California Court of Appeal Aug 22, 2025 No. E085308Unpublished
Filed 8/22/25 In re M.H. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085308
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2400420)
v. OPINION
A.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In re R.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085320
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2400418)
v.
A.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
1
In re K.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085323
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2400419)
v.
A.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dorothy McLaughlin,
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie Jarvi, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant A.R. appeals from the jurisdictional findings and
dispositional orders declaring her son, R.T., and her three wards—K.G., Mark.H, and
Mari.H.—dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section
300, subdivision (b), and ordering family maintenance services for her.1 Appellant
argues that R.T.’s father, A.T., posed the sole risk of harm to the children and that, as a
1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions code.
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result, the record contains insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding
that she was an offending parent or guardian. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following four minors (together, “the children”) are the subjects of this
consolidated appeal: (1) Nine-year-old R.T., who is appellant’s biological son with her
significant other, A.T.; (2) six-year-old K.G., who is appellant’s maternal nephew and
ward; (3) 10-year-old Mark.H., who is appellant’s ward and A.T.’s maternal grandson;
and (4) seven-year-old Mari.H, who is appellant’s ward and A.T.’s maternal
granddaughter.2 Appellant is a social worker employed by the Riverside County
Department of Public Social Services (DPSS).
On September 27, 2024, DPSS received a drug-endangered child referral alleging
that appellant’s boyfriend, A.T., had been arrested and that the police had seized cocaine
and other contraband from A.T.’s home, where appellant and the children were staying.
The social worker contacted the investigating detective, who told her that he had been
surveilling A.T. for the past month. The detective said that he had waited for appellant
and the children to leave A.T.’s home on the morning of September 26, 2024, before
executing the search warrant. Inside a kitchen cabinet accessible to the children, the
police found a loaded firearm, $34,000 in cash, and 250 grams of cocaine. The same day,
A.T. was arrested for driving a stolen truck, inside of which the police found more
2 We have consolidated A.R.’s appeals in the following three cases for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and decision: R.T.’s dependency proceeding (case No. E085320); K.G.’s dependency proceeding (case No. E085323); and the dependency proceeding for Mark.H and Mari.H (case No. E085308).
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cocaine and digital scale bearing white residue. A.T. was affiliated with the Los Angeles
criminal street gang “ ‘Rollin 40 Crips,’ ” but he claimed he was no longer an active
member.
The social worker went to Mark.H.’s school to interview him, but the child
declined to speak with her, saying that appellant had told him not to talk to social
workers. The social worker then interviewed appellant at the home from which the
contraband was seized. Appellant said that she and A.T. had been broken up for six
months. She said that she and the children only visit A.T.’s home and that they sleep at
her mother’s home.
According to appellant, she first learned that A.T. used drugs a couple of weeks
earlier, on September 10, 2024. Despite the fact that she originally said she and A.T. had
been broken up for six months, appellant also told the social worker that discovering his
drug use had been the “final straw” for her and that it made her no longer want “to stay in
the home with [A.T.]” or “to continue their relationship.” Regarding the contraband
found in the home, appellant said that the cash belonged to her, A.T., and her sister, but
that she did not know about the drugs or the firearm. She said that she keeps three guns
in a safe in her closet.3
Appellant said she did not know that A.T.’s vehicle was stolen. She said that he
worked as an auctioneer, and so she had assumed that he purchased the vehicle at an
auction. Appellant submitted to a saliva drug test, which was negative. She denied
3 As we discuss below, appellant later denied that any of the money found with the other contraband belonged to her.
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needing services, and she promised that she would not help bail A.T. out of jail or allow
the children to be in his home if he was to be released.
The social worker also interviewed appellant’s mother, who had learned about
A.T.’s arrest and the search warrant from her daughter the previous day. Appellant’s
mother said that she had never seen A.T. under the influence of drugs, and she confirmed
appellant’s statement that appellant and the children spend the night at her home.
