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In re B.L. (2025) · DecisionDepot
/ California Court of Appeal In re B.L. Published Filed 5/14/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re B.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E085039 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J301822)
v. OPINION
A.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Dawn M. Martin, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant A.L. (Mother) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the juvenile court’s decision to assume dependency jurisdiction over her one-
year-old daughter, Minor (Minor), after Mother’s single-vehicle drunk driving accident in
which the child suffered a severe brain injury. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b)(1),
(e).)1 Mother also contends the court abused its discretion in requiring monitored
visitation. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court issued exit orders to close the
dependency and transfer the matter to the family court, with sole custody vested with
More from California Court of Appeal Source: opinion data from the Free Law Project / CourtListener (public-domain court records). DecisionDepot is for informational use only and is not legal advice — verify against the official reporter before relying on any text or AI-generated summary.
S.L., Minor’s father (Father), which Mother does not challenge. For the reasons we
explain post, we find no error in the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding or its
monitored visitation requirement. We therefore affirm the contested rulings.
BACKGROUND After consuming at a party what she described as “some drinks throughout the
day,” Mother then drove towards a curve in the road at speeds of 65 to 70 miles an hour,
as estimated by a nearby motorist. She made no apparent effort to slow down or navigate
the turn in the dark. Mother drove off the roadway and struck a utility pole. She had just
passed the motorist in the right lane on a two-lane city street as it became one lane. The
motorist turned around and came back to the scene to find Mother attempting “to put the
baby,” then 10-month-old Minor, “back into the car seat” inside her vehicle.
Mother told the motorist not to summon help, directing him “not to call the
police.” Her stated reason was that “she did not want her child to be taken away.” While
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
the motorist was on the call, Mother requested several times that he terminate it and,
when he did not, she requested the phone to speak with the emergency services
dispatcher. The motorist gave Mother the phone and she disconnected the call. The
An officer responded to the scene. The officer noticed Mother’s bloodshot, watery
eyes, her confused speech, and a “strong” odor of alcohol in her presence. She “denied
having consumed any alcohol.” Mother’s statements attempting to describe what
happened “were confusing and incoherent.” She admitted to “feeling the effects of”
alcohol. She failed multiple field sobriety tests.
With minor abrasions and superficial lacerations to her arms and legs, Mother was
transported to Desert Valley Medical Center, along with Minor. Upon being examined
there, Minor was airlifted to Loma Linda Children’s Hospital. Father had been notified,
and he accompanied Minor on the flight. A CT scan at the hospital revealed Minor
suffered a brain bleed due to the collision.
Transported to the Hesperia police station and interviewed by police after being
advised of her Miranda rights, Mother asserted she consumed only two beers at the
party—each totaling about two ounces—for a total of four ounces. She did not drink any
liquor. Earlier at the scene, she claimed she had stopped drinking alcohol more than
three hours before she crashed.
Mother elected a blood draw under the implied consent law instead of a breath test
for blood-alcohol content (BAC) analysis. She was arrested the same evening as the
crash for cruelty to a child (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), inflicting great bodily injury
while driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), and on suspicion of
causing great bodily injury while driving under the influence with a BAC greater than .08
Acting on an immediate response referral, a social worker went to the hospital the
next day. Minor was in a neck brace and crying while a nurse attended to her. Father
was at her bedside to care for her. Father lived with Mother, who also cared for Father’s
two other children, ages six and seven years old. He had not had prior concerns about
Mother’s drinking, but indicated he would remove all alcohol from the home and
reported, “ ‘[T]his will never happen again.’ ” Mother declined to speak with the social
worker, stating only that she had been at a gathering.
Three days after the accident, plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County
Children and Family Services (CFS) filed a petition alleging Minor was in need of the
juvenile court’s dependency protection. The juvenile court found a prima facie basis for
the petition the next day at the detention hearing; Minor remained in the hospital, and
Minor was released to foster care on September 4, 2024, after being in the hospital
for almost three weeks for her brain bleed. The accident caused “bilateral subdural
hematomas and intraparenchymal hemorrhag[ing] in the corpus callosum.” As a result,
she had to have “a surgical procedure to relieve intracranial pressure.” Her doctor
reported that she responded well to treatment, with her bleeding and swelling subsiding.
Minor’s prognosis did not call for further special care at the time, but she would have
follow-up appointments for an MRI and physical therapy.
