California Court of Appeal Aug 8, 2025 No. E083988Unpublished
Filed 8/8/25 P. v. Ransom CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083988
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB702709)
TYWAN RENE RANSOM, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Elizabeth
M. Renner, and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
Jason Anderson, District Attorney (San Bernardino), and Brent J. Schultze,
Deputy District Attorney, as Amicus Curiae.
Tywan Ransom was convicted of murder for a killing that he committed in 2007
when he was 16 years old. Ransom appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition to
Cal.App.5th at p. 442.) “[W]hen plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between
identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn are
inconsistent with equal protection,” the “pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.”
(People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 850-851.) Because section 1170(d)(1) does not
involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right, the applicable standard of review
is the rational basis test. (Hardin, at p. 847; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 631.)
“Under this deferential standard, we presume that a given statutory classification is valid
‘until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
10
conceivable.’ [Citation.] The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not
have been ‘ever actually articulated’ by lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’
[Citation.] Evaluating potential justifications for disparate treatment, a court reviewing a
statute under this standard must ‘treat the statute’s potential logic and assumptions far
more permissively than with other standards of constitutional or regulatory review.’
[Citation.] ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its
“‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’”’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he logic behind a potential justification
need [not] be persuasive or sensible—rather than simply rational.’” (Hardin, at p. 852.)
The Heard court concluded that there was no reasonably conceivable rational
basis “for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit terms of life without parole
eligible for resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), while denying the same
opportunity to juvenile offenders sentenced to terms that amount to the functional
equivalent” of LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 631.) The court rejected
several potential justifications for the disparate treatment.
First, the concern that an LWOP sentence for juvenile offenders “‘could be
excessive’” was not a rational basis for the statute’s disparate treatment—“the same
concern applies equally to juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent” of LWOP.
(Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 632.)
Second, “the relative culpability of each group” does not justify the disparate
treatment. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p 632.) “Resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1), is available to juvenile offenders convicted of first degree murder
11
whose cases involve a special circumstance finding. [Citation.] Special circumstances
murders are considered ‘the most heinous acts’ proscribed by law. [Citation.] They are
‘more severe and more deserving of lifetime punishment than nonspecial circumstance
first degree murder. . . . Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), thus has the incongruous effect
of extending sentencing leniency exclusively to the category of offenders generally
regarded as the least deserving of it.” (Id. at p. 633.)
Third, the “number of offenses theoretically committed by each group of offenders
. . . fails to justify their disparate treatment.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p 633.) A
juvenile offender who commits multiple offenses and receives a lengthy aggregate prison
sentence might be viewed as more culpable than a juvenile offender who commits “a
single, albeit more serious offense” and receives an LWOP sentence. (Ibid.) But nothing
in section 1170(d)(1) precludes relief for juvenile offenders who received an LWOP
sentence plus additional terms for additional offenses or enhancements. (Heard, at
p. 633.) Both groups of juvenile offenders may have committed multiple offenses, but
only those who received LWOP sentences are eligible for relief under the statute.
The defendant in Heard received a sentence of 103 years to life. (Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612.) The court concluded that the sentence was the functional
equivalent of LWOP. (Id. at p. 629.) And because the court could not identify a rational
basis for the disparate treatment of the two groups—juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP and those sentenced to the functional equivalent—the court held that denying the
defendant the opportunity for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) violated his right to
12
equal protection of the law. (Heard, at p. 633.) Sorto involved a juvenile offender
sentenced to 140 years to life (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440), and that court
agreed with Heard that section 1170(d)(1) “violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection by denying relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent
LWOP terms” (Sorto, at p. 454). The Heard court reaffirmed its holding in Bagsby, a
case involving a juvenile offender sentenced to 107 years to life. (Bagsby, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1046, 1054-1063.) Sorto and Bagsby considered and rejected several
more potential justifications for the disparate treatment of juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP and those sentenced to the functional equivalent. (Sorto, at pp. 450-454; Bagsby,
at p. 1061.)