After those interviews, the investigating detective informed the social worker that
law enforcement had also seized a stolen trailer and two stolen jet skis from A.T.’s
garage. The detective said that he was not currently viewing appellant as a subject of the
investigation; but, it concerned him to learn that appellant had told the social worker that
the money was partly hers because the money was stored in the cabinet along with the
other contraband.
When the social worker asked appellant about the trailer and jet skis, she said that
A.T. had acquired them the year before, and that she had “ ‘felt something was off’ ” but
did not ask A.T. about it because she felt like “the less she knows, the better.” When
asked how she could know about the money but not the cocaine or firearm in the kitchen
cabinet, appellant clarified that the money she had been referring to was her own $10,000
in cash, which she kept in a zippered pouch elsewhere in the home. The social worker
observed that the home “was filled with personal belongings for the children and
[appellant], suggesting they are in the home often.”
The social worker then interviewed A.T. while he was in custody. As part of the
criminal investigation, A.T. had already told law enforcement that appellant and the
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children lived with him in the home where the contraband was found. During his
interview with the social worker, he said that he and appellant had been together for nine
years and were still in an active relationship. He denied working at an auction and said
that he did not have a job because he did not want to pay child support.
Regarding the criminal charges against him, A.T. said that on September 25, 2024,
he was at his “ ‘side piece’s’ ” home when they got into an argument, and he left. He
took his cocaine, firearm, and cash back with him to the home he shared with appellant
and the children, and he put the items in the kitchen cabinet. That evening, he slept
downstairs while appellant and the children slept upstairs.
A.T. said that appellant did not know about the contraband. He denied selling
cocaine and maintained that the large amount of the drug found at his home was for
personal use. He said that he had purchased half a pound of cocaine on
September 23, 2024, because it was such a “ ‘good deal.’ ”
A.T. said that he had been using cocaine since he was 18 years old, and that he
consumes seven grams of cocaine every day, along with marijuana. He said that he used
a scale to weigh his purchases and to ensure that he is using no more than seven grams a
day because he is “scared he will overdose in the home and the children and [appellant]
would find him.”
He said that appellant learned of his drug use on September 10, 2024, “when law
enforcement called her to come pick up the truck.” He said that after September 10,
appellant and the children continued to sleep at his home three times a week, and that he
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sometimes picked the children up from school and let them stay at his home until
appellant returned from work.
A.T. said that appellant, his mother, and appellant’s mother were all actively
working to bail him out of jail. He agreed that if he were released he would participate in
services and stay with his mother pending the investigation.
On October 1, 2024, DPSS took the children into protective custody and placed
them with appellant’s mother. The following day, DPSS filed dependency petitions on
behalf of the children, alleging that they come within the meaning of section 300,
subdivision (b), due to A.T.’s drug use and criminal activity and appellant’s failure to
protect them from the risk A.T.’s conduct posed. The petitions contained a b-1 allegation
concerning appellant and a b-2 allegation concerning the contraband found at the home.
The b-1 allegation stated that appellant knew or reasonably should have known “that her
significant other was abusing controlled substances . . . and failed to intervene and protect
the children.” The allegation also stated that appellant placed the children at risk of harm
because she allowed A.T. to be around the children and “transport [them] home from
school,” despite knowing that A.T. had been “cited for possession of cocaine residue on
or about September 10, 2024.” The b-2 allegation stated that the children were at risk of
substantial harm because the police found cocaine, a loaded firearm, and $34,000 in cash
at “the family home” in “a lower kitchen cabinet accessible to the children.” In addition,
R.T.’s petition contained a b-3 allegation stating that the child’s father had a drug-related
criminal history that included an arrest on September 10, 2024, for possession of cocaine
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residue and an arrest on September 24, 2024, on charges related to the drugs, firearm,
cash, and stolen vehicles found at his home.
On the advice of her attorney, appellant declined to speak with the social worker
for the jurisdiction and disposition report.
