California Court of Appeal Aug 12, 2025 No. E082767Unpublished
Filed 8/12/25 P. v. Mendiola CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082767
v. (Super. Ct. No. INF2201836)
JUAN MENDIOLA III, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Randolph Rogers, Judge.
Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Seth M. Friedman, and
Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Juan Mendiola stabbed I.R. after seeing I.R. talking with
his girlfriend. Just after the stabbing, I.R. identified defendant in a photographic lineup.
A jury convicted defendant of willful, premeditated, and deliberate attempted murder 1 (Pen. Code §§ 664/187, sub. (a); count 1) , and making an attempted criminal threat
People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1217 [finding photographic lineup not unduly
suggestive where “[a]ll of the photographs were of Black males, generally of the same
age, complexion, and build, and generally resembling each other”].) Nothing in the
second six-pack “‘caused defendant to “stand out” from the others in a way that would
suggest the witness should select him.’” (People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 698.)
Defendant contends Paiyarat singling out his photo in the second six-pack and
asking I.R. “what about this one?” and Lopez sending I.R. a picture of defendant was
unduly suggestive. But this conduct occurred after I.R. had already identified defendant
in the second six-pack, without any suggestive behavior from either officer. “Generally, a
pretrial procedure will only be deemed unfair if it suggests in advance of a witness’s
identification the identity of the person suspected by the police.” (People v. Brandon,
supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052, italics added; People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 769 [same].) The officers’ conduct after I.R. identified defendant
as his attacker was thus not unduly suggestive. (See People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th
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353, 413 [identification procedure not unduly suggestive when witness asked to see a
picture of the suspect after identifying the defendant as the offender]; People v. Holmes,
McClain and Newborn, supra, at p. 769 [same].)
Even if the identification process was unduly suggestive, I.R.’s identification of
defendant was nonetheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances here. I.R. saw
defendant before the altercation as defendant ran across the street, and I.R.’s description
of him then was consistent with defendant’s appearance and clothing. Critically, I.R. got
a clear view of defendant’s face right before the attack, and I.R. never identified anyone
other than defendant as his attacker. Although I.R. was at most a 5.5 or 6 out of ten
certain it was defendant, I.R. identified defendant as the assailant immediately after
Paiyarat showed him the second six-pack less than 24 hours after the attack. Under these
circumstances, we conclude I.R.’s identification of defendant was sufficiently reliable.
(See People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 611, disapproved on another ground in
People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459.) As a result, we conclude the trial court
properly admitted I.R.’s pretrial and in-court identification of defendant as his attacker.
C. Sentence Enhancements
Defendant faced liability for three sentence enhancements: one year for the
weapon enhancement, three years for the great bodily injury enhancement, and five years
for the serious felony prior enhancement. The probation report outlined several factors in
aggravation, including that defendant “engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious
danger to society,” while noting there were no mitigating factors. The report opined that
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defendant’s assault on I.R. “clearly demonstrates the serious threat to public safety he
poses.” The report also noted that, “despite the numerous opportunities previously
afforded him by the court, parole, and probation to address his criminogenic needs,
[defendant’s] criminality has only escalated.”
The People urged the trial court to impose all three enhancements and give
defendant the maximum statutory sentence given his extensive criminal history and the
egregious facts of this case. Defense counsel, on the other hand, argued that section 1385
required all but one enhancement to be dismissed. Defense counsel thus asked the court
to dismiss the five-year prior enhancement since it was more than five years old, strike
one of the other enhancements, and impose the remaining enhancement.
The trial court stated that it “did consider” striking the five-year prior
enhancement, but was “leaning against” it because defendant “violated probation [for that
offense] and ended up going to state prison on it,” and he had “two or more state prison
commitments before this offense.” The court told defense counsel, “if it had been
different, I’d have been with you. But I’m not seeing it under the circumstances.”
In 2022, the Legislature amended section 1385 to include subdivision (c). (People
v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 295; People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,
1028.) Section 1385, subdivision (c) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, the
court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(1).) Subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 provides: “In exercising its discretion under
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this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to
(I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other
serious danger to others.” (Italics added.)
Thus, under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), “absent a finding that dismissal
would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss
enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating
circumstances when they are present.” (People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.)
The parties disagree whether the trial court found that dismissing the
enhancements would endanger public safety. Defendant contends the court made no such
finding while the People argue the court did so, albeit “tacit[ly].” We agree with the
People. The court’s comments show that, given defendant’s prior prison sentences and
violation of parole, the court was concerned defendant would reoffend—in other words,
that he would endanger public safety again.
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In any event, section 1385, subdivision (c), contains no express or specific
requirement that the court articulate any findings for its rulings. (§ 1385, subd. (c); cf.
§ 1385, subd. (a); In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 [noting express findings
requirement of § 1385, subd. (a), if a prior strike conviction is dismissed].) On this
record, in the absence of an affirmative duty to make findings, we presume that the court
was aware of its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c), had an adequate basis for
its section 1385, subdivision (c) findings, and that the findings were correct. (See People
v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666 [appellate courts “presume that a judgment or
order of the trial court is correct”])
Regardless, even without an express finding that dismissal would endanger public
safety, “a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it
assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are
present.” (People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.) The trial court here
considered everything the parties presented in making its decision, including the
probation report outlining defendant’s criminal history and the absence of any mitigating
factors. The court was aware of its discretion under section 1385 to dismiss the
enhancements and properly exercised that discretion in imposing all three enhancements
instead of dismissing two of them as defendant requested.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
We concur:
FIELDS J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions for attempted murder and attempted criminal threat, holding that substantial evidence supported the verdict and that the trial court did not err in admitting identification evidence or imposing sentencing enhancements.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of intent to kill, premeditation, and deliberation.
Whether the pretrial and in-court identification procedures were unduly suggestive or unreliable.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion under Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c) by declining to dismiss sentencing enhancements.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“There was substantial evidence that defendant acted with the intent to kill.”
“The identification procedure employed here was not unduly suggestive.”