By its terms, subdivision (d) of section 1170 limits relief to juvenile defendants
who were either originally sentenced to LWOP or resentenced to LWOP upon petitioning
for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). (§ 1170(d)(1)(A) & (10).) However, two
courts have recently held that constitutional principles of equal protection require that
relief under section 1170(d)(1) be extended to juvenile offenders who were originally
sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 633-634; Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 454; see also People v. Bagsby (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054-1063 [reaffirming the holding in Heard].) In Heard and
Sorto, the defendants were sentenced to terms of over 100 years to life before section
3051 was enacted; consequently, when the sentences were imposed they did not allow for
11
parole eligibility within the defendants’ lifetimes. (Heard, at pp. 613-614, 628; Sorto, at
pp. 440-441, 445.) The subsequent enactment of section 3051 rendered the defendants
eligible for youth offender parole after serving 25 years. (Heard, at p. 628; Sorto, at
p. 441.) The People consequently argued in both cases that under Franklin’s holding
concerning section 3051 and the functional equivalent of LWOP, the defendants were no
longer serving de facto LWOP sentences, so it was appropriate to deny them relief under
section 1170(d)(1). (Heard, at p. 628; Sorto, at p. 447.)
Both Heard and Sorto rejected the argument. (Heard, at pp. 628-629; Sorto, at
pp. 447-448.) Heard explained that because section 1170(d)(1)(A) “‘uses the phrase
“was sentenced” and refers to the past,’” the relevant inquiry under the provision is the
sentence that was originally imposed, which might not be the same as the sentence
currently being served by the defendant. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.)
Heard reasoned: Although the defendant’s “sentence as it currently operates is no longer
the functional equivalent of life without parole, this does not change the fact that the
sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence at the time it was imposed. Because
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), refers to the ‘offense for which the defendant was
sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole’ (italics added), and
[the defendant] was sentenced to the functional equivalent of a life without parole
sentence, he is similarly situated with the juvenile offenders whose sentences make them
eligible to seek resentencing.” (Ibid.) Sorto rejected the People’s argument for the same
reason. (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.)
12
In granting Valdez resentencing relief under section 1170(d)(10), the trial court
concluded that the equal protection analysis in Heard applies to juvenile offenders who
were resentenced under section 1170(d)(1) to the functional equivalent of LWOP and
then petition to be resentenced again under section 1170(d)(10). We need not decide the
issue, and we also need not decide whether Heard and Sorto were correctly decided. We
assume for the sake of argument that Heard and Sorto were correctly decided and that
their analysis applies equally to juvenile offenders who petition for resentencing under
section 1170(d)(10) after having been resentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP
pursuant to section 1170(d)(1). Even given all of those assumptions, Valdez is not
entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10), because he was not resentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP.
Heard and Sorto concluded that the sentences of the defendants in those cases
were the functional equivalent of LWOP despite youth offender parole under section
3051, because section 3051 did not exist when those defendants were sentenced, which is
the relevant inquiry under section 1170(d)(1). (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629;
Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.) But section 1170(d)(10) does not include the
same “was sentenced” language as section 1170(d)(1) and accordingly does not refer to
the sentence originally imposed. (Cf. Heard, at p. 629.) Rather, section 1170(d)(10)
provides for resentencing if the juvenile offender “is resentenced to imprisonment for life
without the possibility of parole,” so the relevant sentence is the one that was imposed
upon resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).
13
In 2018, Valdez was resentenced to 50 years to life, and his offenses did not
exclude him from youth offender parole eligibility. Valdez was resentenced after the
enactment of section 3051, so the 50-year-to-life sentence imposed on resentencing
included the availability of youth offender parole under section 3051. Franklin
characterized such a sentence as “a life sentence with parole eligibility during [the
defendant’s] 25th year of incarceration,” which Franklin concluded did not constitute the
functional equivalent of LWOP. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 279.) We are bound
by that precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1960) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
Under Franklin, Valdez was resentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility during
his 25th year of incarceration, which is not the functional equivalent of LWOP.
(Franklin, at p. 279.)
Contreras does not require a contrary result. Valdez’s 50-year-to-life sentence is
distinguishable from the 50- and 58-year-to-life sentences imposed on the juvenile
defendants in Contreras, because both of those defendants were sentenced under the one
strike law and consequently were ineligible for youth offender parole. (Contreras, supra,
4 Cal.5th at pp. 357, 359, 368-369; § 3051, subd. (h).) As a result, the defendants in
Contreras were not eligible for parole until the ages of 66 and 74. (Contreras, at pp. 359,
368.) In contrast, Valdez is eligible for youth offender parole and in fact already received
a youth offender parole hearing at age 42. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279-
280.)
14
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Valdez was not resentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that equal
protection requires that resentencing under section 1170(d)(10) be available to defendants
resentenced under section 1170(d)(1) to the functional equivalent of LWOP, the trial
court still erred by granting Valdez’s petition for resentencing under section
1170(d)(10).1
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate
issue directing the trial court (1) to vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief
under section 1170(d)(10), and (2) to enter a new and different order denying the petition
for resentencing. The stay of proceedings in the trial court shall be dissolved when this
opinion becomes final.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MENETREZ J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.
