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People v. Mejia CA4/2 (2025) · DecisionDepot
/ California Court of Appeal People v. Mejia CA4/2 Unpublished Filed 8/7/25 P. v. Mejia CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E082728
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV20002406)
OSCAR ARTURO MEJIA, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. John Nho Trong
Nguyen, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed with directions.
Stephen M. Lathrop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Kelley
Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
INTRODUCTION After hearing evidence that he molested two of his stepdaughters and his
stepgranddaughter when they were children, a jury convicted Oscar Arturo Mejia of eight
More from California Court of Appeal Source: opinion data from the Free Law Project / CourtListener (public-domain court records). DecisionDepot is for informational use only and is not legal advice — verify against the official reporter before relying on any text or AI-generated summary.
counts of lewd conduct with a child under 14 years old. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).)
As to each count, the jury found true the multiple-victim circumstance allegation under
the one strike law. (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (b).) On appeal, Mejia argues that
(1) CALCRIM No. 1191B, regarding the use of Evidence Code section 1108 evidence to
show a propensity to commit sex offenses, violated his right to due process, and (2) the
abstract of judgment contains various clerical errors regarding the description of his
convictions.1 We direct the superior court to correct the clerical errors, but we otherwise
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Mejia was married to R., who had four daughters, from 1998 to 2014. During
their marriage, Mejia molested two of his stepdaughters, C. and L., and his
stepgranddaughter, J. Many years later, in 2017, J. came forward to report the abuse after
she gave birth to her daughter, out of a fear that something similar could happen to her.
J., who was 26 years old at the time of the trial, described several incidents of
sexual abuse. She testified that when she was about three years old, she was lying in
Mejia’s bed for a nap and Mejia came in his room, put a blanket over her, and rubbed her
buttocks with his hand. On one occasion near Christmas, when J. was about four years
1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Evidence Code.
old, she was alone in the living room with Mejia, singing songs while sitting on his lap,
and Mejia reached into her tights and touched her vagina.
When J. was about five or six years old, she and Mejia were alone in his room on
his bed, and Mejia raped her. Mejia was naked and had positioned J. on top of him so
that she was straddling his torso. Mejia put his penis inside her vagina and moved her
body back and forth on top of him, and J. felt a burning sensation in her vagina. Around
that same time, on an evening when the family was in the living room watching a movie
together, Mejia rubbed J.’s vagina with his hand underneath a blanket. Sometime before
J. turned 10 years old, she and Mejia were alone in the room she shared with her siblings,
sitting on the bed. Mejia rubbed her hand over his exposed penis and then pushed her
head down and inserted his penis into her mouth.
Finally, J. testified about an incident that occurred in a bathtub when she was very
young. At trial, her recollection was that she had been about one year old and that Mejia
had rubbed her vagina with his hand while he was giving her a bath. However, the
officers who interviewed J. in 2017 and 2020, respectively, both testified that she told
them that she had been two years old at the time of the incident and that Mejia had
inserted his finger into her vagina.
Mejia’s stepdaughter C., who was 30 years old at the time of the trial, testified that
Mejia molested her from the time she was seven or eight years old until she was about
12 years old. C. started playing tennis when she was about six years old, and—under the
guise of giving her a sports massage to ensure “peak performance”—Mejia would
“regularly” message her thighs, buttocks, and breasts while he and C. were in the garage
with the weight lifting equipment. The massages continued until C. was about 12 years
old. Sometimes, Mejia would tell C. to lift up her shirt during a massage, and he would
rub her breasts and tell her “that they were getting too big, and it wasn’t desirable for
performance.” C. testified that it “wasn’t uncommon” for Mejia to kiss her after practice
as a way of saying “good job.” One time, when she was about eight years old, Mejia
“lingered” during a kiss and used his tongue. On another occasion, when they were lying
next to each other on Mejia’s bed, watching television, Mejia rubbed her teeth with his
fingers, inserted his fingers past her teeth into mouth, then used that hand to masturbate.
Mejia’s stepdaughter L., who was 37 years old at the time of the trial, testified
about two incidents that also occurred in Mejia’s room. The first happened when she was
about 10 years old and Mejia told her to wait in his room for her mother to come home.
L. fell asleep on Mejia’s bed while waiting, and she awoke to him touching her breasts
underneath her shirt. She testified that she felt “paralyzed” as he was touching her, and
when it was over, she saw that her bra was on the floor, and she knew that she had not
taken it off herself. The second incident also took place on Mejia’s bed, but this time L.
was about 13 years old. She had fallen asleep on the bed and awoke with Mejia’s fingers
inside her mouth, rubbing against her teeth, while he used his other hand to rub her
vagina underneath her underwear.
Mejia testified in his own defense and said that he never inappropriately touched
the victims. He said that before he met R., he was a police officer in Virginia; and, after
they got married, he became a bishop at her church. Mejia’s sister, son, and two nephews
testified that they never saw him act inappropriately with the victims.
