California Court of Appeal Aug 26, 2025 No. E084790Unpublished
Filed 8/26/25 P. v. Hawkins CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084790
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF032287)
LEON DWANE HAWKINS, TENTATIVE OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Joshlyn R. Pulliam,
Judge. Affirmed.
Leon Dwane Hawkins, in pro. per.; and Jean Matulis, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant, Leon Dwane Hawkins, filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95,1 which the court denied at the prima
facie stage.
On appeal, counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), setting forth a statement of the case and requesting
that we exercise our discretion to independently review the record for error.
We offered defendant the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief;
defendant subsequently filed two supplemental briefs.2 Defendant contends the matter
must be reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court unconstitutionally
admitted the testimony of Johnny Crawford at trial, the prosecutor engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court erroneously imposed five years on the prior
serious felony conviction enhancement, insufficient evidence supported his conviction,
and trial counsel engaged in ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury found defendant and appellant Leon Dwane Hawkins guilty of second
degree murder. (§ 187, count 1.) It also found that he personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense (former §§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), and that
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended and renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 “If the defendant . . . files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
2
he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily harm or death
the law that ‘“must be applied in the subsequent stages of the cause”’—i.e., the law of the
case—‘“and they are res adjudicata in other cases as to every matter adjudicated.”’
[Citation.]”]; People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 443 [The “‘law-of-the-case doctrine
binds the trial court as to the law but controls the outcome only if the evidence on retrial
or rehearing of an issue is substantially the same as that upon which the appellate ruling
was based. [Citations.]’ ”].) The court properly denied defendant’s petition.
3 We also note that defendant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that Crawford’s testimony was unreliable. We denied the petition. (In re Hawkins on Habeas Corpus (July 24, 2024, E083921).) We further observe that the claim that the court erred in imposing a five-year consecutive term on the prior serious felony conviction enhancement is a new one. Regardless, defendant cites People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393 (Monroe), for the erroneous assertion that prior serious felony conviction enhancements have been found invalid since his conviction. Monroe only held that in proceedings pursuant to section 1172.75, trial courts have discretion to strike prior serious felony conviction enhancements. (Id. at p. 400.) The instant case was not brought under section 1172.75; thus, not only is defendant not entitled to have his prior serious felony conviction enhancement stricken, but the court below did not even have discretion to strike it.
8
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s motion is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER J.
FIELDS J.
9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the defendant is ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 because the record of conviction establishes as a matter of law that he was the actual killer and was not convicted under any theory of imputed malice. Furthermore, the court determined that the defendant's additional claims of trial error were either previously adjudicated or not cognizable under the resentencing statute.
Issues
Whether the trial court properly denied the defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage.
Whether the defendant's claims regarding trial error, sentencing enhancements, and ineffective assistance of counsel are cognizable in a section 1172.6 proceeding.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the record of conviction irrefutably establishes as a matter of law that the jury determined [defendant] was the actual killer.”
“the jury instructions reflect that the court did not instruct on, and the jury therefore did not find defendant guilty of, murder under any theory of imputed malice.”
“Section 1172.6 does not afford defendant “a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence . . . .””