California Court of Appeal Jun 16, 2025 No. E084812Unpublished
Filed 6/16/25 In re T.J. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E084812 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J268952) v. OPINION T.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Charles J. Umeda,
Judge. Affirmed.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Maxine Hart, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
In January 2017, the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office alleged that
T.J. (Minor) murdered Rocky Holmes in January 2016, committing the offense two
months before Minor turned 17 years old. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The murder
allegation was based on eyewitness accounts, including that after the victim survived an
initial salvo of gunfire, Minor returned to the scene and shot him to death at close range.
The prosecutor alleged Minor came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court based on
respect to the degree of criminal sophistication, Sen. No. 545 also added new mandatory
factors for the court to consider: whether the minor has had any involvement in the child
welfare or foster care system and whether the minor has been “a victim of human
trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion.
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a
unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s
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ruling under review.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) As
pertinent here, a lower court’s “conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its
application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Ibid,
fns. omitted.) We interpret the governing law de novo. “In interpreting a statute, our
primary goal ‘ “is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable
indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and
ordinary meaning.” ’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294.) “ ‘ “If the
statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
C. MINOR’S CONTENTIONS AND OUR ANALYSIS
Minor argues that under Assem. Bill No. 2361 and Sen. No. 545 “ ‘amenability to
rehabilitation’ is a separate and determinative factor” in the juvenile court’s transfer
decision. (Underscore omitted.) Minor’s briefing repeatedly emphasizes amenability to
rehabilitation as “a separate factor,” “in addition to the other considerations set forth in
section 707, subdivision (a)(3),” i.e., the five enumerated criteria the juvenile court must
also consider. Minor acknowledges the juvenile court “is still required to consider those
five factors,” but insists that “a separate determination the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation” is also necessary. Minor asserts the juvenile court “fail[ed] to make a
separate finding [that he] was not amenable to rehabilitation,” which “requires . . .
reversal of the transfer order.”
We first address Minor’s contention the juvenile court failed to make a separate
finding regarding his amenability to rehabilitation. Minor is factually incorrect. As set
16
out in the juvenile court’s transfer order, the record reflects that after discussing its
findings regarding each of the five enumerated criteria in subparagraphs (A) to (E) of
subdivision (a) of section 707, and identifying how each criterion and relevant subfactors
weighed in the court’s transfer decision—whether for or against—the court in a separate
paragraph made a separate finding regarding Minor’s ultimate amenability to
rehabilitation. Namely, the court found: “Based upon all the foregoing reasons, after
considering the 707a transfer criteria, the Court finds that the People have met their
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Youth is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” At bottom, therefore,
Minor’s bid for reversal on grounds that the juvenile court did not make a separate
finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation is unsupported by the record. That
distinct finding is embodied in the quoted paragraph.
Regarding Minor’s more general contention concerning the governing law for the
juvenile court’s decision, Minor’s argument can be interpreted as noncontroversial and
correct, in a certain sense. That is, a minor’s amenability to rehabilitation is a separate
factor or component in the trial court’s calculus of its transfer decision. It is distinct from
any single enumerated criterion. As this court has recently explained, the juvenile court’s
“ultimate” amenability determination is “not the same as” any single criterion or factor,
but rather “concerns a global assessment of the minor’s suitability to rehabilitation within
the juvenile court system.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166-167, italics
added.) We have no quarrel with Minor’s contention when read in that sense.
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But we think Minor meant something else. By a repeated, italicized emphasis on
amenability to rehabilitation as a separate factor in the trial court’s transfer decision—
essentially a sixth factor “in addition to” and thus suggested to be unmoored from the five
statutory criteria enumerated by the Legislature—Minor seems to argue that the juvenile
court’s amenability determination must be made apart from or divorced from those five
criteria. To the extent that is what Minor argues, he is wrong. As Miguel R. explained
regarding the juvenile court’s “global” assessment of amenability: “Section 707(a)(3) (as
amended by Assembly Bill 2361) mandates that the juvenile court ‘shall consider the
criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive’ in determining whether ‘the
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’
Thus, according to the statute’s plain language, the court is required to consider each of
the five listed criteria in determining whether the prosecution has carried its burden of
proof to transfer a juvenile to criminal court.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 166, italics added.)
