California Court of Appeal Apr 29, 2025 No. E083498Unpublished
Filed 4/29/25 P. v. Jones CA4/2 See Concurring Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083498
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF083076)
KEVIN ANTHONY JONES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John. D. Molloy, Judge.
Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and
Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Kevin Anthony Jones appeals the trial court’s judgment
following its resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.75. He argues that the court
erred in failing to dismiss a sentencing enhancement under section 1385, subdivision
On October 23, 1998, defendant committed a bank robbery. On February 17,
1999, following a court trial, he was found guilty of robbery. (§ 211.) The court also
found true the allegations that defendant had 20 prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds.
(c) & (e) and 1170.12, subd. (e)), two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)),
and one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On April 23, 1999, the court sentenced
him to 25 years to life in state prison on count 1, plus a determinate term of 11 years for
the two prior serious felony enhancements and the prior prison enhancement.
On June 26, 2023, after defendant’s name was presumably provided to the trial
court as someone potentially eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, the court
held a full recall/resentencing hearing. The minute order indicates the court struck the
prison prior as invalid, pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a), and that sentenced
1 All further statutory references will be made to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. 2
was defendant to 25 years to life, plus a determinate term of 10 years. It then set a
hearing pursuant to Romero.2
Defendant filed a brief seeking to have the court resentence him by striking one or
both of his prior serious felony enhancements and/or 19 of his 20 prior strike convictions,
pursuant to sections 1172.75, subdivision (b), and 1385, subdivisions (a) and (c).3 The
People filed a brief arguing that section 1172.75 did not entitle defendant to litigate a
Romero motion, and that, in any event, the court should not dismiss any of his prior strike
convictions. The People further argued that the court should not exercise its discretion
under section 1385 to dismiss any of the enhancements.
The court held a hearing on March 5, 2024, and noted that it had read both sides’
moving papers. The court found that defendant was entitled to a full resentencing and
was entitled to “run an additional Romero motion.” However, it declined to exercise its
discretion to dismiss any of defendant’s prior strikes, in light of his extensive criminal
history. Defense counsel then asked the court to strike both of defendant’s prior serious
felony enhancements under section 1385. The People requested that the court only strike
one of them. The court exercised its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c),
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. We note the record on appeal does not appear to contain the reporter’s transcript from the resentencing hearing, so it is unclear exactly what the court said or did, or why it sentenced defendant and then set another apparent sentencing hearing.
3 The record on appeal does not appear to contain a sentencing brief by defendant. However, the record does indicate that he filed one.
3
stating, “I will strike one of the nickel priors, but not both of them. So the total aggregate
term will now be 25 years to life plus five years.”
DISCUSSION
Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2)(C) is Inapplicable
Defendant contends his sentence was unauthorized because the court was required
to dismiss his remaining prior serious felony enhancement. Specifically, he asserts that
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) required dismissal of the enhancement because his
sentence exceeded 20 years. The People argue that defendant forfeited his claim since he
failed to raise a specific objection at the resentencing hearing, and in any event, his claim
lacks merit. We agree with the People.
A. Defendant Forfeited His Claim
At the outset, we note that defendant forfeited his claim of sentencing error under
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) by failing to object below. (People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [“only those claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are
reviewable on appeal”].) Defendant concedes that he did not object to the sentence based
on section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), but contends an objection was not required
because his sentence was unauthorized under the statute. We disagree. (See post, § D.)
B. Standard of Review
Defendant’s claim involves a question of statutory interpretation, which this court
reviews de novo. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) “As in any case
involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the
4
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by
examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.”
(People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) “‘If the statutory language is
unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls.’” (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100,
1106.)
C. Relevant Law
“[S]ubsequent to the original sentencing, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to allow for the imposition of one-year
prior prison term enhancements only for specified sexually violent offenses.” (People v.
provides nine “mitigating circumstances” that “weigh greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement.” In these situations, the statute is not silent about a judge’s dismissal
discretion but encourages dismissal by giving the circumstance great weight.
One of these circumstances is: “The application of an enhancement could result in
a sentence of over 20 years.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).) That circumstance applies the
special dismissal standard to any enhancements in a case where the total imprisonment
results in a sentence exceeding 20 years (putting aside the few enhancements that the law
never allows to be dismissed). Here, for example, the total sentence is 30 years to life.
That means that the five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony would be subject to
the special standard. Its application resulted in a sentence over 20 years; that is, 30 years
to life.
The majority opinion, in contrast, holds that an enhancement “results” in a
sentence over 20 years only when it puts the sentence over the 20-year threshold. (Maj.
