Oasis Independent Medical Associates v. Lopez CA4/2 (2025) · DecisionDepot
Oasis Independent Medical Associates v. Lopez CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Sep 25, 2025 No. E082871MUnpublished
Filed 9/25/25 Oasis Independent Medical Associates v. Lopez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
OASIS INDEPENDENT MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC., E082871, E083728 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2304878) v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION JOB LOPEZ et al., [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Defendants and Appellants. ___________________________________
JOB LOPEZ, et al.,
Cross-complainants and Appellants,
vs.
OASIS INDEPENDENT MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, et al.,
Cross-defendants and Respondents.
1
The petition for rehearing filed by appellant on September 12, 2025, is denied.
The opinion filed in this matter on August 28, 2025, is modified as follows:
Following the third paragraph on page 15, and prior to the first paragraph on
page 16, we insert the following..
Lopez Associates asserts that, under section 16600.5, Oasis’s
lawsuit is “not protected by section 425.16.” Section 16600.5, subdivision
(d), provides, “An employer that enters into a contract that is void under
this chapter or attempts to enforce a contract that is void under this chapter
commits a civil violation.” Our Supreme Court has concluded that
wrongful prosecution claims are not categorically exempt from anti-
SLAPP protections. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31
Cal.4th 728, 741.) Based upon that conclusion by our Supreme Court, it
follows that a claim under section 16600.5 would not be exempt from
anti-SLAPP protections.
The last full paragraph on page 16, which begins “Filing a lawsuit . . . ,” is
removed and replaced with the following paragraph:
Lopez Associates assert that filing a lawsuit to enforce an allegedly
void noncompete agreement is unlawful. There is not uncontroverted
evidence that the exclusivity agreement is void. In Lopez’s declaration in
opposition to the preliminary injunction, he declared, “On August 27,
2023, Oasis stated that any relationship that it had with me was
terminated. I dispute that I had a relationship with Oasis that was subject
2
to termination.” Lopez’s denial that he worked for Oasis raises a question
as to whether section 16600’s per se rule applies.
Except for these modifications, the opinion remains unchanged. The
modifications do not effect a change in the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER Acting P. J.
I concur:
CODRINGTON J.
3
Filed 8/28/25 Oasis Independent Medical Associates v. Lopez CA4/2 (unmodified opinion) Opinion following order vacating prior opinion
See concurring opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
OASIS INDEPENDENT MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC., E082871, E083728 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2304878) v. OPINION JOB LOPEZ et al.,
Defendants and Appellants. ___________________________________
JOB LOPEZ, et al.,
Cross-complainants and Appellants,
vs.
OASIS INDEPENDENT MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, et al.,
Cross-defendants and Respondents.
1
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Manuel Bustamante,
Judge. Affirmed.
Kelly, Trotter & Franzen and David P. Pruett for Defendants, Cross-
complainants and Appellants.
Doll Amir & Eley, Michael M. Amir and Paul M. Torres for Plaintiffs, Cross-
defendants and Respondents.
This opinion addresses two appeals from one lower court case. In both appeals,
the appellants are Job Lopez (Lopez), CoachellaMed, Francisco Cordova, M.D., and
Carlos Lopez, M.D. The first appeal (Court of Appeal case No. E082871) concerns the
trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction against Lopez. The respondent in the first
appeal is Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc.
The second appeal (Court of Appeal case No. E083728) addresses the trial
court’s partial grant of an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) against a
cross-complaint that was brought by Lopez, CoachellaMed, Francisco Cordova, M.D.,
and Carlos Lopez, M.D. In the second appeal, the respondents are Oasis, Desert Oasis
Healthcare, and Heritage Provider Network. We address the appeals in turn.
I. FIRST APPEAL (E082871)
Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc. (Oasis) sued Lopez, CoachellaMed,
Francisco Cordova, M.D., and Carlos Lopez, M.D., for unfair competition (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200)1, breach of contract, and other causes of action. At the request of Oasis,
1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Business and Professions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
the trial court issued a preliminary injunction restraining Lopez “from providing any
false and/or misleading information to . . . Oasis’s members regarding their care” and
“from making unsolicited communications to . . . Oasis Medicare Advantage members.”
Lopez contends that, for a variety of reasons, the trial court erred in issuing the
preliminary injunction. We affirm.
FACTS
A. ALLEGED WRONGFUL ACTS
The following facts are taken from Oasis’s memorandum in support of its ex
parte application for a preliminary injunction. Independent physician associations (IPA)
contract with HMOs “to provide . . . health care services to the HMO’s members.”
“The IPA then contracts ‘downstream’ with numerous physicians to actually provide the
medical care to the IPA’s enrollees.” “Physicians may further contract ‘downstream’
with other providers.” “Oasis is an IPA which contracts with [physicians] and other
providers . . . to provide care to . . . Oasis enrollees.” Albert Anderson, M.D.