1 Valdez requests judicial notice of a letter filed by the Attorney General in another appeal in the Second District in which the Attorney General withdrew its argument that Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, was wrongly decided. The People, represented by the Riverside County District Attorney, oppose the request. We deny the request because the letter is not relevant to our analysis. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268, fn. 6.)
15
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two - No. E084222
S289792
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA En Banc ________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent;
MARIANO VALDEZ, Real Party in Interest. ________________________________________________________________________
The request for an order directing depublication of the opinion in the above- entitled appeal is denied.
(See Concurring Statement by Justice Liu)
_______________/s/_____________ Chief Justice
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (VALDEZ) S289792
Concurring Statement by Justice Liu
This case addresses resentencing eligibility under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d)) in an unusual set of circumstances. (All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) In 2000, defendant Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at the age of 17. (People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 791, 794 (Valdez).) In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) and was resentenced to 50 years to life. (Valdez, at p. 794.) Valdez’s resentencing came after the 2014 enactment of youth offender parole under section 3051, such that unlike his original LWOP sentence, his new “50-year-to-life sentence . . . included the availability of youth offender parole.” (Valdez, at p. 801.) After People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard) held that section 1170(d) resentencing must be made available to youth offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP, Valdez sought a second resentencing. (Valdez, at p. 794.) He argued that because his new 50 years to life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, Heard meant he must be given a second chance at section 1170(d) resentencing. (Valdez, at p. 794.) I express no view on the merits of Heard or the merits of Valdez’s resolution of its fact pattern. But I am concerned that Valdez is being cited as authority for something it does not say. 1
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (VALDEZ) Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of depublication
According to a depublication request jointly submitted by the Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Office and the Pacific Juvenile Defender Center, Valdez is cited as “controlling authority” in opposition to “all” of the initial resentencing petitions under section 1170(d)(1) that the public defender’s office is handling for petitioners otherwise eligible for such resentencing under Heard. They explain that the Los Angeles County District Attorney is arguing that Valdez stands for the proposition that a youth offender originally sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) because youth offender parole has since become available. The Riverside County District Attorney’s opposition to depublication maintains this reading of Valdez and argues that any resulting confusion reflects a split of authority over the meaning of functional LWOP. In fact, Valdez says nothing about the meaning of functional LWOP for purposes of the inquiry under section 1170(d)(1). Consistent with the specific facts in Valdez, the opinion explains that its holding is limited to the inquiry for successive resentencing petitions under section 1170(d)(10). (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 797 [“[T]he 50-year-to life sentence that Valdez received on resentencing in 2018 is not the functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of resentencing under section 1170(d)(10)” (italics added)].) The notion that Valdez is “controlling authority” for initial petitions is all the more odd given that the opinion’s analysis is driven by the distinction it draws between the text of section 1170(d)(10)’s successive petition provision and initial resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 800–801.) Valdez notes that “Heard explained that because section 1170(d)(1)(A) ‘ “uses the phrase 2
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (VALDEZ) Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of depublication
‘was sentenced’ and refers to the past,” ’ the relevant inquiry under the provision is the sentence that was originally imposed, which might not be the same as the sentence currently being served by the defendant.” (Valdez, at p. 800.) The court in Valdez read Heard to say that a sentence of over 100 years to life was “the functional equivalent of LWOP despite youth offender parole under section 3051, because section 3051 did not exist when [the] defendant[] [was] sentenced, which is the relevant inquiry under section 1170(d)(1).” (Id. at p. 801; see also People v. Lopez (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 649, 654 [youth offenders whose original LWOP sentences were later modified on habeas to life sentences under Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 were nevertheless entitled to section 1170(d)(1) relief because the “section uses the phrase ‘was sentenced’ and refers to the past,” and defendants “were sentenced to LWOP terms”].) By contrast, Valdez observed, “section 1170(d)(10) does not include the same ‘was sentenced’ language,” and therefore concluded that the provision “does not refer to the sentence originally imposed.” (Valdez, at p. 801.) For successive resentencing eligibility under section 1170(d)(10), “the relevant sentence is the one that was imposed upon [the first] resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).” (Valdez, at p. 801.) Because youth offender parole was available when Valdez was resentenced in 2018, he was not entitled to a second resentencing because his new 50 years to life sentence was “not the functional equivalent of LWOP.” (Ibid.) Valdez’s express rationale makes clear it should not be cited as authority for the meaning of functional LWOP under section 1170(d)(1). The opinion repeatedly states it does not disturb Heard’s conclusion that the subsequent creation of youth offender parole does not alter the meaning of functional
3
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (VALDEZ) Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of depublication
LWOP for purposes of section 1170(d)(1). (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 797, 801 [“We assume for the sake of argument that Heard . . . [was] correctly decided.”].) Appropriately, no Court of Appeal has endorsed the contention that Valdez is a barrier to resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).
LIU, J.
4
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a juvenile offender who was resentenced to 50 years to life under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) is not entitled to further resentencing under section 1170(d)(10) because such a sentence, which includes eligibility for youth offender parole, is not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole.
Issues
Whether a 50-year-to-life sentence that includes youth offender parole eligibility constitutes the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole for purposes of Penal Code section 1170(d)(10).
Disposition. granted
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Valdez was eligible for youth offender parole under the 50-year-to-life sentence that he received at his resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). Consequently, when that 50-year-to-life sentence was imposed, it was not the functional equivalent of LWOP.”
“Because Valdez was not resentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent, he is not entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10).”