California Court of Appeal Sep 17, 2025 No. E083596Unpublished
Filed 9/17/25 P. v. Tagle CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083596
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF2100687)
JUAN MANUEL TAGLE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jason Armand, Judge.
Affirmed.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Paige B.
Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2021, defendant and appellant Juan Manuel Tagle “snatched” a purse in
H.L.’s possession while inside a casino parking structure. A subsequent search of
defendant’s vehicle produced defendant’s California identification card, a BB gun, a
lock-pick kit, a designer hand bag containing foreign currency, multiple counterfeit $100
bills, miscellaneous jewelry and watches, and mail correspondence addressed to someone
other than defendant. When defendant was taken into custody by law enforcement, he
had a debit card belonging to someone named L.S. in his possession.
As a result of this incident, a jury found defendant guilty of the robbery of H.L.
(Pen. Code,1 § 211; count 1); unlawful possession of personal identifying information of
L.S. (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1); count 3); and unlawful possession of burglary tools (§ 466;
count 5). Defendant was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life in state prison for the
robbery conviction pursuant to the alternate sentencing provisions of the three strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) as the result of four prior convictions, as well as
concurrent terms for the remaining offenses.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to give a
requested pinpoint instruction providing the jury a specific definition of “force” with
respect to commission of a robbery; (2) substantial evidence does not support his
convictions for unlawful possession of personal identifying information of L.S. or
unlawful possession of burglary tools; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his Romero2 motion inviting the trial court to dismiss his prior strike offenses in
the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385. We disagree with each of the claims
asserted by defendant on appeal and affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Charges
In May 2021, staff at a casino responded to H.L.’s screaming in the casino’s
parking structure. H.L. reported that she had been threatened by a man wielding a gun,
she attempted to run away, and she had her purse “snatch[ed]” by another man when she
attempted to seek help. Law enforcement reviewed the casino’s surveillance videos and
determined that H.L.’s reported encounters actually involved the same man. Law
enforcement officers searched the man’s vehicle and recovered a California identification
card belonging to defendant; a BB gun; and a lock-pick kit, among other items. They
also discovered a debit card belonging to L.S. in defendant’s possession when they took
defendant into custody.
As a result of this incident, defendant was charged with robbery (§ 211; count 1);
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
3
possession of stolen property valued over $950 (§ 496, subd. (a); count 2); unlawful
possession of personal identifying information of L.S. (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1); count 3);
unlawful possession of counterfeit currency (§ 476; count 4); and unlawful possession of
burglary tools (§ 466; count 5). It was also alleged that defendant had suffered four prior
convictions qualifying as serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)) and strike offenses (§§ 667,
subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)).
B. Relevant Evidence at Trial3
H.L. testified that, in the early morning of May 18, 2021, she was looking for her
boyfriend outside of a casino’s parking structure. She was carrying a suitcase, some
bags, and a purse because she and her boyfriend were planning to return home. A man
pulled up in his vehicle, exited the vehicle, and asked H.L. to give him money. When
H.L. refused, the man returned to his vehicle, retrieved what appeared to be a firearm,
displayed the object in a threatening manner, and demanded H.L. get into his vehicle.
H.L. ran from the man in fear, attempting to hide from him. After hiding for about 10
minutes, she entered the parking structure, saw what she believed to be another man
standing near a charging station, and yelled for help. The man ran over but then
immediately “snatch[ed]” her purse. H.L. testified she was unable to resist because she
3 Because defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect
to the element of intent necessary to convict him for unlawful possession of personal identifying information (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1); count 3) and unlawful possession of burglary tools (§ 466; count 5), we summarize only the evidence relevant to resolution of these claims on appeal and the evidence necessary to provide context.
4
was already in fear from her first encounter.4 H.L. was terrified and screamed, drawing
the attention of casino staff.
When H.L. was first interviewed by law enforcement officers, she expressed the
belief that the man who initially asked her for money and the man who took her purse
were different people. She believed the two men were dressed differently. And H.L. was
unable to identify defendant when law enforcement attempted to conduct an “infield line
up.” However, when testifying at trial, H.L. clarified: her interaction with the man who
took her purse lasted only seconds; it was dark during both encounters; and, at the time,
she was scared and simply looking for someone to help her. In retrospect, she now
believed it was likely the same person who initially threatened her with a firearm and
took her purse.
