overruling [a] defendant’s
demurrer de novo. We exercise our independent judgment as to whether, as a matter of
law, the petition alleged sufficient facts to justify revocation of [a] defendant’s
parole.’ ” (Perlas, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 832.)
8
A supervising parole agency may only petition to revoke parole if it “has
determined, following application of its assessment processes, that intermediate sanctions
up to and including flash incarceration are not appropriate.” (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) For
this reason, the California Rules of Court require that “a report filed by the supervising
agency in conjunction with a petition to revoke parole . . . must include the reasons for
that agency’s determination that intermediate sanctions without court intervention as
authorized by Penal Code section[] 3000.08(f) . . . are inappropriate responses to the
alleged violations.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.541(e).)
We agree with the trial court that DAPO’s report met the requirements of
section 3000.08 and rule 4.541(e). The law requires only that the parole agent submit a
report alongside the petition for revocation stating that they considered intermediate
sanctions and found them inappropriate given the allegations. The report here satisfies
that requirement. It states that DAPO “considered remedial sanctions,” what sanctions it
considered, and its reason for rejecting these intermediate sanctions. Specifically, it says
DAPO rejected intermediate sanctions because “[t]he negative outweighs the positive
when Hull is congregating with codefendants, minors, and pornography,” Hull
demonstrated no intention of complying with parole conditions generally, and “the
severity of the violations appears to be escalating, placing the community at unnecessary
risk.” This satisfies the requirements that the parole agency consider intermediate
sanctions and state why those sanctions were rejected.
9
Hull argues this case is like People v. Osorio (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1408
(Osorio), disapproved on other grounds in People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640. In
that case, the defendant was accused of violating his parole by associating with gang
members for ten minutes. (Id. at pp. 1410-1411.) The defendant filed a demurrer
arguing the parole agents had not adequately considered intermediate sanctions, which
the trial court denied. (Id. at pp. 1411-1413.) The court, reviewing de novo, concluded
the facts alleged in the petition were insufficient to justify revocation, even though the
defendant conceded the violation. (Id. at pp. 1414-1415.) In particular, the court felt that
the nature of the alleged violation—a 10-minute meeting with other gang members—was
not serious enough to warrant revocation. (Id. at p. 1415.) It therefore reversed the trial
court’s order denying the demurrer. (Id. at pp. 1415-1416.)
This case differs from Osorio because DAPO alleged multiple, serious violations,
not a single violation based on a short period of contact with a prohibited person.
Because the requirement to consider and reject intermediate sanctions is a threshold
requirement to file a petition for revocation, we consider whether that requirement was
met in the context of alleged violations, no matter how many of those allegations were
sustained by the trial court and survived appeal. Here, the alleged violations constituted a
significant escalation in violative behavior, not a minor violation, so DAPO’s rejection of
intermediate sanctions was reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision denying Hull’s motion to dismiss.
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DISPOSITION
We reverse and vacate the trial court’s finding that Hull violated condition 31 of
his parole and its order revoking his parole. We remand to allow the trial court to either
strike condition 31 or modify it in accord with this decision, and to consider whether to
revoke parole based on the sole remaining violation. In all other respects, we affirm.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAPHAEL J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.
11
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a parole condition prohibiting the possession of pornographic material was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an express knowledge requirement and failing to define the term, while also ruling that the parole agency sufficiently considered intermediate sanctions before seeking revocation.
Issues
Whether a parole condition prohibiting the possession of sexually oriented or pornographic material is unconstitutionally vague.
Whether the parole agency adequately considered intermediate sanctions before petitioning for parole revocation.
Disposition. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Hull’s condition 31 suffers from both these fatal defects. It has no express knowledge requirement; nothing required Hull to know ahead of time that the materials are prohibited. It also uses the term “pornographic materials” without further defining”
“The law requires only that the parole agent submit a report alongside the petition for revocation stating that they considered intermediate sanctions and found them inappropriate given the allegations. The report here satisfies that requirement.”