California Court of Appeal Sep 12, 2013 No. E054593Unpublished
Filed 9/12/13 P. v. Saxon CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E054593
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. PEF005081, RIF137090) CUTRENIA SAXON, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jeffrey Prevost, Judge.
Affirmed.
Daniel G. Koryn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Anthony Da
Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
In 2006 and 2007, defendant Cutrenia Saxon convinced five people to disclose
their Social Security numbers and other pertinent personal information to her by posing
as a loan broker who could help them refinance their homes or buy new homes. After
these transactions fell through or the potential buyers backed out of the transactions,
defendant continued with the loan process by submitting false loan applications and
obtained the loans. Forged deeds of trust on the properties were filed as collateral for the
loans. Defendant set up a corporation that she used to wire money from the loans.
During the time she obtained these proceeds, she did not file tax returns reporting this
income.
Defendant was found guilty of numerous counts of identity theft, grand theft by
false pretenses against several lending institutions, recording fraudulent trust deeds,
money laundering, and tax evasion.
Defendant contends on appeal as follows:
1. The trial court erred in denying her motion under Batson v. Kentucky
(1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) based on the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory
challenge to excuse a female African-American prospective juror and denying her
mistrial motions based on the prosecutor’s racially charged questions during voir dire in
front of the entire panel.
2
2. Her sentences for laundering of money under Penal Code section 186.10,
subdivision (a) 1 should have been stayed pursuant to section 654.
We affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Crimes Against Celena Salazar (Counts 1-5)
In 2005, Celena Salazar’s mother’s home was facing foreclosure. Salazar’s
cousin referred her to a friend, claiming he could help Salazar. Salazar gave the friend all
of her personal information. During this process, she spoke with defendant on the phone.
Nonetheless, Salazar’s mother’s home went into foreclosure.
Sometime in 2006, Salazar received calls from a bank for past due mortgage
payments for a property located at 23911 Via Alisol in Murrieta (Via Alisol). Salazar
never signed loan documents for the property. Her signature on the documents was
forged. Two trust deeds for security for the Via Alisol property were filed; one for
$576,800 and another for $144, 200.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 We will only briefly recite the facts of this voluminous case along with the procedural background, as the facts of the case are minimally relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
3
In the escrow instructions, DRE Home Improvement (DRE) was to be paid
$83,980 from the loan, purportedly for improvements to the home to be completed after
the purchase. DRE was wired that amount on September 21, 2006. DRE was owned by
defendant. The Via Alisol property was vacant after the sale.
Defendant admitted using Salazar’s name and identifying information but claimed
that it was a legitimate transaction. Defendant was arrested attempting to take $43,000
out of the DRE account.
For these actions, defendant was convicted of forgery (§ 470, subd. (b)) (count 1);
grand theft by false pretenses for the loan (§ 487, subd. (a)) (count 2) with the
enhancement that the value exceeded $150,000 (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)), i.e. a monetary
enhancement; two counts of recording a false document for the first and second trust
deeds on Via Alisol (§ 115) (counts 3 &4); and money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a))
for the wire transfer in the amount of $83,980 to DRE (count 5) with a monetary
enhancement (§ 186.10, subd. (c)(1)(A)).
B. Crimes Against Kevin Crockett (Counts 7-10)
During a search of defendant’s vehicle on June 2, 2007, officers found documents
regarding a $100,000 line of credit from National City Bank in Kevin Crockett’s name,
which was secured by a property located at 18713 Glass Mountain Street in Riverside
(Glass Mountain). Defendant had a checkbook and credit cards in her purse for the line
of credit.
4
On May 18, 2007, a $75,000 payout to DRE was made on this line of credit.
Crockett did not write the check. Information on the documents to obtain the loan was
false.
Defendant was Crockett’s cousin-in-law. Crockett had sought defendant’s help to
buy a property and had given her all of his information. The sale never occurred, and he
never gave permission for her to obtain a line of credit. He checked his credit when he
found out defendant was arrested and discovered the unauthorized loans.
Defendant was convicted of identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)) (count 7); forgery
(§ 470, subd. (b)) (count 8); grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) for the money taken from
National City (count 9) with monetary enhancement (§12022.6, subdivision (a)(1)); and
money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a)) (count 10) for the $75,000 check to DRE.
