Oasis Independent Medical Associates v. Lopez CA4/2 (2025) · DecisionDepot
Oasis Independent Medical Associates v. Lopez CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jul 18, 2025 No. E082871Unpublished
Filed 7/18/25 Oasis Independent Medical Associates v. Lopez CA4/2
See concurring opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
OASIS INDEPENDENT MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC., E082871, E083728 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2304878) v. OPINION JOB LOPEZ et al.,
Defendants and Appellants. _____________________________
JOB LOPEZ, et al.,
Cross-complainants and Appellants,
vs.
OASIS INDEPENDENT MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.,
Cross-defendants and Respondents.
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APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Manuel Bustamante,
Judge. Affirmed.
Kelly, Trotter & Franzen and David P. Pruett for Defendants, Cross-
complainants and Appellants.
Doll Amir & Eley, Michael M. Amir and Paul M. Torres for Plaintiffs, Cross-
defendants and Respondents.
This opinion addresses two appeals from one lower court case. In both appeals,
the appellants are Job Lopez (Lopez), CoachellaMed, Francisco Cordova, M.D., and
Carlos Lopez, M.D. The first appeal (Court of Appeal case No. E082871) concerns the
trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction against Lopez. The respondent in the first
425.16.) Lopez Associates contend the trial court erred by partially granting the anti-
SLAPP motion. We affirm.
FACTS
In their first amended cross-complaint (FACC), Lopez Associates sought a
judicial declaration that the exclusivity agreement was void under section 16600. In
their second cause of action, Lopez Associates alleged that Oasis’s lawsuit, which
included a claim for breach of the exclusivity agreement, constituted unfair competition
(§ 17200) because the exclusivity agreement is an improper restraint on Lopez
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practicing his profession. The following is a quote from Lopez Associates’ second
cause of action: “[Oasis’s] . . . filing of an action in court to attempt to enforce
restraints of trade, so as to suppress competitive employment in California, violate
California’s unfair competition law and public policy against restraints of trade,
Sections 16600 and 17200.”
In partially granting the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court struck: (1) the
entirety of Lopez Associates’ second cause of action; (2) in the fourth cause of action,
paragraph 73, the portion reading, “ ‘and attempted enforcement of Exclusivity
Contracts with NP Lopez’ ”; (3) paragraph 24, which reads, “ ‘Those threats have
included threats of entangling competitors in litigation, with cease and desist letters,
including threats of injunctions, to deter competitors from contracting with health care
providers who were induced to sign cross-defendants’ Exclusivity Contract’ ”; and
(4) the portion of paragraph 1 reading, “ ‘including threats of litigation and
commencement of litigation by those cross-complainants in an effort to achieve
restraints of health care providers’ professions, trades, and business by virtue of cross-
defendants’ Exclusivity Contracts.’ ”
DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To resolve an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court engages in a two-step inquiry.
First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the
challenged cause of action arises from a protected activity. [Citation.] The moving
party has the burden of showing that the challenged cause of action arises from a
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protected activity. [Citation.] Second, if the moving party has carried that burden, the
court must decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the challenged cause of action. [Citation.] ‘The trial court’s rulings on
both issues are reviewed de novo.’ ” (City of Oxnard v. Starr (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
313, 320.)
B. PROTECTED ACTIVITY
A protected activity is one arising from an act in furtherance of a person’s “right
of petition or free speech.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) That includes
“any written or oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding” or
“under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” (Id. at subds. (e)(1) & (2).)
The portions of the FACC stricken by the trial court all pertain to Oasis’s actions
in bringing its complaint against Lopez Associates. Oasis’s complaint constitutes a
writing before a judicial proceeding that is also under consideration by a judicial body.
Therefore, the stricken portions of the FACC pertain to the protected activity of Oasis
suing Lopez Associates.
Lopez Associates contend the exclusivity agreement is void per se under section
16600, as a posttermination noncompete agreement, and suing to enforce a void
agreement is not a protected activity. The section 16600 void per se rule applies
“strictly in the context of noncompetition agreements following the termination of
employment or the sale of interest in a business.” (Ixchel, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1159.)
Lopez Associates fail to explain what type of relationship with Oasis was terminated,
e.g., an employment relationship or an interest in a jointly held business. Due to Lopez
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Associates’ failure to provide the necessary arguments, we conclude they have forfeited
the issue of whether the exclusivity agreement is void per se under section 16600.
(Mahram v. The Kroger Co., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 310.) As a result, we reject
their assertion that Oasis’s complaint does not constitute a protected activity.
C. PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING
Lopez Associates, as the cross-complainants, bore the burden of proving a
probability of prevailing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In the second cause
of action, Lopez Associates alleged that Oasis’s initiation of litigation to enforce the
exclusivity agreement was an “unfair business practice[] under Sections 16600 and
17200.” Because the unfair business practice claim (§ 17200) is based upon section
16600, Lopez Associates must demonstrate a probability of establishing that the
exclusivity agreement is either (1) void per se or (2) void under the reasonableness
standard. (Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp.
350-351.) Lopez Associates rely on the void per se rule but fail to explain what type of
relationship between Oasis and Lopez was terminated. As a result, they have failed to
establish a probability of prevailing on their claim that Oasis engaged in an unfair
business practice (§ 17200).
D. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in partially granting the anti-SLAPP motion.
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DISPOSITION
The order granting the preliminary injunction is affirmed. The order partially
granting the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. In both appeals, respondents are awarded
their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER Acting P. J.
I concur:
CODRINGTON J.
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[Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc. v. Lopez, E082871; Lopez v. Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc., E083728]
MENETREZ, J., Concurring.
The preliminary injunction prohibits only false or misleading communications and
unsolicited marketing communications. Appellants’ arguments concerning Business and
Professions Code section 16600 do not show that prohibiting those communications was
an abuse of discretion.
The special motion to strike was granted only as to allegations concerning
respondents’ litigation or prelitigation conduct. That conduct is protected activity under
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and is covered by the litigation privilege. (Dove
Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784; Rubin v.
Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1194-1195.) Appellants’ arguments concerning Business
and Professions Code section 16600 again fail to show error, because even meritless
litigation is protected activity and is covered by the litigation privilege.
I therefore concur in the judgment.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction against a nurse practitioner for deceptive marketing and affirmed the partial grant of an anti-SLAPP motion against a cross-complaint challenging the enforcement of an exclusivity agreement. The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudicial error regarding the injunction and failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the anti-SLAPP motion.
Issues
Did the trial court err in granting a preliminary injunction against a nurse practitioner for deceptive marketing and unsolicited communications?
Did the trial court err in partially granting an anti-SLAPP motion against a cross-complaint alleging that the enforcement of an exclusivity agreement violated Business and Professions Code section 16600?
Did the appellant forfeit the argument that the exclusivity agreement was void per se under section 16600 by failing to identify the nature of the terminated relationship?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court’s ruling was primarily based upon its conclusion that Oasis was likely to prevail on its cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising from a contract between Oasis and Lopez.”
“We have not been presented with an argument demonstrating that the trial court prejudicially erred in granting the preliminary injunction.”