California Court of Appeal Sep 3, 2025 No. E082030Unpublished
Filed 9/3/25 P. v. Pacheco CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082030
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1700565)
CHRISTIAN PACHECO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun,
Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Jason L. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Donald
W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant Christian Pacheco murdered his girlfriend, Elilia Valdez (the victim),
by stabbing her multiple times in the back of the head and neck. Before he was arrested,
defendant burned down the victim’s trailer, ran another vehicle off the roadway, and
decapitated a chihuahua puppy in front of family members. On appeal, defendant
concedes the evidence admitted at his trial supports a conviction for second degree
murder but challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation
to support the jury’s verdict of first degree murder. In addition, defendant contends the
trial court erred by imposing a full one-year term for a weapon enhancement on his
conviction for maliciously and intentionally killing an animal.
The People concede the weapon enhancement should have been one-third the
term, and request we modify the judgment to reflect an eight-month term for that
enhancement. We conclude the record supports the jury’s verdict of first degree murder,
accept the People’s concession regarding the sentence enhancement, and affirm the
judgment as modified. 1
1 Defendant also petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus (case No. E085172), which we resolve by separate order.
2
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
In March 2017, the victim was 31 years old and lived with her two children in a
trailer park in Thermal. She was in a dating relationship with defendant at the time. The
victim’s car had broken down, so she borrowed her brother’s Hyundai to go to work. No
one else was permitted to drive the car while the victim borrowed it.
On the night of March 16, 2017, the victim called her cousins for help because
defendant had taken her brother’s car and would not return it. Three of the victim’s
cousins drove to her trailer to help her. When they arrived, the victim was waiting
outside. The victim was upset, anxious, and worried. As the cousins tried to comfort the
victim, defendant drove up in the Hyundai and demanded that the victim get in the car “to
talk.” The victim got inside the car, and she and defendant began arguing.
As the victim and defendant were inside the car arguing, the victim’s cousins
worried defendant might try to take the car, so they stood behind the car to block
defendant from driving away. Undeterred, defendant put the car in reverse and
accelerated toward the cousins and almost hit them. Defendant sped away with the
victim still in the passenger seat of the car. The victim’s cousins quickly got into their
own car and gave chase, but defendant was driving very fast and the cousins soon lost
2 Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to all charges. He does not challenge the jury’s verdict during the sanity phase of his trial that he was sane at the time of the commission of his offenses. Nor does defendant challenge the evidence to support his convictions for arson, assault with a deadly weapon, and killing an animal. Therefore, we need not recite the facts of those offenses in detail.
3
sight of him. The cousins returned to the victim’s home to watch her young children,
who were sleeping inside alone.
Worried about the victim, her cousins kept calling and texting her, but she did not
answer or respond. Around 1:40 a.m., the cousins received a text message from the
victim’s phone. The text message, purportedly from the victim, read: “Hey, sorry about
that. I’m okay. It is okay. We are just talking.” The cousins could tell the victim did
not write the text, and they grew even more worried. They continued to call the victim,
but she did not answer. After repeatedly calling her, the victim eventually called back
and said, “she was in Indio” and that she was “coming home.” They could “hear
someone else breathing on the phone.” The cousins waited at the victim’s home for
another two hours, but she never came home.
Defendant drove the victim to a tribal cemetery in a “very isolated” area of
Thermal and killed her. Defendant stabbed the victim between four and six times in the
back of her head and neck, cutting her vertebral artery in half. One stab wound above her
left collar bone was six to eight inches deep and cut her trachea (windpipe) in half. The
victim tried to defend herself and suffered several defensive wounds to her hands.