After the parties agreed on the jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury
with, among other things, a unanimity instruction, and a modified version of CALCRIM
No. 1191B, which permitted the jurors to view evidence of Mejia’s guilt of one of the
charged sexual offenses as evidence of his propensity to commit such offenses and as
evidence that he “was likely to commit and did commit the other sex offenses charged in
this case.” During closing arguments, the prosecutor explained that of the eight charges
against Mejia, two involved L., three involved C., and three involved J. The prosecutor
told the jury that the case against Mejia was “undercharged” because J. and C. both
described more acts of molestation than there were counts against him. The prosecutor
told the jurors that they all had to agree as to which act constituted which count.
The jury convicted Mejia of all eight counts of lewd conduct with a child under
14 years old and, as to each count, found that he committed the offense against multiple
victims within the meaning of the one strike law. The trial court sentenced Mejia to
consecutive 15-year terms for each count, for a total of 120 years in prison. Mejia
DISCUSSION Mejia argues that reversal is required because the propensity instruction that the
trial court gave the jury, a modified version of CALCRIM No. 1191B, violated his right
to due process. While Mejia acknowledges that he did not object to CALCRIM No. 1191
in the trial court, he asserts that, because the issue affects his substantial rights, he may
raise this issue for first time on appeal. Although the failure to object to a jury instruction
generally waives a challenge to the instruction on appeal (e.g., People v. Hudson (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012), Mejia is correct that Penal Code section 1259 permits us to
“review any instruction given . . . , even though no objection was made thereto in the
lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (§ 1259.)
On the merits, we conclude that Mejia’s challenge fails.
“Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of a propensity or
disposition to engage in a type of conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person’s
conduct on a specified occasion.” (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1159
(Villatorro), citing § 1101, subd. (a).) “This ban against admitting character evidence to
prove conduct, however, does not prohibit admission of specific acts of misconduct to
establish a material fact like intent, common design or plan, or identity (§ 1101,
subd. (b)), and does not affect the admissibility of evidence regarding the credibility of a
witness (id., subd. (c)).” (Villatoro, at p. 1159.) “The Legislature has also created
specific exceptions to the rule against admitting character evidence in cases involving
sexual offenses (§ 1108, subd. (a)), and domestic violence, elder or dependent abuse, or
child abuse (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1)–(3)).” (Villatoro, at p. 1159.) As relevant here, section
1108 provides: “In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual
offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is
not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to
Section 352.” (§ 1108, subd. (a).)
In People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 (Falsetta), our Supreme Court upheld
section 1108 as constitutional, observing that the provision “was intended in sex offense
cases to . . . assure that the trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant’s other sex
offenses in evaluating the victim’s and the defendant’s credibility.” (Falsetta, at p. 911.)
The Court explained that, by enacting section 1108, the Legislature determined that: “By
their very nature, sex crimes are usually committed in seclusion without third party
witnesses or substantial corroborating evidence. The ensuing trial often presents
conflicting versions of the event and requires the trier of fact to make difficult credibility
determinations. Section 1108 provides the trier of fact in a sex offense case the
opportunity to learn of the defendant’s possible disposition to commit sex
crimes.” (Falsetta, at p. 915.)
In People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007 (Reliford), our Supreme Court held
that, despite the fact that section 1108 makes “no mention of inferences,” the statute
permits jurors to “infer the defendant has a disposition to commit sex crimes from
evidence the defendant has committed other sex offenses,” and that jurors “may—but are
not required to—infer from this predisposition that the defendant was likely to commit
and did commit the charged offense.” (Reliford, at pp. 1012–1013.) In Villatoro, our
Supreme Court held that section 1108 applies to evidence of both uncharged and charged
sex offenses, and the Court upheld a version of CALCRIM No. 1191B that was modified
to apply to other charged sex offenses. (Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1162.)
For our purposes, the instruction upheld in Villatoro is identical to the instruction
the trial court used here, which states: “The People presented evidence that the defendant
committed the crime of lewd or lascivious act with a child under 14 years, in violation of
Penal Code section 288(a), as charged in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. [¶] If the
People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed one or more
of these crimes, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the
defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that
decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit and did commit the other
sex offenses charged in this case. [¶] If you find that the defendant committed one or
more of these crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the
other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of another
crime. The People must still prove each charge and allegation beyond a reasonable
In Villatoro, the Court held that this instruction did not lessen the prosecution’s
burden of proof or otherwise violate the defendant’s due process rights. Specifically, the
Court concluded that the instruction does “not permit the jury to convict [a] defendant of
one count based simply on its guilty ‘verdict’ on any other counts.” (Villatoro, supra,
54 Cal.4th at p. 1165.) The Court explained: “It is not the verdict itself, but rather the
jury’s factual finding that defendant has committed a sex offense, that the jury relies on to
draw an inference of disposition or propensity. Specifically, like an instruction based on
uncharged sex offenses, the modified CALCRIM No. 1191 explained to the jury that if it
decided that defendant had committed a charged sex offense, ‘from that evidence’ it
could conclude that defendant had a disposition to commit the other charged sex offenses,
and that based on that decision, the jury could also conclude that defendant was likely to
and did commit the other charged sex offenses.” (Ibid.) The Court further reasoned that
because the instruction “clearly [tells] the jury that all offenses must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, even those used to draw an inference of propensity,” there “was no risk
the jury would apply an impermissibly low standard of proof.” (Id. at p. 1168.)
