California Court of Appeal Aug 7, 2025 No. E084025Unpublished
Filed 8/7/25 P. v. Santos CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084025
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVA020834)
JOSE RODOLFO SANTOS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Daniel W.
Detienne, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Nora
S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
In 2024, the trial court recalled the sentence of Jose Santos under Penal Code
section 1172.1 and resentenced him, reducing his sentence from 42 years to life to 40
years to life. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The court
declined to reduce the sentence further by striking a firearm enhancement or imposing an
risk of danger to public safety’” as “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a
new violent felony within the meaning of” subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) of section 667. “The
eight felonies listed in that provision are referred to ‘as “super strikes.”’” (People v.
Lewis (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401, 409; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351.)
In recalling and resentencing under section 1172.1, the trial court is required to consider
“postconviction factors,” including “the defendant’s risk for future violence.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(5).)
Santos argues that “The Trial Court, In Holding That The Presumption In Favor
Of Recall And Resentencing Had Been Overcome, Improperly And Erroneously Focused
On Appellant’s Offense While Ignoring Appellant’s Postconviction Conduct And
Rehabilitation.” (Boldface omitted.) He also argues that “the trial court, in determining
whether appellant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, failed to
consider the length of appellant’s sentence or the fact that, even if relief were granted, he
would still have a life term to serve on his sentence, as well as the fact that, to be
released, appellant would still be subject to the determination of the parole board as to
whether he constituted such danger.”
7
Both arguments presuppose that the trial court found that the statutory
presumption favoring recall and resentencing was overcome because Santos posed a risk
of committing a super strike offense. The arguments fail because the presupposition is
false. The trial court did not find that Santos posed a risk of committing a super strike.
Rather, the court expressly declined to make such a finding, applied the statutory
presumption, recalled Santos’s sentence, and resentenced him.
Moreover, as required by section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), the trial court in
resentencing Santos did consider postconviction factors, including risk of future violence.
At the hearing, the court confirmed that it had read and considered the case summary and
evaluation report submitted by the CDCR, and Santos gave a statement at the hearing. In
determining whether to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement or to impose a lesser
enhancement, the court described some of the rehabilitative efforts that Santos had made
while in prison. In addition, the court emphasized that “fights happen all the time.” The
court’s recognition that Santos escalated a fist fight by firing a weapon thus reflects a
concern that Santos posed a risk of potentially deadly violence in the future if released.
In sum, the record reflects that the trial court did recall Santos’s sentence and
resentence him, did not find that Santos poses an unreasonable danger to public safety,
and did consider Santos’s postconviction conduct in the appropriate context, namely, at
resentencing. For all of these reasons, Santos’s arguments fail.
8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
MILLER Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court properly exercised its discretion under Penal Code section 1172.1 by recalling the defendant's sentence, applying the statutory presumption in favor of resentencing, and considering postconviction factors before declining to further reduce the sentence by striking a firearm enhancement.
Issues
Did the trial court erroneously find that the statutory presumption favoring recall and resentencing was overcome by a finding of unreasonable risk to public safety?
Did the trial court fail to consider postconviction factors and rehabilitation in its resentencing determination?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court did not find that Santos posed a risk of committing a super strike. Rather, the court expressly declined to make such a finding, applied the statutory presumption, recalled Santos’s sentence, and resentenced him.”