California Court of Appeal Sep 13, 2013 No. E055976Unpublished
Filed 9/13/13 In re S.P. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re S.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E055976 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J23826) v. OPINION S.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Thomas S. Garza,
Judge. Affirmed with directions.
David L. Annicchiarico, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Charles C.
Ragland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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S.P., a minor, appeals after he was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court for
possession of metal knuckles. He contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. He further contends that,
even if the adjudication was proper, two of the conditions of his probation are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We agree that one of the probation conditions
should be modified to include a knowledge requirement. Otherwise, however, we affirm.
picnic tables, restrooms), and that he and his companions might have gone to the park for
any number of reasons. However, none of the young men were carrying anything visible
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such as bats, racquets, skateboards, picnic coolers, basketballs, or anything else to
indicate that they had any reason to be at the park, other than to participate in the fight.
The timing of their arrival and apparent purposefulness in approaching the impending
altercation were sufficiently reasonable, articulable circumstances to justify a brief
detention. (See, e.g., People v. Lindsey (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1401 [Tip from
911 caller reported a shot fired in apartment complex, and described the shooter. The
officer responded within minutes, and saw the defendant, matching the description of the
shooter, and holding his waistband in a peculiar manner, as if a heavy object were
concealed there. This was sufficiently reasonable suspicion, under the totality of the
circumstances, to support a detention and patsearch of the defendant, i.e., that the
defendant had been involved in criminal activity and was presently armed and
dangerous.].)
C. The Patdown Search Was Proper
Law enforcement officers may conduct a patdown search incident to a detention
only under certain conditions. An officer may conduct a patdown search to determine if a
person is carrying a weapon after the officer observes suspicious behavior—prompting a
reasonable suspicion—that the person is armed and dangerous to the officer or others.
(Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 24 [88 S.Ct. 1868; 20 L.Ed.2d 889] (Terry).) The
officer’s patdown search—the “frisk”—was “ ‘only a “frisk” for a dangerous weapon. It
by no means authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in
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the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled by the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is essential.’ ” (Terry,
supra, 392 U.S. 1, at p. 16, fn. 12 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 903, fn. 12].) The California
Supreme Court has also unanimously so held. (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156,
161 [patdown search “only” for weapons]; accord People v. Garcia (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 782, 788.)
Here, Officer Nelson had good reason to suspect that one or more of the young
men was armed and presented a physical danger to himself or others. Until backup
arrived, he and the campus officers were outnumbered. The young men, including the
minor, had spent time at the back of the car, appearing to reach for something in the
trunk. Given their approach as a group to the brewing fight, as well as the lack of
anything visible in their hands, it was reasonable to suspect that one or more of the young
men had secreted a weapon on his person. The timing of their arrival and their calling
out to others who appeared to be ready to fight justified the suspicion that they were
armed. Under the totality of the circumstances, the safety of the officers, students in the
area, and other bystanders was a genuine concern, justifying Officer Nelson’s direction to
have school officer Rojas pat the minor down for weapons. A reasonably prudent person
in such circumstances would be warranted in the belief that the brief search was
necessary for the safety of the officers and others. (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. 1, at p. 27.)
The evidence discovered in the minor’s pocket (a weapon, metal knuckles) was not the
result of an unlawful search or seizure. The trial court properly denied the minor’s
motion to suppress the evidence.
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II. One of the Minor’s Probation Conditions Should Be Modified to Include a
Knowledge Requirement
The minor contends that two of his probation conditions, condition 2 and
condition 14, are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Condition 2 required the
minor to “Obey parents, responsible adults and the probation officer . . . .” Condition 14
mandated that the minor “Not possess any dangerous or deadly weapons, including but
not limited to any knife, gun, or any part thereof, ammunition, blackjack, bicycle chain,
dagger or any weapon or explosive substance or device as defined in Penal Code section
12020 and/or Penal Code section 626.10.”
A juvenile court has broad discretion in selecting and imposing probation
conditions for the purpose of rehabilitating a minor. (In re Josh W. (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Generally, in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion, the
court’s orders will not be disturbed on appeal. (Ibid.) However, the claim that a
probation condition is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad presents a question of law,
which the appellate court reviews independently. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
888.) Because of the rehabilitative function of the juvenile court, a probation condition
that might be improper or unconstitutional as to an adult, may nevertheless be permissible
as to a ward of the court. (Id. at p. 889.)