CFS met with both Mother and Father, separately, in advance of the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing. Mother’s version of the accident was now that she hit a speed
bump in the roadway, dislodging her water bottle, which fell under the brake pedal; she
lost control of her vehicle when she reached for the bottle. According to Mother, she was
knocked out briefly during the accident, regaining consciousness after the police arrived.
Reminded that she had asked the motorist who stopped not to call for help, Mother said
she did not remember that. Mother felt “ ‘horrible’ that she caused her child’s severe
injuries that could have killed her, but it was an accident.” She felt “ ‘lost without’ her
Father no longer had contact with Mother; he “d[id] not wish her anything bad,”
but told the social worker he would “not allow her to harm his ‘baby ever again.’ ” Their
relationship was “over” and he had her move out. She had “always been a loving and
dedicated mother,” so he initially found it “hard to believe that she made the decision to
drive if she was under the influence of alcohol.” But “seeing his daughter suffering,
having to have surgery, and be in pain and risk of dying due to [M]other’s poor choices
. . . made him make the decision to leave [her] and focus on caring for [Minor].”
The child’s maternal grandmother reported that Mother did not have a substance
abuse problem. She described the accident as “an isolated incident that unfortunately
ended up causing harm to the child,” but for which, in her view, Mother “does not
deserve to have her child taken from her.”
CFS was informed by the sheriff’s department that the blood test result remained
pending and could take up to eight months to process. While Father had missed an initial
drug test when Minor was in the hospital because he did not want to leave her side, he
tested negative thereafter, and CFS had no further concerns. CFS recommended that the
juvenile court remove Minor from Mother’s legal custody and place her in Father’s sole
custody with family maintenance services, and no reunification services for Mother. The
juvenile court ordered placement with Father and continued the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing from early September to October, and then to November.
CFS’s update for the hearing reflected that Minor was recovering well, with no
impairments observed; she was crawling, standing, and holding onto furniture as she
ventured towards walking. An MRI was scheduled soon, but her medical team found
physical therapy unnecessary. Father was attentive to Minor, provided well for her, she
was bonded to him, and he ensured her safety and continuing medical care.
Mother progressed well in her case plan requirements. The social worker reported
that Mother “complied with the case plan and participated in parenting classes, individual
counseling, substance abuse testing, and substance abuse counseling.” Mother reported
she “‘learned a lot,’ from the parenting education class” and “has learned to be
accountable for her actions.” Mother “shared that she has learned no[t] . . . to store away
her feelings, and has been taking the time to really reflect, and make changes in her life
and make the necessary changes to become a better person, and a better . . . mother.”
Mother “learned how substance abuse can ‘change your life in an instant’ and [that] has
helped her realize ‘what a beautiful life’ she had with her family, and she does not want to
hurt anyone that she loves again.” Mother’s drug and alcohol tests continued to be
negative, and her visits with Minor were positive: she engaged with Minor and was
CFS continued to recommend that sole physical and legal custody of Minor be
vested with Father, removing her from Mother’s custody. CFS also recommended that
“[the] dependency [be] dismissed” and the matter transferred to family court, with a new
case number assigned there upon the juvenile court clerk filing said custody order. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.475.)
At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court assumed
dependency jurisdiction over Minor on two grounds under section 300—under both
subdivision (b) [failure to protect] and subdivision (e) [severe physical abuse]. The court
explained as to the subdivision (e) basis in particular: “I do believe that the child suffered
serious bodily harm as a result of Mom’s severe physical abuse, and that physical abuse
is, basically, the act of her getting into the car under the influence causing a car accident
and [her] responsibilit[y] for that having resulted in severe injury to the child.”
The court indicated that, were it to maintain jurisdiction, it would not bypass
reunification services for Mother. The court praised Mother’s “genuine and sincere”
progress “in the predisposition services.”
The court, however, determined that ongoing dependency jurisdiction was not
necessary, electing instead to issue exit orders to transition the matter to family court.
The court found “the arguments made by County Counsel and Minor’s counsel are
correct as far as the appropriate family law order.” Minor’s counsel summarized that
following initial dependency jurisdiction to vest custody with Father, transfer would be
“appropriate” for the family court to supervise Mother’s potential progress towards
regaining custody. Minor’s counsel argued, “[T]here needs to be more time for Mother to
demonstrate her sobriety [because less than three months since the accident] has not been
a significant period of time . . . to transition to unsupervised visits and have joint legal
and joint physical custody.”