In the hours after the killing, defendant used the victim’s ATM card to purchase
gasoline and withdraw money from an ATM at a gas station convenience store. Later, he
returned to the victim’s trailer and set it on fire. Shortly after committing the arson,
defendant confronted a tourist who happened to be taking photographs in the area, chased
his vehicle on the roadway, and drove him off the road and caused the tourist’s vehicle to
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roll over. Finally, defendant drove to his mother’s house and, with a butcher knife he
retrieved from the kitchen, decapitated a chihuahua puppy he had with him in the car.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a),
count 1; undesignated statutory references are to the Pen. Code), arson of an inhabited
dwelling (§ 451, subd. (b), count 2), assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, a motor vehicle
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 3), and maliciously and intentional killing an animal (§ 597,
subd. (a), count 4). The jury also found true the allegations that defendant personally
used a deadly or dangerous weapon (a knife) in the commission of counts 1 and 4
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for 25 years to
life for the murder plus a consecutive determinate term of eight years eight months.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict of First Degree Murder.
As he did at his trial, defendant concedes the jury heard substantial evidence that
he committed murder but challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding
that the killing was premeditated. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment, as we must, we affirm.
i. Standard of Review.
“‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
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credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court ‘“‘presumes in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’”
supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27.) Without more, evidence the defendant was in a “‘bad mood’”
or angry with the victim will not support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.
(Boatman, at p. 1268.)
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The People argue the evidence shows defendant had a motive to kill the victim
because she tried to prevent him from using her brother’s vehicle and, perhaps, because
he wanted to steal money from her. Defendant contends that evidence he was angry with
the victim was not enough to establish a motive for purposes of first degree murder.
Because the evidence of planning and the manner of the killing strongly support the
inference of premeditation and deliberation, we need not decide whether the evidence of
a motive also supports that inference. (See, e.g., People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897,
966, quoting People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 957 [“[M]otive ‘evidence is not
indispensable to proving premeditation when the manner-of-killing evidence is so
compelling’”].)
In sum, we conclude the record contains substantial evidence of premeditation and
deliberation.
B. The Judgment Is Modified to Correct the Sentence on the Enhancement for
Personal Use of a Firearm on Count 4.
The trial court deemed count 2 (arson) to be the principal count and sentenced
defendant on count 4 (killing an animal) to a consecutive term of eight months in prison
(one-third the middle term of two years). (§§ 597, subd. (d), 1170, subd. (h), 1170.1,
subd. (a).) For the true finding that defendant personally used a knife during the
commission of count 4, the trial court imposed a full one-year consecutive prison term.
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) The parties agree the sentence on the enhancement was
unauthorized and must be corrected, as do we.
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Absent exceptions not applicable here, the consecutive term for a subordinate
offense is one-third the middle term for the offense plus one-third the term for any
“specific enhancements” applicable to that subordinate offense. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).)
Status enhancements, which relate to the status of the offender, are not subject to the one-
third limitation of section 1170.1, subdivision (a). (See People v. Beard (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 936, 941-942.) The enhancement in section 12022, subdivision (a), for
personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon “relates to the circumstances of the crime”
and is expressly designated a “specific enhancement” subject to the one-third rule.
(§ 1170.11.) In other words, the sentence for the enhancement on count 4 must be one-
third the one-year term, or four months. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Therefore, we will
modify the judgment to reflect a four-month term for the enhancement on count 4 and a
total determinate prison term of eight years. (§ 1260 [reviewing court may modify the
judgment].)
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III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect a four-month term of imprisonment on the
enhancement for count 4, for a total determinate term of eight years in state prison. The
clerk of the superior court is directed to correct the minutes of sentencing and forward an
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
We concur:
FIELDS J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of premeditation and deliberation for first-degree murder and corrected an unauthorized sentence enhancement for a weapon use conviction.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support a first-degree murder conviction.
Whether the trial court erred in imposing a full one-year term for a weapon enhancement on a subordinate count instead of one-third the term.
Disposition. Affirmed as modified.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude the record supports the jury’s verdict of first degree murder, accept the People’s concession regarding the sentence enhancement, and affirm the judgment as modified.”
“The circumstances of the murder show planning and strongly support the inference of premeditation and deliberation.”