California Court of Appeal Jun 6, 2025 No. E084079Unpublished
Filed 6/6/25 C.M. v. Sims CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
C.M.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084079
v. (Super.Ct.No. ICSICVCH202369009) EMILY SIMS, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Inyo County. Brian L. McCabe, Judge.
Affirmed.
Emily Brinton Sims, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Liebersbach & Ibrahim and Jeremy M. Ibrahim, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
The trial court granted C.M. a one-year civil harassment restraining order against
Emily Sims. C.M. sought to renew the restraining order just before it expired, and the
court entered an order renewing the restraining order for five years. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 527.6, subd. (j)(1); unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) Sims appeals from
the five-year renewal order. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In March 2023, C.M. applied for a civil harassment restraining order against Sims.
C.M. was in a romantic relationship with Matthew Sieleman. Sims is Sieleman’s former
romantic partner, and Sims and Sieleman have a daughter.
In support of C.M.’s application for the restraining order, C.M. described incidents
in which Sims had appeared at C.M.’s home uninvited and had followed Sieleman and
C.M. in her car. During the car incident, Sims tailed Sieleman and C.M.’s car, flashed
her lights and honked her horn, and attempted to force their car onto the side of the road.
C.M. also attested that Sims sent text messages to Sieleman threatening to accuse C.M. of
kidnapping and driving while intoxicated, without any evidence or support. Sims then
repeatedly contacted C.M.’s employer (in person, by phone, and by email) and falsely
accused C.M. of the same crimes, threatened to report C.M. to the California State Bar,1
and requested that the employer present C.M. for questioning by Sims. Sims also
emailed C.M. directly, asking whether she would submit to questioning by Sims and
stating that Sims would appear at her house with a “‘public authority.’” In addition, Sims
1 C.M. is a lawyer. 2
posted her accusations against C.M. on Facebook, named C.M.’s mother in the post, and
pleaded with C.M.’s mother to “talk some sense into” C.M. C.M. submitted
documentary evidence of the various messages and emails and the Facebook post. She
attested that Sims’s actions had caused her severe emotional distress and anxiety; C.M.
could not sleep, had difficulty focusing at work, and was concerned about her job.
Sims filed a response and testified at the hearing on C.M.’s application. Sims said
that she did not intend to harm C.M. and that she merely wanted an investigation into
C.M.’s and Sieleman’s conduct in order to protect her own daughter.
In March 2023, the court granted C.M.’s request for a civil harassment restraining
order against Sims. The restraining order protected C.M. for one year.
C.M. applied to renew the restraining order in March 2024, just before the order
expired. C.M.’s declaration in support of the renewal application described the earlier
incidents supporting the one-year restraining order. In addition, she attested to more
communications that occurred from May 2023 to March 2024, and she submitted
documentary evidence of those communications. For instance, Sims sent a text message
to Sieleman calling C.M. “dishonest, sick, selfish, [and] evil” and stating that Sims would
“never stop working to protect” herself and her daughter from C.M. Sims sent other text
messages to Sieleman accusing C.M. of lying and child abuse, stating that C.M. and
Sieleman would “‘pay dearly,’” and threatening to have C.M. disbarred. Sims also
emailed C.M.’s employer again, accusing C.M. of crimes and calling on public officials
to stop the crimes. And Sims again posted about C.M. on Facebook; the public post
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accused C.M. of manipulating and “mentally abus[ing]” Sims’s daughter. Most recently,
Sims sent Sieleman a text message in March 2024, stating: “Restraining order is lifted in
about a month[.] The lies she told to get the order, in retaliation, will be turned around
against her.” The message further stated that C.M. “exposed and hurting” was “the
course for correction” and that C.M. was “an unethical lawyer . . . who will be found in
contempt and pay dearly for her deeds.”
C.M. declared that Sims’s accusations continue to be false and that despite all of
the accusations, C.M. has never been arrested, charged with a crime, or convicted of any
crime. C.M. feared for her safety and was concerned that Sims appeared to be “counting
down how much time remains in the initial restraining order.”