Counsel for the county, like the court, acknowledged Mother’s progress, including
as reflected in a third-party psychological examination that Mother arranged, with
positive results showing Mother “is remorseful” and had improved her “understanding”
concerning how “her conduct . . . led to [Minor’s] injuries.” This was “consistent with
what the Department saw in Mother’s participation with the case plan” leading up to the
hearing. Nevertheless, the deputy county counsel emphasized especially “in regards to
the (e) allegation” the severity of Minor’s brain injury and the gravity of Mother’s choice
to “put her 10-month-old child in the car with her.” CFS thus sought, upon the court
taking jurisdiction, a disposition vesting “sole custody to [Father] . . . and that Mother’s
visits are supervised.” The custody ruling would then be filed in family court to open
proceedings there as the initial “family law order.” The court entered the order as
requested (“so I’ll sign that”).
DISCUSSION Mother contends the juvenile court erred in taking dependency jurisdiction over
Minor and by ordering that her visitation with Minor be monitored. The court did not err.
“ ‘ “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, supports them. ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ [Citation.] ‘We
do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if
there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’ ” ’ ” (In re L.O. (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238, quoting In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over Minor under
subdivisions (b) and (e) of section 300. Subdivision (b) provides for jurisdiction when
“[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . : [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s
parent . . . to adequately . . . protect the child” or “(D) The inability of the parent . . . to
provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . substance abuse.”
Subdivision (e) separately authorizes jurisdiction when “[t]he child is under five
years of age and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent.” The statute continues:
“For the purposes of this subdivision, ‘severe physical abuse’ means any of the following:
any single act of abuse that causes physical trauma of sufficient severity that, if left
untreated, would cause permanent physical disfigurement, permanent physical disability,
or death.” (Italics added.)
Mother only challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under
section 300, subdivision (b). She does not cite, quote, or otherwise address
subdivision (e) to contest the court’s decision to assume jurisdiction on that ground. This
omission has ramifications, as we discuss below. As to subdivision (b), Mother argues:
“A look at three cases clearly illustrates that it takes more than a one-time incident
involving alcohol to sustain jurisdiction under section 300(b).” The three cases Mother
relies on are In re Gilberto G. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 52, 63, In re B.T. (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 685, 693-694, and In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 210, 1025-1026
Mother’s summary of J.N., as “perhaps the closest on point” of these cases,
encapsulates her argument against jurisdiction based on a single incident. There, as
recounted by Mother, “the parents of some young children . . . went out for pizza and
beer [and] had too much of the latter . . . . On the way home, the father was driving” and,
like Mother here, “he, too, ran into a utility pole. The children were slightly injured and
he (and the mother) were arrested on various charges including felony child
endangerment and, for the father, felony drunk driving with a blood alcohol reading of
.20.” Mother sees J.N. as analogous because “[b]y the time of the jurisdiction hearing,
both parents had shown a strong commitment to sober living, had complete[d] alcohol
education programs, [and] consistently tested negative for drugs and alcohol. The Court
of Appeal found no basis to sustain jurisdiction base[d] on this one-time abuse of
alcohol.” (Italics added.) Mother contends the same result is required here, including
because “[t]here was some evidence” in J.N. “of . . . prior use of alcohol but no evidence
of any prior instances of alcohol abuse.” She also adds, “Of interest to note is that the
jurisdiction hearing in that case, like this one, was held about two/three months after the
Mother’s jurisdictional challenge fails for multiple reasons. First, Mother’s failure
to contest jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (e) is fatal. Dependency
“jurisdiction may rest on a single ground.” (D.M. v. Superior Court (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1127 [“ ‘Any child who comes within any of the following
descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,’” italics added]; see § 300,
[¶] 1.) An appealable order is presumed correct until shown otherwise—it is the
appellant’s obligation to raise claims constituting reversible error. (In re Sade C. (1996)
13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) Thus, absent any challenge directed at the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional finding under subdivision (e), it stands as an alternate, independently
sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
Second, even assuming arguendo Mother intended her appellate arguments
directed at section 300, subdivision (b), to also contest jurisdiction under subdivision (e),
they are without merit. This is plainly so regarding her single-incident-is-not-enough
contention. By its terms, section 300, subdivision (e), expressly provides for jurisdiction
in “single act” instances, at least where the parent “causes physical trauma of sufficient
severity that, if left untreated, would cause permanent physical disfigurement, permanent
physical disability, or death.” Mother does not dispute that Minor’s brain bleed met this
standard. In contrast to Minor’s brain trauma requiring surgery, the cases on which
Mother relies to dispute single-act jurisdiction, like J.N., all involved minor injuries and
jurisdiction found only under subdivision (b), not (e). They are therefore inapposite.
