California Court of Appeal Jun 6, 2025 No. E083652Unpublished
Filed 6/6/25 Mejia v. Mares CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
RUBEN MEJIA,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E083652
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVRI2305277)
JOHANNA MARES et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Carol A. Greene, Judge.
Affirmed.
Ruben Mejia, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Doyle Schafer McMahon, Terrence J. Schafer, and Ryan T. Cox for Defendant
and Respondent, Johanna Mares.
Charlston, Revich, Harris & Hoffman, Ira Revich, and Tim Harris for Defendants
and Respondents, Dawn Elaine Shipley, Bryan Fazio, Theresa DeVries and Kellen
Dugan.
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Lester, Cantrell & Kraus, David Cantrell, and Brad Zurcher for Defendant and
Respondent, Burns and Oblachinski, and Heidi Burns, successor in interest to deceased
Respondent Michael Burns.
Ruben Mejia brought this legal malpractice action against his court-appointed
counsel and others in an underlying dependency case. The trial court sustained
defendants’ demurrers and gave Mejia leave to amend, but Mejia failed to file an
amended complaint. The court entered orders dismissing the action with prejudice as to
each defendant, and Mejia appealed. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Allegations of the complaint
Mejia filed his complaint in October 2023, representing himself. He alleged a
single cause of action for legal malpractice against Dawn Elaine Shipley, Theresa
DeVries, Johanna Mares, Kellen Dugan, Bryan Fazio, Michael Burns, and Burns and
Oblachinski, A Professional Corporation dba Juvenile Defense Panel.1
According to the complaint and exhibits attached to it, Mejia’s children were the
subject of a dependency case that started in July 2023. The juvenile court appointed
DeVries to represent the children and Shipley to represent Mejia. Mejia tried to file
documents before the July 2023 initial hearing on the dependency petition. The superior
court clerk refused to accept the documents because Mejia was represented by counsel.
1 We refer to the Burns and Oblachinski firm as Juvenile Defense Panel. In September 2024, we granted Heidi Burns’s motion to substitute herself for Michael Burns as his successor in interest. 2
Mejia left the documents with Juvenile Defense Panel, which refused to file them. On
the day of the initial hearing, Shipley allegedly was “belittling” when she met with Mejia.
He requested new counsel at the initial hearing, and Shipley declared a conflict. Shipley
told the juvenile court that Mejia was being verbally abusive toward her. The juvenile
court relieved Shipley and appointed Mares to represent Mejia. Mares also did not file
the documents that Mejia wanted to submit to the juvenile court, and she allegedly did
not object to anything. The juvenile court detained Mejia’s children from him and issued
protective custody warrants for the children.
Mejia filed a State Bar complaint against Shipley, and the State Bar investigated
and closed the complaint. At some point, the juvenile court relieved Mares and appointed
Dugan to represent Mejia. Mejia asked Dugan to appeal the court’s order at the initial
hearing. Mejia had to ask Dugan to appeal several times, and he copied Dugan’s “boss,”
Burns, on at least one email making that request. Dugan filed the appeal, but the
appellate court dismissed it, because the order could only be challenged by writ petition.
Mejia filed a State Bar complaint against Dugan, and the attorney asked to be relieved.
The juvenile court then appointed Fazio to represent Mejia. Mejia told Fazio that he was
going to file a legal malpractice suit against Juvenile Defense Panel and confronted Fazio
about the actions of the other attorneys. Fazio said that he was still willing to work with
Mejia, but when they went to court, Fazio requested that the juvenile court appoint a
guardian ad litem for Mejia. Fazio told the juvenile court that Mejia’s behavior
concerned Fazio.
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Mejia alleged that his court-appointed attorneys had failed to submit exculpatory
evidence to the juvenile court and deprived him of due process and a fair trial. He also
alleged that they colluded with the county to ensure that he lost.
II. The demurrers
Defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); unlabeled
statutory references are to this code.) Shipley, Fazio, and Dugan argued that Mejia had
not alleged breach of duty or causation. Shipley represented him for a matter of minutes,
Fazio and Dugan did not represent him at the initial hearing when the children were
detained, and Fazio’s request to appoint a guardian ad litem was not a breach of duty.
Mares likewise argued that Mejia failed to allege breach of duty or causation; in
particular, there were no allegations showing that Mejia would have obtained a more
favorable outcome at the initial hearing absent any alleged breach of duty. Juvenile
Defense Panel and Burns argued that the complaint failed to allege an attorney-client
relationship between them and Mejia, breach of duty, or causation. DeVries similarly
argued that the complaint failed to allege an attorney-client relationship between her and
Mejia; she was appointed to represent Mejia’s children in the underlying dependency
case and owed no duty to a nonclient like Mejia.
In December 2023, the trial court sustained Shipley and Fazio’s demurrer without
leave to amend. In January 2024, the court sustained Mares’s demurrer, DeVries’s
demurrer, and the demurrer of Juvenile Defense Panel and Burns, all with 60 days leave
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to amend. And in February 2024, the court sustained Dugan’s demurrer with 20 days
leave to amend.
After Mejia failed to file an amended complaint, defendants filed ex parte
applications for an order dismissing the action with prejudice. The court granted the
applications and entered orders dismissing the action with prejudice as to each defendant.
Mejia filed a notice of appeal from the judgments of dismissal. (See § 581d [written
dismissals ordered and signed by the court “shall constitute judgments and be effective
for all purposes”]; City of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Bd.
(2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 150, 157.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint
de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under
any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
If the trial court sustains a demurrer with leave to amend, and the plaintiff fails to amend
the complaint, then the court may dismiss the action upon a party’s motion. (§ 581, subd.