1
opn., ante, at pp. 6-7.) So the majority finds that the five-year enhancement is not subject
to the special standard because the sentence was 25 years to life without it.
The majority’s interpretation is disconsonant in the context of this statute. Here,
the Legislature obviously intended to heighten scrutiny of enhancements that make
sentences particularly long. It does not make sense that the Legislature would encourage
dismissal of enhancements that happen to increase sentences above 20 years but not
enhancements that make longer sentences even longer.
Twenty years is not a magic number, but the Legislature’s way of identifying a
long sentence. As is common with laws that draw a line at an age or length of time, the
Legislature picked a point above which a rule applies, though that 20-year level itself
does not have independent significance. The Legislature wanted to identify
enhancements to long sentences for scrutiny, so it drew a simple, clear line.
The majority’s standard is arbitrary beyond just line-drawing. Consider the
majority test’s effect on a trial court’s consideration of the five-year enhancement for a
prior serious felony. The special standard in section 1385, subdivision (c) would apply
when the sentence was sixteen to twenty years long without the enhancement. Then, the
five-year enhancement alone would push the total sentence over the 20-year threshold.
But the heightened standard would not apply when the sentence was 21 years or more
without the enhancement. Then, the five-year enhancement would result in an even
longer sentence but not be the threshold-crosser. There is no reasonable basis for this
rule.
2
The legislative history of the bill that created the nine mitigating circumstances
supports my reading of the statute, that the Legislature meant to apply the special
standard to long sentences, not enhancements that chance to cross the 20-year threshold.
The legislative report from the introduction of Senate Bill No. 81 cited a study that found
“[t]he incremental deterrent effect of increases in lengthy prison sentences is modest at
best.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
Mar. 16, 2021, p. 4. (Senate Report).). The report also cited the state’s Little Hoover
Commission criticism of the state “putting away offenders for increasingly longer periods
of time, with no evidence that lengthy incarceration, for many, brings any additional
public safety benefit.” (Ibid.)
Senate Bill No. 81 was meant to “codify” a recommendation from the Committee
on Reform of the Penal Code. (Senate Report, at pp. 4-5). That committee’s report
proposed the circumstance at issue here with language that shows it meant to apply to any
enhancement where the overall sentence exceeded 20 years. It recommended the higher
standard where “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case or the total sentence
is over 20 years.” (Com. On Revision of Penal Code, Annual Report and
Recommendations (Feb. 9, 2021) at p. 37 <https://perma.cc/TG5N-XNGL>.) It did not
signify that an enhancement that itself crossed the 20-year mark was significant. It
simply identified cases where the total sentence exceeded 20 years. Also, in accord with
what the Legislature would later state, the Committee described “broad consensus”
among academic studies that “long sentences have little or no public safety value.” (Id.
3
at p. 42.) The proposal was to have trial courts scrutinize enhancements to long
sentences, not only enhancements that happen to cause a sentence to surpass 20 years.
While I disagree with the majority’s restrictive interpretation of the word “results,”
I agree that there was no error here. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.) Defendant originally was
sentenced with two five-year serious felony enhancements. In the 2024 resentencing, the
trial court expressly referred to section 1385, subdivision (c), which it stated applied to
those enhancements. It stated that it was “mindful of the change in the law with respect
to 1385” and would strike one of the defendant’s two enhancements. It referred to
section 1385, subdivision (c) when it struck the enhancement. It stated that it would not
strike both enhancements. The record thereby indicates that the trial court properly
applied the law. The defendant’s argument here is not that the trial court failed to apply
the mitigating circumstance, but that, when that circumstance applies, dismissal is
mandatory under section 1385, subdivision (c). Defendant is wrong about that, as the
trial court instead must “‘engage[ ] in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the
enumerated mitigating factors.’” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036.) The
mitigating circumstance applied here, but nevertheless the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in striking one enhancement, but not both.
RAPHAEL J.
4
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not mandate the dismissal of a sentencing enhancement when the defendant's base sentence already exceeds 20 years, and that dismissal under this statute remains discretionary rather than mandatory.
Issues
Whether Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) requires the dismissal of a sentencing enhancement when the total sentence exceeds 20 years.
Whether the defendant forfeited his claim of sentencing error by failing to object at the resentencing hearing.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.”
“it cannot be said that the application of the enhancement “could result in a sentence of over 20 years” since defendant’s sentence already exceeded 20 years”
“dismissal of an enhancement is not mandatory, but rather discretionary.”