Maqueda v. Kia Motors America CA4/1

Filed 8/14/25 Maqueda v. Kia Motors America CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

HOMAR MAQUEDA et al., D083298

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019- 00070127-CU-BC-CTL) KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Bowman and Brooke, Brian Takahashi, Richard L. Stuhlbarg, and Amanda Heitz for Defendant and Appellant. Knight Law Group, Steve Mikhov, Amy-Lyn Morse, and Roger Kirnos; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Cynthia E. Tobisman, Joseph V. Bui, and Kent W. Toland for Plaintiffs and Respondents. This case involves an offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 that contained two separate, independent offers. After Plaintiffs Homar Maqueda and Gustavo Lopez prevailed at trial against Kia Motors America, Inc., Kia sought to curb Plaintiffs’ recovery of attorney fees

and costs and recover its own costs because the jury’s award of $16,470.66 plus a $1 penalty fell short of the lump-sum option of $25,000 in Kia’s section 998 offer. The court, however, deemed the entire section 998 offer invalid because the statutory option Kia offered at the same time as the lump-sum option was insufficiently specific. We conclude, as we did in Zavala v. Hyundai Motor America (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 458, 463, review granted March 19, 2025, S289000, that section 998 offers may include simultaneous, independent options for the offeree to select from. As a result, here the court should have separately considered the validity of Kia’s lump-sum option even if the statutory option were invalid. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s orders ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees and the parties’ competing motions to strike or tax costs and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Shortly after Plaintiffs sued Kia for allegedly violating its warranty obligations for their car, Kia extended an offer to compromise under section 998. As relevant here, the section 998 offer contained two separate, independent offers that permitted Plaintiffs to select either (1) a lump-sum option of $25,000 or (2) a statutory option to recover certain categories of expenses and damages permitted under the Civil Code “subject to proof,” with the court to resolve disputed amounts. Plaintiffs could choose to accept one option only, not both. Plaintiffs did not accept either option. Instead, they litigated the case for three more years, only for the jury to award them a total of $16,471.66. After trial, the court ruled Kia’s section 998 offer was invalid because the statutory option was “unclear.” As a result, it granted Plaintiffs’ motion