Pham v. Nguyen CA6
Filed 8/26/25 Pham v. Nguyen CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THUY PHAM, H052108 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 17CV311664)
v.
OLIVIA NGUYEN,
Defendant and Respondent.
Thuy Pham sued her ex-husband, An Duc Nguyen, and his first wife, Olivia Nguyen,1 to void an allegedly fraudulent transfer of real property and also pursue damages and other relief. This is the third appeal engendered by Olivia’s special motion to strike Pham’s complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,2 California’s anti-SLAPP statute.3 In case No. H051679, we partially reversed the trial court’s order granting Olivia’s motion, concluding that Pham has shown minimal merit on three of the
For clarity, given their shared surname, we will refer to Olivia Nguyen and An 1
Nguyen by their first names; no disrespect is intended. (See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136, fn. 1.) 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 3 SLAPP signifies “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”
four fraudulent transfer-related claims she alleges against Olivia.4 This appeal is from the trial court’s intervening order awarding Olivia prevailing party costs and attorney fees. Pham argues that because this court partially reversed the grant of Olivia’s motion to strike, Olivia is no longer a prevailing party under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), and thus not entitled to a fees award under the statute. Olivia concedes that the fees award must be vacated. We accept Olivia’s concession, reverse the order awarding costs and attorney fees, and remand. I. BACKGROUND
Pham’s underlying lawsuit against An and Olivia relates to real property located in Fawnskin, California. An and Olivia jointly owned the property during their marriage, and when they divorced, agreed to sell the property and divide the proceeds. But the couple did not sell the property. Years later, while An and Pham were embroiled in a divorce proceeding involving substantial property interests, An and Olivia entered a stipulation in which An agreed to transfer his one-half interest in the Fawnskin property to Olivia. Pham sued both, alleging that the former spouses conspired with each other to engage in a fraudulent transfer. As relevant here, Pham’s claims against Olivia included: (1) actual fraudulent transfer; (2) constructive fraudulent transfer; (3) conspiracy to commit fraudulent transfer; and (4) aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer. Olivia moved to strike Pham’s claims under section 425.16. The trial court rejected Olivia’s argument that the claims arose from protected activity. In case No. H047433, a different panel of this court reversed, remanding to the trial court “for further consideration of the second prong of the motion to strike”—whether Pham’s claims have “minimal merit.”
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