(f)(2).) The motion to dismiss the action under those circumstances may be made by ex
parte application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(h).) We review the court’s decision
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to dismiss the action for abuse of discretion. (Leader v. Health Industries of America,
Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 612.)
DISCUSSION
Mejia fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrers or
that the court abused its discretion by dismissing the action.
First, Mejia argues that his due process rights have been violated, because it was
unfair that defendants were representing him in the underlying case and also demurring to
the complaint in this case. He has forfeited the argument by failing to support it with any
citation to authority. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
939, 956.) In any event, the argument does not explain how the court erred by
concluding that Mejia failed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice. (See
Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the trial court erred].) Mejia chose to file this action, and defendants
were entitled to defend themselves against it. They had to respond to the complaint in a
timely manner or risk defaulting. They did not violate Mejia’s due process rights by
defending themselves against his complaint, and even if they did, that putative due
process violation has no tendency to show that Mejia has stated a viable cause of action
for legal malpractice.
Second, Mejia argues that the court dismissed his case on a technicality, namely,
his “lack of knowledge” and failure to file an amended complaint. He asserts that “it has
always been the policy of the court in California to resolve a dispute on the merits of the
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case rather than allowing a dismissal on technicality.” But the court did resolve the
dispute on the merits when it sustained defendants’ demurrers and determined that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice. The court gave Mejia an
opportunity to remedy the defective complaint, but he did not do so. The dismissal was
not based on a mere technicality. Section 581, subdivision (f)(2), authorized the court to
dismiss the action under those circumstances.
Third, Mejia argues that the court abused its discretion by not allowing him to be
heard and not giving him a clear understanding of its order granting him leave to amend.
He asserts that the court provided limited guidance because it did not want to be
perceived as offering legal advice. The record does not support Mejia’s assertion that the
court denied him the chance to be heard. The minute order for the hearing on Mares’s
demurrer shows that Mejia appeared, and there is no indication that the court prevented
him from being heard. The minute orders for the hearings on the other demurrers show
that Mejia did not appear. In each case, the minute order states that the court posted its
tentative ruling, and it did not receive a timely request for oral argument. Nothing in the
record shows that the court was at fault for Mejia’s failure to appear or to request
argument. Similarly, nothing in the record shows that the court was to blame for Mejia’s
failure to file briefs opposing the demurrers. And with respect to the ex parte
applications to dismiss the complaint, Mejia appeared at the hearing on those
applications, and there is no indication that the court prevented Mejia from being heard.
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As for Mejia’s suggestion that the court should have provided more guidance, he
does not identify how the court’s order giving him leave to amend the complaint was
unclear. In general, a self-represented party “is to be treated like any other party and is
entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.”
(Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.)
The court holds the self-represented litigant to the same rules as an attorney representing
a client. (Bistawros v. Greenberg (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 189, 193.) The court had no
duty to “help[] him out” or advise Mejia on how to litigate his case. (Lombardi v.
Citizens Nat. Trust etc. Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 209.)
Lastly, Mejia asserts that the court “only allowed [him] a limited amount of time”
to file an amended complaint. The court gave him much more time to amend than the
default period under the California Rules of Court, which is 10 days. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1320(g).) Mejia does not persuasively explain how the court’s more
generous order amounted to an abuse of discretion.
For all of these reasons, Mejia fails to show that the court erred by sustaining the
demurrers or by dismissing the action.2
2 Shipley, Fazio, DeVries, and Dugan request that we take judicial notice of our nonpublished opinion concerning the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders in the underlying dependency case. Mejia requests that we take judicial notice of another appeal that he filed in the underlying dependency case. He also requests that we take judicial notice of email correspondence between him and counsel for DeVries, and he asks that we “[a]cknowledge the necessity of compelling testimony” from DeVries. (Boldface omitted.) Mejia also filed a “notice to the court of appeal [footnote continued on next page]
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DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs of appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.
regarding judicial misconduct and procedural irregularity in lower court.” (Capitalization omitted.) That filing requests that we take judicial notice of materials in a different action that he brought against the County of Riverside and individual defendants (Mejia v. County of Riverside et al., CVRI2500547). In addition, Mejia filed a “notice of supplemental evidence and judicial misconduct under color of law and request for judicial action and preservation of record for federal review.” (Capitalization omitted.) That filing requests that we take judicial notice of the county’s demurrer in the separate action (Mejia v. County of Riverside et al., CVRI2500547) and an email between the parties in the separate action. Lastly, Mejia filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief, and he submitted a proposed supplemental brief with exhibits.
We deny all of the requests for judicial notice because the materials are irrelevant and unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. (County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29.) The materials do not show that the court erred by sustaining the demurrers in this action or that the court abused its discretion by dismissing the action after Mejia failed to file an amended complaint. We also deny Mejia’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief. The arguments in the proposed supplemental brief and the exhibits attached to the proposed brief do not bear on the issues in this appeal. (See Holland v. Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 378, 382, fn. 1.) Finally, to the extent that Mejia asks us to compel testimony by DeVries, none of the authorities that he cites authorizes us to do that, so we deny the request. 9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's legal malpractice action because the plaintiff failed to amend his complaint after the trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers.
Issues
Did the trial court err in sustaining the defendants' demurrers for failure to state a cause of action?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by dismissing the action after the plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers and gave Mejia leave to amend, but Mejia failed to file an amended complaint. The court entered orders dismissing the action with prejudice as to each defendant, and Mejia appealed. We affirm.”
“The court did resolve the dispute on the merits when it sustained defendants’ demurrers and determined that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice.”