People v. Clayton CA4/1

Filed 8/5/25 P. v. Clayton CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085021

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2403616)

JESSE EDWARD CLAYTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions. Mytili G. Bala, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jesse Edward Clayton appeals an order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon under Penal Code section 4852.01. Clayton argues—and the People agree—the trial court misconstrued

section 4852.01 by concluding Clayton was statutorily ineligible. He also asserts the trial court committed a reversible error by failing to appoint counsel as required by section 4852.08. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we accept the People’s concession and reverse and remand with instructions. I. According to his petition, in 2012, Clayton was convicted of knowingly

possessing child pornography (§ 311.11(a))1, having knowing contact with a minor to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3(a)), and attempting to use a minor for obscene material (§§ 664, 311.4(c)). Clayton was released from prison in 2013 and discharged from parole in 2016. In 2024, Clayton petitioned for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. Clayton represented himself in the petition’s proceedings. The trial court denied the petition after concluding Clayton was not eligible to petition for relief under section 4852.01(b). II. A. Clayton argues the trial court erred because he is eligible to petition for relief under the plain language of section 4852.01(a). The People concede error, and we agree. The trial court’s denial turned on its interpretation of section 4852.01, which is a question of law we review de novo. (People v. Failla (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1520.)