C. Crimes Against Candice Grizzell (Counts 11-17)
In the latter part of 2006, defendant offered to help Candice Grizzell and her
husband (who was defendant’s cousin) obtain a loan to purchase a residence in Moreno
Valley. The transaction was cancelled, but Grizzell had given all of her personal
information to defendant.
In 2007, Grizzell received notice from a bank for nonpayment of a loan for
property located on Cape Cod Court in Yucaipa. Loan documents found in a storage
facility belonging to defendant contained correct personal information for Grizzell, but
she had not signed them, and the monthly income and employer were incorrect. There
were two trust deeds filed on December 13, 2006, to secure the loan in the amounts of
5
$328,000 and $82,000. The escrow for the property showed that $70,228.77 was
transferred to DRE on December 18, 2006.
Defendant was convicted of forgery (§ 470, subd. (b)) (count 11); grand theft
(§ 487, subd. (a)) for the $328,000 trust deed (count 12) with a monetary enhancement
(§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(2)); two counts of recording a false document (§ 115) for the two
trust deeds (counts 13 & 15); grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) for the $82,000 trust deed
(count 14) with a monetary enhancement (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(1)); money laundering
(§ 186.10, subd. (a)) for the wire transfer of $70,228.77 to DRE (count 16) with a
Liu, J.).) However, the majority opinions in these cases continued to employ the standard
for evaluating Batson/Wheeler claims as set forth in this opinion, ante. (See People v.
Mai, supra, _____ Cal.4th _____ [2013 D.A.R. 11356, 11379].) These recent opinions
have no impact on the result here. We conclude that the trial court did not error by
finding that the race-neutral reasons given by the prosecutor were adequate and find no
Wheeler/Batson had occurred.
23
III
SECTION 654 AND MONEY LAUNDERING
Defendant contends that her convictions for money laundering in counts
5 (Salazar), 10 (Crockett), 16 (Grizzell), and 23 and 27 (Vargas) should have been stayed
pursuant to section 654. She argues that she had a single objective of stealing the
victims’ money. The money laundering occurred simultaneous with the unlawful receipt
of money. These convictions, as outlined, ante, were based on the wire transfers out of
escrow to DRE. As such, when the deeds of trust were filed, the money was transferred
to DRE.
At sentencing, the People argued that the money laundering convictions should
run consecutively, as they were “separate and apart” from the other parts of defendant’s
scheme. Defendant’s counsel argued that the money laundering was all part of one
transaction to obtain fraudulent loans and have the money wired to defendant. The
People then argued that section 186.10 expressly stated that section 654 should not apply.
The prosecutor referred to the fact that section 115 contained language that it was not
subject to the bar in section 654, and section 186.10, subdivision (b) contained the same
language. The trial court ruled, “Subdivision (b) sets forth the penalty in language that is
similar to that in 115. I’ll find that money laundering in violation of Penal Code section
186.10, specifically subdivision (b), is not subject to the provisions of Penal Code section
654.” Inexplicably, on appeal, neither party discusses subdivision (b) of section 186.10.
24
We conclude the trial court properly determined that the plain language of section
186.10, subdivision (b) excludes its provisions from being subject to section 654.
Section 654, subdivision (a), enacted in 1872, “bars multiple punishment not only
for a single criminal act but for a single indivisible course of conduct in which the
defendant had only one criminal intent or objective.” (People v. Moseley (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 1598, 1603.) “ . . . ‘If all of the crimes were merely incidental to, or were
the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, a defendant may be punished
only once. [Citation] If, however, a defendant had several independent criminal
objectives, he may be punished for each crime committed in pursuit of each objective,
even though the crimes shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible
course of conduct.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Conners (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 443, 458.)
Section 186.10, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part as follows: “Any person
who conducts or attempts to conduct a transaction or more than one transaction within a
seven-day period involving a monetary instrument or instruments of a total value
exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) . . . through one or more financial institutions
(1) with the specific intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of any criminal activity, or (2)
knowing that the monetary instrument represents the proceeds of, or is derived directly or
indirectly from the proceeds of, criminal activity, is guilty of the crime of money
laundering.” A transaction includes a deposit into or withdrawal from a financial
institution. (§ 186.9, subd. (c).)