Casino staff located surveillance video of both incidents. Upon review of the
surveillance video, casino staff and law enforcement were able to identify the vehicle
involved in the initial incident and also determine that the two incidents involved the
same suspect. Law enforcement searched the vehicle after obtaining a warrant and
discovered: (1) a wallet containing defendant’s California identification card; (2) a BB
gun; (3) a lock-pick kit; (4) counterfeit $100 bills; (5) an assortment of jewelry and
watches; (6) a designer handbag; and (7) mail correspondence addressed to someone
other than defendant. Law enforcement officers kept the vehicle under surveillance and
4 Specifically, H.L. stated: “And the man that took my handbag. And I was able
to get chased by this man because I was so scared already and I peed myself already.”
5
eventually arrested defendant when he returned to retrieve the vehicle.
While being taken into custody, law enforcement officers discovered a debit card
belonging to L.S. in defendant’s pocket. L.S. testified that he did not know defendant
and could not think of any reason why defendant would be in possession of L.S.’s debit
card. A subsequent investigation also revealed that the designer handbag found in
defendant’s vehicle was stolen from a storage facility the day prior to the incident with
H.L.
C. Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty of robbery of H.L. (§ 211; count 1); guilty of
unlawful possession of personal identifying information of L.S. (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1);
count 3); guilty of unlawful possession of burglary tools (§ 466; count 5); and not guilty
on the remaining counts. In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted the truth of the
special allegations that he had suffered four prior convictions qualifying as serious
felonies and strike offenses. Specifically, the prior convictions consisted of the robbery
and kidnapping of two different victims.
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a Romero motion inviting the trial court to
dismiss his prior strike offense in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385.
Defendant argued that his four prior strike convictions were all committed during the
same incident and should be considered by the trial court as only a single prior strike
conviction for purposes of sentencing. The People filed written opposition noting that
defendant’s four prior strike convictions arose out of separate criminal acts committed
against multiple victims. The People also highlighted the fact that defendant had a
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lengthy criminal history.5 The trial court denied defendant’s invitation to dismiss his
prior strike offenses, concluding that defendant did not fall outside the spirit of the three
strikes law.
Defendant was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life in state prison, representing
25 years to life for the robbery pursuant to the alternate sentencing provisions of the three
strikes law (count 1; §§ 211, 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)); a
concurrent term of 364 days for unlawful possession of personal identifying information
of L.S. (count 3; § 530.5, subd. (c)(1)); and a concurrent term of 180 days for unlawful
possession of burglary tools (count 5; § 466).6 Defendant appeals from the judgment.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err Declining to Give Defendant’s Pinpoint Instruction
Defendant’s first claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by refusing to give a
pinpoint instruction on the definition of “force” with respect to the robbery charged in
count 1. Specifically, defendant requested the trial court include the following statement
with the standard jury instructions for robbery: “ ‘The force required for robbery must be
more than the incidental touching necessary to take the property.’ ” We find no error in
the trial court’s refusal to modify the standard jury instructions with this statement.
5 The record shows that defendant was convicted for offenses arising out of at
least eight separate and distinct incidents between 2004 and 2021. His criminal history included convictions for false imprisonment (§ 236), battery (§ 242), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), and robbery (§ 211). 6 The trial court also imposed an additional five years for each of the prior serious
felony convictions but stayed execution of these enhancements. (§ 667, subd. (a).)
7
“ ‘ “Under appropriate circumstances, ‘a trial court may be required to give a
requested jury instruction that pinpoints a defense theory of the case. . . .’ ” ’ [Citation.]
Pinpoint instructions ‘ “relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case or ‘pinpoint’ the
crux of a defendant’s case,” ’ ” and “parties are entitled to legally correct and factually
warranted pinpoint instructions, should they request such additional instruction.” (People
v. Lyon (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 237, 252.) And “[w]e review claims of instructional error
de novo.” (Lyon, at p. 253; People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 592.) Here, we
conclude the trial court did not err for two, independent reasons.