(Anderson), had a contract to treat Oasis’s members. Lopez was a nurse practitioner
who entered into a partnership with Anderson. Due to that partnership, Lopez also
treated Oasis’s members.
After years of Lopez and Anderson working together with no major issues,
Lopez mass mailed a letter to Anderson’s Oasis patients claiming that if they followed
Lopez to a different practice “with a new primary care doctor (instead of Dr. Anderson),
the ‘patients will never lose any benefits or services’ and that the patients ‘will continue
enjoying [their] benefits exactly as before.’ ” Oasis alleged the foregoing claim by
3
Lopez was false because “Oasis has many programs, services (e.g., medication
management, cardiac, and pulmonary clinics) and specialists (e.g., oncologists,
cardiologists, etc.) who will not be available with [Lopez’s new practice].” Oasis
further alleged that Lopez’s “agents, including insurance brokers, are cold calling . . .
Oasis enrollees assigned to Dr. Anderson, and pushing the same false narrative
described above.” The allegations about Oasis’s services being unique to Oasis and
unavailable to patients who leave Oasis are supported by the declaration of Melissa
Diaz, Oasis’s marketing manager.
One of Oasis’s former patients declared, “Recently, a woman called me,
unsolicited, and told me that she was calling on behalf of . . . Lopez. The woman told
me that I needed to change my primary care doctor and that such a change would not
impact my ability to continue seeing the other doctors in . . . Oasis’[s] network of
doctors. I reluctantly agreed to switch my provider. After thinking about it, however, I
called the person back and told her that I did not want to change my primary care doctor
from Dr. Anderson and that I wanted to stay with . . . Oasis. The person responded that
I could not change back.”
In Oasis’s complaint, it alleges that it sent Lopez a cease-and-desist letter on July
27, 2023. Oasis further alleged that Lopez’s wrongful acts occurred “within the past
several months.” Oasis’s complaint was filed on October 6, 2023, so we infer the
alleged wrongful acts occurred in the summer and fall of 2023. Brian Hodgkins, M.D.,
executive vice president of Oasis’s clinical operations, discovered that, within the 45
days prior to his November 2023 declaration, 80 of Anderson’s patients left his care.
4
B. EX PARTE APPLICATION
Oasis applied ex parte for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction. Oasis asserted it was likely to prevail on its cause of action for unfair
425.16.) Lopez Associates contend the trial court erred by partially granting the anti-
SLAPP motion. We affirm.
FACTS
In their first amended cross-complaint (FACC), Lopez Associates sought a
judicial declaration that the exclusivity agreement was void under section 16600. In
13
their second cause of action, Lopez Associates alleged that Oasis’s lawsuit, which
included a claim for breach of the exclusivity agreement, constituted unfair competition
(§ 17200) because the exclusivity agreement is an improper restraint on Lopez
practicing his profession. The following is a quote from Lopez Associates’ second
cause of action: “[Oasis’s] . . . filing of an action in court to attempt to enforce
restraints of trade, so as to suppress competitive employment in California, violate
California’s unfair competition law and public policy against restraints of trade,
Sections 16600 and 17200.”
In partially granting the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court struck: (1) the
entirety of Lopez Associates’ second cause of action; (2) in the fourth cause of action,
paragraph 73, the portion reading, “ ‘and attempted enforcement of Exclusivity
Contracts with NP Lopez’ ”; (3) paragraph 24, which reads, “ ‘Those threats have
included threats of entangling competitors in litigation, with cease and desist letters,
including threats of injunctions, to deter competitors from contracting with health care
providers who were induced to sign cross-defendants’ Exclusivity Contract’ ”; and
(4) the portion of paragraph 1 reading, “ ‘including threats of litigation and
commencement of litigation by those cross-complainants in an effort to achieve
restraints of health care providers’ professions, trades, and business by virtue of cross-
defendants’ Exclusivity Contracts.’ ”
14
DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To resolve an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court engages in a two-step inquiry.
First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the
challenged cause of action arises from a protected activity. [Citation.] The moving
party has the burden of showing that the challenged cause of action arises from a
protected activity. [Citation.] Second, if the moving party has carried that burden, the
court must decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the challenged cause of action. [Citation.] ‘The trial court’s rulings on
both issues are reviewed de novo.’ ” (City of Oxnard v. Starr (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
313, 320.)
B. PROTECTED ACTIVITY
A protected activity is one arising from an act in furtherance of a person’s “right
of petition or free speech.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) That includes
“any written or oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding” or
“under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” (Id. at subds. (e)(1) & (2).)
The portions of the FACC stricken by the trial court all pertain to Oasis’s actions
in bringing its complaint against Lopez Associates. Oasis’s complaint constitutes a
writing before a judicial proceeding that is also under consideration by a judicial body.
Therefore, the stricken portions of the FACC pertain to the protected activity of Oasis
suing Lopez Associates.
