California Court of Appeal Jul 9, 2025 No. E074846AUnpublished
Filed 7/9/25 P. v. Jones CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E074846
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB18003148)
DAVID PIERRE JONES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ronald M.
Christianson, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
David W. Beaudreau, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General,
Eric A. Swenson, Jennifer B. Truong, Marvin E. Mizell and Tyler L. Krentz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant David Pierre Jones was convicted of committing three
one-strike offenses (Pen. Code, § 667.61),1 and other crimes, when he was 19 years old in
2018. He was sentenced to 105 years to life for his one strike offenses and
enhancements, plus a determinate term of 32 years four months for his other crimes and
enhancements.
Defendant appealed, arguing that section 3051, subdivision (h) (section 3051(h)) is
facially unconstitutional because it violates the state and federal equal protection rights of
all young adult one strike offenders. In our initial opinion, we concluded that
section 3051(h) is constitutional and affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted
a petition for review and ultimately reached the same conclusion regarding the
constitutionality of section 3051(h) in People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 136
(Williams). However, it transferred the cause back to this court with directions to permit
the parties to address defendant’s potential entitlement to the benefit of ameliorative
legislation that became effective while review was pending. We vacated our initial
opinion and permitted the parties to file supplemental briefing.
In his supplemental brief, defendant contends that reversal is required because:
(1) there was a violation of the Racial Justice Act (§ 745, subd. (a); (RJA)) at the time of
his trial; (2) he is entitled to the benefit of amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b),
limiting the trial court’s discretion to impose an upper term sentence; (3) the trial court
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
erred to the extent it relied on the residual clause of rule 4.421(c) of the Rules of Court to
find aggravating circumstances warranting an upper term sentence; and (4) he is entitled
to the benefit of amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), providing for the low term
as the presumptive term of imprisonment under the circumstances presented in this case.
In light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Williams, we reaffirm our previous
conclusion that section 3051(h) does not violate the equal protection clauses of the state
or federal constitutions. However, we agree that defendant is entitled to resentencing as a
result of the amendment to section 1170, subdivision (b), limiting the trial court’s
discretion to impose an upper term sentence. Because this conclusion requires reversal of
the judgment and remand for further proceedings, it is unnecessary to address the merits
of defendant’s additional arguments, as he will have the opportunity to raise the
remaining issues for the trial court’s consideration upon remand.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE2
A. Prosecution Evidence
On August 6, 2018, Defendant entered a check cashing business in Ontario and
robbed two of its employees of around $1,200, while pointing a gun at them. Later that
day, defendant visited a massage parlor in Colton. After he was taken into a massage
room, defendant demanded money, at gunpoint, from two of the massage parlor’s
employees, Doe 1 and Doe 2. The three of them then went to the employee waiting
2 We only briefly summarize the evidence underlying Jones’s convictions, given that the evidence is immaterial to his facial constitutional challenge to section 3051(h).
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room, where Doe 1 and Doe 2 gave defendant several hundred dollars. Defendant
dropped a bullet from a semiautomatic firearm on the floor of the waiting room.
While in the hallway next to the massage rooms, defendant attempted to rape
Doe 2 and forced Doe 2 to orally copulate him. He then forced Doe 2 into one of the
massage rooms, where he raped Doe 2, then raped Doe 1. He was holding the gun the
entire time.
B. Defense Evidence
Defendant testified that he committed the four robberies, but he claimed that he
used a toy airsoft pistol in the robberies. He also claimed that his sex acts with Doe 1 and
Doe 2 were consensual. He testified that Doe 2 offered him “two free dates” or “two free
sexual intercourses”—with herself and Doe 1—in exchange for his agreeing not to take
any more money from Doe 1 and Doe 2, and he accepted the offer.
C. Jones’s Convictions and Sentence
A jury convicted defendant of four counts of second degree robbery (§ 211, counts
used a firearm in each count (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(3)); and (4) defendant committed the
offenses against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)).
Defendant was sentenced in February 2020 to a determinate term of 32 years four
months on his convictions and firearm enhancements in counts 1 through 5, plus an
indeterminate term of 105 years to life on his one strike convictions and firearm
enhancements in counts 6, 7, and 8 (three consecutive 25-year-to-life terms, plus three
consecutive 10-year terms for the firearm enhancements). The determinate term included
the imposition of the upper term on count 1 (§ 213, subd. (a)(2)). In selecting the upper
term, the trial court expressly relied on the following circumstances in aggravation:
(1) defendant suffered a prior juvenile adjudication for grant theft auto; (2) the current
offense involved acts of great violence and threat of harm displaying a high degree of
callousness, viciousness, and cruelty; (3) defendant did not display remorse for his
commission of the current offense; (4) defendant did not display any concern for his
victims; and (5) defendant’s conduct in the commission of the current offense showed he
represented a serious danger to society. The trial court also expressed its intent to
sentence defendant to the maximum sentence permissible under the law and that it would
decline to exercise any available discretion to show leniency.3
3 Specifically, the trial court stated: “it is the Court’s intent to impose the maximum sentence. I do not find it appropriate to exercise any current discretion available to strike any portion of the sentence and would not strike any portion if discretion subsequently becomes available.”