Sims filed a response to C.M.’s application to renew the restraining order. The
trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the renewal application. The tentative ruling
observed that the majority of Sims’s response concerned the propriety of the initial
restraining order, but Sims never appealed from that order. The tentative ruling
concluded that C.M. had presented sufficient evidence that Sims continued to indirectly
contact C.M. through Sieleman and C.M.’s employer, knowing that C.M. would read the
messages or be told about them. The tentative ruling also rejected Sims’s argument that
the First Amendment protected her speech, because her messages concerned private
matters and were not constitutionally protected or immune from civil restraining orders.
4
At the hearing in May 2024, the court adopted its tentative ruling and granted
C.M.’s application to renew the restraining order. The court found evidence of a
reoccurring pattern of abuse and harassment by Sims, including emails, Facebook posts,
and other communications with third parties that were intended as indirect contact with
C.M. The court further found that C.M.’s expressed concern and fear of future
harassment were genuine and reasonable, and there was a reasonable probability that
Sims’s wrongful acts would be repeated in the future. The court renewed the restraining
order for five years.
DISCUSSION
Sims challenges the initial restraining order on procedural grounds and raises
several arguments about the evidence supporting the renewed restraining order. Her
arguments lack merit.
Section 527.6 provides that the trial court must issue a restraining order if the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the requesting party has suffered
harassment. (Id., subds. (a), (i).) The statute defines harassment as “a credible threat of
violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that
seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.
The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to
the petitioner.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).)
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The court may renew a civil harassment restraining order for an additional five
years “without a showing of any further harassment since the issuance of the original
order.” (§ 527.6, subd. (j)(1).) Section 527.6 thus “grants the trial court discretion to
renew a restraining order based on its review of the record of the past harassment
underlying the original issuance of the restraining order and without the protected party
presenting any new evidence.” (Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 91
(Cooper).) Still, the court should renew the restraining order only if it finds a
“reasonable probability” that the restrained party would repeat the past wrongful acts in
the future. (Id. at p. 90.)
We review the court’s decision to renew a restraining order for abuse of discretion.
(Cooper, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 89.) We review for substantial evidence the
court’s express and implied factual findings underlying the restraining order. (R.D. v.
P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.) “We resolve all factual conflicts and questions
of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable
inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence
which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232
Cal.App.3d 755, 762.)
Sims argues that the court violated her right to due process in connection with the
initial restraining order by considering evidence that C.M. submitted one day before the
hearing. Sims did not appeal from the initial restraining order. That order is now final,
6
and she cannot bring challenges to the initial order on appeal from the renewed order.
(Cooper, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 92.)
Sims’s other arguments do not show that the court abused its discretion by
granting the renewed restraining order or that substantial evidence does not support the
court’s factual findings. C.M. was not required to show any further harassment since the
issuance of the initial restraining order, but she nevertheless presented ample evidence of
further harassment. Sims continued to contact C.M.’s employer to accuse C.M. of
criminal conduct and continued to send messages to Sieleman, saying that C.M. would
“pay dearly for her deeds” and would be “exposed and hurting.” And Sims indicated that
C.M. would face retaliation when the initial restraining order expired. All of that
constitutes substantial evidence that there was a reasonable probability that Sims would
repeat her wrongful acts in the future.
Sims argues that there was no evidence that she intended to harass C.M. and that
her messages were intended to protect her daughter and resolve issues with her coparent.
Again, section 527.6 did not require C.M. to show any further harassment in order to
secure a renewed restraining order. But even if section 527.6 required such a showing,
the statute does not require an intent to harass. Rather, the statute requires “a knowing
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys,
or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).)