Minor disagrees, but simply points to the existence of the language in section 707,
subdivision (a)(3), prohibiting transfer unless the juvenile court “find[s] by clear and
convincing evidence that a minor was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Minor invokes legislative history restating this
statutory language in the following manner: “the court [must] find that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in order to
transfer the minor to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” (Assem. Com. On Pub. Saf. Com.
on Assem. Bill No. 2361 (2022 Reg. Sess.), p. 7.) Minor views the addition of this
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statutory language in Assem. Bill No. 2361 as a “further requirement” in addition to the
five statutory factors, “result[ing] in a separate and distinct factor to be considered by the
juvenile court.”
In essence, Minor’s position is that because the amenability to rehabilitation
language was added to section 707, subdivision (a)(3), in a different grammatical
sentence than the Legislature’s reference to the five criteria for making that
determination, the amenability determination is an additional criterion that is separate
from the other five. This manner of statutory construction is wholly incorrect. Statutory
language must be “read as a whole, not as individual words in isolation.” (People v.
Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 97.) We avoid interpretations that render other,
accompanying statutory language surplusage. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 166.) The statute plainly specifies, as noted in Miguel R., that “[i]n making its
[amenability] decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A)
to (E).” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) Thus, “the express terms of section 707(a)(3)
require the court to evaluate [the] five criteria in determining whether ‘the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ ”
(Miguel R., at p. 167.) Minor’s suggestion that amenability is a separate, sixth criterion
to be made without reference to the five enumerated criteria is without merit.
Minor makes the same interpretative error in relying on California Rules of Court
(CRC), rule 5.770(b). Minor observes that in restating “Criteria to consider (§ 707)” for a
19
juvenile court’s transfer decision, the rule lists amenability to rehabilitation in a different
paragraph than the criteria specified in section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)-(E).2
Minor argues that this grammatical division of amenability and the five statutory
criteria into different paragraphs “makes it clear unamenability to rehabilitation is a
separate factor the prosecution is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence, in
addition to the other considerations set forth in section 707, subdivision (a)(3).” Not so.
We agree with respondent that “just because the Judicial Council added amenability to
rehabilitation as a third finding in the wake of AB 2361, rather than incorporating it into
the second finding, does not mean it is divorced from the five criteria.” Rather, we regard
the Judicial Council’s decision to use multiple paragraphs instead of a single, longer one
to be a drafting choice for brevity and convenience. In other words: a choice similar to
the Legislature’s use of more than one sentence in articulating transfer considerations in
section 707, subdivision (a)(3). In any event, the rule of court furnishes no support for
Minor’s construction of the statute, given the statute’s “express terms” tying amenability
to consideration of the five criteria. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 167; see In
2 CRC rule 5.770, regarding “Conduct of transfer of jurisdiction hearing under section 707,” provides in pertinent part under “Criteria to consider (§ 707)”: “Following receipt of the probation officer’s report and any other relevant evidence, the court may order that the youth be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence each of the following: [¶] (1) The youth was 16 years or older at the time of any alleged felony offense . . . ; [¶] (2) The youth should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court based on an evaluation of all the criteria in section 707(a)(3)(A)-(E) as provided in that section; and [¶] (3) The youth is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
20
re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 863 [court rules may have “force of [a] statute,” but
only “to the extent that they are not inconsistent with legislative enactments”].)