25
“[A] Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (a) prosecution based on a
defendant’s conducting a transaction through a financial institution with a monetary
instrument of $5,000 or more based on the knowledge of criminal proceeds theory,
requires proof that (1) the defendant’s entire business was illegal, (2) there were deposits
of $5,000 or more in criminally derived funds, or (3) there was a transfer of all funds out
of the account.” (People v. Mays (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 13, 32.)
Section 186.10, subdivision (b) provides, “Notwithstanding any other law, for
purposes of this section, each individual transaction conducted in excess of five thousand
dollars ($5,000), each series of transactions conducted within a seven-day period that
total in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000), or each series of transactions conducted
within a 30-day period that total in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000),
shall constitute a separate, punishable offense.” (Italics added.)
In People v. Gangemi (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1790, the court, in addressing the
application of section 654 to violations of section 115, noted that a different rule applies
to offering false instruments for filing or recording. (Gangemi, at p. 1800.) It recognized
that the language of section 115, subdivision (d) provides that “‘[f]or purposes of
prosecution under this section, each act of procurement or of offering a false or forged
instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded shall be considered a separately punishable
offense.’” (Gangemi, at p. 1800.) It noted, “This language demonstrates an express
legislative intent to exclude section 115 from the penalty limitations of section 654.
Thus, the Legislature has unmistakably authorized the imposition of separate penalties for
26
each prohibited act even though they may be part of a continuous course of conduct and
have the same objective. [Citation.] . . . [E]ach false filing is separately punishable.”
(Ibid.)
Section 186.10, subdivision (b) contains even stronger language that it is not
subject to section 654. “It is assumed that the Legislature has in mind existing laws when
it passes a statute. [Citations.]” (Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837.) Here, in
enacting section 186.10, it is presumed that the Legislature was familiar with section 654.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that the Legislature has the power to
override section 654 in specific circumstances and that it need not necessarily cite section
654 specifically. (See People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 32-33.) Based on the plain
language of section 186.10, subdivision (b), defendant’s convictions pursuant to section
186.10, subdivision (a) were not subject to the prohibition of multiple punishment under
section 654.
Defendant relies exclusively on the holding of Conners as support for her position
that all of the money laundering convictions should have been stayed. In Conners, the
defendant was charged with money laundering and receiving stolen property for cashing
five checks that were written to him from a fund that was illegally obtained through a
fraudulent sale of property. (People v. Conners, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 450.) The
issue in that case was whether the defendant could be separately punished for receiving
stolen property based on the same act that was the subject of the money laundering. The
appellate court concluded there was clearly a single, indivisible course of conduct since
27
the receipt of the stolen money and the cashing of the five checks were part of the same
transaction. It noted that any sentence at his resentencing must reflect a stay of the
sentence for receiving stolen property. (Id. p. 458.)
We note that the Conners did not discuss the language in section 186.10,
subdivision (b). However, it noted that the receiving stolen property convictions must be
stayed, not the money laundering convictions. As such, it is not in conflict with our
decision here.
Even if we were to conclude that defendant’s convictions for violating section
186.10, subdivision (a) were subject to section 654, its provisions were not violated.
Defendant obtained the fraudulent loans and properties in the names of Salazar, Crockett,
Grizzell, and Vargas all on separate occasions. Moreover, defendant first obtained the
deeds of trust for these properties. In addition to obtaining the deeds of trust, she
siphoned off money to DRE from the loans for her personal use. It remained to be seen
what she was planning to do with the deeds of trust and the properties that she had
fraudulently obtained. She clearly had a separate objective in taking money from the
loans initially and could be separately punished.
Based on the foregoing, defendant was properly sentenced consecutively for her
convictions pursuant to section 186.10, subdivision (a).
28
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.
RICHLI J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
KING J.
29
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's Batson/Wheeler motion, as the prosecutor provided a race-neutral justification for the peremptory challenge based on the juror's demeanor and nonverbal behavior. The court also held that the defendant forfeited her claim regarding the denial of a mistrial by failing to support it with reasoned argument and legal authority.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's Batson/Wheeler motion regarding the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of an African-American prospective juror.
Whether the defendant forfeited her claim that the trial court erred in denying her mistrial motions based on the prosecutor's voir dire questioning.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We review a trial court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges “‘with great restraint.’””
“The justification need not support a challenge for cause, and even a “trivial” reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice.”