The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearings for the children took place on
November 18 and 27, 2024. Appellant provided the same stipulated testimony at each of
the hearings. She testified that she was currently employed as a social worker for DPSS;
that she is familiar with a safety plan; and that—as soon as she became aware of A.T.’s
drug use on September 10, 2024—she implemented a safety plan requiring her to (1) not
leave the children alone in his care, (2) not allow him to “drive the children alone,” and
(3) obtain childcare and transportation help from her neighbor and from her mother.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petitions, found that the children
came within subdivision (b) of section 300, declared them dependents, and ordered
family maintenance services for appellant. The court explained that its ruling came down
to a credibility contest between appellant and A.T. and that, based on “the totality of the
information that is before the court,” the court found that appellant was aware of the risk
that A.T.’s conduct posed to the children and failed to protect them from that risk.
DISCUSSION
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the b-1
jurisdictional finding only. “The general rule is that ‘the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over a child will be upheld if substantial evidence supports any one of the
statutory bases for jurisdiction enumerated in the petition.’ ” (In re M.R. (2017)
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7 Cal.App.5th 886, 896.) Appellant does not challenge the b-2 jurisdictional finding
regarding the contraband found in the family home, and that finding is “independently
sufficient to justify the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over [the children].”
(Ibid.) In such circumstances, it is nevertheless appropriate to reach the merits of the
jurisdictional challenge “in three situations: (1) the jurisdictional finding serves as the
basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal; (2) the findings could be
prejudicial to the appellant or could impact the current or any future dependency
proceedings; and (3) the finding could have consequences for the appellant beyond
jurisdiction.” (In re A.R. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1150.) Because the b-1
jurisdictional finding serves as the basis of the dispositional order that appellant also
challenges, we address the merits of her challenge to that finding.
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), allows the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction
when a “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness, as a result of” a parent’s or legal guardian’s failure or inability
“to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A).) A jurisdictional
finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires that DPSS prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the following elements: “(1) neglectful conduct, failure,
or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
840, 848.) The child must be subject to a defined risk of harm at the time of the
jurisdiction hearing. (In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572, 582; In re Savannah M.
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1389, abrogated on another ground in In re R.T. (2017)
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3 Cal.5th 622, 628-630 (R.T.).) The juvenile court “ ‘need not wait until a child is
seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the
child.’ ” (In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048.)
“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.’ ” (R.T., supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) “ ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review
the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that
issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (Ibid.)
Appellant contends that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the b-1
jurisdictional finding because the only evidence that she allowed A.T. access to the
children after she learned of his drug use was “one statement [A.T.] purportedly made
while in jail.” But as just noted, issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court, and appellant’s argument ignores that basic principle of substantial evidence
review. Because it is the juvenile court’s role to weigh the evidence and assess
credibility, the juvenile court was entitled to credit A.T.’s statement about how often he
saw the children and in what capacity. The juvenile court was also entitled to give little
or no weight to appellant’s stipulated testimony that she kept the children away from A.T.
after she learned of his drug use. (See, e.g., In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52
[“It is the trial court’s role to assess the credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the
evidence to resolve the conflicts in the evidence.”], overruled in part on other grounds by
In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636.) As a reviewing court, we must accept the
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juvenile court’s assessment of the evidence so long as it is not arbitrary or unreasonable.
Here, the juvenile court made clear that its decision came down to a “credibility
determination of two individuals.” The court’s decision to credit A.T.’s statements over
appellant’s testimony was reasonable because, unlike appellant, A.T. had no motive to
downplay for the social worker his interaction with the children. Moreover, and as the
juvenile court noted, appellant made statements to the social worker early on in the
investigation that damaged her credibility. For example, appellant initially told the social
worker that she and A.T. had been broken up for six months but, in the same interview,
she also said that learning of his drug use a couple of weeks earlier made her want to end
their relationship. The court reasonably concluded that these statements were
contradictory. In addition, appellant admitted that she ignored her own concerns that
A.T. might be engaged in criminal conduct because she believed that “the less she knows,
the better.” The juvenile court identified that statement as one of the reasons that it did
not find appellant credible, and reasonably so. Such a denial-based approach to A.T.’s
conduct was not protective of the children.