We find the analysis in Heard persuasive and likewise conclude that section
1170(d)(1) violates principles of equal protection by denying relief to juvenile offenders
sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. The Attorney General concedes that
Heard was correctly decided and that the trial court erred by declining to follow it. But
the San Bernardino County District Attorney submitted an amicus brief arguing that
Heard was wrongly decided and urging us not to follow it. The district attorney’s
arguments lack merit.
The district attorney argues that the Legislature enacted section 1170(d)(1) to
address the constitutional problems with an LWOP sentence identified by the Eighth
Amendment case law, and because that case law did not initially involve sentences that
were the functional equivalent of LWOP, the Legislature had a plausible basis for
13
limiting section 1170(d)(1) to LWOP offenders. It is true that the bill enacting section
1170(d)(1) “‘was inspired by concerns regarding sentences of life without parole for
juvenile offenders’” and that the bill was introduced or enacted after Graham and Miller,
which involved LWOP sentences. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 617.)
The developing case law provided a reason to grant relief to LWOP juvenile
offenders, but it did “not provide a reason to deny the same relief to functionally
equivalent LWOP offenders.” (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 451.) Graham held
that states must give “the juvenile offender a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,’ and that ‘[a] life without parole
sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and
maturity.’” (Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 266.) “[T]he same concern applies
equally to juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent” of LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 632.) Indeed, that is why Caballero extended Graham’s reasoning to
juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Caballero, at
p. 268.)
The district attorney further argues that even assuming that section 1170(d)(1)
violates principles of equal protection, the proper remedy is to invalidate the provision for
all juvenile offenders rather than extend the provision to juvenile offenders sentenced to
the functional equivalent of LWOP. “It is true that ‘[w]hen a court concludes that a
statutory classification violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
14
laws, it has a choice of remedies.’” (Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.) But the
Legislature’s preference must guide the court’s choice of remedies. (Ibid.)
The district attorney contends that the Legislature has shown its preference by
extending youth offender parole hearings to juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences.
The argument fails for reasons explained in Bagsby. (Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1062-1063.) The Legislature extended section 3051 to LWOP juvenile offenders in
2017, and it has amended section 1170 several times since then. (Bagsby, at p. 1062.)
Yet the Legislature has not eliminated the recall and resentencing provision in section
1170, subdivision (d). (Bagsby, at p. 1062.) Moreover, since Heard was decided in
2022, the Legislature has continued to amend section 1170 without eliminating section
1170, subdivision (d). (Bagsby, at p. 1063.) If the Legislature wanted to eliminate the
recall and resentencing procedure in response to section 3051 or Heard’s equal protection
holding, then the Legislature could have accomplished that result itself. By leaving the
provision intact, it has signaled its preference. (Bagsby, at p. 1063.)
For these reasons, we conclude that constitutional principles of equal protection
require that relief under section 1170(d)(1) be extended to juvenile offenders who were
sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.
III. Functional equivalent of LWOP
We further conclude that when Ransom was sentenced in 2010, his sentence of 50
years to life was the functional equivalent of LWOP. Whether Ransom’s sentence “is the
functional equivalent of LWOP presents a question of law on undisputed facts, which we
15
independently review.” (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.) In the context of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, our Supreme
Court concluded in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras) that two 16-
year-old defendants received the functional equivalent of LWOP when they were
sentenced to 50 years to life and 58 years to life.1 (Id. at pp. 356, 368-369.) The
Contreras court reasoned that the defendants’ earliest possible release at age 66 or age 74
did not give them a meaningful incentive to rehabilitate or a meaningful opportunity for
redemption and reentry into society. (Id. at pp. 368-369.)
Ransom similarly was sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. He
committed his offense when he was 16 years old, but he was not taken into custody until
he was nearly 18 years old. With a sentence of 50 years to life, he would be almost 68
years old on his earliest possible release date. Even assuming that his earliest release date
fell within his expected lifespan, that chance for release would come near the end of his
life, and he “will have spent the vast majority of adulthood in prison.” (Contreras, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 368.)