Minor’s citation to legislative history mentioning Kevin P. v. Superior Court of
Contra Costa County (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173 (Kevin P.) is also unconvincing. Minor
cites Kevin P. as “illustrative of the Legislature’s concerns” in stating expressly in
section 707, subdivision (a)(3), the centrality of a minor’s amenability to rehabilitation in
a juvenile court’s transfer decision. Minor then quotes the reviewing court’s decision in
Kevin P., which predated the enactment of Assem. Bill No. 2361. The Kevin P. court
stated: “Although the trend in the law is clearly toward retaining more minors in juvenile
court, nothing in section 707 supports the notion that the rehabilitation criterion is now
determinative regardless of the other criteria that must be considered. Thus, even though
the evidence of Kevin’s amenability to rehabilitation in juvenile court is compelling, we
are unable to say as a matter of law that ‘[n]o juvenile court could reasonably conclude,
based on all of the evidence presented,’ that he should be transferred to criminal court.”
(Kevin P., at p. 201.) Next, Minor also excerpts legislative history critical of Kevin P., as
follows: “Absent statutory guidance, the appellate courts have been unwilling to find that
youth amenable to rehabilitation must be retained in juvenile court. (See Kevin P. v.
Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 201.)” (Assem. Com. on Pub. Saf. com. on
Assem. Bill No. 2361, supra, p. 6.)
Minor then reaches the conclusion from these respective case and legislative
history excerpts: “The amended language of section 707 is clear. The juvenile court still
should consider the five statutory factors, but the court must also make a separate
21
determination that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation prior to ordering transfer to
adult court.” Minor’s conclusion that the amenability determination is entirely separate
from the five statutory criteria is a bare assertion; it does not follow from the excerpts.
Again, moreover, Minor does not address the statutory language as a whole, including the
Legislature’s plain directive that “[i]n making its [amenability] decision, the court shall
consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E).” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); Miguel
R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166-167.) The statutory language is thus clear in a
manner exactly contrary to Minor’s construction. Hence, Minor’s bare gloss on the
statute is not only unsupported by his excerpted language, there is no need to resort to
legislative history given the statute’s clear terms. (People v. Mendoza, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 294.)
Finally and independently, Minor’s appellate challenge fails for lack of prejudice.
(See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [“No judgment shall be set aside . . . unless, after an
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion
that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”].) Minor fails to
identify any specific evidence or consideration the juvenile court should have weighed
regarding amenability as a hypothetically separate, sixth criterion that the court did not
otherwise consider in weighing the Legislature’s five enumerated criteria. Under a
heading asserting that reversal is required because the juvenile court “fail[ed] to make a
separate [amenability] finding,” Minor complains only that “[i]t was not until he was
transferred to county jail that his behavior changed,” and he similarly highlights that “he
was doing well in juvenile hall before the original transfer hearing.” But the juvenile
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court expressly considered this and similar evidence under criterion (B) of section 707,
regarding Minor’s prospects for rehabilitation under juvenile court jurisdiction. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).) The court concluded that criterion as a whole “weigh[s] against his
amenability” and Minor does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
court’s conclusion—which we may not reweigh. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 165 [“we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court's findings”].)
For all of the foregoing reasons, Minor’s challenge to the juvenile court’s transfer
order is without merit.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s transfer order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER Acting P. J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON J.
MENETREZ J.
23
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the juvenile court properly applied the transfer criteria under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, correctly finding by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was not amenable to rehabilitation. The court rejected the argument that amenability must be assessed as a factor separate from the five enumerated statutory criteria.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court misapplied 2023 and 2024 amendments to transfer laws by failing to treat amenability to rehabilitation as a separate and determinative factor from the five statutory criteria.
Whether the juvenile court failed to make a required separate finding regarding the minor's amenability to rehabilitation.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“to the extent Minor is suggesting that amenability must be assessed in a manner that is, as the People critique the argument, “divorced” from the five criteria, we find no support in the law for Minor’s contention.”
“Minor’s bid for reversal on grounds that the juvenile court did not make a separate finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation is unsupported by the record.”