Mother’s other argument challenging jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b) is also unavailing when considered with respect to subdivision (e).
Specifically, Mother argues that her rehabilitative efforts meant dependency court
protection was not necessary by the date of the jurisdictional hearing. (Citing In re M.D.
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 848 [“ ‘The relevant inquiry under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing
“ ‘subject the Minor to the defined risk of harm’ ” ’ ”].) This principle that there must be
an ongoing, present risk of harm does not aid Mother, whether directed against
jurisdiction under subdivision (b) or (e).
As explained in In re M.D.,“the juvenile court may consider past events when
determining whether a child presently needs its protection” because “ ‘[e]vidence of past
conduct may be probative of current conditions.’ ” (In re M.D., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 848-849.) “ ‘To establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there
“must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will
Here, while Mother’s progress in her case plan and continuing efforts, including
securing an outside psychological evaluation, are laudable, the juvenile court could
reasonably conclude more time was needed, given Mother’s active efforts at concealing
her child endangerment, to Minor’s potentially fatal detriment. Mother likens her
progress to that of the parents in J.N. by the jurisdiction hearing there, which was two to
three months after the father’s car accident while driving under the influence, a similar
time frame here. (See J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1014-1015.)
The J.N. parents, however, did not start from the same depths as Mother, in terms
of the severity of harm Mother caused Minor and the grossly compounded degree of risk
in her repeated actions at the scene. At the scene, she attempted to end a Good
Samaritan’s assistance, obtained his phone by deceit, and then terminated the call to
emergency services. Time was precious for Minor with a brain bleed. The evidence
indicates Mother’s accident was severe, much more so than the one in J.N. Traveling at
65 to 70 miles per hour with her child in the car, she did not brake or turn for a curve
before striking the utility pole. The juvenile court reasonably could find Mother’s
account of the accident lacked credibility. The evidence also showed Mother’s poor
judgment in driving while impaired was compounded dangerously by sustained efforts to
hide her actions and prevent emergency response after a serious accident. This tendency
towards secrecy posed a severe risk to Minor. Intervention and supervision were thus all
the more imperative. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude jurisdiction was
necessary for Mother to make sure—as Father had said—that she would never “allow
her[self] to harm h[er] ‘baby ever again.’ ” Mother echoed this objective; the juvenile
court could simply and reasonably conclude that more time than just two months of court
jurisdiction and supervision was a necessary safeguard.
The same evidence supporting jurisdiction supports the juvenile court’s
determination that monitored visitation was necessary. “The power to regulate visits
between dependent children and their parents rests with the juvenile court and its
visitation orders will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (In re
D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070; see In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d
752, 757 [the “court may, of course, impose any . . . conditions or requirements to further
define the right to visitation in light of the particular circumstances of the case before
it”].) Given, in particular, Mother’s tendency towards concealment at the worst time for
Minor’s safety, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering monitored
visitation so soon after the accident. Mother, of course, may seek in the family court
adjustment of the restrictions on her visitation and custody, as she demonstrates sustained
sobriety and insight into protecting Minor.
DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and monitored visitation requirement
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MILLER J.
FIELDS J. AI-generated · verify before citing Holding. The juvenile court properly assumed dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (e), and did not abuse its discretion in ordering monitored visitation given the severity of the child's injuries and the mother's attempts to conceal the incident. Because the mother failed to challenge the subdivision (e) finding, that independent ground for jurisdiction remained valid.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court erred in assuming dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (e). Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in requiring monitored visitation for the mother. Disposition. Affirmed
“Dependency “jurisdiction may rest on a single ground.”” “By its terms, section 300, subdivision (e), expressly provides for jurisdiction in “single act” instances” “The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering monitored visitation so soon after the accident.”