First, “a trial court is not required to instruct on the meaning of a commonly
understood term and does not err in refusing a requested instruction which attempts to
define such a word or phrase.” (People v. Forbes (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 599, 606;
People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 897 [“The trial court is not obligated to define
the terms ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating,’ even upon request, because they are commonly
understood.”]; People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1454 [“ ‘[I]t is well
settled that where the terms “have no technical meaning peculiar to the law, but are
commonly understood by those familiar with the English language, instructions as to
their meaning are not required.” ’ ”].) And it is well settled that “ ‘[t]he terms “force”
and “fear” as used in the definition of the crime of robbery have no technical meaning
peculiar to the law and must be presumed to be within the understanding of jurors.’ ”
(People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1025-1026; People v. Anderson (1966)
64 Cal.2d 633, 640.) Thus, even when requested, the trial court is not required to define
the term “force” as used in the definition of the crime of robbery.
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Second, a trial court does not err in denying a pinpoint instruction where “the
point of the requested instruction was readily apparent to the jury from the remaining
instructions.” (People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 593.) Here, the trial court gave
the standard jury instructions setting forth the elements of robbery, grand theft, and petty
theft. The jury was further instructed that it could only proceed to consider the lesser
offense of theft if it first concluded that defendant was not guilty of robbery. Because the
jury was already instructed that taking possession of property was an element common to
both robbery and theft,7 the instructions taken together sufficiently distinguished the
concept that force other than that necessary to accomplish the taking of property was an
additional element required to find defendant guilty of robbery.
Defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that the standard instructions
on robbery and theft, when given together, are insufficient to apprise the jury of the need
to find the use of force or fear as a separate and distinct element of robbery. Indeed, the
7 The jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM 1600 that the essential elements
of robbery required finding that: (1) defendant took property that was not his own; (2) the property was in the possession of another person; (3) the property was taken from the other person or her immediate presence; (4) the property was taken against that person’s will; (5) the defendant used force or fear to take the property or to prevent the person from resisting; and (6) when the defendant used force or fear, he intended to deprive the owner of the property permanently or to remove the property from the owner’s possession. The jury was also instructed pursuant to CALCRIM 1800 that the essential elements of theft required finding that: (1) defendant took possession of property owned by someone else; (2) the defendant took the property without the owner’s consent; (3) defendant intended to deprive the owner of the property permanently or to remove it from the owner’s possession; and (4) the defendant moved the property and kept it for some period of time.
9
cases cited by defendant in his opening brief stand for the proposition that, when there is
a factual dispute regarding whether the defendant used the necessary quantum of force to
constitute robbery, the trial court should give the standard instructions on theft as a lesser
included offense. (People v. Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246 [Instructions on
theft should be given when there is “a factual question whether the defendant did [or] did
not use force against the victim.”], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mosby
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 364; People v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 134, 141
[Instructions on theft should be given as a lesser included offense where the evidence
“left sufficiently open the question of whether the element of force was present so as to
entitle the defendant to have the jury consider the matter.”].)
Thus, in giving the standard jury instructions on both robbery and theft, the trial
court here did precisely what was called for in the authorities relied upon by defendant,
and we find no instructional error warranting reversal. Because we find no error, we
need not address the People’s additional argument that any error was not prejudicial
because the overwhelming evidence supported a conclusion that defendant accomplished
the robbery by use of fear.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Verdict on Count 3 and Count 5
Defendant also argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions for unlawful possession of another’s identifying information (count 3;
§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1)) and unlawful possession of burglary tools (count 5; § 466). We
disagree.
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1. Standard of Review
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s verdict finding a
defendant guilty of a criminal offense, we apply the substantial evidence standard of
review. [Citation.] ‘Under this standard, the court “must review the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”
(People v. Johnson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 26, 57.) Under this standard, “ ‘[t]he
testimony of one witness, if believed, may be sufficient to prove any fact. [Citation.]’
‘Further, “the appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 57-58.) Where
the evidence is susceptible of more than one inference, “ ‘ “ ‘ “[i]f the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant reversal of the judgment.” ’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 58.)