To challenge the credibility of A.T.’s statements to the social worker, appellant
relies on A.T.’s counsel’s statements during closing argument at R.T.’s jurisdictional
hearing. Specifically, appellant cites A.T.’s counsel’s statement that it was his client’s
actions, alone, “that put the family in the situation.” According to counsel’s argument,
A.T. was “adamant” that appellant “did not know about his drug use, had no knowledge
of any firearm, any vehicle” and that they were “living separate” because A.T. “was
downstairs” and “[appellant] and the children were upstairs.” However, “[i]t is axiomatic
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that the unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence.” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 396, 413, fn. 11; see Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.4(g) [attorneys must not “assert
personal knowledge of facts at issue except when testifying as a witness”].) Counsel’s
statements have no bearing on our review of the sufficiency of the evidence because
those statements were provided in the form of argument, not testimony.
In any event, A.T.’s interview statement is not, as appellant contends, the only
evidence that she allowed A.T. to have access to the children after she learned of his drug
use. The investigating detective told the social worker that he saw appellant and the
children leave A.T.’s home as he was waiting to execute the search warrant on the
morning of September 26, 2024. From that evidence, the court could reasonably infer
that appellant was minimizing the extent of her relationship with A.T. and the extent to
which he had access to the children.
Appellant’s assertions that A.T. had a “secret life” she knew nothing about and
that “she was unaware that [A.T.] used drugs” are not supported by the record. Appellant
admitted that she discovered A.T.’s drug use on September 10, 2024. She also admitted
that she was suspicious of A.T.’s behavior but that she never acted on her intuition that
“something was off” because she did not want to find out what that something was.
Those statements are at odds with a claim that she had no knowledge of the risk that A.T.
posed to the children.
Finally, appellant argues that even if everything alleged in the b-1 allegation were
true, there was no evidence that the children were currently at a risk of harm because, by
the time of the jurisdiction hearing, she no longer lived with A.T., was participating in
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parenting classes, and had tested negative for drugs. But, as also noted above, the
juvenile court need not wait until the children are seriously harmed to assume jurisdiction
and take steps necessary to protect them. (In re J.A., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 1048.)
“Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions.” (In re D.L. (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.) In terms of past conduct, appellant allowed her children to
live with a person who consumed cocaine daily and kept large amounts of the drug at the
home. Given how much cocaine A.T. was consuming each day, it is difficult to imagine
how appellant was not aware of his drug use before September 10, 2024. But, even if the
court credited appellant’s statement about not discovering the drug use until several days
before the search warrant, there is still substantial evidence in the record that appellant
continued to stay at A.T.’s home with the children in the days leading up to the search
warrant. As for current conduct, even if appellant did not know about the dangerous
contraband A.T. kept at their home until DPSS started its investigation, during that
investigation she attempted to downplay her relationship with him and the access he had
to the children. Based on appellant’s past and current conduct, the juvenile court could
reasonably conclude that the children were at a current risk of harm due to her failure to
protect them. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s b-1 jurisdictional finding.
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DISPOSTION
We affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders of November 27,
2024 in the consolidated cases.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), as the mother failed to protect the children from the risks posed by her partner's drug use and criminal activity. The court emphasized that the trial court's credibility determinations regarding the mother's knowledge and protective actions were reasonable and supported by the record.
Issues
Whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
Whether the juvenile court erred in its credibility determinations regarding the mother's knowledge of her partner's conduct and her protective actions.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a child will be upheld if substantial evidence supports any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction enumerated in the petition.”
“It is the trial court’s role to assess the credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the evidence to resolve the conflicts in the evidence.”