Wattar v. Palmdale School Dist. CA2/2
Filed 10/4/13 Wattar v. Palmdale School Dist. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
NIZAM I. WATTAR, B242050
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MC022442) v.
PALMDALE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Brian C. Yep, Judge. Affirmed.
Nizam I. Wattar, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carpenter, Rothans & Dumont, Justin Reade Sarno, Louis R. Dumont for Defendant and Respondent.
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The trial court dismissed the lawsuit of Nizam Wattar after finding that she failed to make a timely claim against the Palmdale School District under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.).1 We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Complaint: Judgment on the Pleadings Plaintiff Wattar worked at defendant Palmdale School District (PSD), starting in 2000. She is a naturalized American citizen of Lebanese extraction. Wattar received worker’s compensation benefits in 2003 and again in May 2005. She was cleared to return to work on November 10, 2006. PSD denied Wattar a job and took the position that she had resigned. She filed suit against PSD on March 23, 2011, alleging discrimination based on her national origin. PSD answered the complaint, alleging (among other things) that Wattar’s suit is time-barred and that she failed to comply with Government Claims Act (GCA) provisions. PSD brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting that Wattar failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a timely claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). PSD reasoned that without a right-to-sue letter, the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed. Wattar responded that she is proceeding under the state Constitution, not under FEHA.2 PSD countered that if Wattar is not proceeding under FEHA, she was required to make a timely claim under the GCA. On August 4, 2011, the trial court granted PSD’s motion, but gave Wattar leave to amend her pleading.
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