The Attorney General concedes that Ransom’s 50-years-to-life sentence is the
functional equivalent of LWOP under Contreras. But the district attorney argues
otherwise. The district attorney asserts that section 3051 has effectively abrogated
1 Both Contreras defendants were convicted under the one strike law and consequently were ineligible for youth offender parole under section 3051. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359; § 3051, subd. (h).)
16
section 1170(d)(1) because no juvenile offender to whom section 3051 applies is serving
an LWOP sentence or the functional equivalent.
Section 3051 “supersede[s]” the juvenile offender’s sentence and “change[s] the
manner in which the juvenile offender’s original sentence operates by capping the
number of years that he or she may be imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on
parole.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278.) Accordingly, our Supreme Court held in
Franklin that juvenile offenders eligible for relief under section 3051 are not serving an
LWOP sentence or its functional equivalent, because section 3051 makes them eligible
for parole during their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration. (Franklin, at pp. 277,
280.) The district attorney contends that Heard is inconsistent with Franklin because
Heard concluded that the defendant’s sentence of 103 years to life was the functional
equivalent of LWOP.
Heard addressed Franklin and explained why the district attorney’s argument fails
with respect to defendants like Ransom, who were sentenced before the effective date of
section 3051. Section 1170(d)(1) makes a defendant who “was sentenced” to LWOP
eligible for relief. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) Because the statute “‘“refers to the past,”’
the relevant inquiry under the provision is the sentence that was originally imposed,
which might not be the same as the sentence currently being served by the defendant.”
(Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.) Like Ransom, the defendant in Heard was
sentenced before the effective date of section 3051. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
p. 614.) Heard thus reasoned: “Although under Franklin, Heard’s sentence as it
17
currently operates is no longer the functional equivalent of life without parole, this does
not change the fact that the sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence at the
time it was imposed.” (Id. at p. 629.) Sorto rejected the argument that Heard “‘runs
roughshod’” over Franklin for the same reason. (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 447-448.) And Bagsby reaffirmed Heard’s analysis, again concluding that Franklin
does not undermine Heard. (Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1056-1057; but see
People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1264 [disagreeing with Heard and
concluding that “Heard cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Franklin”].)
We agree with Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby that the relevant inquiry under section
1170(d)(1) “is the sentence that was originally imposed” (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th
at p. 800), and Franklin does not require a contrary result. In 2010, section 3051 did not
exist, so Ransom “was sentenced” to the functional equivalent of LWOP within the
meaning of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A).
People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499 (Munoz), review granted June 25,
2025, S290828, recently held that, even without a youth offender parole hearing under
section 3051, a sentence of 50 years to life for a 15-year-old defendant is not the
functional equivalent of LWOP. (Munoz, at pp. 502-503, 507.) The Munoz defendant,
who was convicted of first degree murder, was eligible for release at age 65. (Id. at
pp. 503, 508.) He argued that he was eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1) and
Heard. (Munoz, at p. 507.) The Munoz court distinguished Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby on
18
the ground that in those cases the minimum periods of incarceration before parole
eligibility were “much greater than 50 years.” (Munoz, at p. 507.) Munoz also
acknowledged Contreras’s holding that a sentence of 50 years to life is the functional
equivalent of LWOP. (Munoz, at p. 510.) But Munoz concluded that Contreras did not
control, because the Contreras defendants “did not commit murder, which was an
integral part of the Supreme Court’s analysis” in Graham, and Contreras “considered
only whether the defendants’ sentences violated the Eighth Amendment” and not an
equal protection challenge to section 1170(d)(1). (Munoz, at pp. 510-511; accord, People
v. Thompson (July 15, 2025, B333097) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2025 Cal.App. LEXIS 453, at
p. [20]] [agreeing with Munoz “that the Contreras notion of functional equivalence does
not answer” whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life is eligible
for relief under section 1170(d)(1) as a matter of equal protection].)
Munoz does not persuade us that Contreras is inapplicable. We agree with the
dissent in Munoz that although Contreras was an Eighth Amendment case, “its reasoning
must inform our decision whether a 50-years-to-life sentence is likewise functionally
equivalent to an LWOP sentence for purposes of an equal protection challenge.” (Munoz,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 513 [dis. opn. of Feuer, J.]; accord, People v. Cabrera