2. Unlawful Possession of Another’s Personal Information
Section 530.5, subdivision (c)(1), prohibits the acquisition or possession of the
personal identifying information of another person with the intent to defraud. “The
statute prohibits a person from acquiring, retaining, or using information, rather than
taking it, an indicator that the Legislature was concerned with possession or use rather
than with theft.” (People v. Weir (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 868, 874; People v. Harrell
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 256, 263 [“The gravamen of section 530.5 is [not] directed . . . at
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unlawful taking of property.”].)
On appeal, defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the element of intent to defraud, arguing that mere possession of another person’s
personal information in itself cannot support a finding of intent. However, actual use of
the personal identifying information is “not an element necessary to prove an intent to
defraud” and “a jury [can] reasonably infer an intent to defraud from the circumstances
to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation is subject to review under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard.” (Carmony, at p. 374.) “Only extraordinary circumstances
justify finding that a career criminal is outside the Three Strikes law. [Citation.]
Therefore, ‘the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the
criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more
extraordinary.’ ” (Avila, at p. 1140.)
Defendant concedes on appeal that the record showed he had an extensive criminal
history, which included the commission of multiple violent offenses in the 15 years prior
to his commission of the present offenses. } Defendant’s extraordinary criminal history
included offenses beginning in 1998 and continuing up to the present crimes.
Defendant’s prior criminal history included two wardship petitions and convictions for
violations of Health and Safety Code section 11377 (a) (possession of a controlled
substance) and sections 148.9 (false identification to a peace officer); section 242
(battery); section 207 (kidnapping); section 211 (robbery); section 4573 (possession of a
controlled substance in prison); section 30305 (unlawful possession of ammunition by a
felon); and several other offenses. Defendant’s offenses were continuous with no
15
appreciable break from criminal activity while he was out of custody. In fact, defendant
was on probation at the time he committed the present offenses. As our Supreme Court
has opined, this type of criminal history is “ ‘an exemplar of the “revolving door” career
criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is addressed,’ ” and a decision not to strike a
prior strike conviction under such circumstances “is neither irrational nor arbitrary and
does not constitute an abuse of . . . discretion.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 379.)
Unquestionably, this was a permissible factor that weighed in support of the trial court’s
decision to deny defendant’s Romero motion.
Moreover, the circumstances of the current offenses were serious. Defendant
committed robbery, a new serious felony, and a violent felony (see §§ 1192.7, subd.
(c)(19), 667.5, subd. (c)(9)), by confronting the victim at approximately 4:45 a.m. in a
casino parking lot, demanding that the victim get in his car and hand him all her money,
and displaying, in a threatening manner, what appeared to her to be a gun. The victim
was so terrified that she “peed” herself. And when she yelled for help after coming out
from hiding, defendant confronted her again and snatched her purse.
Thus, even accepting defendant’s argument that his four prior strike offenses
should have been credited only as two prior strike offenses, thereby making the prospect
of “striking one more strike more feasible and reasonable,” we cannot conclude that the
trial court’s ultimate decision to decline to strike one more strike was irrational or
arbitrary where the record contains clear factors supporting the manner in which the court
exercised its discretion. All of the factors related to defendant’s background, character,
and prospects were set forth in the parties’ briefs below and considered by the trial court.
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Sadly, defendant’s prospects were poor given his continuous history of criminal activity,
including while in prison.
On appeal, “ ‘ “[i]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree
about whether to strike one or more” prior conviction allegations.’ ” (People v. Brugman
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) Unless the circumstances present a situation in which
the trial court’s decision “ ‘is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it’ ” (ibid.), defendant has not met his burden to show an abuse of discretion
warranting reversal. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision not to
strike any of defendant’s strikes.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions for robbery, unlawful possession of personal identifying information, and unlawful possession of burglary tools, holding that the trial court did not err in its jury instructions, that substantial evidence supported the convictions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's Romero motion.
Issues
Did the trial court err by refusing to provide a pinpoint instruction defining 'force' for the robbery charge?
Was there substantial evidence to support the convictions for unlawful possession of personal identifying information and burglary tools?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's Romero motion to dismiss prior strike offenses?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court is not obligated to define the terms ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating,’ even upon request, because they are commonly understood.”
“Only extraordinary circumstances justify finding that a career criminal is outside the Three Strikes law.”