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Equal Protection Claim
Initially, we briefly address defendant’s original argument that section 3051(h)
represents an unconstitutional violation of his right to equal protection under the state and
federal constitutions. While we disagreed with this argument in our original opinion, that
opinion was vacated to permit the parties to submit supplemental briefing on additional
issues. Because our Supreme Court has since definitively addressed defendant’s equal
protection argument in Williams, concluding that the provisions of section 3051(h) that
defendant challenges on appeal do not violate equal protection under either the state or
federal constitutions (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 136-137), we no longer need to
address defendant’s arguments in detail. Instead, we simply reaffirm our prior conclusion
that defendant’s constitutional challenge to section 3051(h) is not grounds for reversal of
the judgment in this case.
B. Amendments to Section 1170
In supplemental briefing, defendant contends that his sentence on count 1 must be
vacated in light of amendments made to section 1170, subdivision (b), which now
requires (1) that most circumstances in aggravation be found true beyond a reasonable
doubt before the trial court may rely on those circumstances to impose an upper term
sentence (§ 1170, subds. (b)(1), (b)(2)), and (2) that the trial court apply a presumptive
lower term sentence upon a specified factual showing (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)). We agree
that the amendments to section 1170 require defendant’s sentence be vacated and the
matter remanded for resentencing.
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When defendant was sentenced in 2020, former section 1170 provided the trial
court broad discretion to impose a sentence that, in its judgment, served the interest of
justice by selecting among three statutorily specified terms. (People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730, 773.) However, while defendant’s appeal was pending, the Legislature
amended section 1170 to place limits on the trial court’s discretion in selecting among the
statutorily specified terms. (§ 1170, subds. (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(6).) As amended, the
statute generally provides for the middle term of imprisonment as the presumptive
sentence. (Ibid.) And a trial court may impose an upper term sentence “only when there
are circumstances in aggravation of the crime” and “the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Ibid.) Additionally,
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), provides that the lower term be considered the
presumptive sentence where a defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
specified factors such as the defendant’s youth, prior abuse, or childhood trauma
contributed to the commission of the offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
Our Supreme Court has explained that a trial court’s reliance on unproven
aggravating factors to impose an upper term sentence constitutes error requiring reversal
“unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have
found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper
term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the
current statutory requirements.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) Here, defendant
was sentenced to the upper term of five years on count 1. In making this decision, the
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trial court expressly relied upon multiple aggravating factors, and the People concede that
the record is insufficient for us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would
have found true all of the factors relied upon by the trial court. We agree and, as a result,
defendant’s sentence must be vacated and defendant is entitled to a remand for
resentencing. (Lynch, at p. 768.)
Despite the People’s concession that resentencing is required as a result of the
amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), the People argue that the scope of
resentencing should be limited upon remand to preclude the trial court’s consideration of
whether defendant is entitled to a presumptive lower term sentence pursuant to
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). We disagree.
Our Supreme Court has explained that “when a court has not exercised its
informed discretion, remand is the default ‘unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the
trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had
such discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431.) And it is true that
the trial court expressly stated at the time of sentencing that it was disinclined to exercise
any discretion to lower defendant’s sentence, even if such discretion was available.
However, the amendment to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), “dramatically restrains [the
trial court’s] discretion to impose the middle or upper term, now requiring the court to
impose the lower term if a qualifying trauma [or youth] was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense ‘unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term be contrary
to the interests of justice.’ ” (Salazar, at p. 426.) Because the statute imposes new
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limitations on the scope of the trial court’s discretion, our Supreme Court has explained
that statements revealing an intent to impose a harsh sentence when applied to other
discretionary sentencing statutes reveal very little about whether the trial court would
impose the same sentence if it was required to apply the provisions of section 1170,
(b)(6)] depends on both factual determinations and the exercise of discretion” (People v.
Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1044); and, certain facts, if found true, will operate
to constrain the scope of the trial court’s discretion (People v. Hilburn (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 189, 204-205; § 1170, subd. (b)(6)). Thus, the fact that the trial court
expressed an intent to exercise its discretion to impose the maximum sentence permitted
by law, the maximum sentence that the trial court has discretion to impose cannot be
ascertained where the factual findings required under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
have not been made. And it is not our role to make the necessary factual findings in the
first instance. (People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 893 [“Appellate courts
do not make factual findings; we review ‘ “the correctness of a judgment [or order] as of
the time of its rendition.” ’ ”].) Instead, we conclude that at the time of resentencing,
defendant should have the opportunity to fully develop the evidentiary record, make
arguments directed toward the appropriate statutory criteria, and obtain factual findings
on whether he is entitled to a presumptive lower term under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6).
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C. We Need Not Decide the Remaining Issues Raised in Defendant’s Supplemental Brief
Because we have concluded that the judgment must be vacated and the matter
remanded for a full resentencing, it is unnecessary for us to reach the merits of
defendant’s remaining claims.
Generally, “when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for
resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ” (People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) As commonly applied, “the full resentencing rule
allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”
(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425) and “may involve the trial court’s
revisiting such decisions as the selection of a principal term, whether to stay a sentence,
whether to impose an upper, middle, or lower term, and whether to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences” (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 46).
In light of the full resentencing rule, we agree with the People that it is
unnecessary for us to address defendant’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of the
residual clause set forth in Rules of Court, rule 4.421(c), which provides that the trial
court may consider “any other factors statutorily declared to be circumstances in
aggravation or that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstance sunder which
the crime was committed” as a circumstance in aggravation. (Rules of Court, rule
4.421(c).) It is possible that upon remand, rule 4.421(c) proves irrelevant to the trial
court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion and, therefore, any opinion on this matter
would be premature and advisory. (People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1083;
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People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693 [Courts should abide by a “ ‘ “cardinal
principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to
decide more.” ’ ”].)
Additionally, because defendant’s sentence must be reversed for sentencing error,
it is unnecessary for us to reach the merits of defendant’s RJA claim in this appeal.
“ ‘The Legislature enacted the [RJA] with the express intent “to eliminate racial bias
from California’s criminal justice system” and “to ensure that race plays no role at all in
seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.” ’ ” (Sanchez v. Superior Court (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 617, 628.) The statue prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a
criminal conviction or seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence on the basis of race,
ethnicity or national origin. (§ 745, subd. (a).) And prior to entry of judgment, the
statute provides “ ‘a comprehensive procedure for making and adjudicating a section 745
motion at the trial level.’ ” (People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 657; § 745,
subd. (c).) Thus, where a judgment is reversed on appeal for independent reasons, an
appellate court need not address the merits of an RJA claim because the defendant “may
on remand raise his . . . RJA claim to the trial court, should he choose to do so.” (Id. at p.
658.)
Given our conclusion that defendant’s sentence must be reversed, we believe it is
the better course to permit defendant the opportunity to raise his RJA claim with the trial
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court in the first instance and develop a full record on the matter4 instead of addressing
the merits for the first time on appeal. We express no opinion as to whether defendant is
entitled to relief under the RJA or what remedy might be appropriate if defendant
ultimately proves any alleged violation.
IV. DISPOSITION
Defendant’s convictions are affirmed; his sentence is vacated, and the matter
remanded for a full resentencing in which the trial court may reconsider every aspect of
defendant’s sentence. On remand, the trial court shall have discretion to (1) grant the
People the opportunity to try any circumstances in aggravation in a bifurcated proceeding
pursuant to the amended version of section 1170, subdivision (b), now in effect, and
(2) grant defendant an opportunity to prove any mitigating circumstances under the
statute, such as the potential applicability of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). Upon
remand, defendant may also file a motion for relief under section 745, should he choose
to do so.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
4 While a party is permitted to raise an RJA claim for the first time on appeal for claims based on the trial record (§ 745, subd. (b)), a motion brought before the trial court potentially provides the parties with a more robust opportunity to develop a record on the issue with a full evidentiary hearing in an adversarial context (§ 745, subd. (c)). In fact, the statute specifically contemplates that even when an RJA claim is raised after entry of judgment, it may be more advantageous to stay an appeal and remand the issue to the trial court to consider an RJA motion in the first instance. (§7 45, subd. (b))
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FIELDS J. We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for full resentencing, holding that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of amendments to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), which limit the trial court's discretion to impose an upper term sentence.
Is the defendant entitled to resentencing under the amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)?
Should the appellate court address the defendant's Racial Justice Act claim and other sentencing challenges prior to remand?
Disposition. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“we agree that defendant is entitled to resentencing as a result of the amendment to section 1170, subdivision (b), limiting the trial court’s discretion to impose an upper term sentence.”
“defendant’s sentence must be vacated and defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.”
“Defendant’s convictions are affirmed; his sentence is vacated, and the matter remanded for a full resentencing in which the trial court may reconsider every aspect of defendant’s sentence.”