15
Lopez Associates contend the exclusivity agreement is void per se under section
16600, as a posttermination noncompete agreement, and suing to enforce a void
agreement is not a protected activity. In support of their position, Lopez Associates cite
a case from this court, Dwight R. v. Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 697, 711-712.
That case provides: “Unlawful or criminal activities do not qualify as protected
speech or petition activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citations.] But when the
defendant’s assertedly protected activity may or may not be unlawful, the defendant
may invoke the anti-SLAPP statute unless the activity is unlawful as a matter of law.
[Citation.] An activity may be deemed unlawful as a matter of law when the defendant
does not dispute that the activity was unlawful, or uncontroverted evidence conclusively
shows the activity was unlawful.” (Dwight R. v. Christy B., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th
697, 711-712.)
Filing a lawsuit is not an unlawful or criminal activity. Lopez Associates assert
that filing a lawsuit to enforce an allegedly void noncompete agreement is unlawful. If
we accept that premise as true, there is not uncontroverted evidence that the exclusivity
agreement is void. In Lopez’s declaration in opposition to the preliminary injunction,
he declared, “On August 27, 2023, Oasis stated that any relationship that it had with me
was terminated. I dispute that I had a relationship with Oasis that was subject to
termination.” Lopez’s denial that he worked for Oasis raises a question as to whether
section 16600’s per se rule applies.
In Lopez’s declaration in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, Lopez did not
deny having a relationship with Oasis, but he failed to define the relationship, e.g.,
16
employer-employee. For example: “Regarding the events leading to the termination of
the contractual relationship with Oasis . . . . By that letter, Oasis stated it could
‘terminate the agreement immediately.’ [Citation.] And, Oasis stated that unless I did
what it told me in its letter that it would terminate its relationship with me . . . .” Lopez
did not indicate if he worked for Oasis as an independent contractor or if he had a
business arrangement with Oasis as a co-owner of the medical practice with Anderson.
As a result, there is not uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that the exclusivity
agreement is void, such that it would be unlawful to seek to enforce it. The trial court
did not err in finding that Oasis’s complaint constitutes a protected activity.
C. PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING
Lopez Associates, as the cross-complainants, bore the burden of proving a
probability of prevailing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In the second cause
of action, Lopez Associates alleged that Oasis’s initiation of litigation to enforce the
exclusivity agreement was an “unfair business practice[] under Sections 16600 and
17200.” Because the unfair business practice claim (§ 17200) is based upon section
16600, Lopez Associates must demonstrate a probability of establishing that the
exclusivity agreement is either (1) void per se or (2) void under the reasonableness
standard. (Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp.
350-351.) Lopez Associates rely solely on the void per se rule and assert that Lopez
worked for Oasis as an independent contractor.
In Lopez Associates’ opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, it provided law
concerning section 16600 and independent contractors. For example, “ ‘[A]n agreement
17
by an employee or independent contractor not to compete with his employer after
leaving that employment is void.’ [Citations.]” In terms of evidence, Lopez Associates
relied on Lopez’s declaration in support of the opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion,
which referred to a generic relationship between Lopez and Oasis – it did not identify
Lopez as an independent contractor. Given Lopez did not declare himself to be an
independent contractor, there is not a probability of Lopez Associates prevailing on the
independent contractor/void per se theory. As a result, they have failed to establish a
probability of prevailing on their claim that Oasis engaged in an unfair business practice
(§ 17200).
D. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in partially granting the anti-SLAPP motion.
DISPOSITION
The order granting the preliminary injunction is affirmed. The order partially
granting the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. In both appeals, respondents are awarded
their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER Acting P. J.
I concur:
CODRINGTON J.
18
[Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc. v. Lopez, E082871; Lopez v. Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc., E083728]
MENETREZ, J., Concurring.
The preliminary injunction prohibits only false or misleading communications and
unsolicited marketing communications. Appellants’ arguments concerning Business and
Professions Code section 16600 do not show that prohibiting those communications was
an abuse of discretion.
The special motion to strike was granted only as to allegations concerning
respondents’ litigation or prelitigation conduct. That conduct is protected activity under
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and is covered by the litigation privilege. (Dove
Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784; Rubin v.
Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1194-1195.) Appellants’ arguments concerning Business
and Professions Code section 16600 again fail to show error, because even meritless
litigation is protected activity and is covered by the litigation privilege.
I therefore concur in the judgment.
MENETREZ J.
1
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction against the defendant and the partial grant of an anti-SLAPP motion against the cross-complaint, finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate error in the trial court's application of section 16600 and that the underlying lawsuit was protected activity.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in finding that Business and Professions Code section 16600 did not apply to the exclusivity agreement.
Whether the trial court erred in granting a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of success on the merits.
Whether the trial court erred in granting an anti-SLAPP motion against the cross-complaint regarding the enforcement of the exclusivity agreement.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“There is not uncontroverted evidence that the exclusivity agreement is void.”
“Lopez’s denial that he worked for Oasis raises a question as to whether section 16600’s per se rule applies.”