In re D.C. CA1/1

Filed 9/11/25 In re D.C. CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re D.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, A172516

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Lake County Super. Ct. v. No. JV320673-B) J.C., Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 When an unexplained adult bite mark appeared on four-year-old D.C. (Child) after beginning an unsupervised visit with her mother (Mother), the Lake County Department of Social Services (Department) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 388. In this appeal, Mother

We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. 1

Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) 2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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challenges the order granting that petition, in which the juvenile court found “that it is not in the best interest of [Child] at this time to have in-person visits with” Mother, and ordered “that contact be limited to one time per week via Zoom until such time as [M]other’s mental health is stabilized and the department feels it is safe to reinstate supervised visitations.” Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implicit finding that maintaining the status quo ante for visitation would be detrimental to Child, and there was no abuse of discretion in any other respect, we will affirm. Mother argues the juvenile court committed legal error in terminating visitation without making a detriment finding. We disagree. Section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1), provides that “visitation between the parent . . . shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child,” and subject to subparagraph (B)’s requirement that “[n]o visitation order . . . jeopardize the safety of the child.” Thus, it “is ordinarily improper to deny visitation absent a showing of detriment.” (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989.) But where “the statute does not mandate explicit findings, and where substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order, findings may be implied.” (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1166.) Here, the juvenile court’s implicit determination that Child would suffer detriment from continuing in-person visitation with Mother is apparent from the court’s conclusion “that it is not in the best interest of [C]hild at this time to have in-person visits with” Mother, its finding that Mother had failed to comply with her mental health treatment plan in the months leading up to an incident in which Child appeared to have been bitten by a human, and its finding “that it is more likely than not that the bite mark occurred while [the four-year-old C]hild was in [M]other’s care.”