Here, the juvenile court placed the minor in the custody of his mother, upon terms
and conditions of probation, including the requirement that he “Obey parents, responsible
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adults and the probation officer and cooperate in a plan of rehabilitation.” The minor
complains that the order that he “Obey . . . responsible adults . . . ,” is impermissibly
vague and overbroad, because it does not define the term “responsible.” He contends that
this term is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect his right to due process, i.e.,
notice of what is required to avoid violation. He also maintains that only “persistent
disobedience” should constitute a violation of the probation condition.
We disagree. The term “responsible adult,” when read in context, reasonably
identifies those adults who are responsible in some way for the minor’s care, guidance or
supervision, such as a parent, guardian, custodian, probation officer, or teacher.
Manifestly, the minor is not required to obey the directions of all persons over the age of
18. The term “responsible adult” reasonably limits the class of persons whom the minor
must obey. The minor’s suggestion that the probation condition should be modeled on
Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 [persistent or habitual refusal to obey
reasonable and proper orders of a parent, guardian or custodian is a basis to find a minor
to be a ward of the court] is without merit. Persistent or habitual disobedience is one
basis for imposing wardship; proof of persistent or habitual disobedience is therefore
required to establish the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in the first instance. Once
wardship has been established, however, the focus becomes the reform and rehabilitation
of the minor. (See, e.g., In re D.G. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 47, 52.) The minor has
already been adjudged a ward of the court; his history shows both law violations and past
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violations of probation. His disobedience to persons exercising lawful control and
supervision over him need not be repeated, persistent, or habitual to constitute a violation
of his current probation. The minor does not have license to disobey his parents,
teachers, or probation officer, so long as he does so only occasionally or once in a while.
Probation condition 2 was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
Probation condition 14 prohibited the minor from possessing dangerous or deadly
weapons: the minor must “Not possess any dangerous or deadly weapons, including but
not limited to any knife, gun, or any part thereof, ammunition, blackjack, bicycle chain,
dagger or any weapon or explosive substance or device as defined in Penal Code section
12020 and/or Penal Code section 626.10.”
The minor contends that this condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad
in two distinct ways. First, he argues that the condition must be subject to a knowledge
requirement, i.e., that he must not knowingly possess any dangerous or deadly weapons.
Second, he claims the condition is overbroad because it “proscribes [his] possession of
everyday items, such as a bicycle chain . . . , without narrowly tailoring the condition to
require that he is only in violation if he intended to use the everyday item in an unlawful
manner.” He further maintains that, “it is beyond dispute that there is nothing improper
about a boy owning and riding a bicycle.”
As to the knowledge requirement, the minor is correct. The condition should be
modified to require that the minor “Not knowingly possess any dangerous or deadly
weapons . . . .” (People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 751-752.) The People
concede the point.
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As to the prohibition of “everyday items,” we begin by observing that a probation
“condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor
those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as
unconstitutionally overbroad.” (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) The minor
is generally correct that there is nothing improper in a boy owning or riding a bicycle,
but, as the People point out, there is no constitutional right at stake in prohibiting a minor
from possessing a bicycle chain. The probation condition is also reasonably tailored to
the purpose of the condition. Here, the minor was found in possession of metal knuckles
on his way to a fight. A bicycle chain may not be a dangerous or deadly weapon when it
is a component of a functioning bicycle, but if it is removed from the bicycle, it certainly
can be. The inclusion of a bicycle chain on the list of prohibited weapons is reasonable in
light of the offense, and is neither overbroad nor vague. The minor does not suggest any
other “everyday item” he finds objectionable, aside from a bicycle chain.
We shall order probation condition 14 modified to include a knowledge
requirement, but otherwise affirm.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court properly denied the minor’s motion to suppress evidence.
We direct that probation condition 14 be modified to read that the minor shall
“Not knowingly possess any dangerous or deadly weapons, including but not limited to
any knife, gun, or any part thereof, ammunition, blackjack, bicycle chain, dagger or any
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weapon or explosive substance or device as defined in Penal Code section 12020 and/or
Penal Code section 626.10.”
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MCKINSTER J. We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the detention and patdown search of the minor were lawful under the Fourth Amendment, but ordered the modification of a probation condition to include an express knowledge requirement.
Issues
Did the juvenile court err in denying the motion to suppress evidence?
Are the probation conditions requiring the minor to obey responsible adults and prohibiting the possession of weapons unconstitutionally vague or overbroad?
Disposition. Affirmed with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Officer Nelson had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the minor and his companions were about to engage in criminal acts, i.e., to join the fight.”
“The condition should be modified to require that the minor “Not knowingly possess any dangerous or deadly weapons . . . .””