In arguing that the instruction violated his due process rights by reducing the
prosecution’s burden of proof, Mejia acknowledges that the holding of Villatoro is
binding on this court. He contends that his challenge is different from the challenge in
Villatoro because his claim is that the instruction permitted the jury to make “irrational”
inferences based on the “unique facts of this case.” Specifically, he argues that the
prosecution presented evidence that he committed various acts of molestation upon the
victims that ranged in severity from an inappropriate massage to rape and that it would be
irrational to infer a propensity to commit rape from the fact that he touched one of the
victim’s inappropriately during a massage.
But that argument, too, is foreclosed by binding precedent. As the Court
explained in Falsetta, “ ‘evidence of any prior sexual offenses is particularly probative’ ”
of a defendant’s propensity to commit such offenses because “ ‘the willingness to commit
a sexual offense is not common to most individuals.’ ” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
p. 912, italics added.) For that reason, a juror’s “ ‘ “consideration of the other sexual
offenses as evidence of the defendant’s disposition to commit such crimes, and for its
bearing on the probability or improbability that the defendant has been falsely or
mistakenly accused of such an offense” ’ ” constitutes a “ ‘ “rational assessment.” ’ ”
(Ibid., italics added.) In other words, Falsetta rejects the notion that it is too speculative
or irrational to infer that a person who has committed sex offenses is predisposed to
commit such offenses. Indeed, as Falsetta observed, evidence that a defendant has
committed other sex crimes has, if anything, “ ‘ “too much” ’ ” probative value. (Id. at
Moreover, we disagree with Mejia’s characterization of the charged offenses as
being too dissimilar or constituting too “broad” an “array” of acts to reasonably support a
propensity inference. Although the charged offenses involved different lewd acts, each
of those acts were committed close in time to one another, against similar victims, and
under similar circumstances. Each of the victims were young members of Mejia’s
household and all of the abuse took place in the family home, with many of the offenses
occurring on Mejia’s bed. Most significantly, both C. and L. described how Mejia would
put his fingers in their mouth, rub their teeth, and use their saliva as lubrication to touch
either himself or them. Where, as here, the sex offenses presented to the jury are “similar
in character” and “not unduly remote,” those offenses are “ ‘extremely probative of
appellant’s sexual misconduct when left alone with young female relatives.’ ” (Falsetta,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 919, italics added, quoting People v. Soto (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th
966, 991.) As was the case in Villatoro, “the victims’ accounts of their respective [abuse]
. . . were strikingly similar in various respects” and, as a result, we conclude that the
victims’ testimony about the abuse was “highly probative” of Mejia’s “propensity to
commit such crimes.” (Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1168-1169.) We therefore
reject Mejia’s claim that CALCRIM NO. 1191B allowed the jury to make “irrational
Next, Mejia argues that the trial court erred by failing to give an instruction on
uncharged crimes evidence in light of J.’s testimony about the bathtub incident. Mejia
has forfeited this argument by failing to support it with analysis and citation to supporting
authority. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) But, in any event, the
argument fails because the incident was a charged offense. Mejia claims that because
J. testified that she was about one year old when it happened, the incident falls outside the
date range the People identified in their charges. But the People also presented evidence,
in the form of testimony from two police officers, that J. reported years earlier that the
incident occurred when she was two years old. The officers’ testimony brings the
incident within the charged date range. Moreover, and as the court instructed the jury,
although “[i]t is alleged that the crimes charged in this case occurred within certain date
ranges,” the People “are not required to prove the exact date on which each of the crimes
took place, but only that it happened within or reasonably close to the specified date
range.” Mejia’s claim that the trial court should have given an instruction on uncharged
Finally, Mejia argues, and the People agree, that the abstract of judgment contains
clerical errors regarding the description of his convictions. We agree with the parties that
the abstract of judgment contains the following errors. First, the abstract states that all
eight counts of lewd conduct are based on violations of section “288(A)-F,” when in fact
the convictions are based on violations of section 288, subdivision (a) only. Second, in
the column entitled “year crime committed,” the abstract incorrectly states that each
count was committed in 2020 when in fact the counts took place over a period of years
spanning from 1996 to 2006. An appellate court may order the correction
of clerical errors (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186-187), and we do so here.
DISPOSTION The trial court shall correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that all eight counts
are based on violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), and to reflect that
counts 1 through 3 occurred between 1999 and 2004; counts 4 through 6 occurred
between 1998 and 2006; and counts 7 and 8 occurred between 1996 and 1999. The court
shall forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL J.