California Court of Appeal Aug 4, 2025 No. E085296Unpublished
Filed 8/4/25 In re D.L. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re D.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085296
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2400445)
v. OPINION
M.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D.L.,
Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mona M. Nemat, Judge.
Affirmed.
Caitlin E. Howard, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
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Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath Shettigar,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent D.L.
M.P. (mother) challenges the findings and orders made during the contested
jurisdiction and disposition hearings held on December 18 and 30, 2024. She contends
the juvenile court (1) erred in asserting dependency jurisdiction because the evidence is
bubble wrap, and an empty large zip-lock with white residue).” Mother said the items
belonged to I.C. The officer opined that he is a “street level narcotics dealer.”
Nonetheless, mother asserts that she stopped driving D.L. to alleviate any concerns
that existed, and thus there was no nexus between her substance use and any defined risk
of harm. Not so. Following her positive drug test on October 3, 2024, she failed to drug
test on at least six occasions, between October 4 and December 4, despite agreeing to do
so. Regarding her positive test, she claimed it was the result of I.C.’s “hotboxing” in her
car, the same car she used on October 3 to drive D.L. to and from school. Mother’s
“implausible denial of drug use” and failure to test provide a reasonable basis for the
juvenile court to disbelieve her assertion that she was not using drugs. (In re E.E. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 195, 214; In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1217
[mother missing a drug test was “properly considered the equivalent of a positive test
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result . . . .” fn. omitted], disapproved on other grounds in N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 650, fn. 18; In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186 [test was inconclusive
due to a dilute urine sample, and father failed to show up for other drug tests he was
ordered to take; “a reasonable inference could be drawn that father’s marijuana use was
more frequent than the one admitted instance . . . .”].) As the juvenile court stated: “I
have a positive test.· I have no indication that there’s sobriety in this case.· I have every
indication and every reason to believe in light of the statements by father, in light of the
positive test, that mother is using controlled substances.”
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
mother’s substance abuse presented a substantial risk that D.L. will suffer serious
physical harm or illness.
2. Domestic violence between mother and I.C.
According to mother, there is no nexus between her prior incidents of domestic
violence with I.C. and an ongoing and current risk of harm to D.L. Again, the
Department and D.L. disagree.
We find sufficient evidence that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, D.L. was
at substantial risk of serious harm due to the domestic violence between mother and I.C.
The evidence of mother’s domestic violence history consists of escalating incidents of
I.C. injuring mother. In June 2024, his arrest outside her home based on domestic
violence warranted a no-negative contact criminal protective order, and in September, he
would not allow her to return home because her injuries were “bad.” Mother stated that
he has violated the no-negative contact order “multiple times.” Although mother kept
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I.C. away from D.L., he still saw the outcome of their domestic violence incidents.
According to father, D.L. is scared for his mother and does not understand why she was
being hurt. Despite mother’s claim that I.C. was not an integrated part of her life, D.L.
had encountered him at least two times—one time in June when I.C. was arrested outside
mother and D.L.’s home, and another time when D.L. was dropped off at father’s house
and I.C. was in the car.
“The subdivision[] at issue here require[s] only a ‘substantial risk’ that the child
will be abused or neglected. The legislatively declared purpose of these provisions ‘is to
provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically,
sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the
safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of
that harm.’ [Citation.] ‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’
[Citation.] [¶] ‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion
that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can
affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the
statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by
substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any
or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the
evidence.’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773-774.) Contrary to mother’s claim, the
evidence supports a finding that “there is a substantial risk” that D.L. will suffer serious
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physical harm given mother’s toxic relationship with I.C., a controlling and violent man,
and her inability to end the relationship despite claiming a desire to do so.
B. Disposition Order.
1. Removal.
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by removing D.L. from her care because
any risk to him was minimal and could be effectively addressed through other reasonable
means. The Department submits on mother’s contention, but D.L. argues the evidence
supports the court’s removal findings and orders.
Where removal from a parent is at issue, the juvenile court must make findings
under section 361, subdivision (c). The court must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the [child] if the [child] were returned
home,” that there are no reasonable means short of removal to protect the minor, and that
the social services agency made reasonable efforts to avoid removal. (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) We review the court’s removal findings for substantial evidence.
(In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.)
Mother reiterates her prior claim that the circumstances that resulted in this
dependency—the threat of domestic violence and mother’s substance abuse—had
significantly decreased by the time of the disposition hearing, and adds that she began a
domestic violence class and was not driving D.L. around. She notes that she and D.L.
had moved out of the maternal grandparents’ home, but fails to explain why. According
to father, mother had been kicked out of the grandparents’ home following an incident
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between mother and the maternal grandmother where an uncle became involved and D.L.
intervened to protect mother. Moreover, mother had not submitted any on-demand drug
tests.
Given the change in mother’s living situation, D.L.’s counsel requested
reunification services because mother had not participated in drug testing, had not
engaged in a program, and no longer had family support after being asked to leave the
maternal grandparents’ home. While D.L. could safely remain with father, the same was
not true with mother. Although father was allowing her to live with him, it was on a
temporary basis, and she was looking for housing. Rather than order mother out of
father’s home, the juvenile court removed custody of D.L. from her and ordered a safety
plan that included her not being alone with him and not driving him. The court explained
that the prior safety plan that included the maternal grandparents and adult siblings was
no longer available, and it had no information regarding her sobriety to decide there was
no longer an imminent risk of harm to D.L.
We conclude the evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court to find that
mother’s substance abuse and toxic relationship with I.C. placed D.L. at substantial risk
of harm, and there were no reasonable means short of removal to protect him.
2. Supervised visitation.
Finally, mother contends the juvenile court erred in ordering supervised visitation.
We review a visitation order for abuse of discretion. (In re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
1542, 1557-1558.) There was no abuse of discretion here. Mother’s claim that
supervised visitation “was unnecessary to protect D.L., unsupported by the record, and
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did not serve D.L.’s best interests” is, at best, speculative, since she had not participated
in drug testing, had not engaged in any programs (other than attending three domestic
violence classes), and no longer had family support after being asked to leave the
maternal grandparents’ home. As the juvenile court stated, “I don’t have additional
information to say that there is no longer an imminent risk of harm to this minor.”
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional order, concluding that substantial evidence supported the determination that the minor was at substantial risk of harm due to the mother's substance abuse and domestic violence, necessitating removal and supervised visitation.
Issues
Did the juvenile court err in asserting dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1)?
Did the juvenile court err in removing the minor from the mother's care under section 361, subdivision (c)?
Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in ordering supervised visitation?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The standard is that there is a substantial risk of physical harm to this minor.”
“The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.”