De Smidt v. Nationstar Mortgage CA4/2 (2025) · DecisionDepot
De Smidt v. Nationstar Mortgage CA4/2
California Court of Appeal May 21, 2025 No. E083812Unpublished
Filed 5/21/25 De Smidt v. Nationstar Mortgage CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CAMERON DE SMIDT,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E083812
v. (Super. Ct. No. CVSW2109381)
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Angel M. Bermudez,
Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Ronald H. Freshman, and Ronald Henry Freshman for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders, Justin D. Balser, Katalina Baumann, and E.
Christine Hehir for Defendants and Respondents Nationstar Mortgage LLC, Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and Federal National Mortgage Association.
Severson & Werson, Elizabeth C. Farrell, and Jan T. Chilton for Defendants and
Respondents Bank of America, N.A. and Recontrust Company N.A.
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Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss and Edward A. Treder for Defendant and
Civ. Proc. § 367.) Because the bankruptcy trustee has not abandoned the claims that De
Smidt acknowledges belong to the bankruptcy estate (all his claims except the wrongful
eviction claim), he lacks standing to pursue them.
Although De Smidt contends he has standing to pursue his wrongful eviction
claim, we disagree. De Smidt argues this claim does not belong to the bankruptcy estate
because it arose in November 2020, after the discharge was entered.
We rejected a similar claim in De Smidt I. There, De Smidt argued “one of his
claims, his cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, falls outside of the bankruptcy estate
because it accrued after he was granted a discharge and therefore constitutes a ‘new
harm.’” (De Smidt I, supra, E069887.) We disagreed, noting that long-standing
California law holds that “even when the allegedly improper foreclosure sale occurs after
the filing of a bankruptcy petition and creation of the bankruptcy estate, the attendant
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wrongful foreclosure claim remains part of the estate because it constitutes an ‘interest in
property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case,’ as well as a
‘product [or] offspring . . . of . . . property of the estate.’” (Ibid., quoting Bostanian v.
Liberty Savings Bank, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1083-1084.) We thus concluded that
De Smidt’s wrongful foreclosure claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate, so he lacked
standing to pursue it. (Ibid.)
The same is true here with regard to De Smidt’s wrongful eviction claim.
Although it arose in 2020, after he was granted a discharge, the claim constitutes an
“‘interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case,’” as
well as a “‘product [or] offspring . . . of . . . property of the estate.’” (Bostanian v. Liberty
Savings Bank, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1083-1084, citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) &
(7).)
In short, the trial court correctly found that De Smidt lacks standing to pursue any
of his claims in this case. The trial court, therefore, properly sustained respondents’
demurrers without leave to amend. (See Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 119, 128 [“A litigant’s standing to sue is a
threshold issue to be resolved before the matter can be reached on its merits.”].) We
therefore affirm the judgment for respondents.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents may recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his claims because they belonged to his bankruptcy estate, as the bankruptcy trustee had not abandoned them.
Issues
Whether a chapter 7 debtor has standing to pursue claims related to property that became part of the bankruptcy estate.
Whether a wrongful eviction claim arising post-discharge constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The widely accepted rule is that after a person files for bankruptcy protection, any causes of action previously possessed by that person become the property of the bankrupt estate.”
“A litigant’s standing to sue is a threshold issue to be resolved before the matter can be reached on its merits.”
“the trial court correctly found that De Smidt lacks standing to pursue any of his claims in this case.”