7
To the extent that Sims is arguing that her messages to Sieleman and C.M.’s
employer had a legitimate purpose, the court could reasonably conclude that they had no
such purpose. Sims does not explain how statements threatening C.M.—namely, that
C.M. would pay dearly for her deeds or that C.M. would be exposed and hurting—
protected Sims’s daughter or would resolve coparenting issues. The same is true with
respect to the messages to C.M.’s employer. Sims contacted the employer to accuse
C.M. even after the employer responded in March 2023 and asked her to “direct [her]
efforts” to “an alternative forum,” like “law enforcement, child protective services, and/or
the Court system.” The employer also told Sims that continuing to contact them would
“not produce the results it appears you are seeking.” Sims does not explain how
repeatedly contacting C.M.’s employer and accusing C.M. of crimes served a legitimate
purpose, especially after the employer asked Sims to stop contacting them.
Moreover, to the extent that Sims argues that messages to third parties cannot
support the restraining order, she is incorrect. Harassing conduct may be “directed at a
specific person” (id., subd. (b)(3)) even if the restrained party did not actually contact that
specific person. It is sufficient if the restrained party sends messages knowing that they
would be discovered or read by the protected party. (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 1400, 1405, 1411, 1413 [the evidence showed that the defendant knew that
the plaintiff would search for and read letters sent to the plaintiff’s daughter, so those
letters were sufficient to show a harassing course of conduct directed at the plaintiff];
cf. People v. Planchard (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 157, 165-166, 168-169 [under the
8
materially similar definition of harassment in Pen. Code, § 649.6, subd. (e), direct contact
is not required, and the evidence need only show that the nature of the conduct “makes it
reasonably foreseeable that the victim would become aware of it”].) The court could
reasonably conclude that Sims knew that the messages sent to C.M.’s romantic partner
and C.M.’s employer would reach C.M. And according to C.M.’s declaration in support
of the application to renew the restraining order, Sieleman and C.M.’s employer did share
the messages with her.
Sims lastly argues that C.M. made “false sworn statements.” Specifically, she
suggests that C.M. falsely stated that Sims contacted C.M. directly while the initial
restraining order was in effect. C.M.’s declaration in support of the renewal application
stated that Sims sent text messages, emails, and voicemails “to various individuals,”
including Sieleman, C.M., and C.M.’s employer. But that was in the section of the
declaration describing the conduct that occurred before issuance of the initial restraining
order. The declaration went on to describe incidents that occurred later, while the
restraining order was in effect. Nothing in the declaration indicates that Sims contacted
C.M. directly while the restraining order was in effect. The record thus does not support
Sims’s assertion that C.M. made false statements to that effect.2
2 Sims filed a document entitled “additional citings and oral argument statement of Emily Brinton Sims.” (Capitalization omitted.) She asserts that the filing falls under rule 8.254 of the California Rules of Court. That rule permits a party to submit a letter informing this court of new authority if the party “learns of significant new authority . . . that was not available in time to be included in the last brief that the party filed or could [footnote continued on next page]
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. C.M. shall recover her costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
FIELDS J.
have filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.254(a).) The letter may cite the new authority but may not discuss the authority or make arguments. (Id., rule 8.254(b).)
Sims’s filing does not cite any new authority that was unavailable when she filed her reply brief on appeal, and we decline to consider the arguments that she improperly raises in the filing. She also appears to request that we take judicial notice of her response to the request to renew the restraining order. We deny that request, because the document is already part of the record on appeal. 10
AI Brief
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Holding. The court affirmed the five-year renewal of a civil harassment restraining order, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining there was a reasonable probability the appellant would repeat her wrongful acts.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in renewing a civil harassment restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.
Whether the appellant could challenge the initial restraining order on appeal from the renewal order.
Whether the appellant's conduct toward third parties constituted a course of conduct directed at the respondent.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court may renew a civil harassment restraining order for an additional five years “without a showing of any further harassment since the issuance of the original order.””
“We review the court’s decision to renew a restraining order for abuse of discretion.”
“Harassing conduct may be “directed at a specific person” (id., subd. (b)(3)) even if the restrained party did not actually contact that specific person.”