People v. Urquilla CA2/5

Filed 9/22/25 P. v. Urquilla CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B339801

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. BA100645)

DOUGLAS ARMANDO URQUILLA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed. William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant Douglas Armando Urquilla (defendant) appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for a People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 hearing to preserve evidence for a future youth offender parole hearing. The trial court denied defendant’s motion because he is serving a life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence, which renders him statutorily ineligible for such a hearing. Defendant asks us to decide whether the governing youth offender parole statutes that make him ineligible for a Franklin hearing violate his constitutional rights, namely, the guarantee of equal protection or the prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment.

I. BACKGROUND1 A jury convicted defendant of the 1994 murders of Martin Jasso and Erika Briseno. The jury found true principal-armed allegations (Pen. Code,2 § 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and a multiple- murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus one year for each firearm enhancement. A prior panel of this court affirmed the judgment